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THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY

OR PROLEGOMENA TO SCIENCE

BY
FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT, PH.D.

Knowing is the measure of the man. By how
much we know, so much we are.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON.

The man who knows not that he knows not aught —
He is a fool ; no light shall ever reach him.
Who knows he knows not and would fain be taught —
He is but simple ; take thou him and teach him.
But whoso, knowing, knows not that he knows —
He is asleep ; go thou to him and wake him.
The truly wise both knows and knows he knows —
Cleave thou to him and never more forsake him.

Arabian Proverb.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. 1

BOSTON
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY
1906

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Published October, 1906

Y 220 . A 1 . 1

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A.

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Abbot, Francis
Ellingwood, 1836-1903.

The syllogistic
philosophy or
1906.

TO THE MEMORY

OF

MY WIFE

IN WHOSE DIVINE BEAUTY OF CHARACTER, LIFE
AND SOUL

I FOUND THE GOD I SOUGHT

OCT. 18, 1839 : OCT. 23, 1893

"She made home happy, and was all the world to her own"

PREFACE

IN bequeathing to my fellow-men the best I have to give them in the results of a lifetime of patient and single-eyed search for the highest truth, which at last have been wrought into the form of a new system of philosophy grounded on the principle of absolute logic that *whatever is evolved as consequent must be involved as antecedent*, I hope they will not deem it a mark of obtrusive self-feeling if I leave on record here a true and simple statement of its origin, both as a thought-system and as a biographical fact. No one can be more conscious than I am of its manifest deficiencies of content and faults of form, and no one could regret these more than I do. Yet at the opening of the twentieth century I conceive it to be the supreme need of the human spirit to understand that the mechanical philosophy of mere evolution — the evolution without involution, which is the half-truth more dangerous than a lie — is but a step towards the organic philosophy of evolution through involution, as itself but a step towards the spiritual philosophy of the identity in difference of evolution and involution as the continuity of Being in the Absolute Ethical I.

This is the philosophy whose foundation is the absolute nature of the syllogism as necessary relational equation of the involved and the evolved in the world-process — that universal and eternal self-realization of Being through Knowing in Doing which determines the immanent and necessary relational constitution of the world itself to be that of the Absolute Ethical I. It is the grounding of this philosophy in the absolute nature of the syllogistic process,

as at once the Apriori of Being, the Apriori of Truth, and the Apriori of Right, and as itself the identity in difference of evolution and involution, which renders it a system of philosophical objectivism or scientific realism, in distinction from all systems of philosophical subjectivism, whether as subjective, critical, or absolute idealism, and which not only justifies but requires its name as the Syllogistic Philosophy.

Nothing short of this grounding of philosophy in absolute logic can possibly fit it to be itself the ground of absolute religion; and nothing short of absolute religion, as free and intelligent obedience to an absolute moral law, which, in Emerson's words, "lies at the centre of Nature and radiates to the circumference," can redeem the world from the imperialism, militarism, commercialism, and general reviving barbarism which are threatening to drown civilization itself at the beginning of this new century. It was the ambition of my youth to interpret in terms of thought and philosophically to justify the "blazing ubiquities" of the Declaration of Independence, and to hold up to the world a proud example of their truth, not only in the Constitution of my country, but in my country's free obedience to it and to them. But it is the sorrow and humiliation of my age to see my country herself trample both it and them under her feet, and retreat under treacherous leadership to betray a trusting ally, conquer a free people, crush a young republic founded on her own principles in the Philippine Islands, and reintroduce into her own body politic that poison of human slavery which she once heroically expelled. All that I can do to lighten the sense of my own unwilling complicity as a citizen in these national wrongs is to leave this work as my solemn protest against them, and to hope that reviving wisdom and virtue may yet lead my country to a better mind and better deeds.

To Sir William Hamilton I owe the great service of awakening my philosophical consciousness, — not, it is true, by way of agreement, but by way of polarization to opposite

opinion. In a three-page pencilled note, dated Sept. 20, 1859, at the end of his then just published "Lectures on Metaphysics," I recorded my dissent from his famous Law of the Conditioned, holding that space *is known* to be infinite because it *is* infinite, and cannot be otherwise. This is the principle of philosophical objectivism, namely, that in knowledge the object determines the subject, as opposed to the principle of philosophical subjectivism, namely, that in knowledge the subject determines the object. The three-page note became the germ of two articles in the *North American Review* for July and October, 1864, in the earlier of which the two important principles of the perceptive understanding and the objectivity of relations had already been deduced from the principle of philosophical objectivism in this more than hint: "Suffice it to say that, if we really *know* the objective relations of things, there must be some faculty of pure and immediate cognition of relations." But the logical development of philosophical objectivism could not and did not end here. The simple objectivity of relations necessarily led to the trichotomy of existence, as things, relations, and conditions; and this triple determination of the object, as existence in general, necessarily led to the further development of the doctrine of the perceptive understanding into the trichotomy of perception itself, as sensuous, intellectual, and rational. These two trichotomies, of which the entire Syllogistic Philosophy is the natural and necessary outgrowth, were reduced to writing in the last months of 1864, as the foundation of two tables of "Cosmical Categories" and "Mental Categories." But the further development of the nascent philosophy was checked and retarded for many years by untoward circumstances, in fact until 1879, since when it has been the supreme aim of all the energy and leisure I could command. If the desire of the late Prof. Francis Bowen, of Harvard University, to have me appointed as his assistant professor of philosophy in 1866 (a desire of which I knew nothing definitely at the time) could have

been gratified, this book would beyond a doubt have been ready for publication twenty or thirty years ago.* But it was not to be. Silent heterodoxy may be no bar to such appointments, but heterodoxy that talks or prints is fatal, or at least was fatal in the sixties.

The first chapter of this book was written in 1893, the last in 1903, and the rest between. That explains many defects and needless repetitions. In the Appendix are contained papers all written in the last three months of 1889 and scarcely changed at all. The Fundamental Philosophemes were then in their tenth draft, and had been drawn up as the ground-plan of five volumes, in order to unfold in accordance with the one undeviating method of evolution through involution the logical content of the Axiom of Philosophy, not as "I think, therefore I am," but rather as "Human knowledge exists." But I saw soon that it would be necessary to explain the absolute self-groundedness of this original position in a sixth introductory volume, and the explanation has grown into this present work. I must leave to other hands, if the syllogistic method of evolution through involution approves itself at last in philosophy to the consensus of the competent, the task of converting this rude path blazed through the wilderness into a beaten highway. The Fundamental Analyses, if carefully compared point by point with each other, exhibit the steady deepening of characteristics in the passage from machine to organism and from organism to person, and the inclusion of each lower type of reality in the next higher and of all in the highest. The Schemas present a

* In a letter dated 11 Quincy Street, Cambridge, Feb. 29, 1892, the late Prof. Andrew P. Peabody, D.D., wrote to me: "Professor Bowen was so much more of a conservative in theology than myself that any objections that I might have had would, I think, have been more than met in my mind by his endorsement of you. I have, however, this distinct remembrance. When Mr. Bowen and I conferred about your Ph.D. degree, he said, 'I wish I could have had Abbot as my assistant teacher.' He undoubtedly referred to the transaction of 1866-7, but I did not know the full meaning of it till your statement in your pamphlet explained it." (In that pamphlet the date was erroneously given from memory as 1866-7; as other letters prove, it was early in 1866.)

similar progress of thought in a wholly different aspect, as relation of individual to universal, of knowledge to life, and of human to Divine, in the world as one. The Categories of Being, Mind, Evolution, and Constitution require to be supplemented and to some extent corrected by the tables at the close of Chapter XVIII, in which the unity of method and form in Syllogistic Philosophy is very succinctly set forth in systematic completeness. The lack of elegance and polish in this system is something of which I am only too keenly conscious; yet when I stand back and look at the statue from a distance, I cannot help recognizing in it the majesty of truth. My earlier books on "Scientific Theism" (1885) and "The Way out of Agnosticism" (1890), as well as the weekly files of *The Index* from Jan. 1, 1870, to July 1, 1880, not one word of which do I retract, were only attempts to save something from the threatened shipwreck on a stormy sea; but in this book I bring my battered barque to port, after a fashion, with whatever cargo of value it may prove to hold. If at last it shall receive sober, just, and intelligent appreciation, I believe that it will be found to have done for philosophy what was done for botany in transition from the artificial Linnæan classification to the natural system of classification by total organic and genetic relationship—a revolution never to be reversed; and to give to ethical and free religion what it has never yet had, a basis in scientific reason. The days of philosophical subjectivism are numbered; and who can conceive a more solid or lasting foundation for objectivism than the principle of absolute logic, the identity in difference of evolution and involution in all Being, Knowing, and Doing, as identity in difference of Nature and Spirit in the Absolute I? Not until absolute logic is seen to be the necessary and only possible foundation of absolute religion and absolute morality, not until the childish and degrading fear of reason is thoroughly outgrown, can the world ever become civilized, — that is, thoroughly moralized. There is no civilization but moralization, and nothing can ever persuade the "heed-

less world" of this supreme and saving truth except the overmasteringness of absolute logic. May this book help the world, taught at last to be heedful and not heedless, to tread the path of the only possible salvation from its own follies and sins — the path of free self-moralization in the Absolute Ethical I.

FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT.

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October 13, 1903.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE manuscript of this book, finished in September, 1903, was revised by the author before his death on October 22, 1903. In accordance with his wish it is printed in detail as he left it, even to the punctuation, upon which he bestowed much care. The sections are numbered as in the manuscript, and it will be seen that sections 38 and 39 are absent; they were not written.

During the proof-reading all quotations and references have been carefully compared with the text of the works cited, with the exception of two which, being comparatively unimportant and not easily accessible, have not been verified.

Many causes, some avoidable, others not, have contributed to the three years' postponement of the publication of the book. In that time De Vries' theory of the origin of species by mutation has come into marked prominence. Since it is not mentioned in the book, and since it combats (how completely or successfully only the future can show) the so-called "fluctuation" theory of Darwin, which is referred to in many places, especially in Chapter VII, I am loth to let the book go forth without calling attention to the fact that, in the recognition of the existence and knowability of the individual difference and the reality and mutability of species, the two theories are philosophically in complete harmony. It is only in their biological aspects that they differ. De Vries himself says "My work claims to be in full accord with the principles laid down by Darwin."

I take this opportunity to thank cordially all those who by advice and in innumerable other ways have aided and encouraged me in the publication of this, my father's work.

THE EDITOR.

September, 1906.

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THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY

§ 1. PHILOSOPHY has always been held to be a search for Knowledge. On this point there has never been any difference of opinion. (Ancient philosophy sought for knowledge of Being ($\tau\acute{o} \delta\upsilon\tau\omega\varsigma \delta\upsilon\nu$). Modern philosophy seeks for knowledge of Thought (*Bewusstseyn überhaupt*). Reformed modern philosophy seeks for knowledge of Knowledge, as the indissoluble union of Being and Thought.)

§ 2. Conceived as purified from all the crudities of "common sense," — that is, from all the errors, prejudices, preconceptions, misjudgments, and false inferences which are due to an unreflective habit of mind, and from every distortion of truth which may be referred to "merely individual experience" or to the "personal equation," — the Knowledge of Knowledge becomes the Science of Science. As yet, however, science is scarcely conscious of existing otherwise than as a number of more or less loosely allied particular sciences. If it were to be developed in its ideal unity and universality, the Science of Science would become the Philosophy of Philosophy; and this, perhaps, is the highest expression for the self-consciousness of human reason. Certainly, philosophy is very much more than a mere succession of individual philosophical systems, uncritically expounded without bringing out their internal rational connection. It is very much more, also, than even a profoundly critical history of such systems; for nothing could be more shallow or more untrue than the strangely admired dictum that "the history of philosophy is philoso-

phy itself." Philosophy itself can be nothing short of a unitary and universal system of the Knowledge of Knowledge, containing within itself all principles of discovered truth, animated by an organic life-principle of its own, and capable of perpetual growth as a living whole. Whatever is known must be set by it in due relation and proportion to whatever else is known; whatever is learned must be promptly incorporated and assimilated by it as so much food for the natural systemic development of the whole. Mere criticism is not philosophy; nay, criticism unregulated by a system of philosophy is itself unphilosophical. The "professional" critic who assumes his office without first qualifying himself for its duties by conscientiously mastering a necessary system of necessary truths as the only just standard of measurement for philosophical values, plays the part of a buccaneer on the high seas, criticises from mere caprice, attacks better craft than his own with broadsides of blunders, and preys on the commerce of human reason under no other flag than the pirate's skull-and-cross-bones, — the empty skull of ignorance over the cross-bones of detraction and personal conceit. In fact, the criticism which presumes to philosophize without a philosophy is the most offensive form of "naïveté" and "common sense." The only criticism which deserves to be considered as in the least degree philosophical is such as is prompted and guided at every step by a philosophy already demonstrated to be true. Hence the mere history of philosophy, however critical, is never philosophy itself; this can never be other than the Philosophy of Philosophy, — an all-inclusive and perfectly rational system, absorbing whatever is true in all prior and partial systems, yet, so far from being arbitrarily eclectic, substantiating whatever truths it thus absorbs by a rigorous deduction of them from its own all-permeating principle, — in short, a philosophy which shall philosophize all philosophies.

§ 3. This conception of philosophy is the ideal aim of human reason itself. It is more or less clearly hinted at,

perhaps even partially expressed, in Aristotle's *νόησις νοήσεως*, Fichte's *Wissenschaft von einer Wissenschaft überhaupt* or *Wissen vom Wissen*, Hegel's *Begriff des Begriffes*, and so forth. But it means something very different here. From the simple fact that every philosophy which can receive critical consideration must appear (1) in the *history of human thought*, and, in order to appear in the history of human thought, must appear, also, (2) in the *form of literature*, it follows that every such philosophy must possess a literary or serial form; that is, it must begin with an initial affirmation, proceed by intermediate affirmations, and end with a final affirmation. This, from the nature of the case, must be just as true of the ideal Philosophy of Philosophy as it is true of all the philosophies it must philosophize. Hence, as a reasoned literary exposition of the Knowledge of Knowledge, the series of affirmations or philosophemes constituting the Philosophy of Philosophy must begin with a known or absolutely necessary and certain starting-point, proceed by a known or absolutely rational method, and end with a known or absolutely demonstrated result.

§ 4. But how is it possible for any philosophy to start with an affirmation, proposition, or judgment which shall reconcile and realize in itself the necessary requirements of being, at the same time, (1) absolutely necessary and certain, and yet (2) rationally first? In the combination of these conditions there lies an apparent contradiction.

Philosophy, as such, neglects all affirmations of pure feeling, imagination, memory, will, and so forth, and limits itself to rational affirmations alone. The former are all subjective, contingent, and individual, while the latter are all objective, necessary, and universal. Now every rational affirmation is a known or absolutely certain one; it must affirm knowledge, that is, either of an actual experience or of a valid reason; and the actual experience or the valid reason is the ultimate ground on which it unconditionally depends, as the necessary condition of its own rationality.

To affirm what is known is rational, but to affirm what is not known is irrational or at least non-rational; for the existence of this ultimate ground of knowledge is what makes an affirmation rational. This principle is well expressed by Descartes, when he says that "the light of nature dictates to us, never to make a judgment except about something which is known."¹ This ultimate ground, however, being necessarily implied and presupposed by every rational affirmation as the condition of its own rationality, may always be affirmed, and, being affirmed, rationally precedes the affirmation which it conditions. It would appear, therefore, that every known or unconditionally certain affirmation depends of necessity upon a prior ground of knowledge, either in experience or in reason; and this prior ground of knowledge, when affirmed, constitutes a rationally prior and really first affirmation. Hence it is an apparent contradiction to require that the starting-point of the Philosophy of Philosophy shall be at once absolutely certain, yet really and rationally first. The starting-point must be a truth, or else what follows from it cannot be true. Yet, says Schopenhauer, "every truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside of itself, and *intrinsic truth* is a contradiction in terms. . . . Truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside of itself, as its sufficient ground."² How, then, can the first judgment or starting-point of philosophy be a truth not dependent on some rationally prior truth? How can this seemingly insuperable difficulty be overcome, not by a

¹ Principia Philosophiae, I. 44: "Lumen naturae nobis dictat, nunquam nisi de re cognita esse judicandum."

² A. Schopenhauer, Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde, §§ 30, 33. So, also, J. G. Fichte, Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 424: "Der Grund fällt, zufolge des blossen Denkens eines Grundes, ausserhalb des begründeten; beides, das begründete und der Grund, werden, inwiefern sie dies sind, einander entgegengesetzt, an einander gehalten, und so das erstere aus dem letzteren erklärt." Again, Zweite Einleitung, Werke, I. 456: "Der Grund liegt allemal ausserhalb des begründeten, d. i. er ist demselben entgegengesetzt."

trick, but by a rational solution? How can the Philosophy of Philosophy find a known or absolutely certain starting-point, that is, an affirmation which shall be grounded on knowledge, yet to which the affirmation of its ground shall not be rationally prior?

§ 5. Whatever else, indeed, may be true of the starting-point or required initial affirmation of the Philosophy of Philosophy, these two conditions, it seems clear, must be fulfilled in it:—

I. The rationally first affirmation of philosophy, in order to be necessarily affirmed or absolutely certain, must be grounded on knowledge. But—

II. The affirmation of its ground must not be rationally prior to it.

These two conditions of the actuality of an affirmation which can serve as a rationally first or fundamental proposition in philosophy, however contradictory they may seem, must be found capable of a strictly rational reconciliation, and must be actually reconciled, if philosophy, as the system of universal reason, can actually begin. For, unless the first affirmation of philosophy is strong enough to bear the combined weight of all the affirmations that rest upon it, it needs no argument to show that they must all crumble together in one common ruin. How, then, shall the two conditions above mentioned be actually and rationally reconciled?

§ 6. The solution of this problem lies almost in the statement of it. It needs but to draw the necessary inference from the two conditions themselves, as follows:—

I. The rationally first affirmation of philosophy, in order to be absolutely certain, must be grounded on knowledge. But—

II. The affirmation of its ground must not be rationally prior to it. Therefore—

III. The affirmation of its ground must be rationally simultaneous with it, that is, must be contained in it. In

other words, the content and the ground must be identical, and the affirmation itself must be thus self-grounded.

If a rational affirmation can be found which shall affirm its own universal ground as its own particular content, and if both content and ground can be thus expressed in one and the same form of words as one indivisible judgment, then it is clear that a separate affirmation of the universal ground will be in no degree different from the original affirmation itself, — will be, not prior to it, but simultaneous and identical with it. The two separate affirmations of the universal ground will be really one and the same affirmation repeated; the two together will say no more than either will say alone; the original affirmation will be in itself the identity of content and ground, and thus constitute an absolute starting-point for philosophy. The content will be affirmation of the ground, and the ground will be affirmation of the content; neither will be rationally prior to the other, but both will be equally, simultaneously, and absolutely necessary or certain. Thus one and the same affirmation will be both absolutely necessary and certain and rationally first, because it is exclusively *self-grounded*, — grounded in itself on the affirmation of its ground, and rationally independent, therefore, of any prior or separate affirmation of that ground. What Schopenhauer denied to be possible will have been actually found, — an “intrinsic truth.”

Such a self-grounded affirmation, therefore, provided it can be found, will reconcile and realize in itself the two apparently contradictory conditions of a real starting-point for the Philosophy of Philosophy. Moreover, it will stand as the rational norm, type, or criterion of all philosophical beginnings; its identity of content and ground will become a universal principle of philosophical criticism by which to test and determine the validity or invalidity of these beginnings. Not the subjective principle of “self-evidence,” measuring the legitimacy of a starting-point in philosophy by the degree of clearness with which it appears to some

individual philosopher, but the objective principle of *identity of content and ground in the starting-point itself*, measuring the legitimacy of it by its internal rational necessity, will become the criterion of philosophical beginnings for all philosophers. Nothing, therefore, could be more important than the discovery of such a self-grounded affirmation, for philosophy can find nowhere else a beginning which will really begin. Philosophy cannot begin nowhere, nor everywhere, nor yet anywhere at random; it must begin somewhere in particular, and must abide rigorously by its own beginning. Hence the incalculable importance of beginning aright, since to begin amiss is to foreordain failure in the end.

§ 7. Now, every philosophy being necessarily constituted (so far, at least, as criticism can take cognizance of it) as a series of rational affirmations appearing under the form of literature in the history of human thought, the question as to a self-grounded affirmation is a question as to the universal ultimate ground of all rational affirmation itself. If this ground can be determined, and then made the content of a first affirmation, such an affirmation will exhibit that absolute identity of content and ground, that absolute indifference between separate affirmations of the two, which is necessary to make it a self-grounded affirmation, and therefore an absolute starting-point or real beginning for philosophy itself. From the very nature of the case, there can be but one such beginning. If all rational affirmations have but one ultimate and universal ground, it follows that the taking of this one ground for the one content of one affirmation will render this one affirmation the only possible self-grounded affirmation. It must be an absolutely unique judgment, in the sense that no other judgment could possibly fulfil the unique function of furnishing to philosophy a starting-point absolutely certain, yet rationally first. Every other judgment, from the very fact that it is another judgment, must have another content, — not the universal ground of all rational affirmation, but some other content;

yet that universal ground is rationally prior to all its consequents, and the affirmation of that ground is rationally prior to all its consequent affirmations. If, then, the universal ground is made the content of a particular affirmation, the affirmation thus self-grounded will constitute the only philosophical beginning which really begins.

§ 8. Since, then, what makes an affirmation rational is, as we have seen (§ 4), nothing but the existence of human knowledge as its ground or reason, — since, in other words, we cannot rationally affirm anything to be so or so, unless we actually know it to be as we affirm it, and since, as philosophers, *we affirm it simply because we know it*, — the form of the only possible self-grounded affirmation is determined by its nature to be the affirmation of human knowledge itself. Its form, then, will be essentially this: —

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE EXISTS.

Superficially considered, no proposition could be more flat or more uninteresting than this formless and colorless statement. Objection will at once be made: “Human knowledge exists, of course; but what of it? Surely, nothing follows philosophically from that!” On the contrary, everything philosophical follows from that. If nothing but actual human knowledge can be the ground of any rational affirmation, nothing but the affirmation of actual human knowledge can be self-grounded, that is, can affirm its ground in and with its content; and nothing but a self-grounded affirmation can be the ground of a rational philosophy or constitute its first and all-sustaining judgment. If this is true, — and how can it be disputed? — then the existence of human knowledge is the very first principle of philosophy itself. It covers all that is known by man; philosophy itself is simply its methodical development. It will reward us to study patiently the extraordinary characteristics of this altogether unique judgment.

§ 9. “Human knowledge exists.” This judgment presents itself under a variety of aspects.

I. Looked at as *content alone*, it is an empirical or experiential judgment, because the content is a pure matter of fact. Human knowledge exists now, but it did not always exist; it certainly did not exist before man himself existed, and man himself did not exist from all eternity. Hence the existence of human knowledge can be asserted, not at all as a necessary deduction from some principle which is rationally prior to it, but solely as a given fact, a pure datum of experience. Consequently, when philosophy begins with affirming the existence of human knowledge, it begins with an affirmation of pure experience, so far as its content alone is concerned.

II. Looked at as *ground alone*, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is a rational judgment; for the content (*i. e.* "the actual existence of human knowledge is a pure datum of experience") is affirmed because of the ground (*i. e.* "the actual existence of human knowledge is the condition, ground, or reason for affirming that human knowledge exists"). If the content and the ground were to be separately asserted, the original affirmation would be resolved into two identical assertions, the second depending upon the first: "Human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists" — that is, human knowledge *is affirmed* to exist *because it is known* to exist. Here the first assertion, though its content, as before, is purely empirical or experiential, is pure ground in relation to the second, while the second, though potentially pure ground to a possible identical third, is pure content in relation to the first. But the absolute identity of the two assertions is their rational simultaneity; it reveals and demonstrates the absolute identity of content and ground in the original affirmation; and the resolution of the latter into the two assertions is useful merely as showing the two fundamentally different aspects under which the original affirmation may be viewed. The two identical and rationally simultaneous assertions, in fact, say absolutely no more than the original affirmation says; for the latter contains the former as simply two

aspects of itself. Consequently, when philosophy begins with affirming the existence of human knowledge, it begins with an affirmation of pure reason, so far as the dependence of its content on its ground is alone concerned.

III. Looked at as *both content and ground in one*, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is both empirical and rational: empirical as this particular judgment, rational as the universal ground of all particular judgments. Such a self-grounded affirmation furnishes to the philosopher an unconditionally necessary and universal beginning, a "presuppositionless starting-point."

For the fact of human knowledge is not itself a necessary fact, but, to the philosopher, the affirmation of that fact is a necessary affirmation. As the necessary system of universal human reason, philosophy cannot possibly begin except with a rationally self-grounded affirmation. The only alternatives would be to begin (1) with an absolutely ungrounded affirmation, or (2) with an affirmation grounded in another affirmation, expressed or implied, which is prior to itself. On the one hand, to begin with an absolutely ungrounded affirmation would be to begin with a pure dogma, that is, an assertion without a reason; and dogmatism is not philosophy, which requires a valid reason for every assertion without exception. On the other hand, to begin professedly with an affirmation grounded in another affirmation, expressed or implied, which is prior to itself, would be to begin really with that prior affirmation; the prior affirmation would be the real beginning, and the professed beginning would be no beginning at all. If, whatever it may be, the first affirmation of philosophy has a philosophical ground in some prior affirmation, it is a false beginning, and philosophy must affirm that ground as its true beginning. But here again that ground must be a self-grounded affirmation; otherwise, the ground of that ground must be affirmed, and endless regress ensues, and philosophy becomes powerless to begin anywhere. In order to begin at all, therefore, philosophy must begin

with a self-grounded affirmation, — that is, with the only possible “presuppositionless starting-point.” But, as has been shown in §§ 7 and 8, no affirmation except “human knowledge exists” can be self-grounded. Therefore, in order to begin at all, — that is, in order to be, — philosophy must begin with the *necessary affirmation* of the *empirically known* existence of human knowledge.

Similarly, while the fact of human knowledge is not a strictly universal fact, since man himself is not a universal being, the affirmation of that fact, to the philosopher, is a universal affirmation; for it covers and includes (1) all human beings, and (2) all cognitions of each human being. As the necessary system of universal human reason, philosophy cannot possibly begin with a merely individual affirmation, such as, *cogito, ergo sum*. An individual affirmation is here to be understood as one which expresses a merely individual experience, — that is, has a merely individual content; unless its ground, then, is a merely individual ground, the identity of content and ground, which is the necessary condition of a real philosophical beginning, cannot obtain. But an affirmation which has only an individual content and an individual ground can possess no significance for philosophy, as the necessary system of universal human reason. For instance, “my knowledge exists,” or “I know,” is an individual affirmation, with an individual content and an individual ground; if both are separately expressed, it becomes, “my knowledge exists that my knowledge exists,” or, shortly, “I know that I know,” — but not “*human* knowledge exists that *my* knowledge exists,” except so far as “human” can be contracted and narrowed down to merely “my.” Here, in the “I know that I know,” we have, indeed, the required identity of content and ground, but no universality; and the lack of universality deprives the affirmation of all significance and value for philosophy, as the necessary system of universal human reason. A mere affirmation of individual knowledge without an absolutely universal ground

possesses not the flimsiest title to a philosophical position or rank, as part of such a system; in scope and significance, it has no more to do with philosophy than have such affirmations as "I feel hot," "I thrill with pleasure," "I conceive a mermaid," "I remember the battle," "I refuse to stir," or any other affirmation of purely subjective sensation, emotion, imagination, memory, will, and so forth. In all such cases, the original and common ground of affirmation is an implied prior affirmation that "I know : " "I know that I feel hot," "I know that I thrill with pleasure," "I know that I conceive a mermaid," "I know that I remember the battle," "I know that I refuse to stir." Here, it is true, universality obtains within the limited range of subjective thought or personal experience. But this inferior degree of universality is altogether insufficient to give to exclusively personal affirmation an entrance into the circle of philosophical propositions or ideas. No affirmation is philosophical unless it expands and elevates the relative and narrow universality which obtains in individual reason into the absolute universality which obtains in universal reason. Rational necessity is not for you or for me, but for all rational beings; philosophy is nothing if not absolutely universal. Suffice it now to point out that, in order to begin at all, — that is, in order to be, — philosophy must begin with the *universal affirmation* of the *individually known* existence of human knowledge.

§ 10. In the foregoing section it has been thus far shown: (1) that the primordial affirmation of philosophy, "human knowledge exists," looked at as content alone, is a purely empirical judgment; (2) that, looked at as ground alone, it is a purely rational judgment; and (3) that, looked at as both content and ground in one, it is both empirical and rational at once, as a self-grounded judgment. Further, it has been shown that this self-grounded judgment, being rooted equally in experience and in reason, is (1) empirically known, yet rationally or necessarily affirmed, and (2) individually known, yet rationally or universally

affirmed. It now remains to show that this unique and extraordinary judgment, with respect to its origin and its validity, is (1) subjective as to content, (2) objective as to ground, and (3) both subjective and objective *per se*.

I. Experience as such affirms what is actually so or so to the individual subject of knowledge here and now, while reason as such affirms what must be so or so to all individual subjects everywhere and always (*οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως εἶναι*). Hence a purely empirical judgment (*e. g.* "I hear music") is valid for the individual subject alone because it declares an incommunicable experience of that subject, and is itself, therefore, exclusively subjective; while a purely rational judgment (*e. g.* "all equal ratios are one and the same ratio, as $2 : 4 = 3 : 6 = \frac{1}{2}$ ") is valid for all individual subjects because it declares a necessary and universal relation inherent in the object affirmed, and is itself, therefore, exclusively objective. So far, consequently, as the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is a purely experiential content alone, it is exclusively subjective, because it simply declares the incommunicable experience or actual present thinking of the particular human subject that affirms it, and does not at all transcend that experience.

II. So far, however, as the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is a purely rational ground alone, it is exclusively objective, because it simply declares the unconditional dependence of human knowledge as content upon human knowledge as ground, and does not transcend that inherent, necessary, and universal relation of the two in the affirmation itself. That human knowledge is known to exist, as a fact, is a pure datum of experience; but that the *affirmation* of its existence, if it is to be affirmed at all, must be unconditionally grounded upon *actual knowledge* of that existence (the very affirmation itself being an actual case of human knowledge),—this is a pure necessity of universal reason. Hence the affirmation, as pure ground, does not depend in the least on the particular subject that happens to affirm it as pure content; on the contrary, it

simply constitutes the absolute rational or logical condition under which alone that affirmation can be made. In other words, if the existence of human knowledge can be affirmed at all, it can be affirmed solely on the ground or warrant of human knowledge itself. This necessary connection of content and ground, or of consequence and condition, so far from being dependent in any degree upon any particular affirming subject, though it is of course dependent on some affirming subject, is lodged immanently in the essential nature of the affirmation as a self-grounded affirmation; it is the absolute condition of the possibility of any self-grounded affirmation, originates in universal reason, and transcends all limitations of any particular subject. The affirmation as ground alone, therefore, is necessary, universal, and objectively valid for all possible human subjects.

III. The affirmation that "human knowledge exists," therefore, being subjective in its content and objective in its ground, is equally rooted in subjectivity and objectivity, is both subjective and objective *per se*; for it is itself the identity of content and ground in a self-grounded affirmation which originates both in the subjectivity of the subject and in the objectivity of the object, yet constitutes, as *uttered affirmation*, an object which transcends the individual subject altogether, and is objective to all possible human subjects. Utterance in some one of its myriad forms, — literature, speech, gesture, expression, symbolism in general, — is the only known medium of communication between different human subjects, and must be recognized in all philosophies; yet every form of it constitutes a veritable object of knowledge, distinct from and external to the sphere of pure subjectivity in any particular human consciousness. Hence the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," like every other utterance of human thought, must have its own essential and distinctive nature *per se*; it must be subjective *per se*, in that it originates in and outwardly expresses the particular experience of one human subject, but it must also be objective *per se*, in that it originates in, and is itself

an object to, the universal reason of all human subjects. This is a necessary consequence of what has preceded, and it leads necessarily to further consequences.

The subjective particularity of personal experience, and the objective universality of human reason interpenetrate inextricably, though distinguishably, in this first and fundamental principle of the Philosophy of Philosophy. Content and ground, experience and reason, actuality and necessity, individuality and universality, subjectivity and objectivity, are indissolubly united, yet absolutely without contradiction, in the momentous affirmation that "human knowledge exists." In this one, and only possible self-grounded affirmation, therefore, the Philosophy of Philosophy consciously effects what the History of Philosophy and the Criticism of Philosophy have thus far failed to exhibit: namely, an absolutely self-grounded beginning or starting-point, necessary, universal, and objectively valid for all philosophers.

Furthermore, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," involves two, and only two possible interpretations: (1) "My knowledge exists," and (2) "Our knowledge exists."

In the first place, the word "human," necessarily involves both the *one* and the *many*, both the *I* and the *We*. "My knowledge exists," is precisely equivalent to the shorter and more idiomatic, "I know," while "Our knowledge exists," is precisely equivalent to "We know." Thus, out of the seemingly barren generality of the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," there immediately starts forth the sharp and all-important issue between philosophical Individualism and philosophical Universalism, of which the "I know" and the "We know" may be taken as convenient typical formulas. In the necessary emergence of this issue lies the first rational development of the original principle or starting-point of philosophy. Its mere phraseology irresistibly suggests the necessary evolution of it as a living first principle.

But, in the second place, there exists a deeper reason for the same evolution. The content of the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," originates, as has been shown, in the particular experience of the individual subject, while the ground of it originates in the universal reason of the race. But the race itself, with whatever belongs to the race, is necessarily objective to the individual subject. Hence the issue between Individualism and Universalism not only itself emerges, but inevitably and immediately generates the still further issues between Subjectivism and Objectivism, Idealism and Realism. It is sufficient for the present merely to indicate the course of development which is necessitated by the essential nature of the principle with which we start, and to relegate these issues to subsequent chapters. It still remains to show here that the principle itself is (1) indubitable, (2) undeniable, and (3) undemonstrable from other grounds than itself.

§ 11. Doubt is only a sort of knowledge. It is nothing but the self-consciousness of ignorance, while yet self-consciousness itself is nothing but self-knowledge. Absolute or universal ignorance is simple unconsciousness; a stone, as such, is absolutely ignorant because it is absolutely unconscious. But relative ignorance, or doubt, is consciousness of the absence of some particular knowledge—want of that particular knowledge; a man may be absolutely ignorant of many things of which he is unconscious, but he can be relatively ignorant, or doubtful, only of what he wants to know. Doubt cannot exist where nothing has been affirmed; it is necessarily related to affirmation as a conscious reaction against it, or, more accurately, a conscious deadlock between affirmation and negation of the same thing. Hence, only a self-conscious or self-knowing being can possibly be in a state of doubt. But negation itself is only one form of affirmation. Relative ignorance, therefore, or doubt, as a conscious deadlock between two opposing affirmations or pair of contradict-

ories, is just as definite and positive a mental state as knowledge itself; and, being conscious of itself, it thereby knows itself. In other words, doubt is only a form of knowledge — knowledge of knowledge accompanied with knowledge of ignorance — knowledge of itself as ignorant which of two known contradictory affirmations it ought to accept; it is only a bewildered question, “Which of these two is true?” But nothing save knowledge of the two could possibly put that question. In short, doubt is a mere shadow, and knowledge is the substance which casts it.

For these reasons, it is impossible to make doubt the first principle of any rational philosophy. When Descartes, for instance, seemed to derive from absolute doubt (*de omnibus dubitandum*) his first and fundamental principle of knowledge (*cogito, ergo sum*), on the ground that his own doubt, as a mode of thought and his own first certain fact, was immediate and certain knowledge of himself as doubting and thinking, he seemed to make doubt itself the absolutely first principle of his system. Yet, since no one can doubt without doubting something which is known to be there as the object of doubt, doubt manifestly presupposes, as its condition or ground, knowledge of the existence of that which is doubted; and what Descartes doubted was the known mass of prejudices or prejudgments which he had formed before learning to think clearly and distinctly (*varia de rebus sensibilibus judicia — multa praejudicia*). Before his doubt began or could begin, therefore, he *knew* the existence of these prejudices, as a fact prior to his doubt; and his doubt itself was simply, “Are they true or false?” Thus, the Cartesian philosophy really founded itself, not on doubt, but on knowledge, as its first principle. That recognition of the existence of human knowledge, from the nature of the case, must precede all doubt, and that doubt itself has never been either a first principle or a first fact, can be just as easily shown with regard to every other system, even the most sceptical, that has ever appeared in the history of human thought. In truth, ab-

solute scepticism, as a rational system of universal doubt, is an absolutely impossible philosophy, because it would of necessity presuppose the *known existence* of something to doubt, — that is, some known pair of contradictory affirmations with one and the same essential content. But that would be to destroy itself as scepticism.

The only doubt, therefore, which can possibly be directed against the self-grounded affirmation that “human knowledge exists” must take the form of two contradictory affirmations: namely, “human knowledge exists,” and “human knowledge does not exist.” Absolute scepticism would be absolute indecision and uncertainty as to which of these two reciprocally exclusive judgments is true; and this doubt, unresolved, would be the infanticide of philosophy at its very birth. But the doubt of the existence of human knowledge inevitably resolves and annihilates itself. For it is itself conditioned on human knowledge (1) of the contradictory affirmations themselves, and, further, (2) of the necessary exclusion of one of the two by the other. If the contradictories themselves and the nature of contradiction in general were not known, the necessary exclusion of one by the other could not be known, and the doubt itself, which is generated solely by knowledge of this reciprocal exclusion, would instantly vanish. In other words, doubt of human knowledge is possible through human knowledge alone. Thus universal doubt of human knowledge absolutely extinguishes itself, either in complete unconsciousness and cessation of all thought, or else in complete certainty of the existence of human knowledge. Consequently, the affirmation that “human knowledge exists” is indubitable.

§ 12. No less certain is it that this affirmation is undeniable. But, supposing that it can be denied, the denial will read: “Human knowledge does not exist.” This denial must be either (1) grounded in a prior judgment, or (2) grounded in itself, or (3) ungrounded or dogmatic.

Now no prior judgment can be alleged as ground of the

denial, for it, like the judgment it denies, can have no prior condition or ground itself. The insertion of the word "not" adds nothing whatever either to content or to ground; these both remain unchanged. If the positive affirmation that "human knowledge exists" can have no ground in a prior affirmation (§ 9), neither can the negative affirmation that "human knowledge does not exist" have any such ground. A prior ground must be assigned to both or to neither; and, since it cannot be assigned to the positive affirmation, it cannot be assigned to the denial of that affirmation. But, even if a prior judgment could be assigned to the denial as its ground, it would be no ground at all, unless it were a known ground; yet, if it were a known ground, it could not possibly be a ground for the *denial* of the existence of knowledge, because it would be a ground for the *assertion* of it. The denial, therefore, is not grounded in a prior judgment.

But, if the denial is grounded in itself, its content and its ground must be identical. Expressing the two in separate affirmations, the denial will then read: "Human knowledge does not exist that human knowledge does not exist." If we omit to press the obvious criticism that this would no longer be a denial of human knowledge, but rather an indirect admission of it, it is clear that, if (as has been shown in §§ 4, 8, and 9) the existence of human knowledge is the ground of all rational affirmation, then, from the ground principle that human knowledge does not exist, nothing follows but the utter impossibility of rational affirmation as such, or, in other words, the utter irrationality, absurdity, or falsity of all affirmations whatever. But this conclusion overthrows the denial itself, as irrational, absurd, or false. Manifestly, therefore, the denial cannot be rationally grounded in itself.

If, however, despite this overthrow, it is still insisted that the denial is a rational affirmation, then it must have for its own ground the universal ground of all rational affirmation: namely, the existence of human knowledge.

Expressed in full, the denial will then read: "Human knowledge exists that human knowledge does not exist." But here the content is flat contradiction of the ground; and, if the *identity* of content and ground in a self-grounded affirmation is the strongest possible proof of rationality, certainty, and truth, then the *contradiction* of content and ground in one and the same affirmation is the strongest possible proof of irrationality, absurdity, and confusion. If, for instance, the sceptic affirms, "Knowledge does not exist," the critic inquires, "*Is it known* that knowledge does not exist?" Two replies alone, yes or no, are possible without evasion, and either is complete surrender of the sceptic's position. If he answers, "No, it is not even known that knowledge does not exist," the critic retorts, "Then your original denial, so understood, contradicts and destroys itself by denying its only rational ground." But, if the sceptic answers, "Yes, it is known that knowledge does not exist," then the critic retorts, "So understood, your original denial contradicts and destroys itself by denying its only actual content." In either case, since knowledge is the only ground of a rational judgment, the self-contradiction lies imbedded in the very heart of the denial itself, as internal negation either of its own ground or of its own content: either the content compels negation of the ground, or the ground compels negation of the content. Such a contradiction as this, so much more profound than when one judgment merely contradicts another judgment external to itself, can arise only when the content is itself denial of the ground; and this is possible only when the content is denial of the existence of human knowledge, — the universal ground of every rational judgment. Being self-contradictory in its very nature, therefore, the denial of the existence of human knowledge cannot be rationally grounded in itself.

If, then, this denial is neither grounded in another judgment nor yet in itself, it must be wholly ungrounded, or absolutely dogmatic. Dogmatism in philosophy can be

nothing but assertion without reason; and it was a misuse of the word, unfortunately perpetuated by his successors, when Kant applied it to the doctrine that "things in themselves" can be known, a doctrine for which, as will appear later (§ 86), very weighty reasons can be rendered. But an assertion without reason, in philosophy at least, is an assertion against reason; and scepticism, if it ever ventures on the denial of the existence of human knowledge in so many words, becomes its own antipode and figures as absolute dogmatism. To show, however, that a given judgment is without reason or against reason is the only rational way to discredit it. Hence, by proving that the denial of the existence of human knowledge can be rationally grounded neither in another judgment nor in itself, but, on the contrary, vanishes instantly in pure irrationality and absolute dogmatism, the conclusion is made rationally certain that the affirmation of the existence of human knowledge is undeniable.

§ 13. Lastly, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is undemonstrable from other grounds than itself. For the attempt to demonstrate it from other grounds than itself must take for granted that those other grounds are themselves already known. If they are not known, the demonstration, of course, does not demonstrate. But if they are known, then the demonstration assumes and uses in the proof the very fact which it professes to prove: namely, the existence of human knowledge itself. Hence the affirmation cannot be demonstrated from other grounds than itself without a manifest begging of the question; and a *petitio principii* is no demonstration at all.

But, while wholly undemonstrable from other grounds than itself, the affirmation has been proved to be self-grounded, that is, self-demonstrated, from the identity of its content and its ground. The ground is the reason, explanation, and demonstration of the content; and the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is self-demonstrated because the statement of its content is at the same

time statement of its ground. The reason why it cannot be demonstrated from without itself lies in the fact that it is already demonstrated from within itself; the identity of its content with its ground precludes the allegation of any other or different ground. This self-demonstration is far more than "self-evidence," although it includes self-evidence, too. Self-evidence is merely subjective certainty; it is certainty to some particular subject; it is incommunicable to other subjects; and, if denied, it can in no way substantiate itself by universal reason. But self-demonstration is objective necessity; it is necessity to all rational subjects; and, if denied, it substantiates itself by reducing the denial to absurdity, as in § 12. It is in this sense that the affirmation of the existence of human knowledge has been shown to be (1) undemonstrable from other grounds than itself, but (2) self-grounded or self-demonstrated, — in other words, necessary, universal, and objectively valid, as the absolute beginning or starting-point of the Philosophy of Philosophy.¹

§ 14. "But," it may now be urged in objection, "you make the absolute beginning of philosophy in a merely experiential recognition of fact as fact; you allege a merely given actuality of experience as ultimate ground of the rational affirmation with which philosophy must begin. Your identity of content and ground is an imperfect rationalization of this first affirmation. The 'human knowledge

¹ "Der Hauptgrund aller Irrungen dieser Gegner mag wohl der seyn, dass sie sich nicht recht deutlich gemacht, was *beweisen* heisse, und daher nicht bedacht, dass aller Demonstration etwas schlechthin Undemonstrirbares zu Grunde liege." (Fichte, Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 508.) If this were true, if all demonstration rested ultimately on the undemonstrable, it would follow that there is no such thing as demonstration; it would be just as reasonable to deny as to affirm the undemonstrable, since no reason, no ground, could be assigned against the denial. This self-stultification of all philosophy, however, is now shown to be as unnecessary as it is humiliating. The positive ascertainment of a *self-demonstrated starting point* is the emancipation of philosophy from all such humiliation, the condition of its existence, and the guarantee of its final success.

exists,' as experiential content alone, is indeed rationalized by the 'human knowledge exists,' as its rational ground; but the 'human knowledge exists,' *taken as rational ground*, has itself a merely experiential content, and therefore remains itself unrationalized. Now this mere actuality of experience in the ground itself must be rationalized, before it can make the first affirmation of philosophy completely rational. There is but one way to do this. Granting that the actual existence of human knowledge, *as a fact*, cannot be logically demonstrated from other grounds than itself without begging the question, it yet ought not to be affirmed or assumed or admitted as a philosophical principle, least of all as the first and fundamental principle of all philosophy, without being first demonstrated *as a possibility*. If philosophy must be rational knowledge, and if all rational knowledge is knowledge by reasons, how can philosophy admit even the existence of knowledge itself as a bare or unrationalized fact, — that is, without first establishing the ultimate reasons or conditions which make it, as a fact, possible? Surely, the question, 'How is knowledge possible?' must be answered. Philosophy must prove knowledge to be at least a possibility, before it can begin with knowledge as a fact."¹

¹ "Nun ist die Thatsache der Erkenntniss unter der dogmatischen Voraussetzung sowohl des Empirismus als des Rationalismus weder erklärt noch zu erklären. Daher ist die nothwendige Folge, dass ihre Möglichkeit verneint wird. Dies geschieht durch Hume's Skepticismus, in welchem die entgegengesetzten Richtungen convergiren und ihren Lauf vollenden. Die Philosophie steht an einem neuen, entscheidenden Wendepunkt, sie darf die Möglichkeit der Erkenntniss nicht voraussetzen, sondern muss dieselbe an *erster* Stelle untersuchen und begründen. Die Natur der Dinge ist bedingt durch ihre Erkennbarkeit. Das Erkenntnissproblem ist das erste aller Probleme. Hume hat den dogmatischen Schlummer der Philosophie gestört; der erste, den er geweckt hat, war *Kant*, der Begründer der kritischen Epoche (1781), die den Entwicklungsgang der neuen Philosophie in die dogmatische und kritische Periode scheidet und die Philosophie unseres Jahrhunderts beherrscht." (Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, I. 144.) But it is quite inaccurate to represent Hume's scepticism as "denying the possibility of knowledge."

§ 15. This objection certainly wears a plausible look, although the plausibility disappears on close and keen inspection. The answer to it falls into two parts.

In the first place, we must admit that the demand for a complete rationalization of the "human knowledge exists," in order to fit it for its function as starting-point, is a perfectly just demand. No affirmation which is not itself completely rational can be the first or fundamental affirmation of a rational philosophy. Likewise, we must admit that there is but one way to rationalize the "human knowledge exists." But this one way is not the way indicated. No inquiry into the "possibility" of human knowledge would have even a remote tendency to establish its actuality, much less to rationalize it; for mere possibility, however thoroughly determined as to its conditions and grounds, will neither establish nor rationalize the actuality of anything. The actual existence of a thing proves its possibility, but its mere possibility does not prove its actual existence; as was well expressed in the old logical maxim, *Ab esse ad posse valet, a posse ad esse non valet consequentia*. Moreover, the question of possibility cannot be raised at all as to any present fact—it is a question of the future alone; yet the existence of human knowledge, *presupposed by the very question itself if it is a known question*, is strictly a fact of the present. Knowledge certainly *may be*, if it *is*; there can be no question of its possibility, if it is a present fact of experience, and, if it is not this, the question itself cannot be asked rationally. In truth, the question propounded is absolutely irrational, and no answer to it would rationalize anything. The only way to rationalize the "human knowledge exists," when looked at as ground alone, is to apply to it once more precisely the

Hume was not so wanting in acuteness as to deny that, and thus involve himself in the contradiction explained above in § 12. His very scepticism was founded on recognition of the "fact of knowledge," for it would have been absurd to reduce all knowledge to *impressions and ideas*, if these were not *known to exist*.

same principle which was applied to the original affirmation as a whole. That is, it must be distinguished within itself as both content and ground, identical as before; and the ground of the ground, if separately expressed, will be a prior "human knowledge exists." The same will be true of the ground of the ground of the ground, and so on forever. Thus, by continually expressing the antecedent ground of each ground, an endless regress arises: "Human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists," and so on forever. But this endless regress differs from every other in the fact that all the terms in the endless series of affirmations are absolutely identical. Consequently, each one of the seriated affirmations contains in itself the whole meaning of the endless regress; each one affirms absolutely all that they all affirm together; the apparently successive terms of the series, being in truth absolutely simultaneous, are all simultaneously affirmed in the one original affirmation that "human knowledge exists;" and the identity of content and ground in this is identity of its one content with the totality of the endless regress or series of grounds. Here, then, in the original affirmation that "human knowledge exists," we have simply one experiential content and one rational ground which are identical with each other, simultaneously affirmed in one judgment, and completely rationalized by the limitless depth of a reason which can be explicated only by a limitless series of reasons, yet which cannot possibly transcend the content of the judgment itself.

§ 16. In the second place, we must deny that the question which the objection emphasizes and makes necessarily preliminary to the admission of human knowledge as a fact of existence — the question, namely, "How is knowledge possible?" — is even an intelligible question. The "possible" is that which may be, but is not yet; it is the non-actual which may yet become actual. Hence the question, "How is knowledge possible?" if it has any

meaning at all, must mean, "How is knowledge a non-actual which may yet become actual?" But this question is the acme of irrationality. Assuming as it does that knowledge is a non-actual, a pure potentiality, a pure non-existent, it is at bottom denial or doubt of the very existence of human knowledge. It proposes to investigate, on the hypothesis that knowledge does not exist — as if investigation itself were not an assumption of its existence! But the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" has been already proved to be indubitable (§ 11), and undeniable (§ 12), and self-demonstrated (§ 13). Consequently, the question, "How is knowledge possible?" at least as a question which must be solved prior to the admission of knowledge as an actually existing fact, is in no sense and in no degree a reasonable question. What, indeed, could be more unreasonable than to try to prove or explain what is not known to exist? Knowledge of the existence of a thing must in the order of reason precede, not follow, any and every attempt to prove it or explain it or account for it. Even if its existence is purely imaginary or hypothetical, its actual existence in imagination or in hypothesis must be certainly known and understood, before it can be critically investigated. The irrational question, therefore, which the objection requires to be answered before the existence of human knowledge can be allowed or affirmed, is not even entitled to a respectful consideration. The question itself presupposes the already known existence of human knowledge, for it must at least be known to be a question, and not an affirmation or a command. A great deal of acute thinking has been wasted in trying to answer preliminarily this impossible question as to the "possibility of knowledge," the "possibility of experience," and so forth; the destructive inversion of the order of reason which is involved in these futile inquiries has diverted many otherwise admirable intellects from the sober and scientific study of real human knowledge to the ghost-world of unrealities, potentialities, and profitless apriorisms.

“Ter conatus ibi collo dare brachia circum,
 Ter frustra comprehensa manus effugit imago,
 Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.”

§ 17. What may justly be demanded here, however, is an answer to a very different question: namely, not “How is knowledge possible?” but “How is knowledge necessary?” The possible is that which may be, but is not yet; the actual is that which may be, and is already; the necessary is that which may be, and is already, and must be everywhere and always. To determine the “conditions of the *possibility*” of human knowledge, as prior to its actuality, is a problem raised by unreason alone, for it is the imbecile question, “How is possibility possible?” But to determine the *conditions of human knowledge itself, by investigating the grounds of its necessity in the mode of its actuality*, — this is a problem of reason, and the solution of it is philosophy. A problem correctly stated is already half solved; and the problem of human knowledge is one, not of possibility at all, but of actuality in necessity and of necessity in actuality. Consequently, the *a priori* method of investigating this problem is based on a misstatement of it; experience is actuality, reason is necessity, and there is no way to investigate either except by the *a posteriori* method of distinguishing the two elements of human knowledge without separating them, and determining their laws as they stand self-manifested in the historico-literary form of seriated affirmation. The absolute condition of such an *a posteriori* investigation is the known existence of human knowledge, as an actual yet self-grounded fact; and it can find a starting-point nowhere but in the primordial affirmation that “human knowledge exists.”¹

¹ “In diese drei Fragen zerlegt sich daher das Grundproblem der kritischen Philosophie: 1. was ist Erkenntniss? 2. ist die Erkenntniss factisch? 3. wie ist dieses Factum möglich? Die Fragen sind so geordnet, dass nur, wenn die vorhergehende gelöst ist, die folgende gestellt werden darf.” (K. Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, III. 291.)

To repeat what was said in § 3, every philosophy which can be critically considered must appear (1) in the history of human thought and (2) under the form of literature. These simple and indisputable requirements, however, necessarily determine its historical form to be that of a written concatenated series of essential or constitutive affirmations, a written body of philosophemes rationally linked together in one seriated and systematic whole. It must have, therefore, a first and fundamental affirmation, —first in the order of reason, at least, if not in that of exposition, and first in both orders at once, if it effects an unexceptionable beginning both as philosophy and as literature. Further, in order really and rationally to begin, this first and fundamental affirmation, as is plain from §§ 6 and 7, must exhibit absolute identity of content and ground, which, again, can be exhibited only in the affirmation that “human knowledge exists;” and this affirmation, therefore, either expressed or implied, either confessed or unconfessed, is the actual beginning of every philosophy known to history. So far, indeed, as any given philosophy fails to meet these several requirements, just so far it will be justly criticised as failing to be genuinely or completely philosophical; but none the less must it appear historically as a series of successive affirmations which, as a system, more or less adequately declare the rational principles of human knowledge. This necessarily historico-literary form of human knowledge, which is common to all the particular sciences as well as to philosophy or universal science, is what we mean here by its *mode of actuality*, and it is only in this historico-literary form, only in this mode of actuality, that the true grounds of necessity which are inherent in human knowledge as such can be rationally investigated. Hence the question, “How is knowledge necessary?” is not preliminary, but subsequent, to the admission of human knowledge itself as *actually existing in the historico-literary form of seriated affirmation*.

§ 18. In order, then, to investigate those grounds of necessity in human knowledge which lie latent or immanent in its mode of actuality, — that is, in its historico-literary form of seriated affirmation, — let us begin with a restatement of some of our results and place them in a fresh light.

The affirmation that “human knowledge exists,” as content, does not differ in *meaning* from the affirmation that “human knowledge exists,” as ground; the single affirmation that “human knowledge exists,” has precisely as much meaning or content and precisely as much ground as the double affirmation that “human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists.” Thus the single affirmation, taken as a first principle inclusive of all its own grounds and pregnant with all its own rational consequences is a self-grounded affirmation, which, as such, constitutes for philosophy an absolute starting-point.

But it should be noticed that the identity of content and ground thus exhibited is not *identity without essential difference*, but *identity in essential difference*, since two cannot be one unless they are two as well as one. For instance, $A = A$ is identity without essential difference; but $A = B \times C$ is identity in essential difference. Such, likewise, is the identity of color and form in every object of vision, the identity of resistance and form in every object of touch, the identity of pitch, intensity, and *timbre* in every object of hearing. Such, likewise, is the identity of subject and object in all self-consciousness, the identity of Space and Time in every event of history, the identity of content and ground in the one self-grounded affirmation. This identity of content and ground does not mean their indifference, but rather their absolute interpenetration in an actual cognition, a particular judgment, just as color and form interpenetrate in an actual object of vision. The color is wherever the form is, and *vice versa*; extinction of one would be extinction of the other; suppression of either would be the destruction of both, as a visual object. Such identity as this interpenetration in space, time, and

essence is profounder than even "indissoluble union," which might be merely indissoluble juxtaposition without interpenetration. To mark this profoundest interconnection, the word "identity" will serve, if protected from meaning *indifference* or *absolute sameness*, by bearing in mind that the two elements are not only identical, but also different and distinguishable. For instance, when Kant teaches that "intuitions without concepts are blind, and concepts without intuitions are empty," he declares their indissoluble union, but not their absolute interpenetration; for he derives them from experience and reason respectively as separate products of separate actions, and not as one inseparable product of one inseparable action (§ 24) — as if color could be known by sense without form being known by understanding, in one indivisible act of sense-perception. Color and form are inseparable in the object as mere phaenomenon; therefore, sense and understanding are inseparable in the perception of it as mere phaenomenon. Content and ground are equally inseparable, equally identical in difference, in the self-grounded judgment. Content as content is not ground as ground; it is only when ground is taken for content, also, in a particular judgment which is its own ground, that identity of content and ground, as identity in difference, can possibly arise.

Inasmuch, further, as rational affirmations, in order not to be one and the same affirmation, must have different contents, yet, in order to be rational, must all have one and the same ground in existent human knowledge, it is clear that there can be only one self-grounded affirmation, — that in which the existence of human knowledge, as this one universal ground, is taken as particular content, also. This affirmation alone will exhibit that identity in difference between content and ground which is necessary in order to render the affirmation itself self-grounded, self-demonstrated, and therefore both *first* and *certain*, as a philosophical starting-point.

But, as appeared in § 15, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," even when taken as ground alone, must be itself resolvable into content and ground, and this ground again into content and ground, and so on indefinitely. Thus an endless regress arises, which may be exhibited to the eye as follows:—

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Human knowledge} \\ \text{exists} = \end{array} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Content} \\ \parallel \\ \text{Ground} \end{array} \right. = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Content} \\ \parallel \\ \text{Ground} \end{array} \right. = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Content} \\ \parallel \\ \text{Ground} \end{array} \right. = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Content} \\ \parallel \\ \text{Ground} \end{array} \right. = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Content} \\ \parallel \\ \text{Ground, etc.} \end{array} \right.$$

But, in this extraordinary regress, all the contents are absolutely one without difference, and all the grounds, likewise, are absolutely one without difference; while the regress itself, from the equation in each term of content and ground as identity in difference, is the absolute equation of all the terms as identity without difference. That is, the whole endless regress is absolutely contained in each of its own terms, and so is itself abolished; for such a series as $5 = 5 = 5 = 5 = 5$ is no real series at all, but is absolutely equivalent to 5 alone.

§ 19. At this point, however, a formidable objection may be interposed: "You offer us, then, as the first principle and only possible starting-point of philosophy, an absolutely self-grounded affirmation. But, if self-grounded, it must be self-existent. Whatever has no ground outside of itself must derive its existence from itself alone; it must exist solely from some inner causal necessity of its own being or nature. In proving, therefore, that your affirmation is self-grounded, you cut it off from all dependence on any cause but itself; you prove it to be an absolute *causa sui*, a self-existent being; and, since this, if maintained of a mere judgment or proposition, is undeniably absurd, you overshoot the mark, prove too much, and leave philosophy, at last, without any rational beginning at all."

This objection, strong as it may seem, has the weakness

of confounding the distinction of ground and cause. The ground is a reason of knowing (*principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*, which Schopenhauer interprets as, "No one can admit anything to be true without knowing why," — this *why* being the ground). The cause, however, is a reason of becoming (*principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*, which Schopenhauer would interpret as, "No change can take place without a determinant in an entire state of antecedent conditions or factors," — this *determinant* being the cause). The law of rationality (ground and result, or reason and consequent) is by no means the law of causality (cause and effect); yet the above objection rests wholly on a confused identification of the two. It must be admitted, however, that an inquiry as to ground leads at last to cause, as will appear below, and that both laws are necessarily involved in the present instance.

The affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is self-grounded, but not self-caused. Every rational affirmation or judgment, as such, has a cause as well as a ground, because it is essentially an act of knowledge. As an "act of knowledge," it must have a rational ground, or reason why it is *known*; as an "act of knowledge," it must have a practical ground, a purpose or reason why it is *done*; but, as an "act of knowledge," it must also have an efficient cause, or *knowing agent*, from which it proceeds. So far as its meaning alone is concerned, it is a manifestation of intelligence; but, so far as its production or pronouncement alone is concerned, it is a manifestation of energy. Apart from its character as an act, every rational affirmation is a cognition, a judgment, a linking of subject and predicate; it must, therefore, have a rational ground, and involve the law of rationality. But, apart from its character as some special purport, every affirmation, whether rational or irrational, is an event, a change of state, an effect; it must, therefore, have a cause, and involve the law of causality.

Considered, therefore, as *at once* a cognition and an effect, every rational affirmation must have its ground and

its cause *in one*, distinguishable but inseparable. This ground-cause, then, can be nothing but a knowing energy, an active intelligence, whence the affirmation, as both cognition and effect, proceeds. In other words, the ground-cause or cause-ground of every rational affirmation can only be a *rational affirmer affirming for a reason*; for example, a philosopher philosophizing. But no affirmation as such can be its own cause. It may be its own ground, provided the content is identical with the reason why it is known, but it cannot be its own cause, because it is not itself a knowing energy or active intelligence. Consequently, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," although (as already explained) self-grounded, is not self-caused. So far, therefore, as the objection infers self-causation or self-existence from simple self-groundedness or self-explanation, it has no critical force whatever. Nevertheless, it serves a useful purpose in developing the necessity of distinguishing the cause and the ground of the affirmation in question.

§ 20. But the subject is not yet exhausted. A strictly rational regress of grounds as such leads to the same conclusion as to cause, strengthening, deepening, and enlarging it, — not, of course, the regress of grounds already considered in §§ 15 and 18, which explains the *content as content alone*, and abolishes itself, but rather the regress which is to explain that *identity of content and ground* which constitutes the self-groundedness of the affirmation as a whole.

As sufficiently explained in what has preceded, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," taken as content alone, has its *ratio cognoscendi* in the same affirmation that "human knowledge exists," taken as ground alone; and this identity of content and ground makes the affirmation self-grounded. But what is the ground of this identity itself, and why must it be affirmed? If, as is said above, the cause of every rational affirmation is a rational affirmer affirming for a reason, what is his reason for making this particular affirmation, and why is it a necessary reason?

The reason why the affirmation is known to be true, *when once made*, is the fact that the affirmation of its content is identical with the affirmation of its ground or *ratio cognoscendi*; but what is the necessary reason why it must be *made at all*?

Now the rational necessity for making it, as an actual affirmation, must lie in the deeply hidden ground of the strange and paradoxical identity it exhibits. What is this necessity? Even as identity in difference, how can a purely experiential content be identical with a purely rational ground? Clearly, it cannot, — clearly, there can be no self-grounded affirmation at all, — if experience and reason cannot be identical themselves. But, if experience and reason *can* be identical themselves, they *must* be identical in a self-grounded affirmation, provided such an affirmation can be produced. The identity of a purely experiential content and a purely rational ground, therefore, in an actually producible affirmation, will be the *necessary consequence*, in that particular case, of a *necessary and universal condition*: namely, the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge itself.

Now the affirmation that “human knowledge exists” is a self-grounded affirmation, and does actually exhibit the identity of an experiential content and a rational ground. This has been proved above, in §§ 9 and 10, beyond all reasonable denial or doubt. The mere fact, then, that a self-grounded affirmation in which this identity demonstrably exists, and which stands, therefore, as a proved concrete case of it, can be and has been actually produced, itself demonstrates the still deeper identity of experience and reason in human knowledge as such. For, as has just been shown, the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge itself is the *necessary condition* of the identity of experiential content and rational ground in the affirmation of human knowledge: or, conversely stated, the identity of content and ground in the affirmation of human knowledge is the *necessary consequence or result* of the identity of experience

and reason in human knowledge itself. But, as Kant pointed out, if a conditioned is given, the totality of its conditions is given in and with it. Since, then, the identity of content and ground in the affirmation is given as an *actual conditioned*, the actual identity of experience and reason in human knowledge is given in and with it, as its *immanent necessary condition*: the actuality of the conditioned demonstrates both the actuality of the condition and its necessity as a condition. Hence the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is not only actual identity of its own content and ground, but also both *actual* and *relatively necessary* identity of experience and reason in the human knowledge whose existence it affirms. Here, then, we have discovered that deeper ground of the "human knowledge exists,"—that rational necessity of human knowledge immanent in its mode of actuality,—of which we were in quest (§ 17). Still, however, we have not yet reached a necessary ground or reason why this particular affirmation must be itself made. To find it, we must look deeper still.

§ 21. Evidently, the identity in difference of experience and reason in human knowledge must be itself explained. As already stated in § 9, the existence of human knowledge is not a necessary fact *per se*; it did not always exist; how, then, can it be at all necessary to affirm its existence? Nay, how can its "existence," in any intelligible sense be affirmed at all? Knowledge itself is neither a person nor a thing; it neither experiences nor reasons; how, then, can it exist as the identity in difference of experience and reason? Is not this a pure paradox? These questions are perfectly fair, and the objections they express must be as fairly met. To find answers to them which shall be neither evasive nor vague, let us pursue a little farther the path of the rigorous regress of grounds or conditions.

The identity of experience and reason in human knowledge, although it is the necessary condition and *ratio sufficiens cognoscendi* of the identity of content and ground in the

affirmation that "human knowledge exists," must have itself a necessary condition, a *ratio sufficiens cognoscendi*. Taken by itself alone, it is clearly not an ultimate condition or ground, for in itself it is not an explanation, but a paradox. In truth, this identity of experience and reason in human knowledge, at which we have arrived as a necessary result, must be candidly admitted to be a direct contradiction of the fashionable metaphysic; for, if true, it subverts and sweeps away that doctrine of the necessary separation of sense and intellect, of experience and reason, which lies at the very foundation of the whole idealistic philosophy, — notably as illustrated in the "pure reason" and "pure *a priori* knowledge" of Kant, and the "pure thought," "absolute idealism," or "panlogism" of Hegel. All these are merely different names for *reason divorced from experience*. The "pure," in these and kindred phrases, means "purified from all experience;" it has no other meaning. Hence the denial of any possible or conceivable separation of experience and reason, which is of course implied in the doctrine of their necessary inseparability or identity in difference, as the essential nature of human knowledge itself, marks the profound character of the change which reformed modern philosophy, aiming at that Philosophy of Philosophy which is more than the history or any possible criticism of it, finds it necessary to make in its treatment of the philosophical problem. In opposition to the traditional idealistic way of seeking the necessity, universality, and objective validity of reason through a rigorous exclusion of all empirical elements (an exclusion never yet accomplished, as Trendelenburg, Prantl, and others, have so ably and conclusively proved in the case of Hegel), reformed modern philosophy seeks the same object by the realistic way of recognizing the necessary inseparability (that is, the identity in difference) of experience and reason in all human knowledge whatever, and thereby finding room for all the facts, instead of crushing half the facts out of sight. How it arrives at this identity of experience

and reason has now been shown; but, if it stops there, it falls short of explanation, and ends in a paradox. Hence the deep-lying ground of this very identity must now be sought, as the only possible explanation and the only convincing proof of the scientific soundness of the realistic way of philosophizing.

§ 22. The proof that experience and reason *are* identical in human knowledge was drawn above, in § 20, from the simple actuality of a self-grounded affirmation, which merely exemplified it in one proved and concrete case. This, however, was a proof of the mere fact or actuality of the identity in a particular instance, not of its inherent rational necessity. Hence this proof had to be supplemented by another, showing that experience and reason *must be* identical in human knowledge, because that identity is related to the identity of content and ground in the self-grounded affirmation as necessary condition to necessary consequence. But this necessity, again, is not an absolute or inherent rational necessity, but only a relative necessity with reference to a consequence different from and external to itself; that is, the condition (identity of experience and reason in human knowledge as such) and the consequence (identity of experiential content and rational ground in the self-grounded affirmation), being a pair necessarily related to each other by their rational connection as condition and consequence, are *only as a pair* that necessary rational condition which had to be discovered, in order to convert the self-grounded affirmation itself from the mere actuality which it apparently was into the rational necessity which it really is and is now seen to be. So far, now, the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge is certainly shown to be necessary *per aliud* — necessary itself through the necessary consequence to which it stands related as the necessary condition. But it is not yet shown to be inherently necessary *per se*, as being itself the necessary consequence of another ground lying more deeply still as its own condition: it must remain a mere fact, although a

necessary fact, until it is shown to be inherently necessary from an immanent ground of its own. Not until this immanent ground of its own is discovered and proved, will the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge be explained, comprehended, or relieved of its seemingly paradoxical character. The problem before us, therefore, is to discover and prove that this identity is not only the *necessary condition of a consequence*, but also itself the *necessary consequence of a condition* — a condition which shall be immanent in itself, yet at the same time more widely universal. Can the problem be solved?

§ 23. The problem itself is to show that the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge, already proved as a fact, is necessarily grounded in a deeper identity, immanent in itself, yet more widely universal. If soluble at all, this problem can be solved only by analyzing the identity in which the deeper identity must lie hidden, as the immanent necessary condition of which the former is itself the necessary consequence or result.

What, then, is meant by “experience,” and by “reason,” and why must they be at once different and identical, distinguishable yet inseparable, in human knowledge?

Experience is observation of single existent facts, perception of given particulars, knowledge of actual individual units of existence (*Erfahrungsgegenstände*); while reason is knowledge of their principles, their necessary relations and universal kinds and constitutive forms (*Principien, Schlussreihen, Ideen*). It is altogether immaterial whether these units exist *in Being*, as particular things in themselves or particular relations in things, or whether they exist merely *in Thought*, as particular ideas, feelings, concepts, intuitions, sensations, states of consciousness in general: experience remains knowledge of the *units*, and reason remains knowledge of the *universals*. Nothing, at bottom, but the difference in the objects known determines the difference in the modes of knowledge; and the inseparability of the units and the universals is the insepara-

bility of experience and reason. No unit of existence, whether in Being or in Thought, can exist unrelated to its kind; to be out of relation is to be out of existence itself, for all existent units must coexist, and coexistence is itself a relation of kind. No unit of existence, moreover, can exist either out of particular relations (*e. g.* to others of its kind) or out of universal relations (*e. g.* to the whole of its kind), — every unit must exist in both at once; for every unit exists only as *one of its kind*, and every kind exists only as *all of its units*. Since, then, experience is knowledge of actual particulars or units of existence, and reason is knowledge of necessary universals or kinds of existence, it follows that the distinctive difference between experience and reason, as modes of knowledge, is determined by the essential difference of their objects as such; units of existence are the objects of perception (“external” and “internal”), while universals of existence are the objects of intellect, and the difference of sense and intellect, or of experience and reason, as modes of knowledge, is in the last analysis determined by a difference of nature in the objects known. At bottom, experience and reason are identical in knowledge because units and universals are identical in existence, — identical, that is, in difference, not without difference, — as *specimens and species*. From the necessity, therefore, that every thing and every kind (that is, every real or possible object of human knowledge) must be at once *both individual and universal*, it necessarily follows that every possible human cognition must be derived both from experience and from reason, — that is, must be at once *both experiential and rational*. In general, human knowledge itself can exist only as the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason in man, because man himself, as the unit-object of his own self-knowledge, is necessarily both individual and universal, — individual as a unit of existence, universal as a kind of existence. Human self-consciousness itself is nothing but *man's knowledge of his own existence*. From the fact

that his existence is both individual and universal, it necessarily follows that his knowledge of it is both experiential and rational. Consequently, the identity in difference of experience and reason in human knowledge, as a necessary consequence, is rationally grounded upon the deeper identity of existence and knowledge in human self-consciousness, as its necessary condition. And this deeper identity, immanent in the former identity as its self-contained, yet more widely universal condition, is precisely what we sought to find.

§ 24. This result is itself a sufficient criticism of philosophical or speculative idealism. Idealism, in its typical form as developed in Germany during the first third of the nineteenth century, has for its distinctive foundation or characteristic principle the *complete separation of experience and reason*, and the complete isolation of reason as "pure reason," "pure thought," "pure productivity," "pure thinking-process," or, in the last degree of abstraction, "pure law of the thinking-process." Its final and logical result is that "pure thought" produces the total object of knowledge absolutely out of itself, according to a law immanent in its own constitutive process and known as Dialectic. That is, nothing is at last knowable but ideas, notions, or states of consciousness, which "pure self-activity" creates out of itself and to which it imparts all those forms, elements, categories, or relations, which render them possible objects of knowledge. The word "pure," in all the above or kindred phrases, simply means "pure from experience," and has no other meaning; it formulates the absolute separation of experience and reason, as, for instance, is done by Kant, when he expressly defines the word "pure" as "containing nothing empirical."¹ Ideal-

¹ "Bei einer Untersuchung der reinen (nichts Empirisches enthaltenden) Elemente der menschlichen Erkenntniss gelang es mir," u. s. f. (Prolegomena, Werke, IV. 71, ed. Hart.). Still more emphatically: "Wir werden also im Verfolg unter Erkenntnissen *a priori* nicht solche verstehen, die von dieser oder jener, sondern die *schlechterdings* von aller

ism thus reduces all knowledge, as such, to reason alone, separates it from experience, and denies the name of knowledge to experience altogether, except so far as experience takes and keeps the "*a priori* concepts" or "categories" of reason itself. Hence it finds nothing intelligible in simple "existence," "the actual," or "the given."¹

For example, Cohen, ridiculing the "given thing in itself," says pithily enough: "To be sure, this 'being given [in itself]' we positively cannot understand; for 'to be given' means 'to be related to experience.'"² In point of fact, "to be given in itself" means "to be at the same time related to experience and internally self-related;" for

Erfahrung unabhängig stattfinden. Ihnen sind empirische Erkenntnisse, oder solche, die nur *a posteriori*, d. i. durch Erfahrung möglich sind, entgegengesetzt. Von den Erkenntnissen *a priori* heissen aber diejenigen *rein*, denen gar nichts Empirisches beigemischt ist." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 34.) "Alle unsere Erkenntniss hebt von den Sinnen an, geht von da zum Verstande und endigt bei der Vernunft, über welche nichts Höheres in uns angetroffen wird, den Stoff der Anschauung zu bearbeiten und unter die höchste Einheit des Denkens zu bringen." (*Ibid.* III. 247.) This is separation, and not merely distinction, of experience and reason. Falkenberg so understands the matter: "Die Scholastiker bezeichneten mit *a priori* die Erkenntnis aus den Ursachen (aus dem, was vorhergeht), mit *a posteriori* die aus den Wirkungen. Kant benutzt, nach Leibnitz' und Lamberts Vorgang, die Termini zum Ausdruck des Gegensatzes: Erkenntnis aus Vernunft — aus Erfahrung. Apriori ist ein ohne Beihilfe der Erfahrung gewonnenes Urteil, und zwar, wenn der Satz, aus dem es abgeleitet worden, auch wiederum von Erfahrung unabhängig ist, absolut apriori, anderenfalls relativ apriori." (Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 1892, p. 272, footnote.)

¹ J. F. Reiff, *Der Anfang der Philosophie*, 1840, p. 10: "Es gibt keine Leiter zur Philosophie; denn sie entsteht nur da, wo ich mit einem Male alles Gegebne von mir werfe."

² H. Cohen, *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, 1885, p. 503: "Zwar dieses Gegebensein können wir schlechterdings nicht verstehen; denn gegebensein heisst 'auf Erfahrung bezogen sein.' . . . Indessen muss sich doch die Erfahrung selbst als Ganzes und somit als Ding denken lassen: das ist das Ding an sich, nicht als Ding des analytischen Denkens, noch als Gegenstand der Erfahrung, sondern Erfahrung selbst als Gegenstand gedacht."

internal self-relation necessarily renders the "object of experience" a "thing in itself." But a sufficient reply to Cohen's airy sophism is simply to ask: Is not experience itself given? And is it anything but given? And, if we cannot understand experience, what can we understand? Cohen had been already answered in advance by Lotze, when he said: "Metaphysic has not to construct reality, but to recognize it, — to investigate the inner order of the given, not to deduce the given from that which is not given."¹ But Cohen unconsciously and amusingly refutes himself on the same page, by confessing that experience *as a whole* is, after all, at once an "object of thought" and a "thing in itself!" If an "object of thought" can be thus a merely given "thing in itself," so likewise may an "object of experience" be a merely given "thing in itself;" and Cohen, now conceding that he *can* "think" (*i. e.* "understand") the "given thing in itself," pricks the bubble of his own objection.

The present condition of philosophical thought in Germany, as the complete decay of speculative idealism in the land of its birth and complete recognition of the identity of experience and reason, is well indicated by Professor Paulsen, of Berlin, as follows:—

"It is the common and fundamental characteristic of the Philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, that they are convinced of their ability to produce a system of absolute knowledge of reality through a new process of rational thought, independently of experience and the experiential sciences. 'The *Wissenschaftslehre*,' says Fichte, 'makes absolutely no inquiries about experience, and pays not the slightest heed to it. It would necessarily be true, even if there could be no experience at all; and it would be certain *a priori* that all possible future experience would have to conform to the laws which it has established.' Similarly, at the beginning

¹ H. Lotze, *Metaphysik*, 1884, p. 163: "Die Metaphysik hat nicht die Wirklichkeit zu machen, sondern sie anzuerkennen; die innere Ordnung des Gegebenen zu erforschen, nicht das Gegebene abzuleiten von dem, was eben nicht gegeben ist."

of the 'Chief Features of the Present Age,' he declares: 'The philosopher would pursue his business (here the construction of history) without regard to any experience, and absolutely *a priori*, and would of necessity be able *a priori* to describe the whole course of time and all possible epochs of it.' Precisely as Fichte deduces history *a priori*, Schelling constructs Nature *a priori*, occasionally pouring out his scorn upon 'the blind and senseless kind of natural science which has everywhere established itself since the destruction of philosophy by Bacon and of physics by Boyle and Newton.' In Hegel, the speculative philosophy attains its ripe perfection; all reality is constructed by him out of pure categories (*Begriffe*); reality and truth coincide in his system. By its side stand the empirical sciences; not *ex principiis*, out of internal reason, but *ex datis*, out of external experience, they heap up a mass of superficial information of all sorts about particulars. Genuine knowledge of reality is the philosophical; its form, the dialectical development of the *Begriff*, is nothing else than the subjective repetition of the objective development-process of the Idea, that is, of reality itself."¹

But:

"Our age no longer believes in the possibility of knowing *a priori* the sense or intellectual content of reality through dialectical development of the *Begriff*. As it knows only one reality, so it knows only one truth and only one way to it: thinking experience. Thought without experience leads to the knowledge of reality just as little as experience without thought. The philosopher has no royal road to knowledge; speculative idealism is in truth nothing but a distorted reflection on cognitions which are due to unconfessed experience."²

¹ F. Paulsen, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1892, p. 29: "Es ist der gemeinsame Grundcharakter der Philosophien Fichtes, Schellings, Hegels, dass sie durch ein neues Verfahren rein begrifflichen Denkens, unabhängig von der Erfahrung und den empirischen Wissenschaften, ein System absoluter Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit hervorzubringen zu können überzeugt sind," u. s. f.

² *Ibid.* p. 16: "Unsere Zeit glaubt nicht mehr an die Möglichkeit, durch dialektische Begriffsentwicklung die Gedanken oder den Sinn der Wirklichkeit *a priori* zu erkennen. Sie kennt, wie nur eine Wirklichkeit, so nur eine Wahrheit und einen Weg zu ihr: die denkende Erfahrung. Erfahrungsloses Denken führt so wenig zur Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit, als gedankenlose Erfahrung. Der Philosoph hat keine *via regia* zur

The persistent attempt of speculative idealism to eliminate from philosophy all recognition "of the given," as simple "fact of existence" or "datum of experience," has been an historical failure because it was a logical failure from the start. For the "pure reason," "pure thought," "pure consciousness," "pure self-activity," "pure productivity," "pure process," "pure law of the process," or whatever else, *must exist, and be known to exist, simply as given fact or datum*: else there would be nothing to know, or to think, or to philosophize about, and idealism itself would vanish into non-existence. Hence idealism struggles in vain to get rid of this obstinate surd of some merely "given existence," some undeduced and unconstructed "reality," be it that of sensation, perception, intuition, concept, idea, or what not, as ultimate fact of existence unexplained by reason. Its highest reach goes no higher than its artlessly artificial *divorce of reason and experience*, and its fluttering attempt to soar with only one wing. It is owing to its defeat by fact and the science of fact that philosophical idealism has never succeeded in making itself the philosophy of the world, but remains still the "fad" of a school. The future belongs to scientific realism alone, grounded as it is upon the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason in all human knowledge, from elemental particular cognition up to universal philosophy.

§ 25. Reviewing now the regress of grounds and surveying it as a whole thus far, we find it consisting essentially of three moments or steps, as follows:—

I. The affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is

Erkenntnis; die Spekulation ist in Wahrheit nichts als eine verzerrte Reflexion über Erkenntnisse, die uneingestandener Erfahrung verdankt werden." This is admirably said, but it must be admitted that Paulsen fails to orient himself in accordance with it. "Erfahrungsloses Denken" is the principle of idealism; "gedankenlose Erfahrung" is the principle of materialism; and "denkende Erfahrung," or scientific method, is the principle of *scientific realism*. In describing his own position therefore, as "idealistic monism," Paulsen seems to sanction a principle which he means to reject (Vorwort, pp. v, viii-ix; cf. pp. 48-51, 351-353).

self-grounded upon the identity in difference of its own experiential content and its own rational ground.

II. The identity of experiential content and rational ground in the affirmation itself is grounded upon the identity in difference of experience and reason in human knowledge.

III. The identity of experience and reason in human knowledge is grounded upon the identity in difference of existence and knowledge in man as a self-knowing existence (fact of self-consciousness).

Or, proceeding in the reverse order of a progress from condition to consequence, we have:—

I. Because existence and knowledge are identical in man as a self-knowing existence, experience and reason must be identical in human knowledge.

II. Because experience and reason are identical in human knowledge, the experiential content and the rational ground must be identical in the affirmation that “human knowledge exists.”

III. Because the experiential content and the rational ground are identical in the affirmation that “human knowledge exists,” the affirmation itself must be self-grounded and self-demonstrated.

Now both the regress to conditions and the progress to consequences reveal equally well the indestructible strength of the chain which anchors the affirmation that “human knowledge exists” to the bed-rock of all human knowledge: namely, the self-knowing existence of man as man. But the regress, in leading from the affirmation to man as man, leads directly back to the affirmer himself; and the affirmer is at once the ground and the cause of the affirmation. It leads to the actual existence of knowledge in man, as the ultimate ground of the content of the affirmation that “human knowledge exists;” and it leads to the actual existence of self-knowing energy in man, as the efficient cause or conscious agent of the affirmation as an act of knowledge. It thus leads to man as the ground-cause or cause-ground of

the affirmation in its double aspect of cognition and effect, and brings out into strong light two of the fundamental elements of his nature: reason, or intelligence, and will, or energy. But this is not all. The affirmation that "human knowledge exists," manifesting most conspicuously as it does the cognitive and the volitive elements of man's nature, manifests also, more or less, the invariable stimulus and concomitant of these: to wit, feeling, or the sensitive element. For no affirmation, considered as an act of will, can fail to be accompanied, in however slight a degree, by the presence of feeling, which is a constant ingredient of the complex state of consciousness involved in every volition. Hence the regress to conditions, necessitated by a philosophical treatment of the "human knowledge exists," leads logically to recognition in man of all the root-characteristics of human consciousness: knowledge or thought, feeling, and will. Nor is even this all. Every affirmation, though silently made, may yet be spoken; and speech is, essentially, mechanico-organic expression of the psychical to the psychical through the physical. Hence the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," as a real or possible utterance, is not completely traced back to its ultimate cause-ground, if the investigation stops short of man as real person, in all the vast complexity of his psycho-physical personal constitution. And nothing short of man as real person and as society of real persons will explain the mode of actuality of human knowledge, — that is, its universal historico-literary form of seriated affirmation.

§ 26. The result of the regress to conditions, namely, that the ultimate rational ground of the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is the fact of man himself as a self-knowing existence, verifies itself by answering all the as yet unanswered questions in what precedes.

As an "act of knowledge" (§ 19), the affirmation must have (1) its rational ground, or reason why it is known; (2) its practical ground, or reason why it is affirmed; and (3) its efficient cause, or reason why it becomes.

(1) The immediate reason why it is known that "human knowledge exists" is the fact that the content itself affirms its own ground. In other words, knowledge proves itself by asserting itself in an act of knowledge. But the deeper and ultimate reason, which lies immanent or implicit in the immediate reason, is the fact that, since knowledge and existence are identical in man, it is utterly immaterial whether he affirms that "human knowledge exists" or that "human existence knows:" either of these perfectly equivalent and convertible judgments, either of which posits or affirms the identity of *knowledge and existence and humanity*, is the self-affirmation and self-demonstration of *Man*, because simply to exist as man is necessarily to affirm them both, — because, in other words, man is both the knowledge of his own existence and the existence of his own knowledge. Hence the known identity of content and ground in the "human knowledge exists," if fully comprehended, is the necessary, universal, and objectively valid self-affirmation of human knowledge itself, as the *fact of human self-consciousness*. In this case, the affirmer is the proof of his own affirmation: human knowledge can exist nowhere but in man, and *existing man is himself the existence of human knowledge*. This is the answer to the question in § 21, how "existence," in any intelligible sense, can be affirmed of human knowledge.

(2) The practical reason why the affirmation is made, as a written or spoken one, will hardly be found to exist except in the mind of the philosopher philosophizing; for the ordinary man has no need to affirm what no one either denies or doubts. But, to the philosopher, the reason of affirming the existence of human knowledge lies very close to the reason of knowing it, in the fact that he knows the existence of human knowledge to be the essence of all human self-consciousness, together with the further fact that, as a philosopher, he himself exists both to know and to tell what he knows because he knows it. If, then, his philosophy goes deep enough and moves surely enough to in-

interpret scientifically the philosophic self-consciousness of human reason as the Philosophy of Philosophy, that is, as both fact of history and highest realization of the philosophic aim, he will necessarily affirm the existence of human knowledge as his only possible foundation or starting-point, and, when he gets through, will find that he has affirmed nothing else than the content of human knowledge from the beginning to the end. To him, therefore, the reason of affirming coincides with the reason of knowing: he speaks because he knows, and because it is his necessary office to tell what he knows. Considering the affirmation, however, not as a spoken or written one, but rather as the unworded self-demonstration of self-knowing existence in man as man, the necessary reason for affirming it lies simply in the fact that no man can help affirming it: his very existence as a man is its necessary self-affirmation in consciousness. If man exists at all, he must affirm that "human knowledge exists," for his existence is unworded affirmation of it. Hence we all instantly understand each other's unspoken affirmation, and instinctively expect every man to manifest the knowledge which his mere presence as a man affirms. If this were not the case, we should never expect any one to know anything until he happened to mention the fact! On the contrary, our knowledge that so-and-so is a man is our knowledge that he knows. These, then, are the reasons why the existence of human knowledge is necessarily affirmed (§ 20).

(3) It was shown, in §§ 19 and 25, that the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," considered as at one and the same time both a cognition and an effect, must have both its rational ground and its efficient cause in one and the same rational affirmer affirming for a reason; that is, in man himself as a knowing energy, an active intelligence, a cause-ground. The affirmation is both cognition and effect. Man affirms it because he knows it; he is affirmer because he is knower; he is cause and ground, ground and cause, in one. Here, then, at least so far as the affirma-

tion that "human knowledge exists" is concerned, man is shown to be not only a self-knowing existence, but also the indissoluble union of reason and energy, the identity in difference of ground and cause. And the affirmation, therefore, has its efficient cause or agent in man, as the identity not only of knowledge and existence, but also of knowledge and will, together with what experience shows to be their concomitants, feeling, and mechanico-organic constitution, — in a word, in man as person.

§ 27. But here there emerges a new difficulty. "The last step of your regress to conditions," it may be very plausibly objected, "gives us, in § 25, man as a self-knowing existence, to be sure, but only as a given fact, a mere datum of experience, a mere actuality which contains in itself no rational necessity, no necessary reason or condition. Yet now you give us, in § 26, man as in himself the ultimate identity of ground and cause, a relatively necessary cause-ground. How can he be at the same time a mere actuality and a rational necessity? How are these contradictory results of your argument to be reconciled?"

We reply that the contradiction is only apparent, and does not exist at all, if the argument is fully understood. It is perfectly true that the regress of § 25 stops with man as a mere actuality of experience or a merely given fact of human self-consciousness, and not with man as a necessity of reason, as a self-grounded existence, or as his own self-explanation. If we stop here, man does not explain himself; but the regress to conditions is not yet concluded, and must be continued. It is likewise perfectly true that § 26 represents man as the ultimate and relatively necessary cause-ground of his own spoken or written affirmation that "human knowledge exists;" and this is undeniable, if the conscious agent is the cause of his own conscious acts. But it does not represent man as the ultimate and necessary cause-ground of the affirmation, so far as it is involved in the mere fact of his existence; the cause-ground of this unworded affirmation must be the cause-ground of

man himself as an intelligible word, the necessary condition of his existence as an actual intelligible word of affirming Nature. These two results are not contradictory positions. Man is the necessary cause-ground of his own worded affirmation, but not of himself, as an unworded affirmation. That remains to be ascertained. The worded affirmation, as an outwardly effectuated and conscious act of knowledge, cannot be traced back of man himself as its ground-cause; for he himself is the whole chain of his own acts and the whole cause of that chain. But man himself must be traced back to a still deeper cause-ground, immanent in himself, yet more widely universal. Otherwise, philosophy will not begin with an absolutely, but only a relatively, self-grounded affirmation in the "human knowledge exists." The question must now be answered, "Why does man exist?"

§ 28. It was proved at the very outset of this long investigation that, with regard to this extraordinary judgment, no ground or rational condition of it can possibly be found in a prior judgment. The entire regression of grounds which we have been pursuing from § 20 has been strictly an immanent regression, and consists solely in the deeper and deeper understanding of the judgment itself. In this respect, the judgment, from its very nature, stands absolutely unique and alone; for in no other judgment could it ever be found that the actual content explicitly states the rational ground, also, in one and the same affirmation. Consequently, the wider and more universal the ground is proved to be, just so much more widely and universally must the content itself be understood and interpreted. Strictly speaking, then, there has been no regress at all, but simple expansion of a meaning at first very imperfectly apprehended; it is a regress so far only as this very expansion consists for us in necessary steps or stages which can be apprehended only in succession. It is worth while, perhaps, to call attention to this quite obvious fact, in order to forestall the unintelligent but yet

possible criticism that, after professing to start with a self-grounded affirmation, we immediately proceeded to investigate its grounds elsewhere.

§ 29. Now the great difficulty under which we have been laboring from the start lies in the very nature of rationality, in the very law of rationality itself. In any series of reasons and results, of conditions and consequences, the law of the rational series is that each term must be at once both condition and consequence, both reason and fact. That is, each term must be to the preceding term a consequence or fact, and to the following term a condition or reason. The difficulty, then, is this: how can there be either a first term or a last term in any rational series or chain? For a first term will be condition, but not consequence; a last term will be consequence, but not condition. Under the law of the series, therefore, neither a first term nor a last term, as a term, is possible; the rational series must be interminable. How is it possible, then, for philosophy to begin, or for man to reason at all?

Precisely the same difficulty, however, emerges in considering a chain of physical causes, and following it either forward or backward. The law of the causal series, the law of causality itself, is that each term shall be at once both cause and effect. That is, each term must be cause to the following term and effect to the preceding term. How, then, can there be either a first term or a last term in any causal series or chain? For a first term will be cause, but not effect; and a last term will be effect, but not cause. Hence neither a first term nor a last term, as a term, is possible; the causal series, too, must be interminable. How is it possible, then, for science to be the explanation of anything?

§ 30. The law of causality being that each link in the causal chain shall be both a cause and an effect, cause of the succeeding link and effect of the preceding link, it follows that no link can be either a cause or an effect of itself. But the whole causal chain itself, which exists only as the

totality of its links, and without which no one of its links could exist at all, has neither cause nor effect in another causal chain; it exists, but without external cause and without external effect. What, then, is the cause of the causal chain itself? This is a question to which but one answer is possible. The causal chain as a whole exists absolutely of itself; it is what no one of its links is or can be, both cause of itself and effect of itself. It is as idle to ask for a cause as it is to ask for an effect of the whole causal chain other than the whole causal chain; it is of necessity a self-cause and a self-effect. This is the undeniable truth of Spinoza's famous distinction of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Self-existing energy, manifesting itself as alternately cause and effect in each link, manifests itself as simultaneously cause and effect in the causal chain as a whole; the whole as a whole cannot transcend itself, and must be what no part as a part can be, — *causa sui* and *effectum sui* in the *nunc stans* of eternity. In this way the causal regress leads necessarily to a first cause, not at all as a first link, but as the unity and universality of all the links together in an eternal chain, — *one universal energy* which acts in each link, unites all the links, and constitutes the immanent necessary condition of the causal chain itself. If this had occurred to Kant, we should never have had his "antinomies." It is this universal manifestation of energy or "efficiency" in the causal chain as a whole, and in each link as a part, which distinguishes the causal nexus from mere "invariable succession," mere "antecedence and consequence," or any other mode of mere time-sequence, and thereby renders possible the relative explanations of science. For, while mere time-sequence without efficiency explains nothing, — while the separate sciences stop arbitrarily with certain earlier links of the chain, conventionally adopted as definitions or first principles, and therefore explain only in part, — philosophy stops only with the whole, and thereby alone explains. "Efficiency," however, it should be noted in passing, is the

beginning, not the end of the explanation, as will appear later.¹

§ 31. Recurring now to the rational series, the law of rationality requires that each term of the series shall be both a condition and a consequence, condition to the term which succeeds and consequence to the term which precedes. Hence it follows that no term can be either a condition or a consequence of itself. But the whole rational series, which exists only as the totality of all its own terms, and without which no term could exist at all, has neither condition nor consequence in another rational series; it exists, but without either condition or consequence external to itself. What, then, is the reason of the rational series itself? Such a question is absurd. To ask the reason why reason exists is pure unreason. Reason, as the rational series of the world, exists because it exists; no other reason can be rendered, and that is no reason at all. In other words, the rational series exists absolutely of itself; it is what no one of its terms can be, — both reason and result of itself; it is eternal reason because it is eternal fact, and eternal fact, because it is eternal reason; it is self-condition and self-consequence in one. Self-existing reason, manifesting itself as alternately condition and consequence in each term, manifests itself as simultaneously condition and consequence in the rational series as a whole; it is *ratio sui* and *consequentia sui*, as the eternal fact of universal

¹ "Schon Plato hatte die *αἰτια* von den *συμπαῖτια*, die bewirkenden Ursachen (*δι' ὧν γίνονται τι*) von den unerlässlichen Bedingungen (*ἀνευ ὧν οὐ γίνονται*) scharf unterschieden. Aristoteles folgt ihm in dieser Unterscheidung." (E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 3te Auflage, II. ii. 331, footnote.) The antithesis of "causes and concauses" is not a happy expression for that of "causes and conditions;" it obscures the real distinction. All causes are conditions, but not all conditions are causes. That is, all causes are energies, and determine effects; all conditions are reasons, and determine conclusions. The rational series of the world's development (*ratio sui*) includes and transcends the causal series (*causa sui*), for it comprehends not only all that happens, but also all that might happen, — not only the actual, but also the possible. Energy acts, but immanent Reason directs its action.

reason. For, although not every reason is a cause, every cause is necessarily a reason,—*principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*, the reason of becoming; and therefore the causal chain itself is necessarily a rational series, also. In this way, the rational regress leads necessarily to a first reason, not at all as a first term in the series, but as the unity and universality of all the terms together in an eternal series, — *one universal reason* which abides in each term, unites all the terms, and constitutes the immanent necessary condition of the rational series itself, — the eternal *ratio sui* of the universe, the ground of all grounds, the unconditioned reason and self-explanation of the world.

§ 32. These preliminary results established, we can now resume the rigorous regress of grounds where we left it in § 25 and § 26. The last step reached in the regress was the identity of existence and knowledge in man as a self-knowing existence, and the identity of ground and cause in man as a cause-ground; that is, the identity of existence, reason, and energy, all in one, in man as real person. This, so far as the regress has yet proceeded, is the ultimate and immanent ground of the affirmation that “human knowledge exists,” and nowise transcends the immanent meaning of the identity of content and ground in the affirmation itself, as the starting-point of the regress. Hence the regress itself has thus far been, from beginning to end, an immanent process of reason.

Now the underlying principle of this regress, the immanent law of this immanent process of reason, has been throughout that *the individual cannot explain the universal, but that the universal must and does explain the individual*. This is the purport of Aristotle’s saying that the whole is prior to the parts; and it is the central or fundamental principle of the theory of universals, to be further elucidated hereafter.¹

¹ “Ich würde daher Erkenntniss aus Principien diejenige nennen, da ich das Besondere im Allgemeinen durch Begriffe erkenne.” (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 248.)

§ 33. Observe how this principle has been applied in the regress hitherto.

I. The affirmation that "human knowledge exists," though of course a universal judgment in one sense, is yet an individual or particular judgment in another sense. That is, while its peculiar meaning is universal, it is yet, as a judgment, a particular judgment differentiated from all other judgments by this peculiar meaning as its particular content; and the identity of its content and ground is, in that sense, simply the identity of a particular experiential content and a particular rational ground in a particular judgment. Now this experiential content, as an individual content, is explained by experience in general, as its universal; and the rational ground, as an individual ground, is explained by reason in general, as its universal. Hence the particular identity of experiential content and rational ground in this particular judgment, as an individual identity, is explained by the general identity of experience and reason in the totality of all judgments or human knowledge, as its universal. Thus, according to the law of the process, the explanation is complete.

II. Further, experience, as a particular or individual mode of actuality, is explained by actuality in general, or existence itself, as its universal; and reason, as a particular or individual mode of cognition, is explained by cognition in general, or knowledge itself, as its universal. Hence the particular identity of experience and reason in human knowledge, as an individual identity, is explained by the general identity of existence and knowledge in man, as its universal. Thus, again, according to the law of the process, the explanation is complete.

III. Thus far, there has been a pure regress of grounds or conditions in the rational series alone, arriving at the fact of individual self-consciousness in man as real person. But here, in man as real person or rational affirmer, the actualized affirmation that "human knowledge exists" makes the rational series effect a junction, so to speak, with

the causal series. As an "act of *knowledge*" or "uttered *cognition*," the affirmation leads through the regress of grounds to the simple fact of self-knowing existence or individual self-consciousness in man. But, as an "*act* of knowledge" or "*uttered cognition*," and therefore as also an effect, the same affirmation leads through the regress to the simple fact of individual activity, energy, or cause in man. That is, individual reason is the rational ground of the affirmation merely as cognition, while individual energy is the efficient cause of the affirmation as utterance or effect. Hence, as "*uttered cognition*," in both its aspects, the affirmation leads necessarily to the particular or individual identity of ground and cause in man, as a particular or individual cause-ground, or rational affirmer; individual rational self-consciousness, the outcome thus far of the pure rational regress, is now found united with individual causality, the outcome of the pure causal regress; and the union of the two results in the identity of ground and cause in an individual—the identity of reason and energy in man as real person. That is, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" contains, as its own deeper significance, the fundamental self-affirmation and self-demonstration of man as its own necessary cause-ground: individual cause of it as an utterance, individual ground of it as a cognition, and individual cause-ground of it as an indivisible act of human knowledge itself.

§ 34. In this manner the regress of grounds comes to exhibit a double aspect, rational and causal, without ceasing to be an indivisible fact in the unity of man as real person. It gives man, not only as knower, but also as affirmer,—knower of the cognition and affirmer of the affirmation,—knower so far as he is ground, and affirmer so far as he is cause, of the necessary affirmation that "human knowledge exists." But, although these two elements of ground and cause are thus at once distinguished and united in man as individual human existence,—although man thus exists as an individual ground and an individual cause

in an individual cause-ground or real human person, — this necessary double aspect of the regress proves to be the salvation of philosophy.

For, considered *exclusively* as an individual living unit, or animal, man can be explained only by animal in general, as his universal; animal, as an individual organic unit, or organism, can be explained only by organism in general, as its universal; organism, as an individual mechanical unit, or machine, can be explained only by machine in general, as its universal; and machine in general is taken by this mode of thinking to be its own universal, as the mechanical universe itself, the absolute ultimate beyond which nothing either appears or exists. The philosophy which thus culminates in universal and unconditional mechanism, as the last explanation of the universe itself, begins with a consideration of man which at least omits and ignores, if it does not explicitly deny, his double character as a cause-ground; and the same want of rational insight which thus prevails at the start will not unnaturally still dominate at the end. Such a philosophy as this, however, is the extinction of reason itself; for, suppressing absolutely the rational series, it insists on explaining the universe by the causal series alone.

From such an extinction as this, notwithstanding, philosophy is saved by the regress of grounds, which urges it irresistibly and necessarily onward to the final development and fulfilment of its own rational implications.

§ 35. The law of the process hitherto undeviatingly pursued is that the individual cannot explain the universal, but can and must be explained by the universal. That is, no individual as such can explain itself or furnish a rational foundation for philosophy; the only possible explanation of the individual, the only possible foundation of a rational philosophy, is the universal alone.

If, then, the regress of grounds ends abruptly in man as an individual (and it has thus far proceeded no further), it ends with a mere unexplained fact. It ends, to be sure,

with a necessary condition relatively to the consequence which it supports or grounds, but not with a condition rationally grounded either in another or in itself — not with a condition which is itself either unconditioned or self-conditioned — not with a condition which, as the ground of all grounds, is itself self-grounded. Yet the affirmation that “human knowledge exists” cannot be self-grounded in the absolute sense, unless its own ultimate or deepest ground is itself self-grounded. If philosophy, therefore, beginning with this affirmation, should be content to end here and push the regress of its grounds no further, it would not, after all, begin with an absolutely self-grounded beginning, but with one which is self-grounded only in a relative sense. The affirmation, in other words, is now left resting on a mere brute fact of existence, not a necessary rational principle, and is so far irrational.

Undeniably, then, philosophy must persevere in the search for an ultimate rational necessity, immanent in the mere existence of man and thereby giving it rationality. But how shall this rationality be found? Man, purely as an individual, purely as a unit of existence, purely as an identity without difference, explains nothing else, and cannot even explain himself; his explanation, if it can be explained, can be found in the universal alone.

§ 36. Manifestly, no explanation of man could be found through the regress of grounds, if it had ended thus far in man as a pure unit of existence, a pure individual, a pure identity without difference. But it has thus far ended with man as a cause-ground, an identity in difference, an individual cause and individual ground in individual person, — as the identity of cause and ground, or energy and reason, in himself. In this lies the possibility of a further prosecution of the regress, obeying still the immanent law of its immanent process, and relying solely on the immanent completion of the regress itself, in order to reach a universal conclusion and a rational foundation for the initial affirmation of philosophy. The fourth step of the regress will then be as follows: —

IV. Man, as a particular or individual efficient cause, is explained by cause in general, or the causal series, as its universal; and man, as a particular or individual rational ground, is explained by reason in general, or the rational series, as its universal. Hence the particular identity of cause and ground or energy and reason in man, as an individual identity, is explained by the general identity of causal series and the rational series themselves, that is, the identity of cause and ground or energy and reason in the universe, as its universal. Thus, according to the law of the process, the explanation is complete, and the regress itself is absolutely completed. For it ends in the absolute universality of the universe itself—in the absolute identity in difference of Energy and Reason in the World, Being and Thought in Nature, *causa sui* and *ratio sui* in God.

§ 37. This, then, is the final result of the regress of grounds. We are now in a condition to recapitulate our long argument as a whole, bring together its main points, and present them in a single synoptical statement.

I. Philosophy, in its necessary historico-literary form of seriated affirmation, can effect a real beginning in a self-grounded affirmation alone, since no other can be both absolutely necessary or certain and rationally first. That is, the first principle of philosophy must be a necessary, universal, and objectively valid truth, depending on no other truth, whether expressed or presupposed. If its professedly first judgment is grounded in another prior judgment, that prior judgment itself is an earlier, hence the only real, beginning; but, if that prior judgment itself is not self-grounded, its ground must be sought in still another prior judgment, an endless regress ensues which does not abolish itself, and a philosophical beginning for philosophy becomes impossible in history and in literature. Thus the demand for a “presuppositionless beginning” is justifiable and unanswerable; but the only “presuppositionless beginning” is a self-grounded affirmation.

II. There is but one possible self-grounded affirmation: namely, that which takes the one universal ground of all philosophical or rational affirmation as its own particular content, and thereby realizes self-groundedness through identity of content and ground. The historico-literary form of such a judgment must be essentially this: "Human knowledge exists."

III. The affirmation that "human knowledge exists," as content alone, is empirical; as ground alone, it is rational; as content and ground in one, it is both empirical and rational. Hence, in its integrity, it is (1) empirically known, yet rationally or necessarily affirmed; (2) individually known, yet rationally or universally affirmed; (3) subjective in content, objective in ground, and both subjective and objective *per se*. Further, it is (1) indubitable, (2) undeniable, (3) undemonstrable from other grounds than itself, but (4) self-demonstrated.

IV. The complete rationalization of this first principle and first affirmation, however, can be effected, — that is, its self-groundedness can be completely understood, — only through an exhaustive regress of its immanent rational conditions or grounds. The rational necessity, universality, and objective validity of the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," as at once a cognition, an act, and an effect, must be discovered, not abstractly or *a priori*, but rationally and immanently in its *a posteriori* mode of actuality or historico-literary form.

V. To be exhaustive, this regress of grounds must be twofold: (1) regress of grounds of the particular content alone, as simple identity without difference, and (2) regress of grounds of the identity of the particular content and its universal ground, as identity in difference. The first regress proves the affirmation, as content, to be absolutely grounded in itself, as ground. The second regress proves the affirmation, as identity of content and ground, to be self-grounded in deeper identities immanent in itself, yet more widely universal.

VI. The regress of grounds of the content alone, as identity without difference, abolishes itself.

VII. The regress of grounds of the identity of the particular content and its universal ground, as identity in difference, develops itself as a regress of concentric necessary principles of increasing universality; each principle discovered as a ground is found to be itself the consequence of a deeper ground, until the ground of all grounds is reached in the *ratio sui*, or absolute rational series of the world. Each principle, therefore, is a universal ground to its own consequence, but a particular case to its own ground; and thus each step in the regress is movement towards a wider universality until absolute universality is attained in the universe as a whole. The steps of the regress are these: (1) Identity of experiential content and rational ground in the affirmation that "human knowledge exists;" (2) Identity of experience and reason in all human knowledge; (3) Identity of existence and knowledge in all human self-consciousness; (4) Conditioned identity of self-consciousness and efficiency or of reason and energy in Man, as individual personality in history and individual cause-ground of the affirmation in literature; (5) Unconditioned identity of self-consciousness and efficiency, reason, and energy, rational series and causal series, or *ratio sui* and *causa sui*, in the universe itself, as universal personality in Nature and universal cause-ground of Man; (6) Absolute identity of Being and Thought, not *without* difference, but *in* difference.

VIII. Since the content of the affirmation, being identical with the ground, includes all that the ground includes, the meaning of the affirmation must expand in proportion as the meaning of the ground is itself expanded. Hence, the regress of grounds is merely a progress in comprehension of the original affirmation. Its progressive meanings may be thus paraphrased: (1) Human knowledge is affirmed to exist simply because it is known to exist; (2) The actual existence of human knowledge means the inseparable

union of experience and reason in every act of knowledge; (3) The inseparable union of experience and reason in every act of knowledge means the inseparable union of existence and knowledge in all human self-consciousness; (4) The inseparable union of existence and knowledge in all human self-consciousness means the inseparable union of causality and rationality in Man as a conditioned individual being; (5) The inseparable union of causality and rationality in Man, as a conditioned individual being, means the inseparable union of causality and rationality in Nature, as unconditioned universal Being — the differenced identity of Being and Thought.

Only by virtue of this ultimate expansion in the comprehension of its meaning can the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" become an absolutely first principle and first affirmation in philosophy. For otherwise it would appear in the rational series of philosophy merely as a *first term*, and not as that *totality of all the terms* which is itself the only possible first reason or *ratio sui* (see §§ 29 and 31). That is, it would not be an absolutely self-grounded affirmation, unless its explicitly self-affirmed ground were known to be an implicit affirmation of the one absolute and all-inclusive ground of all grounds. Herein lies the impossibility of effecting a real beginning of philosophy by essaying to start from the fact of human self-consciousness (whether taken individually or universally), as an ultimate but unexplained datum or postulate or assumption. That is, philosophy can attain neither necessity, universality, nor objective validity, unless it consciously grounds itself on the identity of *causa sui* and *ratio sui* in the self-existent Reason-Energy of the World, and unless it can explain this consciousness in the only rational way through the regress of grounds.

IX. Consequently, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," comprehended in its full significance as the regress of grounds, is the necessary and absolute starting-point of philosophy. This regress of grounds is apodeictic,

and needs only to be understood. The unconditioned rational-causal series of the universe is the absolute condition of philosophy itself and the sole aim of philosophy is to explicate it in human thought. Speculative idealism denies the regress of grounds at the start, by denying the identity of experience and reason in all human knowledge, and by ostensibly isolating reason as the dialectical development of the *Begriff* in "pure thought," yet surreptitiously introducing experience in every step of the process. But scientific realism affirms the regress of grounds in the affirmation that "human knowledge exists." For this is both self-affirmation and self-demonstration of (1) human knowledge as a reality, (2) human knowledge as real identity of experience and reason, (3) human self-consciousness as real identity of existence and knowledge, (4) Man as real but conditioned identity of energy and reason in himself, and (5) Nature as real and unconditioned identity of energy and reason in God. Hence the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," being self-evident to every affirmer because it is internally or objectively self-demonstrated, is the fundamental principle, at once absolutely certain and rationally first, with which philosophy must begin and of which philosophy itself is simply the necessary explication. In the Aristotelian sense of "the affirmation of an immediate syllogistic principle which he must make who intends to learn anything at all,"¹ it may well be termed the absolute major premise or the one and only AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY.

¹ Aristotle, *Analytica Posteriora*, I. 2, ed. Bekker, I. 72, a16: "ἤν [ἀμέσου ἀρχῆς συλλογιστικῆς θέσιν] δ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτίοῦν μαθησόμενον, [λέγω] ἀξίωμα."

CHAPTER II

"COGITO, ERGO SUM"

§ 40. MODERN philosophy was born into distinct self-consciousness in Bacon and Descartes : Bacon, the founder of empiricism or empirism, and Descartes, the founder of rationalism. In this fundamental opposition between experience and reason, sense and intellect, sensation and thought, as in the last analysis two necessarily separate or reciprocally exclusive origins of all human knowledge, modern philosophy not only had its conscious beginning, but has ever since lived its conscious life. As opposed principles (disregarding all illogical compromises of the two, which are valueless in philosophy), empirism holds that all human knowledge is at bottom *self-transformed sensation* — pure sense-activity, gradually transforming itself into thought without drawing on any other original element or energy than itself; while rationalism holds that all human knowledge at bottom is *thought transforming sensation* — pure intellect-activity, gradually constructing knowledge out of a sense-activity that is itself neither knowledge nor an origin of knowledge. But, inasmuch as both sense and intellect are merely different modes of activity of an energizing subject, both empirism and rationalism agree in holding that all human knowledge originates solely in the knowing subject, and that nothing in knowledge is either derived or derivable from the object known, at least as an actually given reality whose existence and nature are independent of all humanly subjective activities or conditions. In other words, both sense and intellect are simply modes of consciousness, sense giving all the "matter" and intellect giving all the "form" of human knowledge; and all

so-called knowledge of a phenomenally external world is reduced to mere inference — which is nothing but an act of consciousness. This, *mutatis mutandis*, is as true of Bacon as of Descartes, of Locke's "observation and reflection" or Hume's "impressions and ideas" as of Kant's "sensibility and understanding." In this manner, empirism, or the *Apriorismus* of sense, and rationalism, or the *Apriorismus* of intellect, equally resolve all human knowledge into states of human consciousness, and find its ultimate origin and explanation in the subject alone. For this reason, the two great parallel streams of "modern philosophy" flow from one and the same source in their common recognition of the fact of *individual self-consciousness* as the sole and un-supplemented origin of all human knowledge. When, therefore, Descartes laid down his "I think, therefore I am," as the first absolute certainty from which all philosophies of self-consciousness must take their start, and made it the fountain-head of his own rationalism, he spoke no more for rationalism than he did for empirism; he spoke simply as the founder of systematic modern philosophy itself, in clear contradistinction from ancient philosophy; he first unequivocally planted himself on the modern affirmation, not of *Universal Being*, but of the *Being of Individual Human Thought*, and thereby made himself, not Kant (who erroneously claimed the honor), the Copernicus of the modern philosophical revolution. To Descartes, the being of an external world, nay, the being of God himself, was simply an *inference* from his own individual being, simply a *consequence* from his own individual thought; each inference, therefore, admitted of rational doubt at the start, and was held by him to be provisionally false.¹ But as is proved in Chapter I, the being of God is the *ultimate neces-*

¹"Sic autem rejicientes illa omnia, de quibus aliquo modo possumus dubitare, ac etiam falsa esse fingentes; facile quidem supponimus nullum esse Deum, nullum coelum, nulla corpora; nosque etiam ipsos non habere manus, nec pedes, nec denique ullum corpus; non autem ideo nos qui talia cogitamus nihil esse." (Principia Philosophiæ, I. 7.)

sary condition of the *absolutely certain fact* of HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. Of this principle, if the immanent regress of conditions is once clearly understood, there can be no rational doubt at all; and this principle is the standpoint of reformed modern philosophy, the philosophy of the future. But it is with good reason that all reputable historians and competent critics agree in acknowledging that Descartes's pithy formula, "I think, therefore I am," is the earliest adequate and accurate declaration of the fundamental principle, the distinctive standpoint, and the historical beginning of modern philosophy, so called.

§ 41. Now it has been made sufficiently plain, in §§ 3-7, that no real starting-point in philosophy can possibly be found except in a self-grounded judgment, proposition, or affirmation, and that self-groundedness consists in the actual identity in difference of ground and content. If any professed beginning in philosophy depends upon some other and prior judgment or presupposition, it is no real or absolute or "presuppositionless beginning;" the real beginning lies in that presupposition. The only way to avoid an interminable regress of relative beginnings is to find a judgment which affirms its own ground as its own content, and thereby affirms both in itself. Here, then, such a self-grounded judgment having been actually ascertained, we possess a critical principle by which we can scientifically determine the validity or invalidity of any and all starting-points in the historical series of philosophical systems. The only possible "presuppositionless beginning" must be one which contains in itself all its own presuppositions or grounds. Such a beginning is the Axiom of Philosophy, "Human knowledge exists," in which each condition in the immanent regress stands as simply an actualized particular case of the more widely universal condition on which it depends as a consequence, and in which, therefore, the whole series of conditions inheres, according to the principle that every universal inheres *wholly* in the totality of its own particulars, and *partly* in each and every one of them — just as

the organic constitution is immanent in the entire organism, and both immanent and transcendent in each and every separate organ. In the case of every other judgment, the regressive concatenation of conditions can be expressed solely by a chain of prior and separate judgments, of which each has a peculiar content different from that of every other; but, in the case of the Axiom of Philosophy, the regress of conditions, being immanent, is *expressed* in one and the same judgment, of which judgment this regress simply constitutes the necessary rational significance. In other words, whoever affirms that "Human knowledge exists" has affirmed objectively, whether he subjectively understands his own affirmation or not, the *one given fact* of which philosophy itself, in its entire rational development both as regress to conditions and as progress to consequences, is neither more nor less than the *absolutely necessary meaning*.

All philosophical education consists in gradually learning to understand this rational necessity, that is, in gradually expanding the mind to comprehend this necessary meaning of the Axiom of Philosophy. For the "existence of human knowledge" includes all that has yet been learned by the human mind, and the "advancement" of it consists in discovering its conditions and its consequences through the inseparable and ever-increasing co-activity of experience and reason. Philosophy itself is the self-comprehension of human knowledge as an organic whole, and its first problem is to understand the germ out of which that whole has grown. In the *knowledge that knowledge exists* lies that original germ; for, rationally developed, it is self-consciousness, race-consciousness, world-consciousness, and God-consciousness, all in one. It is at once beginning, principle, and universal explanation, in the wide meaning of the Greek ἀρχή; and all other knowledges, whether of conditions or of consequences, of particulars or of universals, are but "cases" of it. Because it is the only possible real beginning or principle of philosophy, it is the necessary presupposition of all merely apparent beginnings, and to it,

expressed or implied, confessed or unconfessed, all these must be referred. In the Axiom of Philosophy, therefore, we possess an unconditionally valid principle of philosophical criticism, by which we can determine the validity or invalidity of any and all professed starting-points in the historical series of philosophical systems. With respect to every such starting-point, this question must be put: *Is it an "intrinsic truth" or self-grounded judgment, in the sense that its ground is identical with its content?* In other words, *Is it a legitimate form of the Axiom of Philosophy?* If, then, the affirmation, "I think, therefore I am," is in truth equivalent to the one and only self-grounded affirmation, "Human knowledge exists," modern philosophy has already effected a real beginning. Otherwise, there exists a rational necessity for rethinking philosophy as the necessary outgrowth of that self-grounded affirmation — a necessity so profound and inexpugnable that nothing short of a philosophical revolution can satisfy the demands of reason. Such a rethinking of philosophy as the universal and necessary science of human knowledge will be the Philosophy of Philosophy, as distinguished from the history or the criticism of it.

§ 42. That such a rational necessity exists, and that such a philosophical revolution is impending, will appear indisputable to any thoughtful mind that frees itself from prevalent preconceptions so far as to examine with due care and candor the actual state of philosophy to-day. This presents no more striking characteristic than an ill-concealed despair of the possibility of philosophical construction on a universal scale — despair of the ability of the human mind, at least in its present stage of culture, to arrive at a *world-science at once unitary, universal, and demonstrative*. This despair crops out in myriad ways and forms in the philosophical literature of the period, especially in Germany, the birthplace of *reines Denken*, where the deep river of constructive philosophy seems for the present to have spread itself out, with the consequent sacrifice of depth,

into a wide and relatively shallow lagoon of historical and critical investigation.

For instance, in the first third of our own century, Hegel attempted to think the universe as necessarily and demonstratively one, by means of a dialectical and genetical development of the "categories of pure thought." But to-day, in one of the latest and most scholarly of the numerous recent histories of philosophy, Windelband limits himself to "the history of problems and of conceptions," as "a continuous and everywhere self-correlated whole,"—that is, as "the historical intertwisting of the various trains of thought out of which has grown the modern view of the world and of life;" and he concludes that this purely historical aim is to be fulfilled, "not by a dialectical evolution of categories, but only by an all-sided, unprejudiced, and thorough investigation of the facts."¹ Hence he emphasizes this definition: "The history of philosophy is the process by which European humanity has stored up its view of the world and its estimate of life in scientific concepts."² This scrupulous regard for historical truth prompts and justifies his animadversions upon Hegel's disregard of it, in forcing facts to suit his theory, and constructing an historical order after the pattern of the dialectical order of the categories.³ But Windelband's own standpoint is a frank confession that (in his opinion) Kant has "demonstrated the impossibility of a philosophical (metaphysical) world-science at the side of or above the particular sciences, and thereby once more limited and revolutionized the conception and problem of philosophy;" that thus "the province of philosophy as a particular science is narrowed to the Kantian self-criticism of reason," while its only universal function is the "practical direction of life;" and that this Kantian conception of philosophy is "new and to all appearance final," notwithstanding the candidly admitted

¹ W. Windelband, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vorwort, 1892.

² *Ibid.* Einleitung, p. 8.

³ *Ibid.* Einleitung, p. 9.

fact that the nineteenth century manifests a strong "inclination to absorb all human knowledge into philosophy and expand it into world-science."¹ This standpoint it is not unjust to characterize as despair of the ability of the human mind, in any possible stage of culture, to arrive at a world-science at once unitary, universal, and demonstrative.

§ 43. Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that this standpoint is well taken, precisely what does it mean? It is summed up in these four positions:

(1) Philosophy is impossible as a world-science, a universal science of science. This is true, because Kant "demonstrated" it.

(2) Philosophy is possible only as a particular science, — the Kantian self-criticism of reason.

(3) The history of philosophy is the process by which the European mind has formed a mass of scientific concepts respecting the world and human life.

(4) This purely historical mass of scientific concepts must be understood as a continuous and everywhere self-related whole (*ein zusammenhängendes und überall in einander greifendes Ganzes*), that is as a rational unity.

But is there no inherent difficulty in uniting these four positions with each other? Examination and comparison reveal a fundamental self-contradiction in Windelband's complex standpoint. The fourth position directly contradicts the first. To understand all scientific concepts as a rational whole is of itself to realize philosophy as a universal world-science. If these ultimate concepts of the European mind are left in their naked and brutal actuality as mere historic facts, unphilosophized, unrationalized, uncomprehended in their unity and universality as a rational or demonstrable system, it is self-evident that the fourth position must be surrendered. But, if they are understood as a rational system, then it is equally self-evident that the first position must be surrendered. The contradiction here seems insuperable. To succeed in re-

¹ W. Windelband, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Einleitung, p. 3.

ducing the mass of ultimate scientific concepts, as a fact of European history, to a rational or demonstrable whole, is to succeed in doing what Kant "demonstrated" cannot be done; it is to demonstrate the opposite, and overthrow Kant's asserted demonstration. If it is indeed "impossible" to arrive at philosophy as a unitary, universal, and demonstrative world-science, it is equally impossible to understand the mass of European scientific concepts as a rational whole. But, if it is indeed *possible* to understand the mass of European scientific concepts as a rational whole, then it is not only possible, but rationally and historically necessary, to arrive at philosophy as a unitary, universal, and demonstrative world-science. Waiving all other criticisms, it is obvious that, if Windelband has succeeded in his avowed purpose of understanding the historical mass of scientific concepts as a rational whole, he has himself refuted Kant by actually creating "a world-science at the side of or above the particular sciences," the "impossibility" of which he says that Kant "demonstrated;" and he has himself illustrated the practical necessity of a *philosophy* of philosophy, as the indispensable condition of a *philosophic history* of it. To the historian, the existence of a mass of European scientific concepts is a mere fact of history, a pure datum of experience, a simple affair of manuscripts, books, editions, libraries, given first of all to the historian's senses; and it would be idle to interpret the conversion of European concepts into a conceptual or rational whole as part of the "particular science" of the Kantian "self-criticism of reason," unless Europe itself, its history, and all the monuments and records of its history, can be shown to be deductions of "pure reason *a priori*." In truth, there are but two logical alternatives: either *Kant failed* to "demonstrate the impossibility of a philosophical world-science," or else *the historian himself has failed* to "understand" the mass of scientific concepts gained historically by "European humanity" as a rational whole, and thereby

failed to achieve his "principal aim" (*meine hauptsächliche Absicht*). The first and the fourth positions noted above are irreconcilable with each other.

Nay, more. Windelband's fourth position is nothing but an unconscious admission of the falsity of his own first position. Evidently, he himself has begun to outgrow the cramping Kantian apriorism. The philosophy which is to inherit the future, however, will recognize the falsity of that first position with complete and vigorous consciousness; Windelband's unconscious self-contradiction is but a dim dawning of that consciousness. The truth is that Kant utterly failed to demonstrate the impossibility of a philosophical world-science — utterly failed to restrict philosophy, as a particular science, to the self-criticism of reason — utterly failed to separate reason from experience as even possibly "pure," or to isolate it at all as a faculty which is capable of restricting itself in its cognitive function to self-criticism *a priori*. Most certainly, if reason could possibly abdicate its cognitive function as *knowledge of the world in itself*, it would have absolutely disqualified itself for its practical function as *direction of human life*; for ignorant direction is incalculably worse than no direction at all. How could reason direct practical life in a world of which it really knows nothing? If it is once admitted that the particular sciences are real knowledge of the world, as itself a reality existing independently of the mere individual subject (and Kant himself admits this in his doctrine of "consciousness in general," the universal consciousness of a human race which includes a multitude of individual subjects as "things in themselves"), it must be admitted that reason does not restrict itself (as Kant teaches that it does) to a particular science of philosophy as mere "criticism of reason by itself," but necessarily furnishes, in the mass of particular sciences, all the materials, data, or premises from which to construct a "philosophical world-science" (*Gesammtwissenschaft* or *philosophische Welterkenntniss*). Windelband's fourth

position, unconsciously contradicting his first, is an undeniable recognition of this truth, an unintended recognition of Kant's failure. To this extent, at least, Windelband has unconsciously repudiated the Kantian standpoint which he yet conceives himself to retain. That standpoint of "pure reason" is philosophy in a swoon; and the first symptom of its revival will be a conscious reversal of the Kantian revolution,—a conscious advance to the standpoint of *the identity in difference of experience and reason in the self-grounded judgment*, as the necessary and effective starting-point for a philosophy of philosophy.

§ 44. There must, then, be a "philosophical world-science." Kant's admission of the possibility of philosophy as a particular science logically involved the admission of its possibility as a universal science; for the particular can be grounded in and explained by the universal alone. This necessary consequence has been practically, though unconsciously, deduced by his successors, as we have just seen in one instance. No philosophic history of philosophy, such as Windelband has consciously aimed to produce, can possibly be written, unless it derives its principles of criticism and interpretation from the philosophy of philosophy, as its ground, explanation, and omnipresent guide. If, that is, a "philosophical world-science" is impossible, a philosophical history of philosophy is impossible; while, if philosophy is possible as a "particular science," it can be so only as a part of a universal science of science—a "philosophical world-science," or philosophy of philosophy. Such a world-science, when it comes, will be philosophy itself, unitary, universal, and demonstrative; and this it cannot be, unless it is the necessary and universal development of a single syllogistic principle, absolutely self-grounded in the sense that it contains within itself the entire regress or series of its own conditions, and absolutely comprehensive in the sense that the entire progress or series of its own consequences, involved in it and waiting to be evolved from it in strictly logical sequence, is

identical with the entire actual and potential development of universal human knowledge as a whole.

Now a single principle with these characteristics can be found nowhere but in the self-grounded and all-comprehensive affirmation that "human knowledge exists." The development of this principle can lead to the establishment of no system as a rigid finality incapable of growth, but rather to the establishment of a new conception of human knowledge itself, as an *organic unity of everywhere interpenetrating experience and reason*, whose growth can be limited by nothing so long as the human spirit continues to expand. It is a principle of infinite fertility, and dissipates at once the vain conceit of setting up fixed "limits of human knowledge." That is a philosophical superstition of the past, the irrationality of which will be explained in a later chapter. But the germinal judgment that "human knowledge exists" has been already shown to be at once empirical and rational — empirical as itself a fact of experience, rational in affirming the whole reason of that fact, and self-grounded in affirming both fact and reason simultaneously through the identity of its own ground and content. This is subsumption of experience under reason in cognition — the syllogism itself. The regress of grounds which is immanent in that affirmation, when this is understood as at once cognition, act, and effect, ends only in that ultimate Ground of Grounds which is the bottom reason or cause-ground of all facts as such — in the ultimate Reason-Energy of the World. *Human knowledge knowing and affirming itself as real* — this is the whole germinal fact of experience, of which all science and all philosophy are but the immanent development and elucidation by reason; the chronicles of philosophy are the whole literary record or contemporaneous self-registry of that elucidation throughout the ages, as the gradual coming to consciousness of reason in experience; and a genuinely philosophical history of philosophy will be a lucid, comprehensive, and reasoned digest of that vast record, determined throughout by the

philosophy of philosophy as the matured self-consciousness of reason in experience. That germinal fact of human knowledge, the actualized identity in difference of experience and reason, is the seed of all philosophy; denial of it, doubt of it, proof of it except from itself — these are alike impossible without an utterly destructive self-contradiction. Out of the Axiom of Philosophy, therefore, must be made the starting-point of the philosophy of philosophy, no matter how this fundamental principle may be phrased; it is the only possible test, standard, or criterion of the various starting-points which have been made from time to time in the history of philosophy; and the application of it must consist in a critical inquiry whether these various starting-points are identical with that Axiom in essential meaning.

§ 45. But, in order to understand that inquiry, it is of the first importance to observe that the Axiom of Philosophy is no empty form of words, but both expresses and constitutes a vital act — an act of living self-realization — a veritable *Thathandlung*. The universal knowledge which it affirms becomes a particular reality in that very affirmation, and exists then and there as a fact of experience in the affirming subject. It realizes and proves itself; for the conscious self-affirmation of knowledge is its self-demonstration by deed. The judgment that "human knowledge exists" cannot be understandingly uttered except as a conscious act of human knowledge itself — knowledge which is simultaneously actual, necessary, and one: *actual*, as a fact of experience then and there in the affirming human subject; *necessary*, as the absolute condition, reason, ground, of any rational affirmation by any human subject; and *one*, as the real genus inclusive of all rational affirmations by all human subjects, — immanent in all these affirmations as a whole, and both immanent and transcendent in each of them as a part, — phaenomenally known, therefore, as an *actual unit of experience* in each human subject, and noumenally known as a *necessary universal of reason* both in and beyond each human subject.

Consequently, the uttered or written Axiom of Philosophy, as starting-point, positive affirmation, and fundamental principle, is at once a fact of being and a fact of thought, an indissoluble union of existence and knowledge. It is a particular instance or concrete case of the identity in difference of experience and reason, which is here and now exemplified or illustrated by the identity in difference of its own content and ground. On the one hand, when fully understood, it declares the existence of "human knowledge" in a twofold form: (1) *unitary knowledge*, as an individual mode of reality in the form of an actual cognition in particular, or experience as knowledge of a single rational judgment with a definite content; and (2) *universal knowledge*, as a generic mode of reality in the form of cognition in general, or reason as knowledge of the necessary ground of all rational judgments with whatever content. On the other hand, it is itself a case of the very "existence" of human knowledge which it declares: (1) *unitary existence*, as a single cognitive act performed by the affirming subject in the moment of affirmation; and (2) *universal existence*, as the actual presence in one cognitive act of that necessary generic reason or ground without which no cognitive act is possible. The only valid reason for affirming the existence of knowledge is the actual existence of the knowledge which is affirmed; for nothing can be rationally affirmed to exist, unless it both exists and is known to exist. That is, the affirmation of the actual and particular existence of knowledge here and now, as a fact of experience in the affirming subject, is conditioned on its actual, universal, and relatively necessary existence, as the absolute ground of all rational affirmations. Thus both the content and the ground of the Axiom are not only affirmations, but facts, too. The content is a particular fact, and the ground is a universal fact; and here, as always, the particular is conditioned by the universal. The content and the ground are identical in difference, just as the particular and the universal are always identical in difference;

the content is a particular vital act of self-knowing knowledge in the affirming subject, while the ground in its entirety is that series of grounds which, at once immanent and transcendent in the particular act, is at bottom the universal, necessary, and absolute Ground of Grounds—the self-knowing activity or Reason-Energy of the World, without which, as the absolutely *conditioning and self-knowing universal* (God), the particular subject could neither exist nor rationally affirm itself to exist as a *conditioned and self-knowing individual* (Man). This great conclusion, reached apodeictically through the regress to conditions immanent in the Axiom of Philosophy itself, may be reached no less apodeictically in the progress to consequences evolved from that Axiom; whence it will appear that God is at once the Alpha and the Omega of all human thought, as the explanation of experience by reason in philosophy. For the entire process of philosophy, whenever it comes to comprehend itself as the universalized scientific method, can be nothing else than the rational evolution of that World-Axiom, affirming the total knowledge of man in a seemingly lifeless and indeterminate universality, into the determinate organic unity of a living and growing World-Science as the knowledge of God. The whole process is immanent in human knowledge, and the beginning and the end are one.

§ 46. When, therefore, reformed modern philosophy makes its "presuppositionless beginning" in the self-grounded affirmation that "human knowledge exists," it begins with no abstraction whatever, no empty verbal formula, but with the objective reality and indivisible identity of the particular and the universal, as (1) content and ground, (2) experience and reason, (3) existence and knowledge, (4) causality and rationality, and (5) *causa sui* and *ratio sui*, or Being and Thought: not without difference, but in difference, as distinguishable but inseparable in the empirically apprehended and rationally comprehended fact of human knowledge. The criterion

of all philosophical beginnings, and therefore of the "I think, therefore I am," must be the critical principle of self-groundedness, or identity of content and ground; because, if the judgment which constitutes the starting-point of philosophical exposition is not self-grounded, it is not a starting-point at all, but the real starting-point must be sought in some presuppositionless prior judgment external to it. As literature, philosophy must begin its reasoned process with some verbally stated principle which admits neither of denial nor of doubt nor of demand for proof. Hence it lies under a twofold necessity: the practical necessity of beginning with some positive affirmation, and the rational necessity of beginning with no ungrounded affirmation. The only way to reconcile these two necessities and effect a start at once positive and rational is to begin with a judgment which affirms its own rational ground as its own empirical content, and thus meets the demand for self-groundedness through the identity of its own content and ground.

Now, on the one hand, the judgment that "human knowledge exists" is the only rational affirmation which could not be denied without involving an absolute intrinsic contradiction between content and ground in the naked denial itself (§ 12). On the other hand, the content of the affirmation is itself a mere matter of fact; there was a time when human knowledge did not exist at all, and it is remarkable that what cannot be denied without absolute absurdity should yet not exist of absolute necessity. It is the combination of these two characteristics in one judgment, and in only one, which assigns to the Axiom of Philosophy an altogether unique position among rational affirmations, and makes it the only possible real starting-point in philosophy itself. For what the Axiom establishes beyond the possibility of denial or doubt is this:

I. The actual, not the necessary, existence of human knowledge as a particular fact of experience in the particular affirming subject.

II. The relative, not the absolute, necessity of the existence of human knowledge as the universal fact of reason, *if* that existence is to be affirmed at all as a particular fact of experience by any particular subject.

III. The absolute necessity of the dependence of particular fact on universal fact, consequence on condition, or content on ground, as both immanent in the affirmation itself, whenever, wherever, and by whatever subject that affirmation may be made.

From the very nature of the case, no other judgment than the "human knowledge exists" can possibly satisfy the twofold practical and rational necessity above pointed out, or effect a self-grounded beginning for philosophical procedure. If the "I think, therefore I am," says in substance precisely the same thing as the "human knowledge exists," then it has effected a rational or self-grounded philosophical start. But if it says something less or other than this, then it really depends on this as unacknowledged presupposition, and has effected a merely artificial or conventional, not a self-grounded or rational beginning in the history of philosophy. To determine this point is the aim of the following examination.

§ 47. The "I think, therefore I am," is an affirmation, proposition, or judgment, and, if true, must be grounded on real knowledge. But no affirmation is itself the real knowledge on which it is grounded. The knowledge is an original fact of existence; affirmation of it is a dependent and derivative fact of thought and speech, not at all necessary to the existence of that original fact, since we all know multitudes of things of which we are not at present thinking or speaking; and the original fact itself is the only rational ground for affirming it. Consequently, as has been shown, unless the particular content of an affirmation is its own universal ground, the affirmation itself cannot be self-grounded, that is, cannot be a first or self-demonstrative affirmation in philosophy, but necessarily depends on some prior and different affirmation, expressed

or implied, which has its own ground as its own content. *Self-groundedness*, then, is the necessary mark of any philosophical beginning that shall begin in a rational and not merely historical sense—the universal test or criterion of all actual beginnings in the history of philosophy—the only possible realization of the philosophical ideal of “presuppositionlessness” (*Voraussetzungslosigkeit*).¹

Now the real ground of the judgment that “human knowledge exists” is the fact that human knowledge does really exist. If the judgment, in which content and ground are identical, should be resolved into two judgments affirming content and ground separately, it could only take this form: “human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists.” Here the former expresses the ground, and the latter the content. But the double judgment says neither more nor less than the original single judgment—adds to it absolutely nothing of essential meaning; for the entire ground of it was already fully and completely expressed in the content. Hence it is impossible to discover a prior affirmation on which, *as a ground different from itself*, the original affirmation may depend; and this, therefore, is an absolutely first and underived affirmation—that is, one which, as content, is derived solely from itself, as ground. Thus the Axiom of Philosophy meets the critical test of self-groundedness, or unconditionedness, or “presupposi-

¹ “Die erste Frage sonach wäre die: wie ist das Ich für sich selbst? das erste Postulat: denke dich, construire den Begriff deiner selbst, und bemerke, wie du dies machst.” (Fichte, Werke, I. 458.) “Ein voraussetzungsloser Anfang wie ihn die Philosophie braucht, ist nicht durch eine Behauptung oder einen Satz zu finden, sondern durch eine *Forderung*, welche Jedermann zu erfüllen im Stande sein muss: ‘*Denke dich selbst!*’” (Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1892, p. 464.) Manifestly enough, there is no “presuppositionless beginning” here. A postulate presupposes a *postulator*; a demand presupposes a *demand*er. The only possible “presuppositionless beginning” must remain a judgment which carries all its own presuppositions, conditions, or grounds *in itself*—an “intrinsic truth.” Only in that can philosophy really begin. Every other ostensible beginning is a delusion and a snare.

tionlessness,” as the only philosophical criterion of philosophical beginnings.

§ 48. Tested, however, by the same criterion, how does it stand with the “I think, therefore I am”? Descartes well understood and deeply felt the rational necessity of discovering somewhere an absolute certainty to begin with, an unconditionally certain starting-point, if he was ever to escape from the maze of universal doubt in which he found himself. “I will reject everything which admits of even a particle of doubt, no less severely than if I had found it to be altogether false; and I will go on until I learn something for certain, even if it proves to be no more than the certainty that nothing is certain. Archimedes demanded nothing but a point that should be firm and immovable, in order to move the whole earth from its place; and great things may be hoped for, if I shall discover even a most trivial truth that is certain and unshaken.”¹ He believed that he had found this Archimedean point of absolute certainty in the “I think, therefore I am.”

That this maxim was deliberately and advisedly adopted by Descartes himself as the foundation and rational starting-point of his whole philosophy cannot be doubted in view of his own repeated statements of the fact. For instance: “Observing that this truth, *I think, therefore I am*, was so solidly based that all the most extravagant vagaries of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I judged that I could receive it without hesitation as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.”² And again: “It is a self-contradiction to suppose that that which thinks does not exist at the very time in which it thinks. Hence this cognition, ‘I think, therefore I am,’ is of all cognitions the first and most certain that occurs to any methodical philosopher (*cuiuslibet ordine philosophanti*).”³ From Descartes the maxim has been received with substantial unanimity

¹ *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, Med. II.

² *Discours de la Méthode*, Œuvres, ed. Cousin, II. 153.

³ *Principia Philosophiæ*, I. 7.

by all succeeding thinkers as the first clear and epochal formulation¹ of that principle in which consists the char-

¹ Windelband claims for Augustine the honor of having first effected this clear formulation of subjectivism. He maintains that, "as a philosopher, he made the *principle of the self-certainty of consciousness* the centre of all his ideas;" that "all these ideas have their ultimate basis and their inner union in the principle of *self-certain inwardness*, which Augustine first expressed with complete clearness, and formulated and treated as the starting-point of philosophy;" that, in virtue of this advanced principle of pure subjectivism, "he shot far ahead of his own time and no less the centuries which succeeded, and became one of the *founders of modern thought*;" and that he anticipated Descartes in extracting from universal doubt the special argument for "the valuable truth of the *reality of the conscious being*: even if I should err in everything else, I cannot err in this, for, in order to err, I must be." (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, pp. 217, 218.) Indeed, Arnauld had already quoted Augustine to Descartes himself on this last point (*Meditationes, Objectiones, Quartae*, p. 108, ed. 1663). In support of the above claim for Augustine, however, Windelband cites from the latter's *De Vera Religione*, 39: 72, the following passage: "*Noli foras ire; in te ipsum redi: in interiore homine habitat veritas.*" But, by quoting these words alone, and italicizing the words "*interiore homine*" instead of the word "*veritas*," Windelband misses the main drift of Augustine's far profounder meaning, which is, not to assert the mere subjective certainty or "reality of the conscious being," but, on the contrary, to emphasize his *absolute objective dependence on that universal reason, truth, or light* — that "*lumen rationis*" which Augustine himself explains, in § 73, as "*lumen verum quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum*" (*Joan. I. 9*) — *which is at once immanent and transcendent in the individual*. The importance of this point is so great, rationally as well as historically, as to justify citation of the whole passage, in which we italicize the words that most pointedly correct Windelband's too subjective interpretation: "72. Quaere in corporis voluptate quid teneat, nihil aliud invenies quam *convenientiam*: nam si resistentia pariant dolorem, convenientia pariunt voluptatem. Recognosce igitur quae sit *summa convenientia*. Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat *veritas*; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, TRANSCENDE ET TEIPSUM. Sed memento cum te transcendis, *ratiocinantem animam te transcendere*. Illuc ergo tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. Quo enim pervenit omnis bonus ratiocinator, nisi *ad veritatem*? cum ad seipsam veritas non utique ratiocinando perveniat, sed *quod ratiocinantes appetunt, ipsa sit*. Vide ibi convenientiam qua superior esse non possit, et *ipse conveni cum ea*. CONFITERE TE NON ESSE QUOD IPSA EST: siquidem se ipsa non quaerit; tu autem

acteristic standpoint of modern philosophy, namely, the "self-certainty of individual consciousness." But, what-

ad ipsam quaerendo venisti, non locorum spatio, sed mentis affectu, UT IPSE INTERIOR HOMO CUM SUO INHABITATORE, non infima et carnali, sed summa et spirituali voluptate, CONVENIAT. 73 . . . Deinde regulam ipsam quam vides, concipe hoc modo: Omnis qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit, et de hac re quam intelligit certus est: de vero igitur certus est. Omnis igitur qui utrum sit veritas dubitat, in seipso habet verum unde non dubitat; NEC ULLUM VERUM NISI VERITATE VERUM EST. Non itaque oportet eum de veritate dubitare, qui potuit undecumque dubitare. Ubi videntur haec, ibi est lumen sine spatio locorum et temporum, etsine ullo spatorum talium phantasmate. Numquid ista ex aliqua parte corrumpi possunt, *etiamsi omnis ratiocinator intereat*, aut apud carnales inferos veterascat? Non enim ratiocinatio talia *facit*, sed *invenit*. Ergo antequam inveniantur, IN SE MANENT, et cum inveniuntur, *nos innovant*." (Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia, ed. J. P. Migne, Paris, 1861, III.) All that Windelband gets out of this wonderfully luminous passage is mere evidence to prove that the "self-certainty of consciousness," construed as no more than a *fact* of "inner experience," is the central or pivotal principle of Augustine's entire philosophy: "The rescue from doubt, therefore, consists in the *Augustinian argument of the reality of the conscious being*. But Descartes's application of it is not the same as that made by Augustine and the majority of those who were influenced by him in the transition period. For the latter, the self-certainty of the soul was simply the surest of all experiences, the bottom fact of internal perception; in consequence of which, internal perception came to outweigh external perception in their theory of knowledge. . . . But for Descartes, on the contrary, the proposition *cogito sum* had not so much the meaning of an experience, as rather that of the primary, fundamental, rational *truth*, the evidence of which was not that of a conclusion, but that of immediate *intuitive certainty*." (Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 309.) Nothing could be more unhistorical than this treatment of Augustine, and it is not necessary to travel beyond the passage quoted in order to become convinced of the one-sidedness of such treatment. Augustine's essential positions here are these: (1) all pleasure is explicable as *harmony*; (2) the highest harmony, and therefore the supreme felicity, is harmony of the individual soul with the universal truth; (3) on the one hand, universal truth is *immanent* in the "inner man," as his spiritual "indweller" (*inhabitor*)—as that universal reason from which his own "reasoning soul" derives the "light of reason" itself; (4) on the other hand, universal truth is *transcendent* to the "inner man," is "itself that which thou art not," but is, nevertheless, that to which thou must rise by "transcending thyself;" (5) the "inner man" ought to harmonize himself with "his own indweller,"

ever loose or extravagant claims may have been made for this formula, it cannot be the rational beginning of any

and through this harmony attain that pure pleasure which is not of the flesh, but rather of the spirit; (6) universal truth exists above the individual "conscious being," constitutes that universal "light of reason" which conditions all his perceptions of particular truths, and constrains him to recognize its own transcendent existence just as soon as he comes to know a single particular truth, even that of his own existence as a mere doubter; and (7) this universal truth or reason exists "in itself," can be only discovered, not created, by the "reasoning being" (*ratiocinator*), and would still exist "in itself," although "every reasoning being should perish." This doctrine of the ontological reality or *necessary objectivity of truth*, as that universal "light of reason" which is independent of "every reasoner" and conditions his very existence as a "reasoning soul," is the diametrical opposite of the Kantian doctrine of the *necessary subjectivity of truth*, as the totality of "laws prescribed to Nature" by the legislative human "consciousness in general." No penetrating student of philosophy will confound these two doctrines. The fact that Augustine made the former doctrine the true "centre of all his ideas in philosophy" renders him, notwithstanding the identity of one of his arguments with one of Descartes's and other minor but superficial resemblances to modern writers, a formulator, not of the one-sided modern subjectivism, not of the merely subjective "self-certainty of consciousness" or "reality of the conscious being," but of the broader and profounder objectivism of ancient Greek philosophy, as applied to religion by Neo-Platonism and Christianity. In short, Augustine is not correctly to be regarded as "one of the founders of modern philosophy," as distinguished from ancient philosophy by the principle of subjectivism. Neither is it correct to represent Augustine as taking the "reality of the conscious being" to be a mere *fact of inner experience*, and Descartes as taking it to be the *primary truth of reason*; for this distinction to the disadvantage of Augustine is prohibited by the latter's words above, where he lays down his *regula ipsa*: "Every one who knows that he doubts knows a particular truth (*verum*), and, concerning this fact which he knows, is certain. Every one, therefore, who doubts whether universal truth (*veritas*) exists, has in himself a particular truth about which he does not doubt; and *no particular truth is true, except through universal truth*." Descartes himself never asserted the universality of rational truth so profoundly or so precisely as Augustine here asserts it. For to Descartes universal truths are immanent alone (Prin. Phil. I. 48: — *aeternas veritates, nullam existentiam extra cogitationem nostram habentes*); while to Augustine, as shown above, they are both immanent and transcendent. Augustine was a Greek Realist; Descartes, like all subjectivists, was a Conceptualistic Nominalist (Prin. Phil. I. 58:

philosophy, unless it meets the critical test of self-groundedness through the identity of its own ground and content. What, then, is its own ground?

§ 49. What renders an affirmation rational is the fact that there is a *valid reason for making it in knowledge that it is true*. This knowledge—actually existent knowledge—is the only valid reason or ground for making the affirmation at all. If it is not *known* that the content, the thing affirmed, actually is as it is affirmed to be, then the affirmation itself is not rational—has no valid reason or ground at all. A true affirmation is one which has this only valid reason or ground in real knowledge; an untrue affirmation is one which has no such ground. If the knowledge is not real, actual, existent,—if the affirmation is made on no better ground than a mistake or false semblance of knowledge,—then the affirmation itself is a mistake, not a rational affirmation at all. Only the true affirmation can be a rational affirmation; its truth is its rationality, and its rationality is its actual groundedness in knowledge, not in mistake or mere semblance of knowledge, as the reason why it is affirmed.

It would not be relevant here to object that we cannot tell whether a given affirmation is true or not, unless we possess some absolute criterion of truth, some infallible test by which to distinguish between real knowledge and its false semblance. The objection, if it were relevant, would have to be met by seeking at once to determine such a criterion or test. But it is not relevant here, because that is not the point under consideration. In §§ 11, 12, and 13, demonstrative proof has been found that the existence of human knowledge can neither be denied, nor doubted, nor proved except from itself; the affirmation of it, therefore, is well grounded, rational, and true, since the content or thing affirmed is the very ground of all ration-

—*numerus . . . est modus cogitandi duntaxat, ut et alia omnia quae universalialia vocamus*) ; and inappreciation of this pregnant fact is the root of Windelband's misinterpretation.

ality and truth in human judgments. The immediate question now is whether the judgment, "I think, therefore I am," the truth of which is not in the least impugned or doubted, but, on the contrary, fully conceded, is equally self-grounded, equally a real beginning in philosophy. If its ground is identical with its content, it is self-grounded in this very identity. Otherwise, it must have a ground different from its content, and for that reason alone, however true as a judgment, be neither self-grounded nor a philosophical beginning.

Now the ground of the judgment, "I think," as a rational judgment, must be the fact that "I know." If this be expressed, the affirmation becomes, "I know that I think." Shall we say, then, that knowing and thinking are absolutely identical, in so strict a sense that the content of the affirmation, "I think," is absolutely one and the same with its ground, "I know"? This must be conclusively established, if the *cogito ergo sum* is to meet the critical test or be a really first affirmation in philosophy.

§ 50. Probably, however, when this question is explicitly put, no one will venture to maintain that "I think" and "I know" mean absolutely one and the same thing.¹ Think-

¹ Kant himself, however inadequately, distinguishes the two: "Sich einen Gegenstand *denken* und einen Gegenstand *erkennen* ist also nicht einerlei. Zum Erkenntnisse gehören nämlich zwei Stücke: erstlich der Begriff, dadurch überhaupt ein Gegenstand gedacht wird (die Kategorie) und zweitens die Anschauung, dadurch er gegeben wird." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III, 123-4). A man who in the dark takes a white horse for a ghost has both "concept" and "intuition," but certainly no "knowledge" of the "object of experience." A concept and an intuition together are not enough to constitute knowledge; this requires a third element not recognized by Kant, namely, *truth*, or real agreement of the concept with its object. It would avail nothing to argue that to subsume the intuition of the "object" under the concept "ghost" is to subsume the intuition under the wrong concept; for what makes the concept "ghost" a *wrong* concept, except the fact that it *fails to agree with the object*? Both intuition and concept must agree with the object, or there can be no knowledge, no truth, as Kuno Fischer sees and says (*cf.* next footnote). This insight is at least as old as Aristotle: "Ein Urtheil ist

ing may be, and often is, no better than a tissue of falsities, mistakes, delusions, confusions, contradictions. It may be either (1) a truth grounded on knowledge, or (2) an error grounded on ignorance, or, as more commonly happens, (3) a mixture of truth and error grounded on half knowledge and half-ignorance — on mere inaccuracy. Thought may be either true or false. But knowledge must be thought which is true — thought which actually conforms the relational constitution of the concept to that of the object conceived, whether this object be interpreted as mere phaenomenon or as both phaenomenon and noumenon.¹ Every object may be "thought" to be what it is not; but no possible object can be "known" to be otherwise than as it is. This fundamental difference between thought and

wahr, wenn das Denken, dessen innere Vorgänge durch die Sprache bezeichnet werden, dasjenige für verknüpft oder getrennt hält, was in der Wirklichkeit verknüpft oder getrennt ist, falsch, wenn das Gegenheil stattfindet." (E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II. ii, 219 f.).

¹ Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 1889, I. i. 4: "Wahr ist nur diejenige Vorstellung, welche der Sache oder ihrem Gegenstande vollkommen entspricht. Hier aber giebt es bloss die beiden Möglichkeiten, dass die Uebereinstimmung zwischen Vorstellung und Sache entweder stattfindet oder nicht; in dem ersten Fall ist die Vorstellung wahr, in dem andern falsch." Fischer here indicates the third element of knowledge which Kant omits (see previous note): namely, agreement of the concept with its object — for *Begriff*, as well as *Anschauung*, is *Vorstellung*. Even Hegel recognizes this agreement as necessary to knowledge in the sense of "correctness": "Unter Wahrheit versteht man zunächst, dass ich *wisse* wie etwas *ist*. Diess ist jedoch die Wahrheit nur in Beziehung auf das Bewusstsein, oder die formelle Wahrheit, die blosser Richtigkeit." (Werke, VI. 386.) What he calls "truth in the deeper sense" (*Ibid.* 334, 386-7) is nothing but agreement of the object with its own idea or ideal — *ethical truth*, in a sense which identifies the truth with the good and the untrue with the bad, and which has, therefore, no relevancy to the purely scientific problem. The latter concerns only the agreement of concept and object, as Hegel himself understands: "Das Ziel aber ist dem Wissen eben so nothwendig, als die Reihe des Fortganges, gesteckt; es ist da, wo es nicht mehr über sich selbst hinaus zu gehen nöthig hat, wo es sich selbst findet, und der Begriff dem Gegenstande, der Gegenstand dem Begriffe entspricht." (Werke, II. 65.)

knowledge, whatever inferences may be drawn from it, constitutes the only possible foundation of a scientific epistemology. Thought and knowledge, then, are not identical, and cannot be scientifically identified, so long as ignorance and error, that is, facts of thought which are not facts of knowledge, continue to make a part of human experience. Clearly, then, to affirm that "I think" is by no means to affirm that "I know." To take the famous Cartesian maxim, therefore, as a rationally first affirmation in philosophy, is altogether to lose sight of the truth that every philosophical affirmation, in order to be rational, must have its bottom reason or ground in real knowledge, as an absolutely undemonstrable yet absolutely undeniable fact of existence; it is to mistake a derivative for a self-derived judgment; it is not to see that, back of the "I think, therefore I am," lies necessarily the simple "I know," as its rigorously implied prior affirmation, its rational ground different from and external to itself, since the "I think," or content, is by no means identical with this ground, and since knowing, not mere thinking, is that aboriginal fact with which all philosophy must begin. Hence the "I think, therefore I am," failing to exhibit identity of content and ground, cannot be the rationally or logically first affirmation of any philosophy whatever. In other words, it completely fails to meet the philosophical test of self-groundedness, and is no real beginning in philosophy at all.

§ 51. If, nevertheless, the "I think, therefore I am" has been accepted by modern philosophy as the aboriginal "presuppositionless position" of self-consciousness, the thinking subject, or *thought as such*, and therefore its own rationally first affirmation,¹ — if, in strict consequence, mod-

¹ It is unnecessary to cite many illustrations of this general acceptance. A few will suffice. "Mit der sicheren Einfachheit, welche das Genie kennzeichnet, vollbringt er [Descartes], was Not thut, indem er der Philosophie im Selbstbewusstsein einen festen Ausgangspunkt bescheert, in der Folgerung aus klaren und deutlichen Begriffen ein des Erfolges sicheres Ver-

ern philosophy has aimed persistently at the *knowledge of thought* rather than at the *knowledge of knowledge*, — and if, still in strict consequence, modern philosophy has arrived at the conclusion that there is no real knowledge whatever except the knowledge of thought, — the bridgelessness of the chasm between modern philosophy and modern science in their present condition is but the severe penalty entailed upon a seemingly trivial, yet in reality a momentous error. How great was this error, and how necessarily it lurked in this false beginning, appears conspicuously in the very first consequence which Descartes himself drew from his own first principle.

fahren darbietet und in der mechanischen Naturerklärung die dringlichste und zukunftsreichste Aufgabe stellt.” (R. Falckenberg, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 1892, p. 70.) — “Seine Philosophie will eine Universalmathematik sein. . . . Um so grösser aber war die Macht seiner Einwirkung auf die philosophische Entwicklung, in der er der beherrschende Geist für das 17. Jahrhundert und darüber hinaus gewesen ist. Denjenigen methodischen Gedanken, welche Bacon und Galilei gemeinsam sind, fügte Descartes ein Postulat von grösster Tragweite hinzu: er verlangte, dass die inductive oder resolutive Methode zu einem *einzig* Princip höchster und absoluter Gewissheit führen solle, von dem aus alsdann nach compositiver Methode der gesammte Umfang der Erfahrung seine Erklärung finden müsse. Diese Forderung war durchaus originell und wurzelte in dem Bedürfniss nach einem systematischen Zusammenhange aller menschlichen Erkenntniss: sie beruhte zuletzt auf dem Ueberdruß an der traditionellen Aufnahme des historisch zusammengelesenen Wissens und auf der Sehnsucht nach einer neuen philosophischen Schöpfung aus Einem Guss. So will denn Descartes durch eine inductive Enumeration und eine kritische Sichtung aller Vorstellungen zu dem einzig gewissen Punkte vordringen, um von hier aus die Ableitung aller weiteren Wahrheiten zu gewinnen. . . . Die *Seinsgewissheit des Bewusstseins* ist die einheitliche und fundamentale Wahrheit, welche Descartes durch die analytische Methode findet.” (W. Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, 1892, pp. 307–309.) — “‘*C’est moi, que je peins!*’ Dies ist der Standpunkt, auf welchem Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) im Schlusspunkt der philosophischen Renaissance erscheint; dieser Satz ist das ausgesprochene und durchgängige Thema seiner Selbstschilderungen oder Essays (1580–1588). . . . Montaigne steht an der Schwelle der neuen Philosophie, die er *nicht* überschreitet. Diese beginnt, wo jener endet: mit dem auf die Selbstbeobachtung und Selbstprüfung gegründeten Zwei-

§ 52. The "I think, therefore I am," having been laid down as the one self-evident certainty and absolute starting-point of his philosophy, Descartes's first question was: "What am I?" He thus answered his own question: "Hence I knew that I was a substance of which the whole essence or nature is merely to think, and which, in order to be, needs no place and depends on no material thing; so that this I, that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is totally independent of the body, is still easier to understand than the body, and, even though the body did not exist, would continue to be all that it is."¹ Similarly: "Of those things which I attributed to the soul, what [really

fel, der auch den Glauben an die Natur, aber an die *Erkennbarkeit* derselben in sich schliesst. Es ist der die Erkenntniss suchende und erzeugende Zweifel, der Bacon und Descartes, die Begründer der neuen Philosophie, bewegt." (K. Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, 1889, I. i, pp. 107, 108.) — "Das Denken muss von sich anfangen, und diess ist der voraussetzungslose Anfang der Philosophie." (C. Prantl, Die Bedeutung der Logik für den jetzigen Standpunkt der Philosophie, 1849, I. i, p. 122). — "Die Philosophie ist voraussetzungslos. Diese Voraussetzungslosigkeit ist ihr Anfang, derjenige Anfang, durch welchen sie sich von allen andern Wissenschaften unterscheidet, und erst als eigentümliche, selbständige Wissenschaft entsteht. Sie ist der Begriff der Philosophie, so wie derselbe in ihrem Anfange auftritt. . . . Die Aufhebung aller Voraussetzung muss also zugleich absolute Setzung sein. . . . Die Setzung, wie gefordert wurde, ist zugleich Setzung aller Realität. . . . Dieser Anfang der Philosophie ist absolut; die Philosophie fängt schlechthin an. Er ist grundlos, unbeweisbar; aber er bedarf auch keines Beweises. Beides, weil er eine Setzung ist, die alle Voraussetzung aufhebt. . . . Der Anfang der Philosophie ist das reine Ich. . . . Rein ist es, weil es, was es ist, nur als sein Thun ist. Das reine Ich ist daher Eine Handlung in unendlich vielen, so dass jede einzelne nur Handlung ist, indem sie zugleich alle ist, und die Einheit der Handlung selbst in der Form der Vielheit sich darstellt. . . . Die Aufhebung aller Voraussetzung, welche zugleich absolute Setzung ist, ist in dem berühmten Satze des Cartesius: *dubito, cogito, ergo sum*, und in seiner Lehre von Gott, als dem Erkenntnissprincip des Realen, ausgesprochen." (J. F. Reiff, Der Anfang der Philosophie, 1840, pp. 1-11.) — "Jener Satz, um den, wie man sagen kann, sich das ganze Interesse der neuen Philosophie dreht . . . *cogito, ergo sum*." (Hegel, Encyclopädie, Werke, VI. 132.)

¹ Discours de la Méthode, Œuvres, I. 158-159.

belongs to it]? To be nourished, or to walk? If I no longer have a body, these things, too, are nothing but fancies. To feel? This, also, does not happen without a body, and in dreams I have seemed to feel very many things which afterwards I knew I had not felt. To think? Here I make a discovery; thought is — this alone cannot be separated from me — I am — I exist — that is certain. But how long? Verily, as long as I think; for, if I should wholly cease to think, it might happen, perhaps, that I should instantly and wholly cease to be. I concede nothing now except what is necessarily true. To speak precisely, therefore, I am only a thing which thinks [*tantum res cogitans*], that is, a mind, or soul, or intellect, or reason — words of a meaning before unknown to me. I am, then, a real and really existing thing. But what sort of thing? I have told: a thing which thinks.”¹

Here Descartes fully and freely develops, in his own way, the whole meaning or intellectual content of his own fundamental principle: “I think, therefore I am. What am I? I am only a thing which thinks” (*tantum res cogitans — cogitationem solam*). Applying, therefore, the equation thus carefully established, “I = a thing which thinks,” and substituting in his principle the second for the first member of this equation, as its precise equivalent, the principle takes this cruel form: “*A thing which thinks thinks, therefore a thing which thinks is only a thing which thinks.*”

So fatal is it to begin amiss! This is the necessary and only logical result of taking individual thought, and not universal knowledge, as the first fact of philosophy. But is it a rationally significant result? “*A thing which thinks thinks, therefore a thing which thinks is a thing which thinks.*” This platitude exhausts the rational significance of the *ego cogito, ergo sum*, and shrivels it up into the empty tautology of a purely abstract identical proposition. All that it actually affirms may be condensed into the short single judgment: “Individual thought exists.” But what

¹ *Meditatio Secunda*, ed. 1663, pp. 10, 11.

here becomes of the individual I—what becomes of the “self-certainty of the conscious being” as a *particular consciousness here and now*?

§ 53. The truth is, Descartes unconsciously plays fast and loose with his *ego*, and modern philosophy keeps up the same game to the present day. The (*ego*) *cogito, ergo sum*, affirms, indeed, the existence of individual thought; but this Descartes himself interprets, now as present consciousness or *individual experience*, and now as *universal reason*—now as a concrete or “empirical I,” and now as an abstract or “pure I,” that is, a rational I pure from all experience. In other words, he takes the *ego* now as an empirical unit, now as a rational universal, not determining accurately in his own mind the relation of the two, but leaving his treatment open to the charge of confusion of thought. In order to arrive at clearness on this subject a threefold distinction must be made between the purely empirical I, the purely rational I, and the real I, both empirical and rational at once. The first two concepts rest on the separation of experience and reason, while the third concept rests on their identity in difference. If it is true, as Erdmann maintains, that “the course of modern philosophy henceforth is, not to reach the self by starting from the world or God, but to find the way back to a world and to God by starting from the self,”¹ then it is evident that Descartes led and still leads the “modern” philosophical movement as Subjectivism, and it becomes of paramount importance to clear away all confusion from the concept of the self or I. To this end the distinction named is essential, and we shall now proceed to consider it at length.

¹ J. E. Erdmann, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 4, 3d ed.

CHAPTER III

THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL

§ 54. THE purely empirical I is an attempt to conceive the self as a collection of *units without a universal*, a succession of differing states of consciousness without a necessary ground of identity, a series of transient and multiple *acts* without a permanent and unitary *conditioning activity*. The most forcible expression of this theory, perhaps, is that of Hume:—

“But, further, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . Setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different (times), whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.

. . . It is evident that the identity which we attribute to the human mind, however perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which are essential to them. It is still true that every distinct perception which enters into the composition of the mind is a distinct existence, and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive. But as, notwithstanding this distinction and separability, we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises concerning this relation of identity, whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or only associates their ideas in the imagination; that is, in other words, whether, in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them. This question we might easily decide, if we would recollect what has been already proved at large, that the understanding never observes any real connection among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas. For from thence it evidently follows that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them.”¹

§ 55. The concept of the purely empirical I, therefore, is that of a succession of perceptions which contain no principle of union whatever, each subsisting independently in itself as a “distinct existence” which is “different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive,” and which has “no need of anything to support its existence.” But this is a self-contradictory and self-destructive concept, because it is an attempt to conceive *units of a kind, yet without conceiving any kind*. Hume’s “succession of perceptions,” however self-subsistent he may imagine these to be, is necessarily conditioned on *perception itself*, on that unitary

¹ David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section 6. (Philosophical Works, ed. 1854, I. 312–321.)

and universal perceiving energy of which each particular perception is merely a single case, and which of itself must really connect all particular perceptions, if these are to constitute a real "succession of *perceptions*" at all. In conceiving and designating his "related objects" as in themselves something more than mere non-resembling existences or self-subsistences, as in themselves actual and "resembling perceptions," he inadvertently acknowledges among these "related objects" a real resemblance, a real ground of union, a real unity and identity of kind, which is the absolute condition of his "succession of perceptions," and constitutes their *real and known connection*. Hume himself unwittingly recognizes this fact when he speaks, in the very first line of the quoted passage, of "all our particular perceptions." Particulars of what? Surely, not of nothing. If our perceptions are all particular cases of something, that something is as real as they. "Perceptions," as cases, units, or specimens, can be no more real and no more knowable than "perception," as principle, universal, or species—that is, as perceptive activity or perceiving energy in general. This "perception" *in general*, without which it is ridiculous to speak of "perceptions" *in particular*, is itself their common condition and their common origin, and consequently their real and known connection as "related objects." Consequently, when he maintains that "the understanding never observes any real connection among objects," he confounds his own argument, destroys his own concept, satirizes his own phraseology, and falls into a contradiction, which is irremediable because he is so naïvely unconscious of it. Even the great apostle of empiricism, when he tried to conceive a purely empirical I, could frame no other than an unscientific concept, because he had no scientific theory of universals. Granting, as Hume correctly maintains, that, "when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure,"—granting that

"I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception," — it follows that it is absurd to maintain at the same time, as Hume does, that "I never can observe anything but the perception." For, self-evidently, unless I observe, not only the particular perceptions one by one, but also a *connection among them which makes them all "perceptions," and which, therefore, is just as real as the perceptions themselves*, I never can observe that there is any "succession of perceptions" at all — can never connect, without the warrant of this observation of a *real connection*, the isolated occurrences as a class by themselves, or conceive them as alike in kind, or designate them all by one and the same term. Precisely the same necessity holds good of the series of conscious states in general; every conscious state is necessarily conditioned on that of which it is a state, that is, on consciousness itself, as a unitary, universal, and continuous conscious energy, of which each particular conscious state is merely a single case. The thing cannot possibly be thought otherwise. In short, the concept of a purely empirical I is that of a *collection of things of a kind without any kind, a series of units without any universal*, and, therefore, as absolutely unthinkable and self-destructive as the concept of a spherical cube.

§ 56. On the other hand, the purely rational I is an attempt to conceive the self as a *universal without any units*, a rational self-consciousness pure from all empirical elements or conscious states, a universal and conditioning thought-activity isolated from all particular and conditioned thought-functions or thought-acts, — that is, a mere logical subject abstracted from all real determinations. The typical form of this theory, and the root of all later forms of it, is undoubtedly that of Kant. The substance of it is as follows: —

I. Every single mental presentation or representation (*Vorstellung*), whether state or act, intuition or concept, or whatever else, must, in order to be *my* representation, be accompanied possibly, if not actually, by another and

omnipresent representation, *I think* (*ich denke*). This omnipresent *I think* is the necessary condition of the combination¹ of the manifold content of each intuition into *one representation*, and of the manifold stream or series of representations into the empirical consciousness of *one subject*.

II. This invariably concomitant representation *I think* is an act of *spontaneity*. That is, it cannot belong either to the outer or to the inner sensibility, as simple receptivity of impressions from objects of experience; for it is a universal act of the *determining subject*, not a unitary representation of the *subject determined as its own object*. The latter is empirical self-consciousness or "empirical apperception." But the former is rational self-consciousness or "pure apperception;" it is, likewise, "original apperception," "since it is that self-consciousness which, just because it produces the representation *I think* that must accompany all other representations, and just because it is one and the same in every conscious state, can be accompanied by no representation beyond itself," that is, as its own condition. In other words, the omnipresent *I think* is the "original" or "spontaneous act" of that purely rational self-consciousness which conditions every act or state of the empirical consciousness; which is immanent

¹ "Combination" is *Verbindung, conjunctio, or synthesis a priori*, as a "putting together." Kant selects this name, as he says, "in order to emphasize the facts that we can represent to ourselves no elements as combined in the object, unless we have ourselves previously combined them, and that of all representations *combination* [*i. e.* relation] is the only one which cannot be given through objects, — that it can be brought about by the subject alone, because it is an act of the subject's self-activity." This is to teach in the clearest and most emphatic manner the principle of the exclusive subjectivity of relations. Of course, if relations do not inhere in the *objects related*, but are imposed upon these by the *relating subject*, there is absolutely nothing to know but the subject itself and its modes of spontaneity. The necessary logical consequence of this denial of the objectivity of relations is absolute solipsism — which is avoided merely by that unreflective or *naïve* kind of philosophizing which is comfortably indifferent to logic. (*Cf.* Chap. IX.).

and unchangeable in each of these acts or states (*in allem Bewusstsein ein und dasselbe ist*) as their constant common element; and which itself is conditioned by no act beyond itself. It is that unconditioned or unoriginated unity of self-consciousness which antedates and transcends all experience, and constitutes the source of all pure knowledge *a priori*; for the diverse representations which are given in a particular intuition would not in their totality be *my* representations at all, unless in their totality they belonged to *one self-consciousness*. That is, as *my* representations, whether I am conscious of them or not as mine, they must necessarily conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in a *universal self-consciousness*, because otherwise they would not, whether singly or all together, belong to *me*. I therefore call the unity of this pure, spontaneous, and original apperception the “transcendental unity of self-consciousness,” because it transcends experience and is the source of knowledge *a priori* — that is, knowledge independent of all experience.

III. The empirical consciousness is simply of particular or single states, fragmentary, isolated, and disconnected; there is no real connection whatever among these single states as such, because the empirical consciousness in each of them contains no reference whatever to the identity of the subject. This reference arises, not because I accompany every representation with consciousness of it, but because *I add* one to another and *am conscious* of what I do. The universal or purely rational self-consciousness is that “act” of “synthesis” by which *I join* one conscious state to another and *am conscious* of joining them. Solely through the fact that I am able in this way to combine a diversity of given conscious states in one consciousness, does it become possible for me to conceive the “identity of consciousness” in a connected series of conscious states. Hence the “synthetical unity of apperception” conditions the analytical unity of apperception; it is the work of the understanding, nay, the understanding itself, as the faculty

of conjoining and uniting *a priori* a multitude of given conscious states which in themselves are disjoined and dis-united. In short, it is the relating activity in which all relations originate, and, therefore, "the highest principle in all human knowledge."

IV. In the "synthetical unity of apperception," which transcends all actual or possible experience, I am conscious of myself neither as a noumenon nor as a phaenomenon, but simply as a pure and empty existence — "I am." This representation (*Vorstellung*), this formal, contentless, and objectless thought (*ein Gedanke der Form nach, aber ohne allen Gegenstand*), is an act of pure reason (*ein Denken*), not an act of empirical intuition (*ein Anschauen*). Since, however, both of these acts are necessary to knowledge of ourselves (*Erkenntniss unserer selbst*), my purely rational I remains unknown; only my empirical I is known, as determined by intuition of particular conscious states. "I have no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of one's Self, therefore, is very far from being knowledge of one's Self." "Now by this I, or He, or It, the thing which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental or non-empirical subject of thoughts, an unknown *x*, — unknown, that is, except by means of the thoughts which are its predicates. Apart from these thoughts we never have the least conception of it. Yet we revolve about it in a constant circle, since we are compelled to use it in making any judgment concerning it." Consequently, in the *I think*, "the concept of a subject is taken in a purely logical sense, and it remains undetermined whether *substance* is, or is not, to be understood by it (*so ist der Begriff eines Subjects hier blos logisch genommen, und es bleibt unbestimmt, ob darunter Substanz verstanden werden solle oder nicht*)."¹

V. Consequently, the *I think*, which is "the only text of rational psychology," can contain, if applied to my Self

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 285, ed. Hart.

as an object, nothing but non-empirical predicates of it, since "the least empirical predicate would destroy the rational purity of the science and its independence of all experience." But it follows from this that "there is no rational psychology, as a *doctrine* which would furnish an addition to the knowledge of our Selves, but only as a *discipline* which sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this field;" and that "rational psychology originates in a mere misunderstanding."¹

§ 57. Let us inquire, then, whether this attempted concept of a purely rational I proves to be any more thinkable than Hume's attempted concept of a purely empirical I.

If, adopting Kant's own expressions, we denote by "*x*" the unknown "I, or He, or It, the 'thing which thinks;'" and if we denote by A, B, C, D, E . . . the "succession of perceptions," or series of conscious states which together compose the consciousness of the purely empirical Ego, then the two conceptions of Hume and of Kant may be thus expressed in equations:—

Hume

- (1) The Purely Empirical Ego = A + B + C + D + E . . .
- (2) The Purely Rational Ego = 0.

Kant

- (3) The (mixed) Empirical Ego = $x\text{A} + x\text{B} + x\text{C} + x\text{D} + x\text{E} \dots$
 $= x (\text{A} + \text{B} + \text{C} + \text{D} + \text{E} \dots)$
- (4) The Purely Rational Ego = x .

According to Kant, therefore, the "synthetical unity of apperception" or "transcendental unity of self-conscious-

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 114 131, 273-288, ed. Hart. On the other hand how could Kant refute this *argumentum ad hominem*? Whatever really acts is real substance; the pure I really acts in the transcendental synthesis of all states of the empirical consciousness, and in all combination of the manifold in inner or outer phaenomena; therefore, the pure I is a real substance, and not, as above declared, a mere logical subject.

ness," which is the only identity or unity of the Self recognized by him at all, consists, not in any real unity or real connection of the conscious states *per se*, but solely in the transcendental or non-empirical "synthesis" — that is, in the subjective relation of unity artificially bestowed, or conferred, or imposed upon them from without by the purely rational I, which (in what is in truth a merely mechanical fashion) unites them as disconnected beads by a connecting string. These beads of the empirical consciousness, A, B, C, D, E, whether separate or strung, contain in themselves no consciousness of the Self; the string of the rational Ego, x , holds them together as a series of conscious states, but all the self-consciousness is in the string itself. We must look, then, to the rational string alone, separated from all the empirical beads, to discover the unity of the Self, the purely rational I. What is this string?

The answer to this question depends unconditionally on what Kant meant by the "inner sensibility," "inner sense," or "inner empirical intuition,"¹ by which alone the Ego can take cognizance of itself, through becoming aware of the isolated phaenomenal states which it is its own sole function to join together in one self-consciousness. Does he, or does he not, ascribe this "inner empirical intuition" to the *purely rational Ego*?

I. If he does, then the purely rational Ego, intuiting A as well as x in the compound conscious state xA , — that

¹ "Der Satz aber: *ich denke*, so fern er so viel sagt, als: *ich existire* denkend, ist nicht bloß logische Function, sondern bestimmt das Subject (welches denn zugleich Object ist) in Ansehung der Existenz, und kann ohne den inneren Sinn nicht stattfinden, dessen Anschauung jederzeit das Object nicht als Ding an sich selbst, sondern bloß als Erscheinung an die Hand gibt." — "Welches [d. h. sich als Noumenon zu erkennen] aber unmöglich ist, indem die innere empirische Anschauung sinnlich ist und nichts als Data der Erscheinung an die Hand gibt, die dem Objecte des reinen *Bewusstseins* zur Kenntniss seiner abgesonderten Existenz nichts liefern, sondern bloß der Erfahrung zum Behufe dienen kann." (Werke, III. 290, 291).

is, ceasing to be *purely rational* and becoming incontrovertibly *empirical as well as rational*, — vanishes altogether.

II. But, if he does not, then the purely rational Ego, taking no cognizance whatever of the separate empirical states, $xA, xB, xC, xD, xE \dots$ cannot possibly combine them into one series, confer its own unity upon them, or in any way bring them under the “synthetical unity of apperception.” Discerning nothing whatever to combine or relate or synthesize, it remains utterly incapable of that “spontaneous act” of “synthesis” which constitutes its only being or function. If it cannot intuit A, B, C, D, E , it cannot combine x with A in one term, or $xA, xB, xC \dots$ in one series of terms. If it is absolutely *blind to the terms*, it is incapable of *relating them in a judgment*. Again, therefore, the purely rational Ego vanishes altogether.

In either case, consequently, the string of pure reason which was to connect the otherwise disconnected beads of experience, yet was to be conceived as a purely rational Ego, turns out to be a pure myth. The Ego cannot at one and the same time be purely rational and yet partly empirical. Yet the purely rational Ego, by Kant’s own showing, has nothing whatever to do as the “synthetical unity of apperception,” unless it is at the same time partly empirical, as “intuition” of conscious states to be synthesized. Clearly there neither is nor can be any such “white blackbird” in the constitution of the human mind.¹ Kant’s

¹ This internal collapse of Kant’s theory of a purely rational Ego, or “pure consciousness,” betrays itself in Kuno Fischer’s inevitably contradictory summary of it: “Das empirische Bewusstsein ist so wechselnd und verschieden, wie die menschlichen Individuen; das reine Bewusstsein ist identisch, unwandelbar und darum in jedem dasselbe. Was dieses Bewusstsein vorstellt oder verknüpft, gilt daher für alle, d. h. es hat den Charakter *allgemeiner* und *nothwendiger* oder *objectiver* Geltung. Erst dadurch kommt in unsere Erscheinungen und Wahrnehmungen Objectivität, d. h. sie werden Erfahrungsobjecte und Erfahrungsurtheile. Nun ist das reine Bewusstsein nicht receptiv, sondern thätig und productiv, es verhält sich nicht empfindend oder stoffempfangend, sondern blos verknüpfend oder formgebend, es verhält sich in seiner Formgebung nicht anschauend,

concept proves to be absolutely as unthinkable as Hume's, for no genius, however superb, can think the self-contradiction

sondern denkend oder urtheilend ; daher sind die Formen, die es giebt, Urtheilsformen oder Kategorien ; daher sind es die reinen Verstandesfunctionen oder die reinen Begriffe, welche die Erfahrungsobjecte begründen ; sie machen die Erfahrung und gelten deshalb, so weit dieselbe reicht. Dies war der zu beweisende Punkt, das Thema der Frage, die jetzt gelöst ist." (Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, III. 368.)

Here we see the "pure consciousness" explained as at once capable and incapable of "inner empirical intuition." (1) On the one hand "this consciousness presents (vorstellt) or combines (verknüpft) ;" and, because it is identical and unchangeable in each of us, — because, that is, it is a whole universal inhering immanently in each and every whole individual subsumed under it, — whatever it "presents or combines" in one empirical consciousness must be "presented or combined" in all empirical consciousnesses. Its entire and sole function is to be "active and productive," "combining or form-giving," "thinking or judging." Consequently, its whole essence is to act, produce, combine, give form, — to judge, and therefore of necessity to present, perceive, or intuite the particular subject and predicate of which the judgment consists, — in general, *to relate*, and therefore, since not to perceive what it relates would be simply not to think the relation at all, *to present or intuite the particular terms related*. But this is *Vorstellung* as "inner empirical intuition," and the "pure consciousness" ceases thereby to be "pure." (2) On the other hand, the "pure consciousness" is "not receptive," "not sensitive or capable of receiving sense-material," "not intuitive" at all. It can "present" (*vorstellen*) nothing whatever as a unit-object of thought; it can take cognizance of no mere unit as such, for instance, a conscious state αA ; it cannot perceive or intuite the particular subject and predicate of any judgment, or the particular terms of any relation ; it can only combine, or judge, or relate, *what it can not perceive at all !* This "pure consciousness" is certainly "pure," but only as pure zero ; it is pure form without matter, and, whatever its "necessary and universal or objective validity" may be, it can have absolutely nothing to do with "experience." (3) The only escape from this destructive contradiction in the very heart of the Kantian theory is to abandon the theory altogether ; to admit that *Anschauung* and *Begriff* are absolutely inseparable, and can not even be thought as "pure ;" to admit that *Sinnlichkeit* and *Verstand*, experience and reason, apprehension of units and comprehension of universals, are necessarily identical in difference ; and to renounce, as a wild and exposed delusion, the epistemology which builds on the possibility of "pure concepts," "pure knowledge *a priori*," or "pure rational consciousness." The

dictory. Its source, however, is obvious. Kant's attempt to separate reason from experience, the rational I from the

Kantian *Erkenntnisslehre* is a superb construction of inventive speculative genius, but it is a statue of gold with feet of clay.

Kant himself, however, sought to escape from the above dilemma by means of "productive imagination." This he conceived as "an operation of the understanding on the sensibility" (in his own words, "eine Wirkung des Verstandes auf die Sinnlichkeit,") and interposed it as a mediator between the purely rational Ego and the world of empirical intuitions, — as a faculty at once intellectual and sensuous, whose function it is (1) to reproduce these intuitions in a *synthesis speciosa*, (2) to carry into effect unconsciously the laws of the understanding, and (3) to combine or relate phaenomena according to these laws in a *synthesis intellectualis*. Fischer thus states the theory for Kant in brief: "Die sinnlichen Objecte, die das Bewusstsein vorfindet, sind ein Werk der sinnlichen, die gegebenen Vorstellungselemente componirenden Einbildungskraft; die Einheit und Ordnung, die aus jenen Objecten einleuchten, sind das Werk der intellectuellen, vom Verstande durchdrungenen Einbildungskraft. Die gemeinsame Sinnenwelt, die dem Bewusstsein als eine gegebene erscheint, ist ihm durch die Einbildungskraft gegeben, welche bewusstlos die Gesetze ausführt, die der Verstand giebt, und die Erscheinungen so verknüpft, wie es das reine Bewusstsein fordert: daher das letztere seine Formen (Kategorien), nach welchen die Einbildungskraft die Erscheinungen verknüpft hat, in dieser nicht bloß erkennt, sondern *wiedererkennt*." (*Ibid.* III. 373.)

Now what do these "laws of the understanding" prescribe? Nothing but various *modes of combination of particulars*. The particulars, as units, can be known only by outer or inner empirical intuition, and the modes of combination, as universals, only by reason. This distinction in the nature of the objects known is necessarily, even for Kant, the only assignable ground for his own distinction and separation of the sensibility and the understanding, as fundamentally unlike faculties of the mind. Because, then, the understanding can not perceive or intuit particulars, and the sensibility cannot think or originate combinations, and because these two faculties must be not only different in their nature but also separate in their action, Kant could conceive no way for them to co-operate except through the mediation of a third faculty, the "productive imagination," which should partake of the nature of both—that is, which should (1) consciously perceive particulars, yet (2) unconsciously (*bewusstlos*) combine them as the laws of the understanding require. Unfortunately, the absurdity which was to be avoided by this device forces itself here into view as obstinately as before. Whatever thinks or prescribes "laws"

empirical consciousness, sprang from the mistaken presupposition that it is possible to think a universal without any units. This presupposition, in turn, sprang from an unscientific theory of universals: namely, that the universal wholly inheres in the individual and can be wholly abstracted from the individual, while the individual is only "subsumed" under the universal. That Kant built on this merely inherited theory of the Aristotelian Paradox appears very plainly above in equation (3), where x , the universal, wholly inheres in each and every term as their common element, and in equation (4), where x is abstracted and retained alone. In this way, his purely rational I became necessarily a mere "logical subject" of which "substance" may or may not be predicated; while yet it is certain that a mere "logical subject" which *may not be* "substance" and hence *may not "act" at all*, cannot possibly perform that "spontaneous act of synthesis" which is its sole and necessary function in the "synthetical unity of

for the combination of particulars must be aware of the particulars to be combined: the "pure consciousness" must intuit them, or it can not legislate how to combine them, much less impart to the "productive imagination" even an "unconscious" knowledge how to combine them. On the one hand, how can "laws of combination" be even mediately prescribed for particulars by a consciousness which cannot perceive them at all? Yet, on the other hand, how can a consciousness which perceives them be non-empirical or pure? The conception of a pure rational consciousness legislating *a priori* for empirical consciousness is simply self-destructive. The conception is not in the least helped by dividing it — by making the "pure consciousness" conscious of the laws but unconscious of the particulars, and inventing a "pure imagination" conscious of the particulars but unconscious of the laws; for in this case a fourth faculty must be invented to mediate between the "pure consciousness" and the "pure imagination," and so on forever. The case is a hopeless one. But Fischer makes unwittingly a vast concession. If the sensuous "imagination" can become "intellectual" in virtue of "being penetrated by the understanding," *so can the sensibility in general*. But reciprocal interpenetration of the sensibility and the understanding is nothing but the identity in difference of experience and reason, — the impossibility, therefore, of "pure knowledge *a priori*."

apperception." If it *does* "act," it *must be* "substance;" if it *does not* "act," what becomes of Kant's "highest principle of all human knowledge" as a combining, relating, or active "faculty"?

In fine, the purely empirical I and the purely rational I are but two forms of the *unreal I*. The necessity of such a concept of the *real I* as shall not, like the concepts of these merely imaginary entities, totally ignore the questions of real origin, real form, and real kind, must surely force itself upon all sagacious thinkers.

§ 58. The concrete or real I, as opposed to both forms of the abstract or unreal I, unites in itself both the "succession of perceptions" and the "synthetical unity of apperception,"¹ both the empirical consciousness and the

¹ In adopting above Kant's phrase, the "synthetical unity of apperception," as an expression for the real universality of self-consciousness, it is necessary to point out distinctly that this is done with reservation, and in order simply to avoid embarrassing neologisms. Kant means by the phrase that paradoxical "spontaneous act" of the *unknown, abstract, and transcendental subject* (*blos logisch genommen*) which is the absolute origin of all "combination of the manifold" in every possible object of knowledge — the exclusively subjective origin, therefore, of all relation as such. As adopted above, however, the phrase means that spontaneous activity of the *known, concrete, and immanent self* which makes it (1) the *perceptient* of "combination of the manifold" in the immanent relational constitutions of real objects of knowledge, (2) the *recipient* of that "combination of the manifold" in the reproducing concept of it, and (3) the *origin* of re-combination of the manifold in hypothetical anticipations of possible objects of knowledge — not, therefore, the subjective origin of all relation as such. That is, Kant would determine the whole "succession of perceptions" as solely the work of the human mind, through its spontaneously relating activity as the "synthetical unity of apperception;" while we would determine the "succession of perceptions" as partly the work of the human mind and partly the work of the world (§§ 65, 72, 5), and determine the "synthetical unity of apperception" as the elaboration of percept-concepts in the unity of one self-consciousness. These are important differences, since Kant's notion results from the principle of the exclusively subjective origin of conceptual relations, while ours results from that of the combined subjective and objective origin of conceptual relations. Yet there is a sufficient likeness in the two notions to justify

rational self-consciousness, both experience and reason, in the indivisible identity of the *knowing I*. Neither the purely empirical I nor the purely rational I can *know*; if alone, they are nothing but empty abstractions, incapable of real knowledge. The real I alone, the I that feels and wills and knows, is the seat of all real or possible knowledge (§ 99, III).

On the one hand, considered as to its origin, all real knowledge springs out of an active double-functioning of the real I, (1) as experience or perception of units, and (2) as reason or conception of universals; and these two complementary or reciprocally conditioning functions interpenetrate each other inseparably in every real *act* of knowledge, because every real or conceivable *object* of knowledge is at once a universal to its own constituent units and a constituent unit to its own universal — *some kind of thing, or thing of some kind* (§ 23). On the other hand, considered as to its form, all real knowledge exists as the *percept-concept* of some kind of thing. Whatever is known, however, must be known as it is — cannot be known as it is not; if it is really known by me at all, it must be known in accordance with its own real nature no less than in accordance with mine. Hence, if “human knowledge exists,” the double-constitution of the object of knowledge, as at once unit and universal, necessarily determines the double-functioning of the knowing I as experience and reason, and thereby gives its necessary form to the percept-concept, in which, as at once empirical and rational, the double-constitution of the object reappears as its own double-constitution. Thus the real I, empirical in the perception of units or facts, rational in the conception of universals or principles, and simultaneously active or real in both functions, *knows*, or becomes the *knowing I*, by reproducing in the concept, as at once a unit and a univer-

retention of Kant's phrase, provided these differences are kept well in mind; for they both recognize that universality of self-consciousness which the phrase was devised to express.

sal in Thought, the double-constitution of the object of knowledge, as at once a unit and a universal in Being. For thus alone is attainable that agreement between the concept and its object, that essential identity in the numerical difference of their two immanent relational constitutions, in which alone consists *truth* (§ 50, with footnotes). Briefly, the double-constitution of every real object of knowledge, as both unit and universal (thing of some kind, some kind of thing), determines the double-constitution of the knowing process itself, as both experience and reason (perception of things and conception of kinds); while this double-constitution of the knowing process itself determines the double-constitution of its product, as true thought (percept-concept in agreement with the object). Or, viewed more profoundly still, the nature of Being, as identity of unity and universality in the object (§ 36), determines the nature of Knowing, as identity of experience and reason in the subject, and through this the nature of Knowledge or True Thought, as identity of unity and universality in the concept.

In order, therefore, that the concept of the real I may be true thought or knowledge, it is necessary that the real I itself shall be the real identity of subject and object—that is, shall be a real object of knowledge to itself, as a real subject of knowledge. Like every possible object of knowledge, the real I, as object, must be a thing of some kind, that is, must be both a unit and a universal; it must, as a unit, be known by experience, and it must, as a universal, be known by reason; and the concept of it must, like every true concept, be both empirical and rational at the same time, that is, a percept-concept. Since, moreover, in all real self-consciousness, the I that is known is itself the I that knows, the known constitution of the I as object must be identical with the constitution of the I as subject, which, therefore, must be equally known; otherwise, there is no identity of subject and object, no agreement of object and concept, no truth, no knowledge of self,

no self-consciousness at all. But this is absurd. Hence, whether considered as object or as subject, the real I is at once empirical and rational; and the judgment of real self-consciousness, "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states," which unites in itself both the "succession of perceptions" and the "synthetical unity of apperception," is so far the concept of the real I. If the "I," as rational subject, and the "myself in each and all of my conscious states," as empirical object, were not identical in difference (through the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason, § 20), then it would follow that the judgment of real self-consciousness is itself altogether false, since it falsely affirms that identity in difference of subject and object in which all self-consciousness consists. The unconditional condition of all real self-consciousness, however, is that the "I" and the "myself in each and all of my conscious states" shall be at once identical and different, universal and unitary, rational and empirical. The real I must be, not a mere abstract logical subject with no object at all, but real subject and real object at once, as real in their identity as in their difference and in their difference as in their identity. In other words, every conscious state being *ipso facto* an act of knowledge, the real I, as a universal activity, inheres really in all its own conscious acts, as the self-related totality of all its own units; and its real identity as subject-object consists so far in this real universality—that is, in this universally self-percipient or self-conscious energy of the Self, as (1) immanent in all its conscious acts as a whole, and (2) both immanent and transcendent in each of its conscious acts as a part. And this self-knowing energy, this identity in difference of subject and object in the Self, is the necessary principle of all real Self-Consciousness.

§ 59. But the concept of the real I would remain fatally defective, if this were all. It would give the self as a universal, but not as a unit. It would give the universality of the self as real identity of subject and object in

each and all of its own conscious states, but would not give this universal subject-object as a thing of any kind. It would fail, therefore, to give the self as a real object of knowledge, since, as we have seen, every real object of knowledge must be constituted as both universal and unit at once — must be not only a universal to its own constituent units, but also a constituent unit to its own universal, — must be not only some kind of thing, but also a thing of some kind. The real I, however, if it can be at all an object of knowledge to itself, must fulfil the conditions determining every such object, and be individualized as well as universalized. The concept of self-consciousness, therefore, which, as the “synthetical unity of apperception,” unites the “succession of perceptions” in an indeterminate series, but which is quite incapable of determining this as a unit in any other than the vague, abstract, and merely general aspect of “a series” or “a succession,” gives indeed the *real universality of the subject-object*, but cannot possibly give its *real unity as a real I*, unless it is complemented, completed, and rounded out by the concept of *race-consciousness*, which alone can give the subject-object as *one of a kind* (§§ 68, 69). Recognizing, then, this indispensable race-consciousness — this indispensable complement of the “synthetical unity of apperception” which alone can give it real unity in itself, and by which alone the concept of the real I can be brought into that necessary agreement with its object which constitutes its truth — as the **GENERIC UNITY OF APPERCEPTION**, it becomes clear that I do not know myself at all as *a real Self, a real I, a real Person*, until I know myself, not merely as the indeterminate universality of a series of conscious states, but also as a determined unit in a higher universal: namely, as *One of the We*. And the judgment of all real race-consciousness will be, “I know myself as One of the We.”¹

¹ “Das Bewusstseyn der Individualität [*i. e.* real unity of the I] ist nothwendig von einem anderen Bewusstseyn, dem eines *Du*, begleitet, und nur unter dieser Bedingung möglich.” (Fichte, Werke, I. 476.)

This principle of the generic unity of apperception as necessarily complementing the "synthetical unity of apperception," and as constituting in combination with this the *personal unity of apperception*, or principle of personal identity, must hold a commanding position in the philosophy of philosophy; for it is the very foundation, the necessary condition, of the history of philosophy as the work of personal philosophers. The I cannot be known as a real unit or person, unless it is determined, not only with reference to itself as subject-object, but no less with reference to others of its kind; for knowledge of the thing and knowledge of the kind are one and the same knowledge in every *true thought*, as that union of percept and concept which is identity in difference of experience and reason, because it agrees with the object as identity in difference of unit and universal. In other words, the real I must be (1) empirical in the series of conscious states, (2) rational in the universality of the series, and (3) real in the universality and the unity of the series as a whole. The real unity of the I, as personal identity, is necessarily both internal and external: internal as the "synthetical unity of apperception" in the "succession of perceptions," and external as the "synthetical unity of apperception" in the generic unity of apperception. Its internal unity is its determination as a universal in all of its own units, and its external unity is its determination as a unit in its own universal; and each of these determinations is the absolutely necessary condition of the other, since the two together, as essential factors, are necessary to determine the I as a real unit, whether as "object of knowledge" or "subject of knowledge." Hence Kant's failure to discover the real unity of the I, or to conceive "the I, or He, or It, the thing which thinks," otherwise than as a mere "unknown x " which can never become an "object of knowledge," was the direct, inevitable, and very instructive consequence of his failure to conceive the "synthetical unity of apperception" as itself conditioned on the generic

unity of apperception; for the identity in difference of these two, being the condition of the I's real unity in itself, is the very condition under which alone the I could possibly become an "object" or be "known" at all. Solely through race-consciousness could the vague consciousness of "self" become determined and unified as the consciousness of "*a self*," or take the necessary form of "*my self*" as opposed to "*your self*," that is, as a constituent unit with other constituent units in the higher universality of the kind. Self-consciousness and race-consciousness reciprocally condition each other, as the two essential and inseparable factors of all personal consciousness; and the concept of the real I unites them in itself as the concept of real personality. For, while the I is a universal with respect to its own states as units, it cannot be a unit except with respect to its own kind as its universal; yet it cannot become an object of knowledge at all, unless, like every such object, it is constituted as both unit and universal at once. Personal consciousness both unifies and universalizes at once in knowing the real I as a unit-universal (the thing) in a higher universal-unit (the kind), which it must be in order to be an object of knowledge at all. The generic unity of apperception, therefore, is itself the identity in difference of experience and reason, knowledge of units and knowledge of universals. Kant saw only the principle of *spontaneity*, as the transcendental synthesis of self-consciousness, but wholly disregarded the correlative principle of *heredity*, as the continuity of race-consciousness; but the necessary result of this one-sidedness was to lose all insight into the intelligibility of the I as a real thing or unit of existence. It was inevitable, therefore, that Kant should fail to derive from "pure self-consciousness" *alone* any concept whatever of the I as "object;" for "pure self-consciousness" yields only the I's universality, not its unity, which must be found in order to make it an "object," yet cannot be found out of its kind.

If, then, the judgment of all real self-consciousness is that "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states," and if the judgment of all real race-consciousness is that "I know myself as One of the We," then the judgment of all real personal consciousness, or real personality, or real personal identity, will be that "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We." And this, accordingly, is the concept of the real I, or person as such, in its simplest form — personality, so to speak, reduced to its lowest terms; for in it are united the "succession of perceptions," the "synthetical unity of apperception," and the *generic unity of apperception*, in a form at once empirical, rational, and personal.

§ 60. Repeating here, for convenience of comparison, the table in § 57, the results of the last six sections may be set forth succinctly in tabular form, as follows:—

TABLE I

Hume

- I. The Purely Empirical Ego = $A + B + C + D + E \dots$
 II. The Purely Rational Ego = 0.

Kant

- III. The (mixed) Empirical Ego = $xA + xB + xC + xD + xE \dots$
 $= x(A + B + C + D + E \dots)$
 IV. The Purely Rational Ego = x .

TABLE II

I. SEPARATION OF EXPERIENCE AND REASON

UNREAL I, as	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{either} \\ \textit{or} \end{array} \right.$	Purely Empirical Object without Rational Subject — Mere "Succession of Perceptions" — Mere Units without Universal, —
		Purely Rational Subject without Empirical Object — Mere "Synthetical Unity of Apperception" — Mere Universal without Units.

II. IDENTITY IN DIFFERENCE OF EXPERIENCE AND REASON

REAL I, as	both	Empirical Object — "Succession of Perceptions" — Units in their own Universal, —
	and	Rational Subject — "Synthetical Unity of Apperception" — Universal in All its own Units, —
	in	Personal Subject-Object — Self Knowing Self in Knowing its Kind — Generic Unity of Apperception — Universal in Units (I as Subject-Object of Personal Consciousness) = Unit in Higher Universal (I as a Man in We as Mankind). ¹

¹ Hegel very justly remarks: "The function of philosophy consists simply in bringing into explicit consciousness what has lain implicitly in the consciousness of all men from antiquity down. Philosophy, therefore, establishes nothing new; what we have arrived at by reflection is already the immediate prejudgment of everybody." (*Encyklopädie, Werke*, VI. 43, 44.) But the abysmal difference between the results at which Hegel arrives and the results arrived at above will be plain to any one who compares the doctrine of the real I, set forth in these tables, with Hegel's doctrine of the pure I: "*I* is the pure being-for-self in which everything particular is denied and abolished, this ultimate, simple, and pure fact of consciousness. We can say, '*I* and thought are the same,' or more definitely, '*I* is a thing which thinks' [*Das Denken als Denkendes — res cogitans*: cf. *die logische Idee . . . ist die absolute Substanz des Geistes wie der Natur*. (*Ibid.* 353)] . . . Every man is a whole world of representations which are buried in the night of the I. *I* is thus the universal in which abstraction is made from everything particular, but in which at the same time everything lies concealed. Hence it is not the merely abstract universality, but the universality which contains everything in itself." (*Ibid.* 47-48.) This is *abstracting*, yet *not abstracting*! Hegel's *I*, like Kant's, vanishes in α .

CHAPTER IV

THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL I

§ 61. THE concept of the real I, however carefully determined with respect to its form, must still remain fatally defective as knowledge, or true concept, until the real I, as object of knowledge, has been no less carefully determined with respect to its origin. In these modern days, when all scientific investigation aims to explain classification by genesis or heredity, it would be superfluous to urge that knowledge of form without knowledge of origin falls far short of either science or philosophy. That may safely be taken for granted. Analysis, however, discloses that the proximate origin of the real I is threefold: (I) its origin as a real unit; (II) its origin as a real universal; and (III) its origin as a real but partial concept of itself as a real unit-universal.

§ 62. I. The *oneness* or real unity of the I is its real determination as a unit separated from, yet inseparably and necessarily related to, other units of the same kind. That is, the I, as a real unit, is simply *My Self as One of the We*.

The origin of the I as a real unit, therefore, is necessarily the We as a real universal. The universal is the only origin of the individual; the kind alone is the origin of the thing. Out of the species springs the specimen; the species is the specimen's necessary condition and explanation just because it is the specimen's only possible source. Nothing but evolution at last explains. The human I (and the human I, as the subject of human knowledge, is alone considered here) cannot originate in itself; it cannot originate in another human I; it can originate solely in the

human We, and its actual or historical origin is *birth* — that is, derivation from two I's, each of which is derived from two other I's, and so from *an act of the We*. When Kant teaches that the apperceptive "I think," as a *a priori* synthesis of the manifold in one and the same subject,¹ is that original synthetic "act" of the rational self-consciousness which conditions every act or state of the empirical consciousness, is one and the same in every such act or state, and is conditioned by no act beyond itself, — when he teaches that this aboriginal "I think" is itself that very "faculty" of "understanding" which conjoins *a priori* the manifold content of "my" consciousness into one series and makes it "mine," — he incontrovertibly begins with the individual subject as his absolute first, his "highest principle of human cognition," his unconditioned and underived source of "pure knowledge *a priori*" in a *merely given I*. Nowhere does he seek to account for it rationally, to explain its "bare existence," to trace its existential origin (§ 101). But, self-evidently, that which is merely given is never anything but a datum of experience; and, paradoxical as it appears, pure experience becomes thus the sole foundation of the Kantian system of pure reason! In this way, however, no real unity of the I is arrived at — nothing but the abstract unity of the "I think," as isolated common element of an indeterminate series of empirical states in an empirically given I; whereas no *indeterminate* series can be known as a real unit until determined as a *whole* series in relation to other whole series of the same kind. Hence the mere universality of the "I think" in "my" conscious states is insufficient to yield any intelligible unity of the I, so long as the I is taken as an absolute or unconditioned first, and Kant was perfectly logical when, from such premises, he inferred the I as a mere "unknown *x*;" for mere indeterminate universality is by no means real unity.

¹ "Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine nothwendige Beziehung auf das: *ich denke*, in demselben Subject, darin dieses Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird." (Werke, III. 116.)

It is only when every I is known to be conditioned and determined by the We, only when the synthetic act of the I in the "I think" is known to be conditioned by the synthetic act of the We in generation and determined in the I itself by heredity from the We, that the real unity of the I becomes itself both empirically and rationally known. Experience explains the origin of the I by birth, and reason explains it by the strictly necessary derivation of the individual from the universal, of the I from the We; the "I think" itself is an impossible judgment or "act," until the subject has attained to consciousness of itself as *I in the We* through the generic unity of apperception. Thus the origin of the I, as a real unit, is explained empirically by the fact of birth, and rationally by the reformed theory of universals; and the absolute coincidence of the two explanations is itself explained by the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason in all human knowledge.

§ 63. II. The *wholeness* or real universality of the I is its real determination as a self-conscious series of conscious states or acts, — a self-knowing and partly determined, partly self-determining *Whole of Thought, Feeling, and Will*, which is identical with all like wholes in so far as it shares their common constitution as subject-object, yet is differentiated from them all in so far as it has its own peculiar, unique, and unshared content of self-consciousness, its real individual difference. That is, the I, as a real universal, is *My Self in each and all of My Conscious States*.

To seek the origin of the I as a real universal, therefore, is, in other words, to seek the origin of personal consciousness in the I as a real unit. From these two real determinations of the I, as a unit-universal or *object of knowledge*, there originate in the I itself, as *subject of knowledge*, two modes or forms of consciousness, as *knowledge of the object by the subject*: (1) race-consciousness or knowledge of the We, and (2) self-consciousness or knowledge of the I. Now, in general, knowledge of a thing and knowledge of its kind are one and the same knowledge of the object,

which is necessarily both a unit in its own universal and a universal in all its own units as a whole; consequently, this one knowledge of the object is both empirical, as knowledge of units, and rational, as knowledge of universals. Hence, in particular, knowledge either of the I or of the We is necessarily empirical and rational knowledge of *both in one*. It is evident, therefore, that the two modes of consciousness must interpenetrate one another; neither can originate alone; each involves the other; both at once are essential and indispensable to any real knowledge whatever of "A Self" or "My Self" or "Me." Hence results a principle of the utmost importance in philosophy, inasmuch as it unites the two traditionally opposed and seemingly irreconcilable principles of the mere "succession of perceptions" (empiricism) and the mere "synthetical unity of apperception" (rationalism) in the higher truth of the generic unity of apperception (identity in difference of experience and reason): namely, *Race-consciousness is the I's knowledge of itself as a unit in its own universal, and self-consciousness is the I's knowledge of itself as a universal in all its own units; but neither race-consciousness nor self-consciousness is possible in any real I, except in one personal consciousness of the I in the We, as a universal unit in its own unitary universal.*¹ The origin of the I as a real universal, therefore, is the origin of personal consciousness in the simultaneous development of its two essential and reciprocally conditioning factors, inherited race-consciousness and spontaneous self-consciousness (see below, § 68).

§ 64. III. The *community* or common element of the I, abstracted from all your or my real peculiarities as individuals, is that self-relational constitution of "subject-object" which, being common to all I's, is real in every I, yet constitutes the whole reality of no I; it is altogether unreal

¹ Multiple personality in an individual (*cf.* Pierre Janet, *L'Automatisme Psychologique*, 1889) is so manifestly a form of disease as to militate in no degree against the truth of the above principle.

by itself alone, except as part of each I — the incomplete object of an imperfect concept. The perfection of any concept is its perfect truth, which must consist in its perfect agreement with the complete object — that is, in its absolute comprehension of the object's concrete constitution, as at once *whole universal* and *whole unit in a higher universal*. On the one hand, the imperfect concept (concept of a part abstracted from the whole concrete unit-universal or real object) is an inadequate thought, which apprehends part of the reality, but does not comprehend the whole of it; it conceives the common element in all the units, but conceives neither a whole unit nor a whole universal. On the other hand, the perfect concept (concept of the whole concrete unit-universal or real object) would be an adequate thought which should apprehend and comprehend the reality in its wholeness as an object both of experience and reason — should conceive, not only the common element in all the units, but also the whole universality and the whole unity of each and every unit, and thereby the whole higher universal. Thus the imperfect concept of the I, as mere "subject-object" or "Each of the We," conceives the common element in all I's, but conceives neither a whole I nor a whole We; while, since the thing cannot be known out of its kind, the perfect concept of the I would conceive, not only the common element of all I's, but also (1) the entire personal consciousness of every I, as a real individual, and (2) all the correlations, interconnections, and interactions of the personal consciousnesses of all I's in the We, as their higher universal. Such a perfect concept as this, being both empirically and rationally adequate to the object in its wholeness, and therefore absolutely true, is possible only as absolute and infinite knowledge; it certainly is not found in human knowledge, but constitutes the unrealized ideal of it. The actual human concept of the I, as mere "subject-object" or "Each of the We," is necessarily *imperfect*, because it conceives merely the common element in all I's, and does not conceive either a whole I

or a whole We — abstracts from the “I in the We” (real genus) so much only as belongs to all I’s (abstract specific or class essence), and thereby fails to conceive either the I or the We in the fulness of its reality; while at the same time it is necessarily *concrete*, that is, *both empirical and rational*, because it could not be a true concept at all, unless it conceived the “subject-object” itself to a certain extent as *both a unit and a universal*. For, since every possible object of knowledge must be concrete, as identity in difference of unit and universal, every true concept, whether perfect or imperfect, must be likewise concrete, as identity in difference of experience and reason. Hence the imperfect concrete concept of the I as mere “subject-object” is the inadequate thought of the common element of all I’s without the real peculiarities of any I — the human cognition, necessarily partial, yet none the less indispensable, of “Each of the We;” for the only exhaustive cognition of “Each of the We” would be the identity in difference of intuition and concept as perfect concrete concept, that is, as *absolute percept-concept*, at once exhaustively empirical and exhaustively rational, of *Each and Every I as All of the We*.¹

¹ No one with the least capacity of intellectual discrimination will confound the concrete concept, as above explained, with Hegel’s *konkreter Begriff*. The former is the concretion, or identity in difference, of percept and concept; it is determined as such, in accordance with the principle of the identity in difference of experience and reason, by the necessary nature of the *object known*, as identity in difference of unit and universal. But the latter, as *reines Denken*, is the absolute separation of percept and concept — pure *Begriff* without *Anschaung*; it is determined as such, in accordance with the Hegelian principle that Thought is the only Substance (Werke, VI. 46, 353), by the necessary nature of the *knowing subject*, as pure *Begriff des Begriffes*. What Hegel means by saying that “the *Begriff* is the absolutely concrete,” he himself explains at once, in the same connection, by saying that “the moments of the *Begriff* [universality, particularity, individuality] cannot be separated;” that, “inasmuch as their *identity is posited* in the *Begriff*, each of its moments can be immediately apprehended only from and with the others;” that the *Begriff* can properly be called an “abstraction,” so far as “its element is Thought in general,

§ 65. Now the *origin* of the I as a conceptual universal, an imperfect concrete concept of the "subject-object" or "Each of the We," is explained in the following considerations respecting the origin of the human concept in general. Since the only form of human knowledge is that of the *percept-concept* which to a greater or less extent agrees with the object as *unit-universal*, and since the only growth of human knowledge is the gradual increase of this agreement through the continuous activity of experience and reason, the origin of the human percept-concept in general (for shortness' sake, "the concept") is the origin of all human knowledge itself.

I. If the concept originated spontaneously and solely in the activity of the object, it would be the object's concept, not the subject's; there would be no subject but the object itself. If absolutely inactive, the subject would vanish out of human knowledge. This, if it were thinkable, would be absolute materialism, or absolute absorption of the subject by the object.

II. If the concept originated spontaneously and solely in the activity of the subject, it would be the subject's con-

and not empirically concrete Sense ;" and that "the absolutely concrete is Spirit or *Mind* [*der Geist*]." (Werke, VI, 323-324.) But this is simply the rational or ideal concretion, or identity in difference, of the abstract elements of an abstraction ; Hegel's *konkreter Begriff* remains still *reiner Begriff*, pure reason without experience, pure concept without intuition. Only phenomenal dulness could confound it with the real concretion, or identity in difference, of (1) unit and universal in every possible object, (2) experience and reason in every possible subject, and (3) intuition and concept in every possible cognition. To the principle of pure experience (empiricism) and to the principle of pure reason or pure thought (rationalism), the scientific theory of universals opposes the principle of their necessary concretion, or identity in difference, in every percept-concept or real cognition (scientific realism). This note is a sufficient reply to the attempt by Professor Josiah Royce, in the Appendix to his "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," to refute (without first understanding) the scientific theory of universals, outlined in part in "The Way out of Agnosticism ;" and to misrepresent my philosophy as derived from Hegel's, in the "International Journal of Ethics" for October, 1890.

cept, indeed, but the concept of no object; there would be no object but the subject itself. The object, if absolutely inactive, would vanish out of human knowledge; its place would be held by an absolute illusion, and illusion is the reverse of knowledge. This, if it were thinkable, would be consistent idealism, that is, absolute solipsism, or absolute absorption of the object by the subject.

III. If the concept, then, is possible at all as knowledge, or true thinking of the object by the subject (§ 50 and footnotes), it must originate in their co-activity, in action and reaction between the object and the subject, as equally active and therefore equally real. This is scientific realism, or dynamical correlation of subject and object.¹

¹ This scientific realism is at least as old as Aristotle's doctrine of immediate knowledge: "Jenes unmittelbare Erkennen wird daher nur eine Anschauung, und im Unterschied von der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung nur eine geistige Anschauung sein können. Da aber doch der menschliche Geist die Begriffe nicht als angeborene in sich hat, wird auch die Anschauung, durch die er sie findet, nicht in einer Selbstanschauung, einem Akt der Selbstbeobachtung bestehen, durch den er sich der Principien als einer vorher schon in ihm liegenden Wahrheit bewusst würde; sondern darin, dass gewisse Gedanken und Begriffe jetzt erst durch eine Einwirkung des Gedachten auf den denkenden Geist in ähnlicher Weise entstehen, wie die Wahrnehmung durch eine Einwirkung des Wahrgenommenen auf das Wahrnehmende entsteht. Und an diese Analogie hält sich Aristoteles wirklich, wenn er sagt, der Nus [νοῦς] verhalte sich zum Denkbaren, wie der Sinn zum Wahrnehmbaren; er erkenne das Denkbare, in dem er sich mit demselben berühre; und wie die Wahrnehmung als solche immer wahr sei, so sei es auch das Denken, sofern es sich auf die Begriffe als solche beziehe." (E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II. ii. 195 f.) Despite the crudities of this doctrine, it has had enough vitality and truth to maintain itself successfully against the worst crudities of the current relativism of the present day; for without it in some form there can be no such thing as knowledge of a world external to the individual consciousness. For example, it reasserts itself in Professor Riehl: "Unsere Erkenntniss ist die Erkenntniss von Erscheinungen der Dinge, der Ursprung unserer Ideen daher weder ausschliesslich in uns noch ausschliesslich in den Dingen ausser uns zu suchen, sondern sowohl in uns als in den Dingen, die auf unser Bewusstsein einwirken." (A. Riehl, *Der philosophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft*,

IV. The subject, therefore, cannot possibly create the object or originate knowledge out of itself alone. There is no such thing as "pure knowledge *a priori*." On the one hand, the subject must be stimulated to activity as experience by the active presence of the object as unit (the thing), and it must be stimulated to activity as reason by the active presence of the object as universal (the kind); this is simply saying that there can be no knowledge, either empirical or rational, without *something* to know — that is, a *thing of some kind*. On the other hand, the subject itself, reacting against the activity of the object, must determine its own stimulated activity and fix the form of its own product as either perfect concept or imperfect concept, according to its own definite capacity for experience and reason. If the subject be infinite, the resultant concept must be determined as infinite, adequate, or perfect; if the subject be finite, the resultant concept must be determined as finite, inadequate, or imperfect. But in either case, whether perfect or imperfect, the concept must be concrete, that is, both empirical and rational; it can never be the product either of "pure experience" or of "pure reason." Even the so-called abstraction or abstract concept is never abstract in the sense of being purely empirical or purely rational, that is, in the sense of conceiving the object as either pure unit or pure universal: this is impossible, because each of these two real determinations of the object is the necessary condition of the other, and the reality or real constitution of the object as necessarily a unit-universal or thing of some kind, necessarily determines all real knowledge of it. The inade-

Bd. II. Th. II. s. 175, 1887.) Riehl thinks that his "critical realism" rests on a Kantian foundation; but he breaks away here from Kant, to whom *Erscheinung* = *Vorstellung*, and to whom, therefore, *Erscheinungen* are not "phaenomena of things," but merely "phaenomena in us" — not the "influence of things upon our consciousness," but the mere activity of consciousness itself without any external knowable "cause." For the causality of the Kantian *Dinge an sich*, whatever it may be, contributes nothing either to the form or to the content of a real cognition.

quacy or imperfection of the imperfect concept consists in its apprehending partially or dimly the double-constitution of the object, and failing to comprehend it in its whole extent. Consequently, even the imperfect concept is necessarily *concrete*, that is, both empirical and rational, so far as it goes, inasmuch as it partly conceives both the unity and the universality of the object in their inseparable union; but it is at the same time *abstract*, that is, inadequate, in the sense that it conceives only a part abstracted from the whole. Hence, every human concept is both empirical and rational, or *concrete*, so far as it goes; but it is at the same time abstract, inadequate, or *imperfect*, because it is neither exhaustively empirical nor exhaustively rational, but necessarily apprehends the object under the human condition of a more or less limited capacity for experience and reason alike.

V. Thus the object of knowledge, as identity in difference of unit and universal, is necessarily an active concrete reality or unit-universal of energy, which as unit, or object of experience, is wholly immanent in its own universal, while as universal, or object of reason, it is (1) immanent in all of its own units as a whole, and (2) both immanent and transcendent in each of them as a part. Hence, the concept of the object, as identity in difference of experience and reason, is (1) concrete, so far as it conceives the object as at once unit and universal, and (2) imperfect, so far as it fails to conceive the object exhaustively as whole unit and whole universal; that is, it is *concrete so far as it knows the object*, and *imperfect so far as it fails to know it*. This is the necessary form of human knowledge in general, since knowledge itself consists in the truth or agreement of the concept with the object, and since it can never transcend the subject's capacity of experience and reason. This partial but necessary imperfection of all human concepts, which constitutes the only assignable limit of human knowledge, is the inherent and ineradicable defect of the human concept *per se*, and stamps it as at once the strength and the

weakness, the glory and the infirmity, of the human mind (§ 93).

VI. Every human concept, being concrete so far as the subject both empirically and rationally knows the object in part, and being imperfect so far as the subject fails to know the object exhaustively in its wholeness, has its origin neither in the subject alone nor in the object alone, but in their co-activity, action and reaction, or dynamical correlation. That is, it originates (1) objectively, in positive stimulation of the subject by the object to activity as experience and reason, and (2) subjectively, in negative limitation of this activity by the bounds of the subject's capacity of experience and reason. While, however, the *origin* of the human concept is thus the origin of all human knowledge, it must not be overlooked that the *growth* of the concept depends (3) on the subject's positive reaction upon the object in experimental investigation, directed by scientific imagination in the free formation of hypotheses. This is a topic not germane to the present discussion, but necessary to consideration of the scientific method, and is mentioned here only to avoid the appearance of failing to recognize the subject's free activity as essential to knowledge.

VII. Consequently, the concept of the real human I, personal subject-object, or Each of the We, being concrete and imperfect in the sense just explained, has its origin neither in the I as rational subject alone nor in the I as empirical object alone, but in the I as real identity in difference of the two. That is, it originates, (1) as concept of the "succession of perceptions," in the I determined by its own origin in the We to be an *active object of experience and reason*; (2) as concept of the "synthetical unity of apperception," in the I determined by its own origin in the We and its inherited capacity to be an *active subject of experience and reason*; and (3) as concept of the generic unity of apperception, in the I determined by its origin, its inherited capacity, and its free activity, to be an *active*

subject-object of experience and reason, a personal consciousness, a real person. As real object, the I is constantly determined by stimulation or action from without; as real subject, the I constantly determines itself by its own reaction from within; as real subject-object, therefore, the I is a unitary-universal self-conscious energy which originates the ever-growing concept of itself out of itself. The origin of the concept of the real I, therefore, is the generic unity of apperception, identity in difference of race-consciousness and self-consciousness, or *personal consciousness as I in the We*; its necessary form is that of a concrete but imperfect thought, true so far, and so far only, as it agrees as concept with the real I as object; and its growth is its gradual increase in truth, in proportion as this agreement is enlarged through perpetual stimulation of the I from without and perpetual reaction of the I from within.

§ 66. To the problem of § 61, therefore, touching the threefold proximate origin of the real I, a solution has now been found, as follows:

I. The I as a real unit ("My Self as One of the We") originates in the We, through *birth* or *heredity*.

II. The I as a real universal ("My Self in each and all of My Conscious States,") originates in the I as a real unit, through the identity in difference of *heredity and spontaneity* — through the simultaneous evolution of inherited race-consciousness and original self-consciousness, as two distinguishable, inseparable, and reciprocally conditioning factors of *one personal consciousness*.

III. The imperfect concrete concept of the I as a real unit-universal, thing of some kind, or object of knowledge ("My Self in each and all of My Conscious States as One of the We,") originates in the I as one personal consciousness or real person, through the *generic unity of apperception* — through the co-activity of inherited race-consciousness and original self-consciousness in one gradually evolved personal consciousness, subject-object, or real personality, producing the concept of itself out of itself in

agreement with itself, and therefore arriving at the truth of itself as partial but real *knowledge of the I in the We*.¹

¹ The further problems of the ultimate origin and the ultimate destiny of the *I in the We* do not belong here. For the sake of completeness, however, it may be well to say briefly (not dogmatically) that the ultimate origin of the *We* can be only the Absolute I, whence necessarily results a third element in the personal consciousness as God-consciousness, conditioning and conditioned by both race-consciousness and self-consciousness; further, that the ultimate destiny of the *We*, which includes that of the *I*, is a problem that cannot rationally arise except out of ethico-religious considerations, and therefore belongs to Chapter XVIII. It may also be here pointed out that inherited race-consciousness, which is more than mere "inherited habit," is the true significance of *instinct*.

CHAPTER V

TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: EGO AND NON-EGO

§ 67. IT will not fail to be noticed that this account of the origin of self-consciousness, as absolutely conditioned on race-consciousness in the generic unity of apperception (antithesis of Ego and Other-Egos), differs irreconcilably from the traditional account of its origin in the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego.¹

It is, of course, a mere logical truism to say that "the opposition of A and Not-A divides the universe."² The opposition itself, however, posits the universe, that is, recognizes it as existent; there could be no division of a universe without a universe to be divided. Moreover, the universe

¹ "Der an die Spitze der gesammten theoretischen Wissenschaftslehre gestellte Satz: *das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt durch das Nicht-Ich* — ist vollkommen erschöpft, und alle Widersprüche, die in demselben lagen, gehoben. Das Ich kann sich nicht anders setzen, als, dass es durch das Nicht-Ich bestimmt sey (kein Object, kein Subject). Insofern setzt es sich als bestimmt. Zugleich setzt es sich auch als bestimmend; weil das begrenzende im Nicht-Ich sein eigenes Product ist (kein Subject, kein Object)." (Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 218. For the mystical "Anstoss von aussen," which cannot be explained either by the Ego or by the Non-Ego, see the same, pp. 227-231). Again, in varied form: "Die Grundbehauptung des Philosophen, als eines solchen, ist diese: So wie das Ich nur für sich selbst sey, entstehe ihm zugleich nothwendig ein Seyn ausser ihm; der Grund des letzteren liege im ersteren, das letztere sey durch das erstere bedingt: Selbstbewusstsein und Bewusstsein eines Etwas, das nicht wir selbst — seyn solle, sey nothwendig verbunden; das erstere aber sey anzusehen als das bedingende, und das letztere als das bedingte." (Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 457.) See further, below, Chapter X.

² Cf. E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii. 214-221. So Kant, Logik, Werke, VIII. 101: "Alles Mögliche ist entweder A oder *non A*."

could not be divided, unless it was previously undivided, that is, *one universe*; and "division" of it is simply distinction of some known units from other known units, distinction of two classes of units in a universe of units. Hence the opposition of A and Not-A cannot obtain except within one universe of units or things (in the widest sense of "thing" as *unit of existence*, of whatever sort or nature). It means the recognition of two species within one genus, two sub-kinds within one kind, two classes of existences within Existence, as *summum genus* opposed to mere Non-Existence. It can have no meaning at all, unless A denotes "things which are A" and Not-A denotes "things which are not A," — unless these two classes of things, *qua* things, exist independently of each other as equal and co-ordinate units of existence, — unless, in short, it is an opposition set up within the category Thing. For, if A and Not-A could denote Thing and Not-Thing, Something and Nothing, it would become the purely formal or unreal opposition of Existence and Non-Existence, which in no sense divides the real universe; the universe, being necessarily a universe of units or things, can be divided only as some-things and other-things, and the opposition of A and Not-A, except as dichotomy of the real kind, Thing, is really no opposition at all — no division of the universe.

Further, A must be already posited before it can be negated; the negation of A in Not-A is impossible except through the prior position of A, not only as a unit of existence, but also as an object of knowledge. That is, A cannot be negated unless it is known. But every object of knowledge is necessarily a something or thing of some kind, and every human concept is necessarily imperfect knowledge of a thing of some kind (§ 65, IV, V, VI). Since, therefore, the intrinsic imperfection of the human concept as such consists in knowing its object in part only, the object itself must be a something partly known and partly unknown; and A must not only *denote* its object so far as it is *a thing with known marks or determinations*, but also

connote it so far as it is a *thing with known and unknown determinations*. Now the negation of A negates the denotation of A, but does not negate the connotation — negates the marks which A denotes, but does not negate what has those marks — negates *known marks*, but does not negate *thing*; for, if Not-A negated more than what A denotes (that is, if it negated both denotation and connotation, both “known marks” and “thing”), it would itself denote absolute Nothing. In this case, the universe would be absurdly divided into Somethings and Nothings as two classes of Things; A would denote all Somethings, and Not-A would denote all Nothings or pure Nothing; and the opposition of A and Not-A would not divide the universe at all. But this is contrary to the original thesis that it does divide the universe. Hence Not-A, negating all the known marks of A as a part or element of the universe, but at the same time positing things with other marks, known and unknown, as the residue of the universe, negates the denotation of A, but still posits its connotation. That is, just as we found before, A must be understood as “things which are A,” and Not-A as “things which are not A;” but both alike must be understood as *denoting the same known marks, as either present or absent, and connoting things as a kind, or else the opposition of A and Not-A altogether fails to divide the universe*.¹

¹ The above doctrine that Negation, as a thought-function, applies to the denotation of A, but cannot apply to its connotation, is founded on the necessary principle that all negation must be negation of *something in particular*, and cannot possibly be negation of *everything in general*. For *negation of everything-in-general = position of nothing-in-particular*; but this would negate the *positing subject itself*, as something-in-particular, and thereby prevent the possibility of *its positing nothing-in-particular*; whence it follows that negation of everything in general is absolutely impossible. For example, we may say, “There is no *such* thing as the devil,” for this merely negates the denotation of devil as a particular thing, or unit of existence, and does not negate its necessary connotation of things as a kind, or existent universe of units. But we cannot say, “There is *no-thing* at all,” for both the judging subject and the judgment itself are *some-things*

Out of these necessary results of analyzing the necessary conditions of the problem, however, there necessarily or units of existence ; consequently, what we say we ourselves unsay, and what we try to say remains unsaid. Hence negation itself must posit, or it cannot negate ; it must connote things, or it cannot denote anything. There is, therefore, a measure of truth in Hegel's conception of Negation as not *ein leeres Nichts, die Leerheit, or das reine Nichts*, but rather as *das Nichts dessen, woraus es resultirt, as bestimmte Negation*, or as the Nothing which *ist ein bestimmtes und hat einen Inhalt*. His famous "dialectical movement," which consists essentially in Position, Negation, and Negation of Negation as New Position, and thereby perpetuates itself through an inner necessity of generating a new object out of the old, is, he maintains, "not a merely negative movement ;" the result of each new triad is not "pure Nothing," not "the empty Nothing," but rather "the determinate Nothing which has a Content ;" and each new Position, developed by this double Negation, is only a higher moment or stage in the progress towards "truth." Scepticism, he argues, takes its coarse negations as the Nothing of pure emptiness, which precludes all possibility of rational advance, whereas his own successive results, as "determinate Negation" or "Nothing with a Content," are so many "new forms of consciousness" or "new objects," whereby knowledge advances through a succession of constantly changing forms to its final goal in the agreement of Concept and Object, Object and Concept. (*Phänomenologie des Geistes, Einleitung, Werke, II. 65, 71.*) But the "content" of Hegel's "determinate Negation" is only a *pure thought-determination*, only a moment or phase which is speedily and completely "sublated" (*aufgehoben*) in the self-transformation of the *Begriff*, striving to free itself absolutely from *all empirical elements* ; it is radically different from the *connotation of real things as a kind, an existent universe of units known both rationally and empirically*. The weakness of the Hegelian dialectic of Negation is the fatal weakness of all "pure thought" — namely, the separation of experience and reason ; the whole movement is a futile attempt to eliminate all experience from the final result, and to end in *Begriff des Begriffes, reine Idee*, or the pure self-activity of reason alone, to which, in each new triad, the mere immanent "necessity" of its own procedure, which is to be absolutely independent of all experience, becomes itself "the *origination* of a new object with a new essence." Manifestly enough, this is a theory of Negation which is incompatible with the theory that both Position and Negation equally connote "things as a kind," because they equally involve the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason, experience as the knowledge of things or units, and reason as the knowledge of kinds or universals. Prantl half recognizes the necessity of our doctrine here in his interpretation of Aristotle's οὐκ ἄνθρωπος or ὄνομα ἀβρίστον, when he says :

emerges a further and decisive conclusion: namely, whatever knowledge is possessed of the marks of A must have originated prior to setting up the opposition of A and Not-A, and, therefore, *cannot possibly have originated in that opposition itself*. For, before I can oppose A to Not-A as "things which are A" to "things which are not A," I must already know, not only that things exist, as a divisible universe of units (§ 72, 5), but also that certain marks exist in A, as one class of things, which do not exist in Not-A, as another class of things. Otherwise, I cannot possibly negate A in Not-A, or set up the opposition at all. This prior knowledge in the negating subject is the absolutely necessary condition of the negation itself. In the very *opposition* of A and Not-A, there are logically involved three *positions*: (1) knowledge of a divisible universe of units; (2) knowledge of certain units, A, as a part or element of it; and (3) knowledge of other units, Not-A, as the residue of it. These three positions are three absolute conditions of the division or opposition itself; negation of any one of them would render the opposition impossible. A posits and denotes *something already known*, namely, "things which are A;" Not-A contraposes and denotes *something else already known*, namely, "things which are not A;" and this knowledge, in both cases, is the *condition*, not the *consequence*, of the opposition as such. Clearly, the opposition can originate in me no knowledge of A which I did not bring to the opposition itself. Knowledge of A is (1) the absolute *prius* or condition of (2) the negation of A in Not-A and (3) the opposition of Not-A to A, as dichotomy or division of the universe. Consequently, *knowledge of A cannot possibly originate in an opposition which itself depends on that very knowledge*.

"After abstraction of all that which is 'man,' there remains real a residue of the existent, although not so great, yet always positive, which as such is likewise a unity," — which is the manifest meaning of Aristotle's cited words, *ἐν γὰρ πως σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον*. (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 143, 145.)

§ 68. The bearings of this result on the traditional account of the origination of self-consciousness in the opposition of Ego and Non-Ego are plain enough. The Ego cannot possibly originate knowledge of itself in itself by setting up an opposition which is conditioned on its own prior possession of that very knowledge. It cannot originally discover itself to be conscious by discovering surrounding objects to be unconscious; on the contrary, it cannot discover these to be unconscious, unless it has already discovered itself to be conscious, and thereby learned the ground of the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness. For A *must* be known before Not-A *can* be known; knowledge of *likeness* ("things which are A") necessarily precedes and conditions knowledge of *unlikeness* ("things which are not A"). Hence the Ego must have discovered *some* things to be *like itself* (conscious) before it can possibly discover *other* things to be *unlike itself* (unconscious); it must have discovered itself to be *one of a kind* (conscious things) before it can possibly discriminate itself from *one of another kind* (unconscious things); it must have arrived at knowledge of other Egos (the We) before it can possibly oppose itself to the Non-Ego (the World). Consequently, just as any two constitutive factors condition their own product and thereby condition each other as factors, so race-consciousness and self-consciousness, the two constitutive factors of personal consciousness, must have been already evolved *pari passu* in the nascent Ego, before the Ego itself, as developed personal consciousness, can possibly set up the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego in any sense whatever. *Self-consciousness, therefore, cannot possibly originate in that antithesis as such.*

In fact, however, the simultaneous prior appearance of these two factors in personal consciousness is itself the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego in its germinal form: namely, antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness in the We. For it is only as "My Self as One

of the We" that the Ego can discover its own unity or think itself as a unit at all; yet not till it has discovered its own unity and thought itself as a unit can it make itself a unitary term in any antithesis or any relation whatever. However obscure, rudimentary, instinctive, or even possibly ante-natal, the original act of generic unity of apperception may be, it appears that the necessary fundamental opposition of My-Consciousness (the babe) and Another-Consciousness (the mother) is itself the Ego's discovery of its own unity and the germ of all personal consciousness as *I in the We*; for the babe's consciousness buds out of the mother's consciousness in original unconsciousness, and only gradually differentiates itself from it. The babe originates in the mother, comes to nascent consciousness or becomes dimly aware of itself only in and with the mother, continues long after birth to draw its life from the mother, exists at first only as part of the mother, separates its existence from hers only by degrees, and cannot possibly know itself even rudimentarily as *one* except as identical with, yet different from, its *other*, and as knowing itself and its other as *alike*. Its awareness of itself as *one* is its awareness of itself and its mother as *two* — its generic unity of apperception as *prius* of its synthetic unity of apperception, and *vice versa*. The babe cannot, of course, grow into a vivid and distinct consciousness of *likeness between itself and its mother*, as two of a kind, except after innumerable repetitions of slight and vague impressions, both prior and subsequent to birth; yet this developed consciousness of *likeness*, which is the only possible root of the consciousness of personal unity as "One of the We," must precede all consciousness of its mere negation as *unlikeness*, and must, therefore, lie at the bottom of the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego as *unlike*.¹ Again, therefore, it appears that

¹ "Our knowledge commences with the confused and complex, which, as regarded in one point of view or another, may easily be mistaken for the individual or for the general. The discussion of this problem belongs, however, to Psychology, not to Logic. It is sufficient to say

self-consciousness cannot possibly originate in that antithesis as such ; for that antithesis itself originates in the earlier and germinal antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness, as *two that are alike, yet not one and the same*, in which the real unity of self-consciousness as "One of the We" must be primarily evolved.

This fundamental opposition of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness, transmitted potentially or implicitly by heredity and developed actually or explicitly by personal growth, is itself, likewise, the emergence of *race-consciousness*, or consciousness of the unity of the We as One Kind ("things which are A"). As implicit or potential, race-consciousness goes down from generation to generation, is the same in all generations and all individuals, and constitutes the *unbroken continuity of all human life*. As explicit or actual, it rises simultaneously with its co-factor, self-consciousness, into personal consciousness, which is never duplicated, but constitutes the *real individuality of each human life*. As the hundred-eyed Argus who watched Io in her wanderings closed only two of his eyes in sleeping, while all the rest of them remained awake, so the imperishable race-consciousness of mankind sleeps for a while in the birth of the babe, but wakes during the life-time of all adults. Nay, the rhythmical periodicity of personal consciousness itself, which sinks into unconsciousness at night and renews itself in the morning, is but the repetition in miniature of the larger periodicity of race-consciousness, which goes to sleep in the origination of a

in general that all objects are presented to us in complexity ; that we are at first more struck with the points of resemblance than with the points of contrast ; that the earliest notions, and consequently the earliest terms, are those that correspond to this synthesis, while the notions and the terms arising from an analysis of this synthesis into its parts, are of a subsequent formation." (Sir William Hamilton, *Logic*, 156, 157.) This goes to corroborate the position taken in the text above, that the *resemblance* between the mother and the babe, as like in kind, must be apprehended sooner than the *contrast* between the babe and (say) its rattle, as unlike in kind.

new human being and reawakens in his gradual evolution. There are defects in the analogy, but they are immaterial. Personal consciousness — the unique, original, and incommunicable individuality of a real I — is that identity in difference of hereditary race-consciousness and spontaneous self-consciousness by which, when rationally comprehended, a real I knows the We to be immanent in all of its own units as a whole, and both immanent and transcendent in each of its units as a part; it is essentially the I's knowledge of itself as a unit in its own universal *plus* its knowledge of itself as a universal in all its own units (§ 63), that is, as *I in the We*. For "I and Another" are "We," no less than "I and a thousand million Others;" and the discovery that "I and Another" are *alike*, that is, *two of a kind*, is itself the discovery of *I in the We* — the emergence of personal consciousness out of unconsciousness.

This principle that both the essential factors of personal consciousness originate, not in the later antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, but in the earlier and germinal antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness, is a rational or necessary result of the scientific theory of universals, of which our entire doctrine of the real I is simply an illustration and direct practical application. But it stands, likewise, in complete accordance with the facts of experience. On the one hand, the psychical dualism of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness, as the origin of all personal consciousness in the knowing and knowable I, repeats and illumines the physical dualism of germ-cell and sperm-cell, as the origin of the knowable I itself. That is, just as life itself originates in the dynamical correlation of two sexes, so all personal consciousness of that life originates in the dynamical correlation of two consciousnesses. True, in the origination of life as such, the two (the parents) originate a third distinct from both (the child), while, in the origination of personal consciousness, the two (mother and child) originate simply a higher

form of life in one of that two (the child), since personal consciousness is a more highly evolved form of life than organic unconsciousness. This difference, indeed, in the two cases, brings out the fact (in itself a profounder enigma than the riddle of the Sphinx) that in all personal consciousness the subject must *become* an object to itself. But this very fact shows the emergent personal consciousness as itself a third, a resultant of the two; that is, the simple co-ordination of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness results in My-Personal-Consciousness as *I in the We*. Hence the difference in no degree impairs the analogy, or weakens its corroborative force as a verification of reason by experience. On the other hand, just as personal consciousness originates in the germinal antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness as mother and child, so it culminates in the crowning antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness as husband and wife. Lifelong love between two I's is the supreme personal relation in the We; true marriage is the condition of the highest possible development of human individuality. This is not the place to dwell on these truths; but it is necessary to point out in this connection that the fundamental dualism which marks both the origination and the culmination of personal human life, as such, marks no less the origination of all personal consciousness of that life. The human I begins in the We as two (father and mother), learns to know itself in the We as two (mother and child), and achieves its own highest individuality in the We as two (husband and wife); and these facts of experience powerfully confirm the truth of reason that the human I can neither be born, nor come to personal consciousness, nor realize its destiny, except as *I in the We*.

§ 69. Further, solely out of the I's knowledge of itself as *I in the We* can spring its knowledge of itself as *I in the World*.

Both My-Self and Another-Self, considered merely as units of existence, are *things*; My-Self is one thing, and

Another-Self is another thing. This opposition of My-Self and Another-Self, in which the generic unity of apperception must originally manifest itself as that confluence of heredity and spontaneity which is the genesis of personal consciousness, constitutes necessarily the germ of all real self-knowledge as *I in the We*. For every nascent or potential I that learns by experience to distinguish itself from another I becomes in that very distinction, and only in that distinction, an actual *I in the We*, a conscious thing in its kind. A conscious thing, as *one* of a kind, is possible only through *another* of that kind; there must be *two of them*, at the very least, or there cannot be *one of them*; and two conscious things which are conscious of each other already constitute, so far, *a kind* of conscious things. But, similarly, *a kind* is possible only through *another kind*; there must be two kinds, at least, or there cannot be one kind. *A kind* of conscious things, however, can have *no other kind* than *a kind* of unconscious things; for, from the nature of the opposition of A and Not-A, these two kinds of things together constitute all things as a whole, that is, as the World. In other words, out of the primary consciousness of *other things of the same kind as myself*, there springs necessarily the secondary consciousness of *another kind of things than my kind*, and hence that of the *difference or unlikeness between consciousness and unconsciousness*, as marks of the two great kinds which divide the universe. However difficult it may be to observe the actual beginnings of personal consciousness in others or to remember them in ourselves, it is obvious that, whatever may be the psychological evolution, the logical and philosophical order requires that, before I can distinguish "things which are A" (conscious things) from "things which are not A" (unconscious things) as *unlike classes*, I must have already learned to class together "things which are A" (My-Self and Another-Self) as *like units*. The necessity of this logical order is our only guide in the investigation of facts so obscure as these.

Thus the opposition of My-Self and Another-Self becomes the germ of the opposition of the I and the Not-I. But, it is evident, in this Not-I must be included (1) All Other I's, and (2) All Other Things than I's.

So understood, the opposition of I and Not-I constitutes the Empirical Antithesis, in which the individual human I, as a mere unit of existence or thing, opposes itself to all other things, whether these in themselves are I's or Not-I's. It is a real antithesis, indeed, yet one which, being founded solely on the experience and recognition of individual conscious existence as a unit or thing, and on complete neglect of the rational universality of that existence as one of a kind, is neither critical nor scientific. That is, although it is entirely accurate, and constitutes to that extent the only scientific form of the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, it possesses no particular scientific utility, because it disregards the natural and logical laws of scientific classification. It divides the universe, to be sure, yet on no rational principle, since it opposes one unit of a kind to all other units of that kind, indiscriminately mixed and grouped together with all units of the only alternative kind. The confusion and unscientific character of this purely naïve opposition are obvious; and it has begotten innumerable confusions in philosophy.

The necessity of getting rid of this confusion leads to the correction of the Empirical Antithesis by re-grouping the units of existence, or things in general, according to their natural kind-relations. In this way, the *Empirical Antithesis of I and Not-I* is inevitably evolved, in the philosophic mind, into the *Rational Antithesis of We and Not-We*, in which the We, as a real universal or kind of conscious things, opposes itself to the only alternative kind of unconscious things, as the Not-We. This is the natural and rational opposition to All I's and All Not-I's which opposes all units of one kind to all units of the only alternative kind, and now becomes the scientific antithesis of the sphere of consciousness and the sphere of unconsciousness. This

opposition of the We and the Not-we, the Conscious and the Unconscious, framed in strict accordance with the scientific theory of universals and its fundamental principle of the identity in difference of experience and reason in all human knowledge, divides the universe into two real kinds of things, which together equal all units of existence as *Things in the World*.

Thus out of the I's knowledge of itself as *I in the We* springs its knowledge of *We in the World*, and, therefore, of itself as *I in the World*.

§ 70. In consideration of the interests of exact thinking, it is to be regretted that two real oppositions so obvious in themselves—namely, the empirical antithesis of I and Not-I and the rational antithesis of We and Not-We—should have been so long disregarded or confused. But it is by no means to be wondered at. The long struggle in philosophy since Bacon and Descartes between empiricism and rationalism, growing out of the uncritically assumed and strangely uncontested possibility of separating, instead of merely distinguishing, the two inseparable elements of experience and reason in human knowledge, led inevitably to two other oppositions, in themselves thoroughly one-sided and unscientific.

Empiricism, denying with Hume all knowledge not derived from sensuous experience, and therefore all knowledge of necessity and strict universality, starts with the Ego as the purely empirical I or mere "succession of perceptions," which it conceives to be all that is real in it. Yet to this non-universalized content of the purely individual consciousness it opposes, naïvely and inconsistently, the Non-Ego as the universalized world of unconsciousness, without considering that (unless it should seek refuge in solipsism, which it never does) the opposition thus set up leaves no place in either term for the "succession of perceptions" in *any other Empirical I*, and altogether fails, therefore, to divide the universe. Clearly, the origin of self-consciousness can never be logically derived from the antithesis of Ego and

Non-Ego, when conceived so loosely and illogically as that of the empirical I and the Not-We.¹

Rationalism, on the other hand, denying with Kant that knowledge can be derived at all from sensuous experience or perception as such,² starts with the Ego as the purely rational I or mere "synthetical unity of apperception" — the real fountain of "pure knowledge *a priori*," not as the empty form of objectless or merely possible concepts, but as the filled form of actualized concepts in mathematics and physics — the pure "understanding itself," which creates all concepts out of the pure or impure intuitions of the sensibility as its proper "object" — the original and spontaneous universalizing act of transcendental synthesis, or a *priori* conjunction of the manifold — the universal rational consciousness itself, abstracted from the empirical consciousness and absolutely pure from all empirical elements. This Pure I (*reines Ich*) is that common element of spontaneous transcendental self-activity, that essential community of nature, which is inherent in every Empirical I (*der mit Vernunft begabte Sinnenmensch*), and which, ac-

¹ "Die Gegenseitigkeit von Ich und Nicht-Ich, von Gefühl und Empfindung, von Trieb und Widerstand, Action und Reaction, diese Gegenseitigkeit ist das ursprünglich Gegebene: *das Bewusstsein existirt, cogitatio est*. Die äussere Erfahrung steht an Unmittelbarkeit, Gewissheit und Wirklichkeit der innern nicht nach. Das Dasein von etwas Aeusserem, von mir Verschiedenem ist so wenig aus dem Dasein meiner selbst gefolgt, dass ich von mir selbst nichts wissen könnte, wenn nicht etwas Aeusseres da wäre, wovon ich mich unterscheide." (A. Riehl, *Der philosophische Kriticismus*, II. ii. 147.) Professor Riehl, whose "critical realism" is somewhat paradoxically founded upon Kant's "critical idealism," cannot justly be classed with pure empiricists; but this passage, nevertheless, exhibits the full-fledged empiricist antithesis, and derives from it the origin of self-consciousness. His *Ich* is manifestly conceived as the empirical I, while his *Nicht-Ich* is no less clearly conceived as the Not-We; for "something external and different from me" cannot include something external and like me, *i. e.* another I, but must be something external and different from all I's, *i. e.* the Not-We.

² "In den Sinnen ist gar kein Urtheil, weder ein wahres noch falsches." (Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Werke, III. 245.)

cording to rationalism, must be completely abstracted from the sensibility in order to be thought; it is the universal which inheres in the individual as such, and is one and the same in all individuals (*in allem Bewusstsein ein und dasselbe ist*); in a word, it is the pure "consciousness-in-general" (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*). To this pure consciousness-in-general, as Ego, rationalism opposes the Non-Ego, not, however, as the negation of consciousness-in-general (which would be required by logical consistency), but rather as the negation of all consciousness, general or particular. Naïvely enough, both empiricism and rationalism conceive the Non-Ego irregularly as the universalized world of unconsciousness, and do not determine it as Not-A must be determined by A; that is, they posit the Ego in one sense, and then negate it in another. Consequently, just as in the case of empiricism, there results for rationalism a false antithesis, which leaves no place whatever in either term for consciousness-in-particular. Yet consciousness-in-particular is just as real as consciousness-in-general, and must be equally included in the universe, no matter whether this is conceived as real or ideal, noumenal or phaenomenal or both. Hence the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, conceived by rationalism as that of the Pure I and the Not-We, is just as loose, defective, and illogical as that of empiricism; it wholly fails to divide the universe, and cannot possibly serve to explain the origin of self-consciousness.

§ 71. The positive and critical results of the last four sections are so important that they require to be set forth synoptically in the form of tables, which will enable the careful reader to seize and to fix the distinctions now drawn in the clearest manner possible.

TABLE III

I. EMPIRICAL ANTITHESIS OF I AND NOT-I

- A. The I = Real Unit in its Real Universal = My Self in each and all of My Conscious States as One of the We
= My Inner World (real).

- B. The Not-I = All that is not My Self = All Other Selves than My Self + All Other Things than Selves
= My Outer World (real).
- C. My Inner World + My Outer World = the Universe. This is the only scientific antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, though it possesses no scientific utility.

II. RATIONAL ANTITHESIS OF WE AND NOT-WE

- A. The We = Real Universal in All its Real Units = All I's = All Things which are Selves = All that is Our Consciousnesses
= Our Inner World (real).
- B. The Not-We = All Not-I's = All Things which are not Selves
= All that is not Our Consciousnesses
= Our Outer World (real).
- C. Our Inner World + Our Outer World = the Universe. This is the only scientific antithesis of the Conscious and the Unconscious.

III. IRRATIONAL ANTITHESIS OF I AND NOT-WE

i. *Empiricist Form: Ego = Empirical I, Non-Ego = Not-We*

- A. The Empirical I = Pseudo-Units Out of their Universal = "My Succession of Perceptions" without "Synthetical Unity of Apperception"
= My Inner World (abstract).
- B. The Not-We = Our Outer World (real or ideal).
- C. But My Inner World + Our Outer World do not = the Universe. For Your Inner World, which is no part of mine, is left out of the account. The antithesis is a false one.

ii. *Rationalist Form: Ego = Pure I, Non-Ego = Not-We*

- A. The Pure I = Pseudo-Universal Out of its Units = "Synthetical Unity of Apperception" without "My Succession of Perceptions"
= Pure Consciousness-in-general (abstract).
- B. The Not-We = Our Outer World (real or ideal, noumenal or phaenomenal).
- C. But Pure Consciousness-in-general + Our Outer World do not = the Universe. For every Empirical Consciousness-in-particular, which is no part of Pure Consciousness-in-general, is left out of the account. The antithesis is a false one.

§ 72. From these tables and the tables of § 60 are deducible certain necessary conclusions which go far to dissipate the fog that hangs over unmodernized philosophy and hides from it very obvious distinctions.

1. *The antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego cannot be scientifically used as equivalent to that of the Conscious and the Unconscious.* Nothing but confusion of the Empirical Antithesis with the Rational Antithesis can possibly account for the existence and wide prevalence of the Irrational Antithesis, which posits the Ego in one sense, and negates it in another. The irrationality here consists (1) in positing the Ego as either purely empirical or purely rational, that is, as only a fragment of the real I; (2) in positing the Non-Ego, not as negation of the Ego already posited, but as the Not-We; (3) in opposing the Ego and the Non-Ego, thus misunderstood, as the Conscious and the Unconscious; and (4) in imagining that this false and illogical antithesis of I and Not-We, this mere philosophical blunder, is a philosophical explanation of the origin of self-consciousness. One might as well hope (with Plato) to explain the origin of Existence out of the sterile antithesis of Being and Non-Being, as hope (with Fichte) to explain the origin of self-consciousness out of the equally sterile antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego.

2. The true origin of self-consciousness and of race-consciousness, the two co-factors of personal consciousness, is immediately given neither in the empirical antithesis of I and Not-I nor in the rational antithesis of We and Not-We, but must be sought in that earlier, primordial, and germinal antithesis of *My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness* which is the purely positive and simplest possible consciousness of *I in the We*. Both the I and the We must be posited before either of them can possibly be negated, because they cannot be posited except in conjunction. The *I in the We* is, as it were, the ultimate molecule of personal consciousness, to which self-consciousness and race-consciousness stand related somewhat as the ultimate constitu-

ent atoms, to abstract either of which is to break up the whole essence of the molecule itself. The *generic unity of apperception*, that identity in difference of heredity and spontaneity by which the I and the We must be given together before they can be negated separately, is the only principle which can explain the origin of self-consciousness as a *fact of evolution*.

3. Both the empirical and the rational antitheses illustrate the scientific theory of universals, by which the real individual inheres wholly in its real universal, while the real universal inheres *wholly* in *all* its real individuals and *partly* in *each* of them. They illustrate it, not as a "metaphysical" or merely abstract theory, but as a practical working method adequate to all problems, which is at bottom the method of all scientific investigation, and will be recognized as such by all scientific men, when they rise above their own specialties and come to see that all special matters are only so many special applications of the one universal method of universal science as such — that is, of philosophy itself.

4. The empiricist form of the irrational antithesis illustrates the futility of the attempt to get along with no theory of universals — that is, to suppress the real universal altogether and get along with the real units alone. The rationalist form of it illustrates the futility of the Aristotelian theory of universals, by which the universal, as abstract common element or necessary essence, inheres wholly in each of its units, as the "form" in the "compound of form and matter;" while the individual exemplifies the universal, but does not inhere in it, since the "compound of matter and form" cannot be in the "form" alone. That is, the pure consciousness-in-general (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*), as "form" inheres in every empirical Ego (*der mit Vernunft begabte Sinnenmensch*), as "compound of form and matter," — is identically the same in all empirical Egos (*in allem Bewusstsein ein und dasselbe ist*), — and is both expressible and abstractible as that universal "I think" (*ich denke*)

which must "accompany" (*begleiten*) every one of my conscious states in order to make it mine; while, on the contrary, the empirical Ego, or concrete individual, cannot possibly inhere in the pure consciousness-in-general, or abstract universal, but can only be subsumed under it, as an example of *it and empirical consciousness in one*. The failure of this rationalist form of the irrational antithesis to agree with the facts, already proved by the exposure of the fourfold irrationality of it (§ 72, 1), is simply a practical illustration of the scientific inadequacy of the Aristotelian theory of universals itself, and the practical necessity of superseding it with a better theory.

5. The three antitheses, taken together as a whole, expose the dreary emptiness of the problem on which the philosophical world has for two or three centuries so pathetically wasted so much genius of the very highest order: namely, the "problem of the reality of the external world."

All personal consciousness is primarily or genetically rooted in the gradual divergence and ultimate distinction of *the I and the Other-I*, of My-Consciousness as the babe and Another-Consciousness as the mother, which must condition and antedate the distinction of *the I and the Not-I* as A and Not-A (§ 68). Yet My-Consciousness is my internal world, and Another-Consciousness is already another world, internal to itself, but external to me. Since the original germ of all my self-cognition, and the prime condition of all my other cognitions, consists in knowing myself as *I in the We*, I cannot possibly have any personal consciousness whatever, — I cannot possibly become "a sense-man endowed with reason," an empirical-rational I, a subject of actual knowledge, — unless I know, in one original and indivisible act, an internal world in myself as a unit and an external world in my race as its universal. But, just as I cannot know myself except as *I in the We*, so I cannot know my race except as *We in the World*: that is, I cannot know myself at all except as *I in the We in the World* (§ 69). The We, and the We alone, mediates between knowl-

edge of my internal world (I) and knowledge of my external world (Not-I); *for the We is both in one, as identity in difference of I and Not-I*. Nowhere, with my utmost ingenuity, can I so run a line of logical demarcation between the I and the Not-I, as to make my doubt of an external world anything better than a fool's doubt. For I cannot know the I as a unit without knowing the We as its universal; yet, on whichever side of my line I place the Other-I's that with myself make up the We, they constitute in themselves a *known external world*. If I place them with the Not-I, I get the Empirical Antithesis; if I place them with the I, I get the Rational Antithesis; if I evade the difficulty and ignore them altogether, I can get only the Irrational Antithesis, in one or the other form. Hence I conclude that to doubt an external world, at least from the vantage-ground of the scientific theory of universals, is simply to fall into an abyss of folly. For I cannot at the same time *doubt my external world as the We, yet know my internal world as the I*: to know or doubt either, I must know or doubt both. I conclude, therefore, that the absolutely indivisible and necessary cognition of myself as *I in the We in the World* is itself the absolutely certain cognition of an external world.

In short, this so-called "problem" is no problem at all, except to the empiricism which vainly tries to eliminate the universal, or the rationalism which vainly tries to eliminate the particular, or the eclecticism which vainly tries to reconcile these two contradictory attempts. But it is no "problem" to a scientific philosophy. It is a problem generated solely by an unscientific theory of universals; for the scientific theory of universals, applied to it in the principle of the generic unity of apperception, is the scientific solution of it. This is easily apparent. It is a bald self-contradiction to say, "*We doubt, or do not know, an external world;*" for the "*We*" thus posited or affirmed is itself, to every I, a world partly internal and partly external, and explicitly affirms what the judgment denies. Nay, it would

be a bald self-contradiction even for the solipsist (if he could be found) to say, "*I* doubt, or do not know, an external world;" for the "*I*" thus posited means nothing, unless it means "One of the *We*," and it, too, affirms what the judgment denies. The doubt itself is radically and irredeemably unphilosophic. In fact, the "problem of the reality of the external world" is just as meaningless as the mediæval problem, *num chimæra bombinans in vacuo possit comedere secundas intentiones*; and the best disposition of it that philosophy could make would be to retire it on a pension. It has served out its term.¹

§ 73. It is quite conceivable, however, that some objector should rise up to say: "Your antitheses are valueless, because they leave undetermined the relation of the soul to the body. Do they mean the *I* as soul alone, or as both soul and body in one? Without an explicit and satisfactory answer to this question, the antitheses are too ambiguous to possess any real value."

Such an objection, however, would spring out of a total misapprehension of the subject. The question put is irrelevant; the antitheses hold good, whatever answer may be given to it; they are not ambiguous on any point germane to their purpose. If the body is an essential part of the *Ego*, then it belongs in the *I* of the empirical antithesis

¹ Both of the above judgments, "*We* doubt an external world," "*I* doubt an external world," are contradictions *per se*, if the law of contradiction, as critically formulated by Kant, is valid: "Der Satz nun: keinem Dinge kommt ein Prädicat zu, welches ihm widerspricht, heisst der Satz des Widerspruchs." [Kr. d. r. Vernunft, Werke, III. 148.] The above two judgments, in which the predicate directly contradicts the subject, are intrinsic contradictions, are made such by no judgment external to themselves, and are as absolute, therefore, as that involved in denial of the one Axiom of Philosophy (§ 12). Since all doubt of the existence of the external world must self-evidently express itself in either one or the other of them, the doubter, whether *I* or *We*, is powerless to say or even to think his doubt without contradicting himself in the very saying or thinking of it. If this is not a scientific solution of the "problem," it would be difficult to state what is, or could be.

and the We of the rational antithesis; if it is not, then it belongs in the Not-I of the former and the Not-We of the latter. In either case, however, these two antitheses are completely and equally true to experience and to reason. They perfectly agree with the facts, and they are logically valid because, as A and Not-A, they divide the universe; and they perfectly subserve the uses which have been already made of them. But it is not their purpose or their function to answer the question above propounded. They simply determine the relation of I and Not-I, We and Not-We, in real oppositions which divide the universe, and leave these, as indisputable facts, for further investigation. That the I is a *real unit* and the We its *real universal*, — that the Not-I and the Not-We cannot be confounded together as “Non-Ego,” except in ruinous disregard of experience and reason alike, — so much is certain, whether the body is or is not a part of the I. It cannot but be that rigorous regard for the distinctions established in these antitheses will conduce greatly to a scientific treatment of the latter question. So far as these antitheses alone are concerned, however, this question is left open for strictly scientific investigation; the result of which, if philosophy is possible in the form of historico-literary expression, is already indicated above at the close of § 25.

CHAPTER VI

ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION: THE ARISTOTELIAN PARADOX

§ 74. IN this connection it only remains to show, although necessarily at considerable length, the source of that traditional account of the origin of self-consciousness in the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego which we have been examining in the last seven sections. This could not be shown until the scientific theory of the I, as derived from the scientific theory of universals, had first been positively developed, in order to possess a scientific basis of historical criticism in the philosophy of philosophy.

The historical root of the antithesis, as this has been explained and criticised above, is the Aristotelian theory of universals. Zeller, than whom there is no higher authority on the history of Greek philosophy, maintains that a fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction permeates the whole system of Aristotle, and infects it throughout with incoherence and want of precision. This contradiction, if it be one, lies in Aristotle's two attempts to determine scientifically the object of knowledge, now as the unit of conception, or *intelligible universal essence of the individual* (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία, οὐσία as pure Form), and now as the unit of existence, or *real individual substance of the universal* (τόδε τι, οὐσία as union of Form and Matter).¹ Whether there exists an actual contradiction between these two notions of the object of knowledge, it is not at present necessary to decide, as the question will

¹ Arist. Metaph. VI. 11, 1037 a. 29, ed. Berol. : ἡ οὐσία γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἡ σύνοδος λέγεται οὐσία. Prantl (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 238, Anm. 461) and Edwin Wallace (Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 68, n. 4) adopt the reading σύνολος.

come up again in a later chapter. Our present concern with the Aristotelian theory of universals is simply with reference to its effect upon the concept of the individual as such, and therefore upon that of the real I as the human individual.

§ 75. "With the inquiry into universal concepts," says Zeller,¹ "philosophy had taken in Sokrates that new turn which not only Plato, but also Aristotle essentially followed. From this fact it results that he universally presupposes the Sokratic-Platonic view of the nature of concepts and the problem of conceptual thought. But, just as we shall hear him, in his metaphysics, contradict the Platonic doctrine of the independent reality of the universal which is thought in the concept, so in logic, likewise, he finds in that connection certain stricter determinations necessary for the treatment of concepts. Although Plato himself had demanded that the essential, and not the accidental, properties of things should be included in their definitions, yet he had at the same time hypostasized all universal representations as [substantial or self-subsistent] Ideas, without carefully discriminating between concepts of property and concepts of substance. This discrimination Aristotle makes, since he allows nothing but the individual to be substance. He distinguishes, not only the accidental from the essential, but also, within the sphere of the essential itself, the universal [property] from the genus, and both from the concept or the conceptual essence of things.

"A *Universal* is everything which belongs in common to several things, not merely by accident, but in consequence of their nature (καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ αὐτό — λέγω δὲ καθόλου τὸ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν). If this common element is a determination involved in the essence [*i. e.* as only a necessary part of it], then the universal is a property-concept — it denotes an essential property; but, if it is itself the [whole] essence of the things concerned, the universal becomes the *Genus*. If to the common marks comprised in the concept of the genus there are added, for a part of its extent, still further essential marks by which this part is distinguished from the other parts of the same genus, then there arises the *Species*, which, accordingly, is composed of the genus and the specific differences. If, finally, in this way an object is so determined by means of all its distinctive marks that this determination as a whole is applicable to no other

¹ Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii. 203-214, 3te Auflage.

object [*i. e.* to an object of no other species], then we obtain its *Concept*. The object of the concept, consequently, is the substance, and indeed, more precisely, the determined substance or peculiar essence of the things; and the concept itself is nothing else than the thought of this essence [*der Gedanke dieses Wesens* — ὁρισμός ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων]. This thought of the essence comes to pass through determining the generic universal more definitely by all the distinctive marks of the species. According to Aristotle, however, the essence of things lies in their form alone, and with this alone, therefore, the concept is concerned; no concept can be framed of sensuous things as such. Even if the peculiar essence of an object, and therefore its concept, also, includes a determinate relation of the form to the matter, yet there can be no definition of this sensuous object itself, but only of this determinate mode of sensuous existence — only of the universal form of the object. If from this it immediately follows that the concept does not relate to sensuous individuals as such, then the following statements must hold good of the individual in general: namely, knowledge goes invariably to a universal — even the words of which a definition is composed are universal designations — every concept embraces, or at least may embrace, several individuals — and, although we descend to the lowest species, we yet obtain always universal determinations alone, within which individuals are no longer distinguished specifically, but only by accidental marks. Between accidental marks and specific differences lie those properties which belong exclusively to things of a certain species, yet without being contained immediately in their concept. These Aristotle calls peculiarities (*ἰδιαι*); in a wider sense, however, he includes both specific differences and accidental properties under this name. What falls under one concept is, so far as this is the case, identical; what does not fall under one concept is different. But perfect identity, of course, also includes unity of matter; individuals among which no difference of species exists are yet different with respect to number, because in these the same concept presents itself in different matter.”

§ 76. With regard to Aristotle's conception of the individual as such, Zeller further brings out certain involved and important consequences with great distinctness, as follows: —¹

¹ Die Philosophie die Griechen, II. ii. 339–344; *cf.* also 802.

"Finally, in the matter alone shall we be able to discover the ground of individual existence, at least in all the things which are composed of matter and form. Aristotle, it is true, did not express himself concerning the principle of individuation with the universality and definiteness which might have been desirable, and he thus bequeathed to his followers in the middle ages a rich opportunity for scientific contention. Besides beings possessing bodies, he is acquainted, as we shall learn, in the case of the Deity, the sphere-spirits, and the rational part of human souls, with beings possessing no bodies and tainted with no matter; and these, likewise, we must consider as individuals. But, where the form attains existence in a matter, it is this matter alone to which we can refer the fact that the form exhibits itself in it not otherwise than under certain limitations and with certain more intimate determinations which are not contained in the form as such, the pure concept of the thing. The form or the concept is always a universal; it denotes not a *This*, but a *Such*; it may indeed be thought for itself, but it cannot exist for itself in separation from things; no distinction of species or form can be drawn among the individual beings into which the lowest species split up; individuals, therefore, cannot be distinguished one from another except through their matter alone. Though Aristotle himself cannot maintain this position without some wavering, yet his system leaves no room for individual forms of sensuous things. [In a footnote, Zeller adds conclusively on this last point: "No place at all can be found in Aristotle for such individual forms. For since, according to his well-known principle, the form neither originates nor perishes, and since this must hold good of that form, also, which as *τὸδε τι* exists in an individual being, it follows that there would necessarily belong to the individual forms of sensuous things, if there were any such, an existence separable from the things whose form they are. But this is absolutely unthinkable from the Aristotelian point of view."] Every individual being, therefore, has matter in itself, and every thing possessing body is an individual being: Aristotle uses 'sensuous things' and 'single things' as synonymous. If the matter accomplishes all this, then it cannot, one would think, be distinguished from the form by mere privation or potentiality [*Nochnichtsein*], but it must contribute to the form something positive or peculiar of its own."¹

¹ In two long footnotes, Zeller elaborately and effectively defends his position that, according to Aristotle, "only the matter is the ground of

§ 77. Lastly, in Aristotle's conception of the I as the real human individual, Zeller recognizes the incoherency of a fundamental dualism :—

“Discerning in the living being as a whole a gradual development to ever higher life, Aristotle considers the psychical life of man, likewise, from the same point of view. The individual man, indeed, unites in himself all kinds of animation. To the nutritive soul there is added in him the sensitive and motile soul, and to these two the rational soul. His representative faculty advances from sensation to imagination and memory, then to reflection, and, in the highest grade, to pure rational intuition, while his active faculty advances from sensuous desire to rational will; he is capable not merely of perception and experience, but also of art and science; he raises himself in his ethical activity above desire, as in this he raises himself above the plant-like functions of nutrition and propagation. Thus, then, even Aristotle himself condenses his entire doctrine of the soul into a single proposition: namely, the soul is in a certain sense all existing things, so far as it unites the sensuous and the intellectual and bears in itself the form of the one as well as of the other. Naturally, this must hold good of the human soul first of all. But, as we observed in the case of Plato the defect that he did not know how to combine his three parts of the soul in an inner unity, — nay, that it scarcely admits of a doubt that he altogether failed to propose this problem to himself with scientific clearness, — so in the case of Aristotle, likewise, the same fact is to be regretted. The relation of the sensitive and the nutri-

individuality;” that “the form is a *τὸδε*, so far as it exhibits a determinate kind of being, but first becomes the form of a determinate *single* thing through combination with a determinate matter, irrespective of which combination it is a universal;” and that, contrary to Hertling's erroneous conclusion, “the constitutive principle of individual being lies in the matter by which the form is first individualised.” (Anm. 6, 340–342; Anm. 1, 342–343.) Cf. II. ii. 212–213, Anm. 5, where he says: “Definition can be continued until all specific differences are exhausted, and the *τελευταία διαφορά* is reached; but under this there still always remain the individuals, which are no longer distinguishable in species and are so far *ὅμοια*. Yet these always constitute a plurality, indeed an indeterminate plurality, and precisely for this reason can be no object of science and of the concept.” Thus it results that, for Aristotle, not only matter as such, but also the individual as such, is *unknowable in itself*.

tive soul might of itself be enough to raise the question whether the one is developed out of the other, or whether they both originate simultaneously and subsist separately side by side; and where, in the latter case, the connection between them, the unity of the animal life, is to be sought. Yet this doubt becomes far more pressing with respect to the reason and its relation to the lower powers of the soul. If we consider the beginning or the course or the end of this combination, there is everywhere revealed an unresolved dualism, and nowhere do we obtain a satisfactory answer to the question where the unity-point of the personal life, the power which holds together and controls all parts of the soul, is properly to be sought.”¹

“For Aristotle, the human being [considered ethically] falls asunder in two parts, between which no living bond can be discovered. Similar difficulties would present themselves with relation to self-consciousness, if Aristotle had expressed himself on that subject with greater detail. But the very fact that he did not do this, — that he nowhere raises the question how we come to cling to the I as a permanency in the changing states and activities of life, — shows best of all how imperfectly conscious he is of the problem to explain the unity of the personal life.” In a footnote: “He did not investigate how the identity of self-consciousness is to be explained in the different activities which, indeed, he assigns to different parts of the soul.”²

“As little as his metaphysics gave us a clear and non-contradictory explanation of individuality, just as little does his psychology give us such an explanation of personality. As there it remained undecided whether the ground of individuality lies in the form or the matter, so here it remains in the dark whether personality lies in the higher or in the lower powers of the soul, in the immortal or the mortal part of our nature. The correct conclusion is simply that, on either of the two assumptions, difficulties lie in the way which the philosopher did nothing to remove, and which, therefore, he undoubtedly overlooked. Reason as such, the pure spirit, it appears, cannot be the seat of personality, for it is the eternal, universal, and unchangeable in man; it is untouched by the vicissitudes of the life in time, by birth and death; it lives unalterably in itself, without receiving external impressions or transcending itself in its activity. On the contrary, all manifoldness, and all

¹ Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii. 592, 593.

² *Ibid.* II. ii. 600-602.

motion, all interaction between the world and man, all change and development, in one word, all the vitality and determinateness of personal existence, fall to the side of the sensibility. And yet the personality of a rational being and its free self-determination cannot lie in its sensuous nature. Where it lies, however, we ask in vain. As reason enters the sensuous soul from without and again separates itself from it in death, inner unity is wanting to the two even during life; and what the philosopher says about the passive reason and the will is, in his uncertain treatment, unsuited to effect a scientific accommodation among the heterogeneous elements of the human being.”¹

“Nothing in the Platonic system offends him so much as that dualism of the Idea and the Phaenomenon which took so crude a form in the doctrine of the self-existence of the Ideas and in the reduction of Matter to the concept of Not-Being. His complete transformation of the Platonic metaphysics and the peculiar ground-concepts of his own sprang out of opposition to this dualism. But the more earnestly and profoundly he struggles to overcome it, the less does he in truth succeed. He denies that the generic universal is, as Plato had taught, a substantial existence; yet he maintains, in agreement with him, that all our concepts relate to the universal, and that the truth of our concepts depends on the reality of their object. He combats the transcendent existence of the Platonic Ideas, the dualism of the Idea and the Phaenomenon. Yet he himself, likewise, sets the Form and the Matter over against each other in original disparity, without deriving them from a common ground; and in the fuller determination of these two principles he involves himself in the contradiction that the form, on the one hand, should be the essence and the substance of things, and yet, on the other hand, should be a universal at the same time; while, on the contrary, the ground of individual existence, and consequently of substantiality, too, must lie in the matter. He objects to Plato that his Ideas lack moving power; but no more can motion be really explained by his own determinations of the relation of form and matter. He puts the Deity as a personal being beyond the world; but, in order to resign nothing of its perfection, he believes that he must deny to it the essential conditions of personal life, and, in order not to involve it in the vicissitudes of the finite, he limits its efficiency, in contradiction of his own otherwise more living con-

¹ Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii. 606, 607.

ception of God, to the initiation of motion in the outermost of the heavenly spheres, and this, moreover, he so paints that the Deity is thereby exiled into space. At the same time there is connected with all this the want of clearness by which his concept of Nature suffers: Nature is described, in the spirit of antiquity, as a unitary purposive being, as a rational all-efficient power, and yet his system lacks the subject to which these attributes could be ascribed. . . . A further difficulty resulted from the way in which Aristotle determined the conception of the living being, and especially of man, so far as it is difficult to conceive the different parts of the soul as inwardly united, and still more difficult to explain the processes of the soul's life, if the soul, like every other moving power, must be itself unmoved. But this difficulty culminates in the problem how to combine the reason of man with the lower powers of his soul in a living personal unity, and to determine its share in his spiritual activities and states — to conceive the passionless and incorporeal essence as at the same time part of a soul which, as such, is the perfection or realization [*ἐντελέχεια*] of its body — to assign to personality its place between the two constitutive elements of human nature, of which the one stands too high for it and the other too low.”¹

§ 78. The above interpretations and conclusions of the ripest critical scholarship will be accepted as authoritative; and this fact is our excuse for quoting them so fully in extended translations. To adapt them to our present inquiry, however, it will be advisable to summarize Aristotle's positions in a different form, as follows:—

I. The real individual thing in itself, the *τόδε τι*, comprises three distinct elements: (1) a strictly universal element in the common but real essence of the genus; (2) another strictly universal element in the common but real essence of the species, the specific difference which makes one species unlike all other species of the same genus; and (3) a strictly individual element in the real totality of non-universal and non-essential states, changes, activities, relations, properties, peculiarities, idiosyncrasies, or “accidents” in general — whatever in fact differentiates

¹ Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii. 802, 803.

one individual from all other individuals of the same species. This totality of accidents (*συμβεβηκότα*), though not so named by Aristotle, may for brevity's sake be called the individual or individualizing difference. But Aristotle himself did not know what to do with it in his system, except to recognize its necessary existence and then to disregard it altogether;¹ he could not think the individual specimens of a species, except as an indeterminate multitude of units which, so far as their intelligible essence went, were all alike and undifferentiated (*ὁμοια, ἀδιάφορα*).

Now the first two of these three elements, united in one, constitute completely the thing's real and universal essence or quiddity (*μορφή, εἶδος, οὐσία, τὸ τί ἐστι*), which always remains in itself a pure universal. It becomes real, however, only by becoming immanent (*τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν*) in the individual matter of the individual thing; for the thing exists only as the concrete union of matter and form. As the thing's real essence or true being, the form is at once the ground of the thing's existence and the ground of its intelligibility. But the third element, the individual difference, being absolutely heterogeneous to the universal form, can be referred to nothing but the individual matter (*ὕλη*) in which the universal form realizes itself.² Hence, as Zeller

¹ Top. I. 5, 102 b, 4: Συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ μὴδὲν μὲν τούτων ἐστὶ, μήτε ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι, καὶ ὁ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁτῶν ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. Metaph. V. 2, 1026 b, 3: πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρία. σημεῖον δὲ οὐδεμιᾶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιμελὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ οὔτε πρακτικῇ οὔτε ποιητικῇ οὔτε θεωρητικῇ . . . καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως συμπίπτει. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὀνόματι μόνον τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐστίν. . . . φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. . . . ὁ γὰρ ἂν ᾗ μήτ' αἰεὶ μήθ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τοῦτό φαμεν συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι . . . ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν . . . ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος . . . ὅτι δ' ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερόν. ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἢ τοῦ αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

² Metaph. V. 2, 1027 a, 13: ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία . . . τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.

justly and indeed necessarily concludes, the matter alone can be recognized as the ground of the thing's individuality — the ground, that is, of its individual difference from all other individuals of its own species.

Apart, then, from its immanent universal form, by which alone it can be understood or known or thought, the Aristotelian *τόδε τι*, or real individual thing in itself, fades out into a colorless unreality, a mere arithmetical unit devoid of all individual content (*τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἔν*), a mere specimen of a species, differing from other specimens of the same species in nothing but matter or number, in the sense that the particular matter in it is not, numerically considered, one and the same matter as that in any other specimen. In fact, the Aristotelian conception of species has no conceivable ground whatever of any plurality of specimens; the admission of plurality into it has no basis but mere perception, not scientific knowledge, — mere *αἰσθησις*, not *ἐπιστήμη*; and the *ἀριθμῶ ἔν* is a mere reluctant concession to common-sense. Since, moreover, matter in itself is unknowable,¹ the individuality or individual difference which is grounded on matter alone cannot but be equally unknowable. The reason, therefore, why Aristotle was compelled to ignore it as an element of intelligible reality, becomes perfectly obvious.

In this suppression of the individual difference, however, part and parcel though it is of the real essence of the individual thing in itself, lies the failure of all ancient philosophy as *Begriffphilosophie* from Aristotle to Hegel inclusive. And in the discovery of it, as the “advantageous variation,” lies the unconscious philosophical revolution which was the beginning of a really modern philosophy in the Darwin-Wallace principle of natural selection (§ 86).

II. From this suppression of the individual difference, it was simply a necessary consequence that there could be no individual form of the individual thing (*haecceitas*, *So-*

¹ *Metaph.* VI. 10, 1036 a, 8: ἡ δ' ὅλη ἀγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν. *Phys.* III. 6, 207 a, 26: εἶδος γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὅλη.

cratitas). The rational necessity of this consequence, as Zeller points out, is fully recognized in the Aristotelian system, which has "no room for individual forms of sensuous things," "no place at all for such individual forms." The *τόδε τι* is a mere receptacle or bearer of the specific form, which is a pure universal; it is a mere arithmetical unit of matter; it has no knowable individual nature; it is a continent of the universal with no content of its own.

III. From the fact that the individual thing in itself has neither individual difference nor individual essence or form, it follows of necessity that there can be no individual concept of it, that is, no thought of it as an individual essence (*οἰκείος λόγος*, *notio individualis*). Every concept of a thing must be that of the universal essence or form of the species to which the thing belongs; it must be applicable to all specimens of that species indifferently; it cannot be applicable to one specimen alone, as different from the rest. This consequence, likewise, Zeller has explicitly recognized as necessary, when he says above that, according to Aristotle, "no concept can be framed of sensuous things as such."

IV. Further, from the facts that the individual thing in itself has no intelligible individual difference, and therefore no individual form, and therefore no individual concept, it follows, of course, that there can be no definition of it; for the definition is simply expression of the concept.¹ This consequence, also, is explicitly drawn by Zeller, when he says that "there can be no definition of this sensuous object itself, but only of its determinate mode of existence — only of the universal form of the object."

V. How, then, is Aristotle's *τόδε τι*, the individual thing in itself, to be known at all? The only possible answer to this query is that, according to Aristotle himself, the individual thing, *qua* individual, is completely unknowable.²

¹ Metaph. VI. 15, 1039 b, 28: τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὐθ' ὁρισμὸς οὐτ' ἀπὸδειξις ἐστίν.

² Metaph. II. 4, 999 a, 26: εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τὰ δὲ

It cannot be known—it can only be perceived; and perception (αἴσθησις) is not scientific, that is, conceptual knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).¹ All actual perception is of particulars, but all knowledge is of universals;² and the two are fundamentally unlike in kind, because, as we have seen, particulars are grounded in the matter alone, while universals, whether of property or of genus, are grounded in the form alone. True, Aristotle holds that knowledge cannot be evolved except out of perception, which, moreover, is possessed in some degree by every living being;³ out of perception arises memory, out of many memories arises unitary experience, and out of experience arises the knowledge of universals.⁴ But the original perception of particulars and the evolved knowledge of universals have nothing in common; they remain at last disparate, heterogeneous, separated by the whole difference of matter and form. Perception altogether ceases to be perception, when it becomes knowledge, because there can be nothing in common between the *unknowable matter*, which is the ground of all perception of particulars, and the *knowable form*,

καθ' ἕκαστα ἀπειρα, τῶν δ' ἀπείρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην; ἥ γὰρ ἐν τι καὶ ταυτὸν, καὶ ἡ καθόλου τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτη πάντα γνωρίζομεν. — Rhet. I. 2, 1356 b, 31: τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν.

¹ Anal. Post. I. 31, 87 b, 28: οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν ἐπίστασθαι . . . αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν. — *Ibid.* I. 13, 81 b, 6: τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην. — Phys. I. 5, 189 a, 5: τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνώριμον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. — Yet De Anim. Gener. I. 23, 731 a, 33: αἰσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν [τὰ ζῷα], ἡ δ' αἰσθησις γνώσις τις.

² De Anima, II. 5, 417 b, 22: αἷτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου. . . . τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν.

³ Anal. Post. II. 2, 90 a, 28: ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αἰσθεσθαι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐγένετο ἂν ἡμῖν εἰδέναι. — *Ibid.* II. 19, 99 b, 35: ἔχει γὰρ [πάντα τὰ ζῷα] δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἰσθησιν.

⁴ *Ibid.* 100 a, 3: ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας . . . τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

which is the ground of all knowledge of universals. The Aristotelian dualism of perception and knowledge, therefore, is absolute and irremediable, because the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ is resolved at last into nothing but unknowable matter and knowable form. Zeller thus sums up Aristotle's doctrine on the subject: "In the first instance, perception has the individual as its content; yet, so far as there is always contained in the individual the universal also, though not yet freed for itself, perception directs itself to this universal, too, through the medium of the individual. Or, more precisely: what the senses perceive is not the individual substance as such, but always only certain properties of it; these, however, are already related to the individual substance as the universal—they are not a This ($\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon$), but a Such ($\tau\omicron\iota\acute{o}\nu\delta\epsilon$). Consequently, although they are never perceived under the form of universality, but always only in a This, in an individual determinateness, yet they are in themselves a universal, and the thought of the universal can be developed out of the perception of them."¹ This attempt at a reconciliation, however, fails. If Aristotle's previous determinations stand fast, perception can no more "direct itself to the universal through the medium of the individual" than the eye can direct itself to a symphony or the ear to a rainbow. For he has taught us that perception apprehends nothing but sensuous particulars, and stops altogether short of rational universals; whence, of necessity, it follows that the thought of the universal *cannot* be "developed" out of perception of the particular, but must originate in an absolutely new and underived element: namely, the original and independent activity of the reason or $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. If perception could develop itself into knowledge, there would be no need of any $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ whatever. The individual thing in itself, therefore, or the concrete whole of form and matter ($\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$, $\tau\acute{o}\ \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$, $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$), eludes knowledge altogether; its individuality or individual difference as such being unknowable, it can only

¹ Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii. 198.

be perceived, and nothing of it can be known except the universal in it ($\tau\acute{o}$ εἶδος $\tau\acute{o}$ ἐνόν).¹ As an object of perception, it cannot be known at all; as an object of knowledge, it has lost its individuality or individual difference altogether, become imperceptible, and shrunk into a pure or matterless universal.

VI. With these determinations of the universal and the individual in general, the Aristotelian theory of universals may be fittingly denominated the Aristotelian Paradox: (1) because it makes the individual contain the universal, that is, the part contain the whole; and (2) because it makes the individual as such unknowable, while yet it makes the universal, which exists nowhere but in the individual, the only object of knowledge. How can the essential universal which is to be retained, and the non-essential individual difference which is to be discarded, possibly be discriminated one from the other, unless both are equally known? When Zeller, therefore, as we have seen, says that "Aristotle did not express himself concerning the principle of individuation with the universality and definiteness which might have been desirable," he quite understates the fact. The truth is that, in logical agreement with such a theory of universals, no principle of individuation is possible; for any principle of individuation must self-evidently be grounded on knowledge of the individual difference, and this knowledge Aristotle denies.

It is a mere matter of course, therefore, that, as Zeller so plainly shows, the Aristotelian psychology includes no clear doctrine of human individuality, as the real I or person as such, — no clear doctrine of personality or personal

¹ When Aristotle says, *De Anima*, III. 8, 432a, 5: *ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι*, it is evident that he uses the word *εἶδος* here, not in its philosophical, but merely in its popular meaning, as the form which is physically visible and perceived in the object of sense. For, having just said that "perception is the form of things perceived" (*ἡ αἰσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν*), it naturally follows that the "form of things perceived" is "*perceived forms*" — that is, *εἶδος* in its popular meaning. It would be nonsense for Aristotle to say, *ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι*.

unity or personal identity at all, whether human or divine. All that is clear is that the empirical I and the rational I, the $\acute{o}\tau\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ and the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, are left divided by the chasm of an "unresolved dualism," grounded in that of matter and form; and that, until this dualism is resolved, no scientific theory of the real I is at all possible. The absence of such a theory in Aristotle's system, therefore, is the necessary consequence of the Aristotelian Paradox.

§ 79. This "unresolved dualism" in Aristotle, however, was itself a necessary consequence, a legitimate inheritance of the past. It was simply the best answer he could give to the problem with which Greek philosophy wrestled from its birth: namely, the problem how to discover the One in the Many, the eternal unity in the eternal diversity of the world. Crude attempts to find the principle of the One in the Many — as water (Thales), as undifferentiated and indefinite matter (Anaximander), as air (Anaximenes), as number or harmony (the Pythagoreans), as fire or eternal flux of all things (Herakleitos), as love and hate among the four elements of earth, water, air, and fire (Empedokles), as mind unmixed with matter (Anaxagoras) — led naturally, on the one hand, to denial of the Many by the Eleatics (Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno), and, on the other hand, to denial of the One by the Atomists (Leukippos, Demokritos), or else to despair of all objective knowledge of either the One or the Many in the Sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodikos). Out of this despair Sokrates found an escape, through the dialectical and inductive formation of concepts, in the acquisition of knowledge of objectively valid universals — in the conceptual grasp and definition of universals as objective realities in the world.¹ But in this way

¹ Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II. i. 107: "Diese Nöthigung aber lag für Sokrates in dem Grundsatz, welchen die zuverlässigsten Berichte mit grosser Einstimmigkeit als die Seele seines Philosophirens hervorheben, dass jedes wahre Wissen von richtigen Begriffen auszugehen habe, dass nichts erkannt werden könne, wenn es nicht auf seinen allgemeinen Begriff zurückgeführt und aus ihm heraus beurtheilt werde." —

the original dualism of the One and the Many was simply transferred from the sphere of being to the sphere of thought, and soon developed into the correlative dualism of sense and intellect, as conversant respectively with a world of sensibles (*κόσμος αἰσθητός*) and a world of intelligibles (*κόσμος νοητός*). *Sense alone* perceives the individuals, or the Many; *intellect alone* knows the universal, or the One; each acts in complete independence of the other. This epistemological dualism of the Sokratic concept-philosophy is the absolute separation of experience and reason; and in it, as a germinal principle, lies implicitly the whole history of philosophy down to the very end of the nineteenth century. Out of it sprang immediately the polar opposition of Sokrates's two pupils, Antisthenes and Plato.¹

Antisthenes, on the one hand, though accepting the position of Sokrates that the conceptual essence of things must be determined and defined before anything can be predicated of them, yet nullified it in the main by denying unqualifiedly all knowledge of objective universals, and by maintaining that no subject can have a predicate which adds another concept to the concept of that subject, — that the individual can be defined by itself alone, — that the only possible definition of a thing is its simple name or the simple enumeration of its elements. This, of course, is the putting of mere description in the place of definition, the suppression of all scientific investigation, the impossibility of all scientific knowledge. Antisthenes contended against Plato that *nothing is real but the individual as such*, and that universal concepts express, not the essence of

Ibid. 114: "So wird sich der Streit über Subjektivität oder Objektivität der sokratischen Lehre dahin entscheiden lassen, dass dieselbe zwar im Vergleich mit der früheren Philosophie eine entschiedene Vertiefung des Subjekts in sich zeigt, dass sie aber nichtsdestoweniger keinen rein subjektiven Charakter hat," u. s. f.

¹ Während daher ein Plato aus der sokratischen Forderung des begrifflichen Wissens ein System des entschiedensten Realismus ableitete, leitet Antisthenes einen ebenso entschiedenen Nominalismus daraus ab." (Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II. i. 295.)

things as they are, but only men's thoughts about them: in other words, that the Many can be perceived, but the One cannot be known. This was at once a reaffirmation of the Sokratic dualism and a reaction against its pure universal in behalf of the pure individual.¹

But Plato, on the other hand, accepting equally without reservation Sokrates's epistemological dualism (knowledge of the universal by concepts alone and perception of the individual by the senses alone), proceeded to develop it into the metaphysical or ontological dualism of substance and semblance, noumenon and phaenomenon, archetype and ectype, the One and the Many once more, — that is, the Idea, or universal kind, and the Appearance, or individual thing.² This development was simply a logical necessity inherent in the premises. For, if knowledge by concepts and perception by the senses have nothing in common, then the universal objects of knowledge and the individual objects of perception can have nothing in common; the only possible ground of knowing the difference between knowledge and perception, as acts or processes, lies in knowing

¹ Artist. Metaph. IV. 29, 1024 b, 32: 'Αντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξίῳ λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἑφ' ἐνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι.

² "Was bei Sokrates nur ein allgemeiner Grundsatz gewesen war, das wird bei Plato zum System, was jener nur als Erkenntnisprincip aufgestellt hatte, wird von diesem als metaphysisches Princip ausgesprochen." (Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. i. 562.) — "Sowohl εἶδος als ἰδέα bezeichnet bei Plato im allgemeinen zwar jede Form und Gestalt, im besondern jedoch die Art oder Gattung (denn diese werden von ihm noch nicht unterschieden), und nach der subjektiven Seite die Vorstellung derselben, den allgemeinen Begriff. . . . Einen Unterschied in der Bedeutung beider Ausdrücke haben Aeltere und Neuere vergeblich auszumitteln gesucht." (*Ibid.* 658, Anm. 2.) — "Wir werden daher mit aller Sicherheit behaupten können, dass Plato die Ideen weder für menschliche Gedanken noch für Gedanken der Gottheit gehalten habe." (*Ibid.* 670.) — "Ein solches Dasein, wie das der sinnlichen Dinge, hat er den Ideen freilich nicht beigelegt; aber gerade das ist das Eigenthümliche seines Idealismus, dass für ihn das Unkörperliche mehr Realität hat, als das Körperliche, und das Allgemeine mehr als das Einzelne." (*ibid.* 672.)

the difference between the two classes of objects with which they respectively deal. Hence Plato's development of epistemology into ontology was simply his inference that a real heterogeneity of knowledge and perception must be absolutely conditioned by a real heterogeneity of universal Ideas and individual Appearances. This inference took the form of his well-known "separation" (*χωρισμός, χωριστά*) of the intelligible and the sensible worlds: that is, the Idea, the universal kind which is the only object of knowledge, is itself the only true being, the only real substance; while the Appearance, the individual thing which is the only object of perception, has no reality at all but that of the Idea in which it [quite incomprehensibly] "participates," and is, in effect, as a compound of real being and unreal not-being, little better in itself than a purely illusory semblance of the Many (*τὰ πολλά*) in that which is really the One (*ἐνάδες, μονάδες*). But this Platonic chasm between the Idea and the Appearance, the Universal and the Individual, was a result which, no less than the pure individualism of Antisthenes, accomplished the destruction of all knowledge of Nature as a reality, and made physical science logically impossible.¹

Thus Antisthenes and Plato held two opposite poles of opinion. Antisthenes taught that the universal is unreal,

¹ "Er (Plato) hypostasirt die Begriffe zu Ideen, aber indem er nun diese für das allein Wirkliche, das Stoffliche als solches für das Wesenlose und Nichtseiende hält, macht er sich die Erklärung der Erscheinungswelt unmöglich. Er führt die Begriffsphilosophie zum System aus, aber so tief in's besondere einzudringen, wie sein Nachfolger, findet er sich nicht getrieben; nur die Idee gilt ihm als der wahre Gegenstand des Denkens, das einzelne der Erscheinung hat für ihn kein tiefer gehendes Interesse: er kann es wohl benützen, um die Idee an ihm zur Anschauung zu bringen, aber jene gründliche Vollständigkeit, mit der ein Aristoteles das empirisch Gegebene durcharbeitet, ist nicht seine Sache; die Einzelforschung erscheint ihm fast nur wie ein geistreiches Spiel, und wenn er sich eine Zeit lang in ihr umgesehen hat, kehrt er immer wieder, wie ermüdet, zur Betrachtung der reinen Begriffe zurück." (Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II. i. 564.)

— that the individual alone is real substance, — that the Many can be perceived, but the One cannot be known. Plato taught that the universal alone is real substance, — that the individual as such, having no reality of its own apart from its “participation” in the universal, is mere semblance, — that the Many can be perceived, but not known, while the One can be known, but not perceived.¹ Both alike destroyed the conditions of scientific investigation of the natural world.

In the interest of science, therefore, Aristotle was impelled to oppose both of these philosophers. Yet, as continuator and chief architect of the concept-philosophy, he inherited from Sokrates, Antisthenes, and Plato, and adopted as his own, the same epistemological dualism of knowledge and perception which was their common ground, and could not build his own system except by combining in its foundation much of the two systems he opposed. With Antisthenes, Aristotle declared that the individual is the only real substance; with Plato, he declared that the universal is the only knowable essence; and he combined these two positions in his own fundamental principle that *the universal in the individual*, that is, *the common element or nature of many individuals*, is at once the only substance, the only essence, and the only object of knowledge, even in the individual itself. In this compromise of the Aristotelian Paradox, the greatest philosophy of the Greeks culminates in exclusive, though not always consistent, devotion to the universal, that is, in absolute sacrifice of the individual; for the individual as such vanishes out of phi-

¹ Simplicius, Schol. in Categ. Arist. IV. 66 b, 45: τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰς ποιότητας τελῶς, τὸ ποῖον συγχωροῦντες εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὅς ποτε Πλάτῳ διαμφισβητῶν “ὦ Πλάτων” ἔφη “ἵππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἵππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ.” καὶ ὃς εἶπεν “ἔχεις μὲν ᾧ ἵππος ὁράται τὸδε τὸ ὄμμα, ᾧ δὲ ἵππότης θεωρεῖται οὐδέπω κέκτησαι.” Plato’s *θεωρία* was not *perception* of the universal, but pure *intellection* of it — an activity of the νοῦς as speculative reason. It was, however, an intellectual analogue of sense-perception, and closely resembled the “intellectual intuition” of later days.

losophy altogether, when the individual or individualizing difference, the only possible ground of individuality, is declared to be beyond the reach of knowledge and discarded as of no scientific value. But this, too, is the impossibility of natural science except as classification by mere resemblance; and modern science, in the Darwinian explanation of classification by genesis, broke forever with the Aristotelian Paradox.

In truth, Aristotle's protest against the Platonic "separation" of the universal and the individual was at bottom only a half-protest, founded, as we have seen, on a compromise between Antisthenes and Plato; and it failed just because of its halfness. Plato's χωρισμός was a division of the natural world, as a whole, into imperceptible but knowable Ideas and perceptible but unknowable Appearances, two separate and irreducible elements; Aristotle did but conjoin an Idea and an Appearance in each individual thing as Form and Matter, and then leave these elements just as separate and irreducible in the thing as they had been in the world. For Aristotle's Matter was just as unknowable as Plato's Appearance. In both cases, the historical root of the metaphysical separation was the epistemological separation, and the former could not be overcome while the latter remained. The only way in which Aristotle could have made his protest against Plato's "separation" complete and effective would have been to destroy its root in the fundamental double-principle of the concept-philosophy itself: namely, the positive principle that *pure concepts of pure universals are the only form of knowledge*, and the negative principle that *concepts of individuals as such are impossible, because the individual difference is unknowable*. This double-principle is the essential dogma of the concept-philosophy in all ages, and Aristotle began by accepting it without question from his predecessors; he could not, therefore, overcome Plato's metaphysical "separation," which was the necessary consequence of that epistemological dogma. If knowledge is of the universal alone, and

perception is of the individual alone, then the universal must exist alone and the individual must exist alone; that is, the universal and the individual must be as "separate" in existence as are knowledge and perception of them in thought. That is the Platonic χωρισμός in a nutshell. The separation of knowledge and perception, of reason and experience, of understanding and sensibility, is the essence of the concept-philosophy from Plato's χωρισμός down to Hegel's *reines Denken*; and it ends of necessity in the dualism of the *imperceptible but knowable Idea or Form*, on the one hand, and the *perceptible but unknowable Appearance or Matter*, on the other hand. What Zeller characterizes as Aristotle's "unresolved dualism," therefore, was simply his inheritance from Sokrates, Antisthenes, and Plato, and his legacy to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the rest. So far as Aristotle accepted the dogma of the concept-philosophy, he fought in vain against the Platonic "separation," for the former involved the latter; so far as he refuted Plato's "separation," he refuted himself, too. The only possibility of overcoming the "separation" lay in showing that the individual difference is knowable, that the individual as a whole is conceivable, and that the percept-concept of the single individual is just as strictly "knowledge" as the (supposed) "pure concept" of the universal essence of many individuals. Can these things be shown? Let us examine into the truth or untruth of Aristotle's positions, as already summarized in § 78; for he *separates* the Empirical I and the Rational I, the former as the vegetative and perceptive souls which perish, the latter as the intellective or noetic soul which does not perish; and this profound separation or "unresolved dualism" results from denial of the points just mentioned.

CHAPTER VII

THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS

§ 80. We have seen that, of the three elements of the individual thing as such (namely, the essence of the genus, the essence of the species or the species-making difference, and the mass of mere "accidents" which either may or may not subsist in the thing), Aristotle united the former two alone in the εἶδος or universal form. He did not acknowledge the third at all as essence, reality, or true being, but threw it out of account as unmanageable. The "accidents," indeed, exist "of necessity;" yet, being merely *perceptible by sense* and not at all *knowable by reason*, they must be referred exclusively to the thing's individual matter or ὕλη, as their unknowable ground and cause. Hence Aristotle dismissed the individual difference (τὸ καθ' ἑκάστων) as unknowable, because it is made up of innumerable and incognizable "particulars" or "accidents;" and he determined the object of knowledge exclusively as the universal (τὸ καθόλου). Hence he could not possibly recognize the existence of any *individual essence or form*; his determination of the object of knowledge as the pure universal swept away all reason for it — left, in fact, as Zeller shows, no room for it in his system. All specimens of a species were to him scientifically just alike, without difference, one and the same in every respect but number (ὅμοια, ἀδιάφορα, τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἔν). Thus the Aristotelian individual "thing in itself," the τὸδε τι, notwithstanding the Aristotelian principle (derived from Antisthenes) that the τὸδε τι is the only real substance, was a mere arithmetical unit, a mere continent of the universal with no content of its own; the alleged conjunction in it of matter and form gave it no

more and no other reality than that of the form alone, and no addition to its reality could possibly proceed from the matter as such. For, precisely so far as Aristotle adhered to his own explicit determination of matter as pure "potentiality," matter itself was necessarily unreal; and so, one would think, must be the individual difference, the "accidents" of which it was composed, and the individual thing itself, when its individuality had no ground except in matter alone. This was coming dangerously near to that Platonic doctrine of matter as not-being ($\tau\omicron\ \mu\eta\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$), and of sensuous perception of material things as in effect illusion, which Aristotle tried to oppose.

Against this determination of the individual, however, may be urged the gravest objections, which point to quite another principle than the Aristotelian Paradox.

§ 81. The "accidents" are thrown out of philosophy by Aristotle, as perceptible but scientifically unknowable, because he identifies them with the non-universal and the non-essential. He finds them neither in every specimen of the species ($\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{o}s$) nor in the species which is immanent in every specimen ($\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$), and therefore not at all in the universal ($\tau\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\theta\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\upsilon$), which to him is the only object of scientific, conceptual, or necessary knowledge.¹ But this is a very narrow, fragmentary, and one-sided view of the subject. The "accidents" stand necessarily in a *twofold relation*, (1) to the specimen as an individual, and (2) to the species as its universal. This Aristotle overlooked.

To the specimen itself, on the one hand, the "accidents" are by no means unessential. On the contrary, they are absolutely essential to it; for, if the specimen has any reality at all (and Aristotle everywhere insists, with Antisthenes, that the individual is the only real substance), then this reality must be its total essence or true being, not only

¹ "In der Vereinigung aber des $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\acute{o}s$ und des $\kappa\alpha\theta'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ beruht es, dass das $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ das Nothwendige ist." (Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 122.)

in Space, but also in Time.¹ This total reality must include, not only the permanent common essence which each specimen shares with all the other specimens, but also the "accidents," the transient and successive changes which it undergoes in relation to other things in general. The permanence of the one and the transience of the other are conditioned, of course, by the objective reality of Time, without which nothing could be knowable. In the order, succession, and connection of these changes, in the perpetual action and reaction of the individual as a complex of energies, or thing among things, lies its whole realization in Time as an *evolution-series*. Nothing short of this evolution-series as a whole, as a unitary system of changes in Time as well as in Space, can constitute or exhibit the complete reality of the thing. Aristotle himself presupposes all this in his own principle of the "entelechy" as the self-evolution of the real in the potential, the form in the matter, the species in the specimen; for all the successive evolution-phases in the self-realization of the universal (καθόλου) in the individual (τόδε τι), since they successively appear and disappear, are in truth mere "accidents" in the universal itself, conceived as an evolving individual specimen. Hence Aristotle can defend his thesis of the intelligibility of the universal itself, as a self-evolving reality, in no way whatever except by the principle that the scientific knowledge of evolution of the universal in the individual involves scientific knowledge of its evolution-phases as "accidents," and that these "accidents" are essential to whatsoever evolves. But it follows necessarily from this Aristotelian principle that *the "accidents" are absolutely essential to the specimen*. If Aristotle had only

¹ It is needless to say that the Kantian theory of the pure subjectivity or ideality of Space and Time was as foreign to Aristotle as it is to modern science, and that it is here ignored as contrary to reason and experience alike. For some of the reasons of this rejection, it may be permissible to refer to the author's article on "The Philosophy of Space and Time," in the North American Review for July, 1864. Other reasons will be presented hereafter.

completed his half-protest against Plato, he would have been the first to recognize this necessary truth, and to admit that there can be nothing really unessential, nothing really "accidental" or fortuitous, in a universe of law. He almost seems to recognize it when he says that the accidents exist "of necessity" (cf. above, § 78, 1). By his failure to recognize it, however, he lost control of his own movement to reform the Platonic philosophy, as Phaëthon lost control of the reins by which he was guiding the horses of Helios, and the result was an irremediable defeat of philosophy. Hegel, who might perhaps be considered the last great Aristotelian, made no advance on his master in this respect, and continued to defend the "absolutely accidental side" of the object of experience as such.¹ It was not until the coming of Darwin that the "accident," as "advantageous variation," was found to be essential both to specimen and to species.

On the other hand, the "accidents" will be considered as essential or non-essential *to the species*, precisely in accordance with the manner in which the species itself is conceived. If the species is taken abstractly as merely the common real essence of all the specimens, then the innumerable "accidents" of the innumerable specimens will be indeed, just as Aristotle held, non-universal and non-essential to the species; and the species itself will remain permanent and immutable, unaffected by all the "accidents" of all its specimens. But, if the species is taken concretely as the totality of all the real specimens in all their real interactions and interconnections, as related to things in general, then the essence of the species will include everything that is included in the essences of all the specimens; the "accidents" essential to the specimens as units will be *ipso facto* just as essential to the species as their universal; and the way will then lie open to explain the facts of phy-

¹ "Der Gegenstand hat nunmehr die Bestimmung, (1) eine schlechthin accidentelle Seite, aber (2) auch eine Wesentlichkeit und ein Bleibendes zu haben." (Werke, XVIII. 83.)

logeny as well as of ontogeny, the evolution of the ever-changing species as well as that of the ever-changing specimens.

Precisely here lies the difference of the old science of mere registration and classification and the new science of genesis and of origins. The Darwinian revolution in science was an unconscious revolution in philosophy, a purely practical abandonment of the Aristotelian Paradox, with its abstract and immutable species, for the scientific theory of universals, with its concrete and mutable species. The passage from one to the other was effected by recognizing the truth which Aristotle failed to discover: namely, that *the individual difference is essential to the whole individual, and the whole individual is essential to the whole species*. The individual difference thus becomes the master-key to the evolution of living forms, when it is once grasped as the "advantageous variation" of the individual specimen or specimens. For the specimen stands to its own "accidents" as their knowable universal or real whole, failing which condition, it could not stand as a knowable unit to its own species; yet solely out of the "advantageous variation" of its individual specimens can the variation and evolution of the species be explained by the law of "natural selection." Nothing but this double-constitution as a unit-universal makes the individual as such an object of knowledge, and its knowableness depends just as much on that of its individualizing difference as on that of its universalizing common essence. For solely as a unit can it be perceived; solely as a universal can it be conceived; and solely as a unit-universal, as an object at once to sensibility and to understanding, can it be even incompletely known. Thus the identity in difference of experience and reason in all human knowledge is made luminously manifest in the necessary constitution of its ultimate molecule, the percept-concept: namely, knowledge of the individual as such through knowledge at once of its universal specific essence and its individual reific difference. For it is these two

interpenetrating elements of one reality which alone make the individual *a particular thing of a particular kind*, and thereby *an object of possible knowledge as "something."*

§ 82. The individual difference, then, is real, because it is absolutely essential to the reality, the existence, the actual evolution of the individual as such in Space and Time. Moreover, it is not only real, but also necessarily knowable, because the universal itself would be unknowable, if we could not know the individuals of which it must be either (1) the immanent and abstractible common essence (Aristotelian Paradox) or else (2) the concrete whole substance (scientific theory of universals); while the unknowableness both of universals and of individuals would be the non-existence, nay, the utter impossibility, of all human knowledge. We shall see later, however, that the Axiom of Philosophy, "human knowledge exists," is both an actual and a necessary truth, both a fact of experience and a principle of reason. From these premises it follows, that the particular and perceptible "accidents," of which the individual difference is simply the totality, must be at least partly knowable, because they stand to the known individual difference in the knowable relation of parts to their whole. But how can they be knowable in themselves?

To answer this question, we must recall Aristotle's attempt to explain how knowledge is evolved out of perception, as stated by Zeller above (§ 78, IV). It becomes necessary to controvert the proposition that "what the senses perceive is not the individual substance as such, but always only certain properties of it," or, in Aristotle's technical expression, that "perception is of the Such, and not of the This."¹ On the contrary, perception is always of the This, and never of the Such — always of the unit, and never of the universal; the unit must be perceived, and

¹ Anal. Post. I. 31, 87 b. 28: *εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ τοιοῦδε καὶ μὴ τοῦδ' ἑνός, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γε ἀναγκαῖον τὸδε τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν.* Ibid. II. 19, 100 a, 17: *καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν.*

the universal must be conceived, while at the same time the unit cannot be perceived unless the universal is conceived, nor the universal conceived unless the unit is perceived; both perception and conception enter inseparably into every cognition or act of knowledge. This is only to say that there can be no knowledge unless "something" is known: that is, some particular thing of some particular kind, or some particular kind of particular things. It is only to say that the two acts of perception and of conception — perception of the This and conception of the Such — condition each other absolutely in every possible cognition.¹ It is only to say that an absolutely unrelated term cannot be perceived, that an absolutely undetermined relation cannot be understood, and that terms and their relations must be known together or not at all. It is only to say that sense and intellect, sensibility and understanding, experience and reason, are ultimate categories in the theory of knowledge, for the reason that things and relations, or units and universals, are ultimate categories in the theory of being.

¹ Fichte follows Kant in acknowledging this truth: "Eine blosse Anschauung giebt kein Bewusstseyn; man weiss nur von demjenigen, was man begreift und denkt." (Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 491.) But the converse is just as true, that a mere concept gives no consciousness; it is only the indissoluble union of concept and percept that constitutes a cognition as such. But this principle is refutation of the assumed possibility of "pure thought." This, too, Fichte sees: "Wir können uns nichts absolut erdenken, oder durch Denken erschaffen; nur das unmittelbar Angesehene können wir denken; ein Denken, dem keine Anschauung zu Grunde liegt, das kein in demselben ungetheilten Momente vorhandenes Anschauen befasst, ist ein leeres Denken; höchstens mag es das Denken eines blossen Zeichens des Begriffs und, wenn dieses Zeichen, wie zu erwarten, ein Wort ist, ein gedankenloses Aussprechen dieses Worts seyn. Ich bestimme mir durch das Denken eines Entgegengesetzten meine Anschauung; dies und nichts Anderes bedeutet der Ausdruck: ich begreife die Anschauung." (*Ibid.* 492.) Fichte, however, refers both percept and concept to the pure productivity or spontaneity of the I itself, that is, to the pure activity of the I, as subject, with no object except of its own making. This is his transcendental idealism. But his theory of cognition, nevertheless, agrees with the above, making allowance for this difference.

For example, if I perceive a straight stick, Aristotle would hold that I perceive straightness in the stick as in itself only a *Such*, that is, only as a universal property common to many things, present or absent; but that I perceive the stick as in itself a *This*, that is, as an individual thing or single substance here and now. On the contrary, what I perceive in fact is not straightness in general, but this straightness in particular—not a universal property as such, but only this particular case of a universal property in a particular thing; while at the same time I cannot perceive this particular straightness at all, unless I comprehend the *Such* of which it, too, is a *This*. Every case of straightness in particular is related to straightness in general (as a “universal of property”) precisely as a single stick is related to stick in general (as a “universal of genus”). Each is a unit within its own universal, no matter whether the universal be a kind of things or a kind of property in things; the universal property is the self-related totality of all its units or cases, just as the universal genus is the self-related totality of all its units or things. What experience perceives is the unit as unit; what reason comprehends is the universal as universal; and the truth is, not that reason or comprehension is “developed” out of experience or perception, but that experience and reason, perception and comprehension, are the two inseparable factors of all knowledge as such. In other words, both experience and reason are just as necessary to the act of knowing as the two blades of a pair of scissors are necessary to the act of cutting. The straightness of the stick, then, is simply a unitary instance of a universal property, just as the stick itself is a unitary instance of a universal genus; in either case, perception is of the unit, comprehension is of the universal, and knowledge, or identity in difference of experience and reason, is of the unit-universal, the doubly-constituted object of knowledge, the identity in difference of the *This* and the *Such*. Hence the straightness of the stick, as one of its “accidents,” is just as real and just as knowable as the

stick itself; and so is the totality of all its "accidents," the individual difference as such. For every "accident," however exceptional or transient, is a single case of some universal property, quality, activity, relation, state, or change, and, when both perceived and comprehended, is thereby known.¹ But where, then, lies that absolute *uniqueness* of the individual without which it fails to be completely individualized?

§ 83. If Aristotle had only carried out and completed his half-protest against Plato (see §§ 79, 98),—if he had overcome the Platonic "separation" of Idea and Appearance, Noumenon and Phaenomenon, in the only possible way, namely, by boldly identifying the whole reality of the universal with the whole reality of all its individuals, one in many and many in one, as is done by the Darwinians,—he would have found no more difficulty in conceiving a unique individual than he found in conceiving a unique species. For it cannot be too clearly understood, or too emphatically said, or too often reiterated, that to Aristotle himself, *every species as such is absolutely unique*. He assumes without question, as a mere matter of course, that every species is completely individualized as a species: that is, absolutely distinguished from each and every other species by developing out of the common generic essence, as its matter, its own specific difference, as its form. He thus conceives each specific form as an absolutely unique combination of genus and specific difference;

¹ Aristotle's own example of the "accident" is the "sitting" which may or may not inhere in one and the same person: *ὅλον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν* (already quoted above in a footnote to § 78, I). "Sitting" in itself is a universal mode or property, and is intelligible, therefore, as a *Such*; but, when Sokrates "sits" here and now, *his* "sitting," which in him may or may not subsist, is only a *This*, a particular case of that *Such*, and so perceptible. What Aristotle failed to perceive is that the "accident" itself is just as knowable as the specific mark, even by his own principles; for both one and the other are only particular cases of a universal, both unit-universals, and therefore both intelligible or both unintelligible.

and it is the latter element which makes the combination unique, that is, individual. Now, plainly, if the specific difference specifies, or makes a unique species, no less will the individual difference individualize, or make a unique individual. Parity of reasoning would have led Aristotle to conclude that *every individual as such is absolutely unique in essence, as well as in mere number* (τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἔν), if he had not retained so much of Platonism as to make the ruinous concession that phaenomenal "accidents" are unknowable, and had not for that Platonic reason excluded the individual difference from his system altogether. Through the individual difference, however, it becomes no less easy to conceive the individual as a *unique specimen* than it is through the specific difference to conceive the universal as a *unique species*.

For Aristotle taught, as we have seen, that the common specific form realizes itself in the matter of *every* new individual as such; that is, evolves itself anew in every specimen in Space and Time. This principle, of course, presupposes a necessary evolution-series, as the successive moments or evolution-stages of the form itself. Such evolution-series is the necessary origin of the specific difference in every new specimen of a particular species, just so far as this species differs from every other species. In other words, the specific difference is nothing but the gradually evolving individual difference of the species itself, considered as a higher individual; and it is composed of the common specific marks or characters which, existing in all the specimens, constitute together the one necessary and universal essence of the species as such. In each and all of the specimens, the realization of the form in the matter is the progressive appearance of these specific marks, side by side or one after the other; it is their evolution in Space and Time, and lies in a succession of changes, moments, or steps, each of which appears and then disappears in its successor. Evolution of the form of the species in a new specimen is thinkable on no other condition, as, for in-

stance, in the science of embryology. If the form realizes itself evolutionally and is knowable in this evolution, as Aristotle teaches that it is, then its evolution-series must be knowable, too; for the knowledge of whatever is evolved consists above all in the knowledge of its evolution-series. Incontrovertibly, then, it is essential in Aristotelianism to hold that the uniqueness of a species lies in its specific difference, as a *unique combination* of specific marks which in themselves are universal properties — in the whole evolution-series of changes by which each particular mark is developed in due order in each particular specimen, and combined with all the other marks in an absolutely unique specific whole or form. Shortly, the uniqueness of every species is nothing but the *unique combination* of universal properties, characters, or marks; and this unique combination is itself the common specific form in all the specimens.¹

Now just as the specific difference is related to these specific marks, precisely so the individual difference is related to the individual “accidents.” If the specific mark is essential to the species, but non-essential to the genus, so likewise is the “accident” essential to the individual, but non-essential to the species. Every specific mark is a universal and relatively permanent character common to all the specimens of some particular species, and thus belongs as a *Such* to the specific difference; every individual “accident” is a universal but transient mode of existence — property, relation, activity, state — which is common, not to all the specimens of that species, but to innumerable specimens of innumerable different species, and which, although a *Such*, belongs to the individual difference, not because it may not just as well subsist in other individuals (for it may), but because it is combined with other modes of existence which are united, as a whole, nowhere but in one absolutely unique *This*. Both the specific mark and

¹ “In jedem Wesen sind die Bestandstücke desselben (*essentialia*) die Materie; die Art, wie sie in einem Dinge verknüpft sind, die wesentliche Form.” (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 229.)

the individual "accident," therefore, are alike perceptible as units and intelligible as universals; both are essential parts of the wholes to which they respectively belong; and for these reasons it is just as easy to understand why and how one individual differs from every other individual of its own species as it is to understand why and how one species differs from every other species of its own genus. If the *Such* and the *This*, the universal and the unit, were irreconcilable in the individual difference, they would be no less irreconcilable in the specific difference, and the universal species would then be just as unknowable as the individual specimen. But Aristotle's doctrine of the plexus or union of universals in the *knowable yet unique specific form* is, by necessary implication, confession of the possibility of a similar plexus or union of universals in a *knowable yet unique individual form*.

For example, if "triangle" is a genus and "right-angled plane triangle" is one of its species, then "right-angled" and "plane," being universal and permanent characters which are found in every specimen of that species without exception, constitute together the specific difference, which, as a unique combination, makes that species unique. But



a particular right-angled plane triangle which stands printed on this page here and now with a certain coloring, a certain size, and a certain proportion of parts, differs from every other right-angled triangle, whether in actual or in possible existence, by various particular "accidents" just enumerated as "printed," "on this page," "here," "now," "with a certain size," "coloring," "proportion of parts," and others not specified. Each of these "accidents," considered singly, is a universal determination or mode of existence; each of them subsists in many things besides this particular figure; yet the unique combination of them all individualizes the figure as *this and no other* right-angled plane triangle, and thereby gives it a unique individual form. While each of the "accidents" is in it-

self merely a single case of a knowable universal, they all meet and unite nowhere except in the single case of this one knowable unit; and this unique combination of particular cases of countless universals in this one particular unit constitutes its individual form — that is, makes it an absolutely unique unit-universal or object of conceptual knowledge. Tersely, *the individual is an absolutely unique knot of particular cases of innumerable universals in Space and Time*; the unity of the individual is the uniqueness of the knot; and the unity and the universality together constitute the individual a unit-universal, or object of possible knowledge.

§ 84. Nothing, therefore, except the halfness of Aristotle's protest against the Platonic χωρισμός (§§ 79 and 98) prevented his arriving, in strict accordance with his own principles, at the doctrine of individual forms, without which the derivation and evolution of species or specific forms cannot possibly be explained. The cardinal defect of the Aristotelian Paradox (§ 78, VI), as a theory of universals, lies in its exclusion of the individual difference from the individual essence, and its consequent incompetence to distinguish between the essence of the specimen and the essence of the species. This exclusion dooms it to stop short with the specific characters or marks, instead of the individual "accidents," as the ultimate difference (τελευταία διαφορά), of the individual real substance (τόδε τι). In fact, the reality of the single thing necessarily includes, not only all that is common to the genus and all that is common to the species, but also all that is peculiar to the single thing itself. This total peculiarity or individual difference is reduced by Aristotle to a mere difference in number or matter, and thereby, according to Aristotle himself, relegated to the sphere of the unknowable; whereas it really consists in the totality of individual "accidents" — that is, in the knowable and unique evolution-series of particular changes by which alone the specimen (the *This*) is gradually evolved out of the species (the *Such*). Without knowledge of this origin and progressive development of

the individual, combining the two principles of continuous specific activity (heredity) and original individual variation through constant reaction to an active and ever-changing environment (spontaneity of adaptation), the whole problem of evolution, whether of specimen or of species, would become a riddle without an answer. But, if everything is evolved, then everything must exhibit this twofold activity in a unique individual form within the scope of possible knowledge. We may not yet know it in everything, but *in everything evolved it must exist, waiting to be known.*

Further, this fundamental deficiency of the Aristotelian Paradox on the side of the individual entails upon it a corresponding but vastly multiplied deficiency on the side of the universal. By suppressing the individual difference as unknowable, and thereby cutting himself off from all knowledge of individual forms, Aristotle at the same time cuts himself off from all knowledge of specific forms, otherwise than as conceptual fascicles of merely common elements, separated and abstracted from the exuberant variety of Nature. If we grant that the individual difference of every specimen is unknowable, it follows that knowledge of the species must be strictly limited to what is common to all the specimens in Time as well as in Space; it can include neither the "advantageous variation" of any specimen nor the derivation, evolution, or change of any species; it can originate no scientific principle but the false principle of the "immutability of species." Since it thus fails to correspond with the proved facts of the world, such supposed knowledge is, in truth, ignorance of the universal itself. In short, because the Aristotelian Paradox fails to individualize the individual, it fails necessarily to universalize the universal: its lack of a scientific principle of individuation, so clearly recognized by Zeller, necessitates its failure as a theory of universals capable of founding a scientific theory of evolution.

Lastly, the assumption that the individual difference is unknowable, onesided and untenable as this assumption is,

vitiates fundamentally not only the Aristotelian Paradox, but also for that very reason the modern "speculative philosophy" (*Begriffsphilosophie*) which inherited and still perpetuates that outgrown theory of universals. Rooted in the attempt to separate, instead of simply distinguishing, perception and conception, sense and intellect, experience and reason, the assumption involves a thoroughly unscientific epistemology (*Erkenntnistheorie*); for it altogether sacrifices experience, the knowledge of units, in the interest of reason, the knowledge of universals, and labors in vain to put philosophy on the exclusive basis of "pure reason" and "pure thought" (*reine Vernunft, reines Denken*), that is, reason absolutely independent of experience. The scientific truth is that the knowledge of units and the knowledge of universals are one and the same knowledge of the unit-universal, or only possible object of knowledge; and that this constitution as unit-universal is the necessary condition of knowledge because it is the necessary and most fundamental "condition of existence." The attempt to separate experience and reason apparently first took definite and effective form in the epistemological dualism of Sokrates, which immediately generated the polar opposition of Antisthenes, who suppressed reason, and Plato, who suppressed experience. The whole speculative activity of Aristotle, the friend of science, was directed to recognize both experience and reason, and to mediate between these two extremes through a compromise, which Zeller, however, characterizes as a contradiction: namely, the thesis that the rational universal is the only knowable, while yet the empirical individual is the only real. In this thesis Aristotle saw no contradiction, because to him the universal in the individual ($\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\nu\acute{o}\nu$) was at once the only real and the only knowable. The graver objection that, on this theory, the individual difference, namely, the "accidents" in the individual which "exist of necessity" and are yet non-universal and non-essential to the $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$, thereby becomes unknowable, does not seem to have occurred to him as an

objection at all. Yet, if allowed (and Aristotle does allow it), its effect is to defeat the main purpose of the compromise, inasmuch as it exposes the fact that Aristotle simply transferred the Platonic "separation" from the world as a whole to the individual thing as such, and left it there wholly undisturbed and unreconciled in the dualism of form and matter. The same attempt to separate experience and reason, leading to the same assumption that the individual difference is unknowable, reappears in the Kantian doctrine of the unintelligibility of the "thing in itself," — that is, the individual as such, the unit as unit; and all German idealism builds upon Kant. But the attempt is as fruitless as it has been persistent; Kant's *Trennung* is at bottom nothing but Plato's χωρισμός, and both end in the unknowableness of the real unit of existence. Yet unknowableness of the individual and the individual difference would be the impossibility of that knowledge of the unit without which the universal itself could never be known; it would be subversion of all science. This result emerges conspicuously in the fact that the real *I in the We*, the supreme unit-universal or "thing in itself" which challenges scientific comprehension, proves to be incomprehensible by the Graeco-German concept-philosophy; for this philosophy culminates, yet defeats itself, in the Rationalist Form of the Irrational Antithesis (§ 71). The test is a decisive one. It is the scientific failure of the fundamental dogma of the concept-philosophy: namely, (1) that concepts of pure universals are the only form of knowledge, and (2) that concepts of individuals as such are impossible, because the individual difference is unknowable (§ 79). But this is the scientific failure of the Aristotelian Paradox itself. Darwin unconsciously exploded it in his discovery of the individual difference as the "advantageous variation," his principle of natural selection, and his proof of the derivation, evolution, and transformation of species, as against the Aristotelian doctrine of their invariability. He thus cleared the way for the progress of human knowledge in

philosophy, no less than in biology, by making it absolutely necessary to arrive at a better theory of universals than the Aristotelian Paradox.

§ 85. What, then, is the individual form, the real essence of the individual as such, the intelligible nature or constitution of the "thing in itself"? If this question is really unanswerable, as the concept-philosophy pretends, the universal itself is necessarily unknowable; for knowledge of a universal without knowledge of the units of which it is the universal is a glaring contradiction in terms. The validity of all human knowledge is dependent upon the possibility of finding a true and scientific answer to the question put. Such an answer, however, seems to follow naturally and necessarily from the scientific theory of universals, already outlined in contrast to the Aristotelian Paradox.

§ 86. The individual form, the real and intelligible nature of the individual as such, comprises three distinguishable but inseparable elements: (1) the generic essence or totality of common generic characters; (2) the specific essence or totality of common specific characters; and (3) the reific essence or totality of individual "accidents" — that is, the individual difference, the individual character, the entire evolution-series of the individual's actions and reactions as a system or complex of energies in Space and Time. Through the generic essence the individual exists *in the genus*; through the specific essence it exists *in the species*; through the reific essence it exists *in itself*. These three essences, like three concentric circles, coincide in part, but differ in area, the largest being the reific and the smallest the generic. To this extent Aristotle's doctrine of the immanence of the universal in the individual ($\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\iota\nu\acute{o}\nu$) was correct, for the smallest circle is part of the area of the largest. But this immanent generic essence of the individual is not the whole of the genus, nor the immanent specific essence the whole of the species. The whole reality of the genus is the whole reality of all its species, and the whole reality of the species is the whole reality

of all its individuals; while the immanent universal, if thought by itself alone, is an unreal logical abstraction of common characters *minus* all those individual differences which are essential to the whole reality either of species or of specimen. In actual existence, the generic, specific, and reific essences of the individual are simply elements of a whole individual essence or form, in which every part conditions every other part, and in which the parts and the whole cannot be known separately, just as knowledge of the sides and knowledge of the angles cannot be had except in one knowledge of the triangle. The unity of these three elements as the unique individual form is the essential and intelligible nature, the immanent relational constitution, of the "thing in itself." As such, it is an absolute unique, unduplicated in the whole wide universe; its uniqueness lies in the particular *combination* of elements, universal in themselves, which yet meet all together nowhere else than in this one particular unit. The first two of them are shared by all specimens of the species, but the combination of "accidents" in the third is absolutely peculiar to the one specimen itself. In the last analysis, therefore, the uniqueness, the individuality of the "thing in itself" lies in the individual difference. That is, the individual difference is the individualizing difference, the reific essence, the principle of individuation; for it makes the individual form a universal which is also a unit — a universal to its own "accidents," a unit to its own species, and therefore a unit-universal or object of possible knowledge.

It would be futile to object to these necessary conclusions in the name of that loose, vague, and much-abused doctrine, the "relativity of knowledge," or attempt to explain away our necessary knowledge of this immanent relational constitution on the ground that "the thing in itself is a merely subjective concept." An objection so naïve and uncritical would baffle and refute itself by a bald begging of the question. It would rest upon the presupposed but unconfessed knowledge of the same immanent relational constitution or

individual form in the *conceiving subject* as a "thing in itself." This is self-evident. Every concept, even a "merely subjective concept," is a particular act of conception; and a particular act of conception can proceed only from an actively conceiving being. But here we already have a *known* "thing in itself." An actively conceiving being which produces a particular concept already possesses in itself all three essences whose unity constitutes the individual form: (1) generic essence in "active being;" (2) specific essence in "conceiving;" and (3) reific essence in "producing a particular concept"—for this particular act is only one of innumerable "accidents" which together constitute the individual difference. In other words, it is impossible to suppose that "the thing in itself is a merely subjective concept" without presupposing that *the conceiving subject is a known thing in itself*, whence it follows that "the thing in itself is not a merely subjective concept." Such a criticism, therefore, would annihilate itself by intrinsic self-contradiction.

The new science founded in the Darwinian revolution has already arrived at the conclusions here expressed, so far as concerns the relation of species and specimen. In place of the Aristotelian principle of the old science, namely, that the whole universal (form) is an immanent part of the whole individual (union of form and matter), it has already substituted the Darwinian principle that the whole individual is an immanent part of the whole universal.¹ If this

¹ For instance, the late George John Romanes, one of the most sagacious and philosophical promoters of the new science, in the ninth chapter of his "Post-Darwinian Questions," wrote thus: "Hitherto I have assumed for the sake of argument that we all know what is meant by a species. But the time has now come for showing that such is far from being the case. And, as it would be clearly absurd and preposterous to conclude anything with regard to specific characters before agreeing upon what we mean by a character as specific, I will begin by giving all the logically possible definitions of a species.

"1. *A group of individuals descended, etc.*

"2. *A group of individuals which, etc.* . . .

is the generalized meaning of the theory which, in the mere "accident" of a "spontaneous variation" that proves to be "advantageous," finds so great a scientific value as to explain the actual variability of species, then the Aristotelian Paradox has already given way to the scientific theory of universals; and the paramount present task of philosophy is to explain the Darwinian revolution itself, by showing the deep grounds of its necessity and the limitless scope of its applicability. The real thought-war of the nineteenth century has been waged over philosophical issues, vastly more profound than the actual combatants have seen or

"3. *A group of individuals which, etc.* . . .

"4. *A group of individuals which, etc.* . . .

"5. *A group of individuals which, etc.* . . ."

Similarly, he quotes Alfred R. Wallace's definition of species, beginning: "An assemblage of individuals which," etc. The defect in these definitions is that a "group" inadequately expresses the organic unity of every species as such. But they all agree in showing that, in the new science which explains classification by genesis, the word species means no longer the *abstract universal which inheres in each individual*, but the *concrete universal in which each individual inheres*. It no longer means the abstract common essence, fixed and immutable, of many individuals, but the mutable concrete totality of all the individuals as a higher individual. The essence of the species itself is evolved, that is, gradually changed by incorporating in itself new specific characters which originate in the non-inherited advantageous variations of one or a few specimens, and spread by heredity through the whole species. In the seventh chapter of his "Darwinian Theory," Romanes well states this as follows: "If in any generation some new and beneficial qualities happen to arise as slight variations from the ancestral type, they will (other things permitting) be seized upon by natural selection, and, being transmitted by heredity to subsequent generations, will be added to the previously existing type." Manifestly, such "slight variations" could not be taken account of, if they were unknowable "accidents." Recognition of the individual difference as not only knowable, but also indispensable to the science of philogeny, is the great theoretical advance which was made, however unconsciously, by Darwin beyond Aristotle; for it is the necessary presupposition of natural selection as a scientific theory. In Huxley's *Collected Essays* (Darwiniana, pp. 26-28, 33, 49-50, 74, etc.), the same conception of species as a "group" of real individuals, and not as an inherent universal, is expressed with perfect clearness.

suspected. This deeper conflict has been between the Graeco-German concept-philosophy, founded on the Aristotelian Paradox, and modern science itself, founded on the scientific theory of universals which lay germinant in Lamarckism and Darwinism: the former denies, the latter affirms, *knowledge of the individual difference*. As so often happens, the new truth worked itself into practice long before it came to consciousness in theory. Revolting instinctively against the Aristotelianism of the old science, as exhibited in Cuvier's tenet of the immutability of species, Darwin completely metamorphosed the concept of species from that of the abstract specific nature, immanent and unchangeable in every specimen, into that of the concrete totality of all the specimens themselves as one constantly changing and evolving organic whole. But this was to discover the immeasurable scientific value of the individual difference and the individual form, not at all as a "merely subjective concept" (conceptualistic nominalism), but as an objective reality in Nature and the fountain-head of her inexhaustible variety (scientific realism). This is a philosophical as well as a scientific revolution. For it establishes the momentous truth that the domain of the existent and the domain of the knowable are co-terminous; whence it follows as a necessary corollary, not only that reason cannot transcend experience, but also (what is just as true) that experience cannot transcend reason. In other words, all human knowledge is conditioned on the identity in difference of experience and reason: knowledge of units and knowledge of universals are unconditionally and inseparably one knowledge of the unit-universal, the individual form, the immanent relational constitution of the "thing in itself."

§ 87. The two alternative foundations have now been clearly indicated. Two irreconcilable doctrines of the concept result from the Aristotelian Paradox and the scientific theory of universals.

§ 88. From a forced and artificial combination of two inherited principles, (1) the Platonic principle that the

pure universal (εἶδος, ἰδέα) is the only real substance and the only object of real or scientific knowledge, and (2) the Antisthenian principle that the pure individual is the only real substance and the only object of such knowledge as is possible (in Aristotelian phrase, such αἰσθησις as is not ἐπιστήμη, but γνῶσις τις), Aristotle derived his own compromise-principle that the pure universal (τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι, τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν) is immanent in the mixed individual, or compound of reality and potentiality as form and matter (τόδε τι, τὸ ἐκ τούτων), and that this pure universal is both the only real substance and the only object of real or scientific knowledge in the individual itself. This compromise determined his concept of the concept: namely, the concept is the thinking which signifies the pure, matterless, or universal essence of the individual (ὁ λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι σημαίνων).¹ To Aristotle, the pure universal of *thought* is adequate scientific *knowledge* of the pure universal of *being*; it is pure and perfect knowledge of the whole reality of the individual; there is no individual form in being and no individual concept in thought. That is, the concept of the pure universal is itself the pure and perfect concept. This doctrine of "pure thinking" as the pure and perfect concept, or pure reason absolutely independent of all experience, is the prime tenet of the concept-philosophy in all ages, from Aristotle's realism to Hegel's idealism (the *Begriff des Begriffes* as *absolute Wissen*); and it is the necessary consequence of the attempt to effect the epistemological separation of reason and experience. Nevertheless, the pure concept as knowledge of the pure universal is logically impossible, because knowledge of the universal without knowledge of the units of which it is the universal is itself a mere contradiction in terms. There cannot possibly be any such thing as "pure knowledge *a priori*."

¹ "Der Gegenstand des Begriffs ist mithin die Substanz, und zwar genauer die bestimmte Substanz oder das eigenthümliche Wesen der Dinge, und der Begriff selbst ist nichts anderes, als der Gedanke dieses Wesens." (Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, II. 2, 207-209.)

Hence the concept-philosophy has always been driven to introduce into its professedly pure concepts, albeit surreptitiously and by minute degrees, as in Hegel's dialectic development of the categories, that very empirical element which it pretends to exclude in the gross. This inconsistency, of course, was unavoidable, since without it the concept-philosophy would present nothing whatever to conceive. But complete logical failure of the concept-philosophy might have been predicted at the start from Aristotle's fundamental error: namely, repudiation of the individual difference, the individual form, the individual concept, and the individual definition.

§ 89. From the ground-principle of the scientific theory of universals, that the whole individual inheres in the whole universal, but that the whole universal does not inhere in the whole individual, — in other words, that the individual difference is essential to the whole reality of the individual, and that the whole reality of all its individuals is essential to the whole reality of the universal, — it follows that the individual form is the inseparable co-existence of generic essence, specific essence, and reific essence in one real, knowable, and unique unit-universal in Space and Time (§ 86); and that the individual concept is the thought which thinks this immanent relational constitution of the "thing in itself." The necessity of individual concepts, that is, percept-concepts as the sole form of actual cognition, is involved in the very nature of existence and of knowledge.

"To exist" means "to be something" — that is, to be a thing of some kind, a particular single thing of some universal kind. It means to stand out (*existere*) as the actual concrete union of genus + specific difference + individual difference, in distinction (1) from nothingness, that is, from no-thing-ness, and (2) from other-thing-ness, that is, from all other things, whether of its own or of any other kind. This constitution as a real and unique unit-universal or "thing in itself" is the essential form of all actual

being, the one absolute, necessary, and universal condition of existence itself.

Moreover, this absolute condition or *prius* of all existence or actuality, this APRIORI OF BEING as distinguished from the APRIORI OF THOUGHT (§ 99), is no less the one absolute, necessary, and universal condition of all knowledge. For real knowledge must be knowledge of something by something, that is, knowledge of the object by the subject; and existence of the object and the subject, as terms, conditions the existence of knowledge itself, as a real relation between those terms. To deny or doubt the necessity of this Apriori of Being, as itself the condition of the Apriori of Thought, would be simply to beg the question; for denial or doubt is necessarily denial or doubt of something by something, that is, denial or doubt of the object by the subject, and existence of the object and the subject, as terms, conditions the existence of the denial or doubt itself, as a real relation between those terms. There is no way to evade the necessity of this Apriori of Being as condition of the Apriori of Thought. It is the absolute law that whatever "exists" must "be something;" it underlies all existence and all knowledge, and simply constitutes their possibility.

§ 90. Further, the ontological necessity of the constitution of the "thing in itself" as a real and unique unit-universal of generic + specific + reific essence conditions all possibility of the concept itself as actual knowledge. Even if we grant the most extravagant claim of idealism, that the subject absolutely "produces" (*erzeugt*) the object, it remains true, nevertheless, that both the subject and the object themselves must conform to the ontological *prius* of all existence, and be each constituted as a unit-universal, a "something," a "thing in itself," or else be non-existent. This ontological *prius* conditions whatever productivity the subject may be claimed to possess; the producing subject must "be something," and the object produced must "be something," or else there

can be no production whatsoever. In short, whatever "exists," either subjectively or objectively, must "be something," and "to be something" is *to be only one specimen of only one species of only one genus* — a unit-universal of generic + specific + reific essence — a "thing in itself." Whatever exists, therefore, must exist at once *in its genus, in its species, and in itself*. But this its necessary mode of existence cannot but determine *a priori* any and every possible mode of knowing it, since, of course, nothing can be *known to be* what it is *not*. In other words, the individual form of the "something," or object of knowledge in general (including the subject which knows itself), necessarily determines *a priori* the individual concept of it, just so far as this concept is knowledge of existence or cognition of the real: the constitution of the individual form as a unit-universal necessarily determines the constitution of the individual concept of it to be, likewise, that of a unit-universal. This agreement of the two, this actual determination of the concept by the form of the object, is the *truth* of the concept — its validity as *knowledge*. If such determination were impossible or unreal, the concept would not be knowledge of the object, but ignorance of it — pure error. That is, knowledge could not in that case exist at all. But, as proved in Chapter I, the existence of human knowledge is the one Axiom of Philosophy, of which denial and doubt are alike impossible. It follows that the individual concept, in accordance with the necessary conditions of its existence as knowledge, must be determined by the individual form of the "thing in itself."

§ 91. It would avail nothing against this conclusion to plead that we do not know *how* the "thing in itself" can determine the concept of it. The plea might be admitted without shaking the conclusion itself in the least degree. That "how" may or may not remain to be discovered. But, if knowledge exists at all, the constitution of the concept *must* be determined by the constitution of the object, the conditions of knowledge by the conditions of

existence, the Apriori of Thought by the Apriori of Being. Otherwise, the knowing subject could "know what is not so" — which is the very acme of absurdity. It is as certain as anything can be that existence of the individual concept as real knowledge of the "something" is absolutely conditioned, not only on the real existence in that "something" of an immanent relational constitution or individual form, but also on the real determination of the concept by that form. To deny this would be to deny the possibility of knowledge altogether as *true thinking of being*, and resolve it into a meaningless play of irrationality; while to affirm it is simply to affirm that perception, as distinct from mere sensation, lies at the bottom of all intellectuality or rationality, in the necessary and universal nature of all actual cognition as *percept-concept*.

§ 92. For perception and conception enter inseparably into every actual cognition of a "something" — that is, of whatever exists as an object of real knowledge. If, as seems incontrovertible, every "something" is necessarily a "thing in itself," in the sense that it must be internally constituted as a unit-universal or individual form of generic + specific + reific essence, that is, as only one specimen of only one species of only one genus (and this definition of "something" is purely analytical, transcending in no degree the actual content of the only possible concept of "something" as "a thing of some kind"), then it is manifest that, in order to be known at all, the "something" must be both perceived as a unit and understood as a universal in one indivisible percept-concept. As simply a unique combination, complex, or focus of universal modes of energy (for every individual "accident," no less than every generic and specific character, is in itself universal or common to many), the immanent relational constitution or individual form of the "something" is neither a pure unit nor a pure universal, but necessarily a unit-universal — at once a perceptible unit in its own

species and an intelligible universal in its own "accidents" or evolution-series. Consequently, the concept of any real or particular "something" is at the same time both individual and universal; it includes both an individual difference and a universal essence; it is not a "pure" concept at all, either of the individual or of the universal, but a concretion or concrete knowledge of both, a reciprocally conditioning union of perception and conception — a percept on the side of the unit, a concept on the side of the universal, a single, unique, and indivisible *percept-concept of the unit-universal*. In other words, a concept of the "pure individual" and a concept of the "pure universal" are alike impossible; the percept-concept of the unit-universal is alone possible, even in the desiccated form of the abstraction, in which the attention, indeed, is withdrawn to a greater or less extent from the perceptive element, but in which, nevertheless, the perceptive element still abides as the disregarded foundation of the conceptive element itself.

§ 93. It must not, however, be imagined for a moment, least of all assumed to be a part of the concept-doctrine which is derivable from the scientific theory of universals, that the individual concept of the individual form — in more scientific phrase, the percept-concept of the unit-universal — is to be considered as perfect knowledge of its object. Quite the contrary is the case, as already shown in § 65. The percept-concept is no more "perfect" than it is "pure." In no human cognition (and it is only human cognition which is here considered) can perception actually extend to *all* the units of the species to which a particular "something" belongs. It must extend to several, that is, to an indeterminate number, in order to discern the individual difference of the particular "something" from other specimens of its species; but the quantitative limitation of perceptive power in a given human subject forbids its extension to all the specimens of any species. Since, therefore, the whole reality of a species is the whole reality

of all its specimens, and our perception can never actually extend to them all, it is plain that the percept-concept, founded as it must be on perception, is necessarily prevented by this quantitative limitation of perceptive power from ever becoming perfect knowledge of that whole reality.

Moreover, this very limitation of perceptive power involves a corresponding limitation of conceptive power. While perception grasps the unit in its universal (the specimen as one of its species), conception grasps the universal in all its units (the specimen as the whole of its own "accidents"); but the same limitation of perception which prevents its extension to all the specimens of the single species prevents equally its extension to all the "accidents" of the single specimen. Consequently, the scope of the percept-concept is limited in both directions alike; it fails to perceive all the units of the universal, and for that very reason fails to conceive perfectly the universal in all the units. The whole reality, therefore, of any and every unit-universal, "something," or "thing in itself," extends far beyond the grasp of the human percept-concept, contains always more than has yet been discovered, and perpetually challenges further investigation. Herein lie at once the explanation of the shortcomings of science and the possibility of its limitless advance, the ground of human fallibility and the hope of greater human wisdom. The perfect percept-concept is simply the unrealized ideal of science; as, for instance, the "theory of limits" in mathematics. Nothing, therefore, could be farther from the truth than to suppose that the percept-concept, as the sole and necessary form of human knowledge, can be actually either "pure" or "perfect." Such a claim as this may be freely abandoned to the concept-philosophy which exhibits its pure "concept of the concept" as the realization and perfection of "absolute knowledge,"¹ and which

¹ "Das absolute Wissen ist der Begriff, der sich selbst zum Gegenstand und Inhalt hat, somit seine eigene Realität ist." (Hegel, Werke,

thus, in the eyes of the more modest philosophy of science, surrenders itself a voluntary victim to the "conceit of knowledge without the reality."

§ 94. Lastly, just as the individual difference conditions the individual form and the individual form conditions the individual concept, so the individual concept conditions the individual definition, by which human knowledge is stamped as current coin in the commerce of intellect. Remembering that every single "accident" which goes to make up the individual difference is in itself (1) a universal mode of existence in countless specimens of countless species, yet (2) a unitary case of this universal mode of existence in a particular specimen at a particular place and time, disappearing in another unitary case of the same or of some other universal mode of existence which immediately succeeds it, we can easily understand that not only the complex of "accidents" at any one moment, but also the entire succession of such complexes throughout the whole existence of the individual, must enter into the individual difference as a whole; and that this individual difference as a whole, therefore, is neither more nor less than the total evolution-series of the specimen in its species. Clearly, then, the scientific definition of the individual as such, so far as human knowledge of it extends (and this limitation of the definition results from the quantitative limitation of perceptive and conceptive power in every actual human subject), will be neither more nor less than the record of this total evolution-series. In other words, the scientific definition of the individual as such would be the whole story of its existence in Space and Time — its individual biography. Of course, such a scientific definition as this can never be completely realized; it remains a scientific ideal which can only be approximated in and by the growth of human knowledge. But nothing short of a complete realization of it would be "absolute knowledge" of the "something." It XVIII. 144.) This *Begriff*, as *reines Denken*, contains no *Anschauung*; it is pure concept, not percept-concept.

goes without saying, then, that the concept-philosophy, repudiating the individual difference and recognizing only the universal essence, is a mere travesty of *absolute Wissen*.

For example, taking an illustration from the individual as such in its highest potency, that of the real person or empirical-rational I, it is manifest enough that the life of George Washington was an absolutely unique combination of elements which were yet in themselves universal, as thoughts, feelings, impulses, principles, words, deeds, and so forth. As a human being, his generic essence was "being," and his specific essence "human;" but his reific essence was the absolutely unique evolution-series or life, the absolutely unduplicated character and career, which distinguished George Washington from every other human being that ever existed or ever can exist.¹ This was his individual difference, and every other man has his own. Repudiated by the concept-philosophy of "pure thought," which professes to reject every empirical element from its pure, perfect, and universal concept, but recognized by scientific philosophy as essential to the individual form, individual concept, and individual definition, this personal difference of George Washington is necessarily included in the imperfect concrete concept of him which is expressed in

¹ "Every great man is a unique. The Scipionism of Scipio is precisely that part he could not borrow. . . . Not possibly will the soul, all rich, all eloquent, with thousand-cloven tongue, deign to repeat itself." So says Ralph Waldo Emerson, in the classic essay on "Self-Reliance." What he says is true, and more than he says is true. Every great man is a great unique, and every little man is a little unique; nay, every unit of existence is a unique, and absolutely so. It is interesting to note how Emerson, just like Darwin, is here quite unconsciously repudiating the Aristotelian Paradox, and sturdily championing the *individual difference*, though in another field. The truth is that the advance from the Aristotelian Paradox to the scientific theory of universals has been a vaguely but increasingly felt necessity of the nineteenth century, and asserts itself not only in science and philosophy, but in literature as such, notably in the new emphasis on fiction and biography in general. What we are here doing is but to interpret this demand of the time to itself in a clear intellectual consciousness.

his scientific definition: namely, his personal biography. If his biography is at its best but very imperfect knowledge of him, this fact is exactly what the scientific theory of universals requires that it should be; for this imperfection is only the necessary consequence of the quantitative limitation of perceptive and conceptive power in his biographers as men (§ 93). But his biography remains knowledge of him, however imperfect and partial it may be, and knowledge which is both empirical and rational, too. All history, including the history of philosophy itself, must be subject to precisely the same imperfection, and exhibit precisely the same twofold character. For biography and history are but the scientific definition, at once imperfect and concrete, of the unit-universals with which they deal, and with which they can deal only under the fixed conditions of human knowledge, as determined by the fixed conditions of actual existence.

Or, taking an illustration from the opposite pole of individuality, that of the ultimate atom of the material universe, it is plain that, so far as human perception extends, atoms of one and the same chemical element are to-day indistinguishable from each other. Our knowledge of them is at present confined to their universal characters, as mere arithmetical units of one and the same chemical species; as specimens, they are no more to us than Aristotle's *ὁμοια, ἀδιάφορα, τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἐν*. That is, the individual difference of a single atom is as yet utterly beyond the range of our perceptive and conceptive power. Nevertheless, if we could perceive and conceive the interminable succession of states, changes, affections, combinations, actions, and reactions, of whatever sort, through which a single atom must have passed in the evolution of a universe, this unique complex of "accidents" would distinguish it from every other atom, constitute its individual difference, and supply the indispensable basis for a scientific definition of it as the biography of its unduplicated career, its existence-story in Space and Time. The absolute condition of all

actual or possible existence, that *whatever "exists" must "be something"* — that is, must be a unit-universal of generic + specific + reific essence — is itself the possibility of a scientific definition of that "something," whenever our combined perceptive and conceptive power, our capacity of combined experience and reason, shall have become sufficiently evolved to learn, at least in part, its individual difference. And who is qualified to say that, even in the case of the atom, such an evolution is forever impossible to the human mind?

§ 95. Such, then, are the two doctrines of the concept founded on the Aristotelian Paradox and the scientific theory of universals. Aristotle's neglect of the individual difference, individual form, individual concept, and individual definition, logically necessitated his doctrine of the *pure concept* — that is, perfect and exclusively rational knowledge of real existence as the *pure universal in the individual*, τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν. Correction of Aristotle's fundamental error by full recognition of the neglected elements logically necessitates the doctrine of the *percept-concept* — that is, imperfect and concrete (empirical-rational) knowledge of real existence as the *unit-universal*. The former is the doctrine that the pure universal (εἶδος) is the sole object of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), and that "this something" (τόδε τι = εἶδος + ἴλη), so far as it includes more than the pure universal (this more being the various συμβεβηκότα grounded in ἴλη), is unknowable: the latter is the doctrine that the pure universal is itself unknowable, because as such it is non-existent, and that only the concrete or existent "something," the unit-universal which is identity in difference of generic + specific + reific essence, is knowable at all, because whatever "*exists*" must "*be something*," and whatever "*is something*" must be in itself "*an object of possible knowledge*" — more tersely still, because existence and knowableness are one and the same immanent relational constitution, non-existence and unknowableness one and the same lack of it. The former doctrine is the

self-defeating attempt to separate experience and reason — to eliminate all perception from knowledge, and to produce knowledge, independently of all perception or experience, out of pure conception or reason alone; while the latter is simply the unavoidable acknowledgment of perception and conception as equally necessary and reciprocally conditioning factors of every actual cognition. This result was already involved in the universal principle established in Chapter I: namely, the identity in difference of experience and reason in all human knowledge, as itself grounded on the identity in difference of existence and knowledge in all personal consciousness of the real I as A MAN IN MANKIND.

§ 96. But now arises a new and profound question. Why must the origins of human knowledge (so far as mere modes of acquisition can be considered origins) be limited to two, experience and reason, sensibility and understanding? Thorough-going empiricism and thorough-going rationalism have alike sought for centuries to reduce these two origins to one, the former to sensibility alone, the latter to reason alone; yet neither has succeeded, and the strife still goes on. Nay, all attempts of mere eclecticism to recognize both origins as equally necessary, and to reconcile them in one self-harmonious theory of knowledge, have failed no less signally. Why this long record of failure in philosophy as *knowledge of knowledge*? For philosophy as *knowledge of thought emancipated from all dependence on real being* is not philosophy at all, but a bald begging of the question (§ 86).

The explanation of this failure is not far to seek. It lies in a series of historical facts not difficult to understand, if the results arrived at hitherto are correct: (1) Greek philosophy failed to solve scientifically its one great problem of the Many and the One, the Universal and the Unit, but bequeathed to later ages an unscientific solution of it in the Aristotelian Paradox; (2) mediæval philosophy failed to solve scientifically the same great problem, as revived

and left unsettled in its own long controversy respecting the theory of universals, and simply handed down the same unscientific solution of it, transformed from realism to conceptualism, but essentially unchanged; (3) modern rationalism, as continuator of the Greek concept-philosophy, and modern empiricism, as continuator of the Greek percept-philosophy, have equally failed to solve the ancient and mediæval problem of universals scientifically, because they have both still clung to the Aristotelian Paradox, and uncritically converted into a mere dogma Aristotle's disregard of the individual difference and the individual form of the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ or "thing in itself;" (4) Darwin, solving scientifically the problem of the origin of species, discovered in this particular instance the scientific value of the individual difference as the "advantageous variation," thereby unconsciously overthrowing the Aristotelian Paradox itself, and revolutionizing by necessary implication the whole theory of human knowledge; while (5) modern philosophy has not yet discovered Darwin's discovery, or made a single serious attempt to understand the profound epistemological significance of the Darwinian revolution (§ 86). These facts, if thoughtfully pondered and digested, clearly enough account for the inability of modern philosophy, unhesitatingly avowed by its greatest master, Kant, to explain why the knowing-faculty in general must exercise itself in two, and only two, fundamental functions: to wit, sensibility and understanding. The difficulty itself is simply a necessary consequence of the Aristotelian Paradox.

§ 97. But no more convincing proof or verification of the truth of the scientific theory of universals could be desired, perhaps, than is found in the incidental explanation it affords of this supposed mystery.

To Kant, sensibility and understanding were two ultimate, co-ordinate, heterogeneous, and independent functions of the knowing-faculty in general (*Erkenntnissvermögen*), between which there existed no "known" community of

origin, no "known" reciprocity of influence, no "known" necessity of co-existence.¹ They were two as an inexplicable fact — no reason of the twoness was assignable beyond a bare and blind conjecture that the two might "possibly" spring from some "common, but to us unknown, root."² Here, then, is that unreasoned but unequivocal *separation* of sensibility and understanding, perception and conception, experience and reason, which the great German inherited from the great Greek in the Aristotelian Paradox, and which he made the bottom principle of the German con-

¹ "Mit der erkannten und festgestellten Unterscheidung jener beiden Vermögen beginnt die kritische Philosophie. . . . Demnach theilt sich die Erforschung der menschlichen Vernunft in die Untersuchung der Sinnlichkeit und die des Verstandes." (K. Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, III. 290.) — "In dieser Formel erwarte das Problem seine Lösung, aber nicht von der kritischen Philosophie, die unter ihrem Gesichtspunkte die gemeinschaftliche Wurzel von Verstand und Sinnlichkeit nicht finden kann, und es überhaupt für unmöglich erklären muss, dass die menschliche Vernunft je dieselbe finde." (*Ibid.* III. 458.)

² "Nur so viel scheint zur Einleitung oder Vorerinnerung nöthig zu sein, dass es zwei Stämme der menschlichen Erkenntniss gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaftlichen, aber uns unbekannten Wurzel entspringen, nämlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, durch deren ersteren uns Gegenstände *gegeben*, durch den zweiten aber *gedacht* werden." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 52, ed. Hart.) — "Unsere Erkenntniss entspringt aus zwei Grundquellen des Gemüths, deren die erste ist, die Vorstellungen zu empfangen (die Receptivität der Eindrücke), die zweite das Vermögen, durch jene Vorstellungen einen Gegenstand zu erkennen (Spontaneität der Begriffe); durch die erstere wird uns ein Gegenstand gegeben, durch die zweite wird dieser im Verhältniss auf diese Vorstellung (als bloße Bestimmung des Gemüths) *gedacht*." (*Ibid.* III. 81.) — "Wir begnügen uns hier mit der Vollendung unseres Geschäftes, nämlich lediglich die *Architektonik* aller Erkenntniss aus reiner *Vernunft* zu entwerfen, und fangen nur von dem Punkte an, wo sich die allgemeine Wurzel unserer Erkenntnisskraft theilt und zwei Stämme auswirft, deren einer *Vernunft* ist. Ich verstehe hier aber unter Vernunft das ganze obere Erkenntnissvermögen, und setze also das Rationale dem Empirischen entgegen." (*Ibid.* III. 550.) The antithesis of sensibility and understanding is thus expressly identified by Kant with that of experience and reason, which remains an *ungrounded separation*; while the whole system (or form) of human knowledge is spun *a priori* out of *pure reason alone*.

cept-philosophy as "pure knowledge *a priori*" and "pure thought." Yet this underlying and all-supporting and all-comprehending principle of German idealism is not only confessedly groundless in reason, but also demonstrably false in fact.

For Kant's "common, but to us unknown, root," from which sensibility and understanding diverge as the two constitutive functions of all human knowledge, is discovered through the scientific theory of universals to be those aboriginal particular conditions of the "existence of human knowledge" (Axiom of Philosophy) which are ultimately determined, in the now familiar phrase of modern science, by the "conditions of existence" in general. That is, *if* knowledge exists, it *must* exist as the percept-concept alone. In more technical language, Kant's "common but unknown root" is that Apriori of Being which necessarily determines the Apriori of Thought, because the form of existence necessarily determines the form of all knowledge of existence; more precisely still, it is that ultimate and necessary constitution of the object of knowledge as the "something," the unit-universal, the identity in difference of generic + specific + reific essence, the One in Many and Many in One, beyond which lies only the absolute "nothing" of non-existence and non-intelligibility. Knowledge of existence is the only possible knowledge; knowledge of non-existence or absolute nothingness is impossible, because knowledge of "nothing" = no knowledge at all. Since, therefore, existence is possible only as the "something" or unit-universal, *knowledge is possible only as perception of the unit and conception of the universal in one indivisible percept-concept of the unit-universal.* The ultimate necessity of the twofold branching of the knowing-faculty, therefore, is ontological, not ultimately epistemological or psychological; it must be "rooted" in the nature of the object, no less than in the nature of the subject; the percept-concept is the only actual or possible form of knowledge, (1) *because* the unit-universal is the only

actual form of existence, and (2) *because* the unit-universal must be known as it is, or not at all. In other words, the only possible modes, functions, or faculties of knowledge are, from the sheer necessity of the case, in the uncreated "nature of things," those two forms of activity of the one knowing-faculty which, on the side of the unit, we call sensibility or perception or experience, and, on the side of the universal, understanding or conception or reason.

Further, but still in accordance with the fundamental principle of all scientific epistemology, namely, that existence determines knowledge, this necessary two-sidedness of the knowing-process in Man must originate ultimately in a corresponding two-sidedness of the evolution-process in Nature. For we have seen already, in § 84, that the necessary interaction of two complementary principles alone accounts for the origin and evolution of the "something" as "a thing of some kind" or unit-universal: *heredity*, or continuous specific activity, as the origin of its common element or community, and *adaptation*, or original individual variation in reaction to the environment, as the origin of its peculiar element, individual difference, or individuality. Hence it is plain that, if knowledge is to be possible at all, *perception*, as knowledge of units, is *made necessary by adaptation*, as the origin of individuality or individual unity in the "something;" and that *conception*, as knowledge of universals, is *made necessary by heredity*, as the origin of its community or universality. In other words, the double-constitution of the knowing-process as perception and conception, or sensibility and understanding, results necessarily from the double-constitution of the evolution-process as adaptation and heredity; and this is itself the necessary result of the fact that, by the Apriori of Being, the "something" can neither exist nor be evolved except in the form of a unit-universal. In still other words, every "something," as product, comes into existence through evolution, as process, and this process is the identity in difference of heredity and adaptation; hence *cognition* of the

"something," as product, equally comes into existence through evolution, as process, and this process is identity in difference of perception and conception. The process of evolution, by which the "something" comes into existence, and the process of learning, by which it comes into knowledge, are at bottom one and the same, because the former process necessarily determines the latter, as the condition of its reality. That is, learning is the evolution of all our knowledge: through conception and words we *inherit* the universality of the "something," and through perception we *adapt ourselves to* its unity. Further enlargement on these pregnant principles would be here out of place; but the sagacious reader will divine the depth of their significance, and guess what light may yet be thrown on the origin of the human mind, if the double nature of intelligence as both sensibility and understanding can be thus traced to the double nature of all evolution as both heredity and adaptation.

§ 98. These fundamental analyses or definitions of existence and knowledge may be condensed into the form of continued equations.

I. To "exist" = to "be something" = to be a thing of some kind = to be only one specimen of only one species of only one genus = to be a unit-universal of generic + specific + reific essence = to be an immanently self-related object of possible knowledge = to be a knowable "thing in itself." So far, then, from its being true that the "thing in itself" is unknowable, the truth is that nothing but the "thing in itself" is knowable at all. Kant to the contrary notwithstanding, the phaenomenon can *exist* solely on condition of being, also, a noumenon; the *Gegenstand der Erfahrung* can *exist* solely on condition of being, also, a *Ding an sich*.

II. To "know" = to "know something" = to know some unit-universal = to perceive the unit and to conceive the universal in one indivisible percept-concept of the unit-universal. Tersely, the knowing-faculty in general could

not "exist," except as identity in difference of two, and only two, fundamental functions: perception and conception, sensibility and understanding, experience and reason. In the last analysis, therefore, Kant's "common but unknown root" becomes known as the Apriori of Being — as the absolute law that whatever "exists" must "be something," and that whatever "is known" must "be something," too (§ 84). It is that unconditioned necessity *in rerum natura* which itself conditions and determines the immanent relational constitution of the *res per se*. It is those ultimate, underived, and absolute "conditions of existence" which determine *a priori*, in an ontological sense, (1) the form of every objective or subjective reality to be that of the unit-universal, "something," or "thing in itself," and (2) the form of every particular cognition to be that of the percept-concept, and (3) the form of the universal knowing-faculty to be that of the identity in difference of perception and conception, or sensibility and understanding, or experience and reason, as reciprocally conditioning factors of all human knowledge.

This scientific epistemology, grounded practically in the Darwinian revolution of modern science, and grounded theoretically in substitution of the reformed theory of universals for the Aristotelian Paradox, is the needed logical completion of Aristotle's half-protest against Plato (§ 79); and its truth is logical disproof, not only of Plato's χωρισμός, but also of Kant's *Trennung*, and of Hegel's *reiner Begriff* as *absolute Wissen* (§ 93). For, if Absolute Being is neither pure unity nor pure universality, but the Absolute Unit-Universal or Real Universe, then "absolute knowledge" can be neither "pure experience" nor "pure thought," but only the absolute percept-concept of the absolute unit-universal in the self-knowledge of the Absolute I.

CHAPTER VIII

TRANSITION FROM THE I TO THE WE

§ 99. OUR investigations have thus led us by the path of rigorous necessity to three fundamentally related principles, three ultimate laws, each of which in its own right permeates each of the three spheres of Being, Thought, and Knowledge, and all of which together constitute what may be now with strict propriety called the LAW OF UNIT-UNIVERSALS, as demonstrated identity in difference of those three coincident or interpenetrating and interpermeating spheres of Reality. An "Unknowable Reality" would be simply a non-existent or pure nothing: the All-Being thinks and knows, the All-Thinking is and knows, the All-Knowing is and thinks, — that is, the All-Reality is, thinks, and knows itself as the infinite unit-universal of Energy in the form of a Real, Active, and Knowing I. By rectifying and completing the half-protest of Aristotle against Plato, and thereby rendering obsolete the Aristotelian Paradox, the Law of Unit-Universals becomes in truth an absolute necessity of the philosophical reason in all its valid forms and processes, and may now be formulated or stated somewhat as follows:—

I. The Apriori of Being is that ultimate and underived condition of existence by which whatever really exists must exist and be constituted in itself as *A Something or Thing of Some Kind*: that is, as the identity in difference of generic *plus* specific *plus* reific essence in a real unit-universal of energy, or thing in itself, — as the immanent relational constitution of a noumenon-phaenomenon, the only object of actual or possible knowledge. This is the "principle of individuation," the law of thinghood, the

foundation of scientific ontology, or Science of Being as Universe of Units, One in Many and Many in One.

II. The Apriori of Thought is that derivative condition of existence by which every real cognition of what really exists must itself exist and be constituted as *A Percept-Concept of A Something or Thing of Some Kind*: that is, must be itself constituted as a unit-universal in Thought, and be itself determined as such, however incompletely or approximately, by its correlative unit-universal in Being. The essence of the percept-concept is to perceive a unit in its universal (a thing in its kind) and to conceive a universal in all its units (a kind in all its things). The essence of the syllogism itself, the norm and form of all scientific or empirical-rational thinking, is to be nothing but a percept-concept: (1) the major conceives all the specimens of a given species to belong to a certain genus — “All equilateral triangles are equiangular figures;” (2) the minor perceives some particular being or beings to belong to that species — “This triangle is equilateral;” (3) the conclusion infers that specimen to belong to that genus — “Therefore, this triangle is an equiangular figure;” (4) the whole force of the “therefore” which unites conclusion to premises lies in the necessity of the inherence of the specimen in the species and of the species in the genus, that is, of the individual in the universal. This is reversal of the Aristotelian Paradox. Every syllogism is a highly complex percept-concept; every percept-concept is a virtual syllogism, mediating implicitly between the specimen and the genus by the species. The Apriori of Thought, being derived from and determined by the Apriori of Being, is the constitutive principle of reasoning and the foundation of logic or the Science of Thought.

III. The Apriori of Knowledge is that derivative condition of existence by which every percept-concept of a unit-universal of Being must itself exist in Thought as the cognitive act, however incomplete or inaccurate or partially erroneous, of the Knowing I in the Knowing We: that is,

as the act of a unit-universal of energy which is an active Mind, capable of functioning simultaneously as perception and conception, sensibility and understanding, experience and reason, — the act of a Mind which is *real*, because it indivisibly energizes (1) empirically in the perception of units, and (2) rationally in the conception of universals, evolves thereby (3) an increasingly true percept-concept of a unit-universal of Being, and thereby more or less (4) *really knows*. The Apriori of Knowledge, being derived from that of Being and of Thought together, is the foundation of scientific epistemology in its three stadia of Knowledge of Knowledge, Science of Science, and Philosophy of Philosophy (§ § 1-3, 58).

§ 100. This apriorism of the philosophy of philosophy is opposed to the apriorism of Kant and his continuators by the whole diameter of speculation. The two are opposite poles. The essence of Kant's apriorism lies in this short sentence as in a nutshell: "We must of necessity attribute to things *a priori* all the properties which constitute the conditions without which we cannot think them."¹ Here the conditions of existence are resolved into mere conditions of thought, and all these conditions of thought are resolved into the necessary "attributing," the necessary *a priori* activity, of the human understanding. In other words, the conditions of human thought determine absolutely *a priori* whatever knowable conditions of existence there may be, and, beyond our human experience as thus determined solely by our human understanding *a priori*, there are no knowable conditions of existence at all: all knowable conditions of existence are the pure *a priori* work or product of the human mind. This is the Kantian apriorism. Of course it follows that the existence of the human mind itself is determined by no knowable conditions

¹ "Die Ursache aber hievon liegt darin, dass wir den Dingen *a priori* alle die Eigenschaften nothwendig beilegen müssen, die die Bedingungen ausmachen, unter welchen wir sie allein denken." (Kant, Werke, III. 277.)

whatsoever; the human mind is presumably self-existent and unconditioned. Against this Kantian apriorism stands opposed the Law of Unit-Universals, with its threefold Apriori of Being, Thought, and Knowledge, by which existence determines knowledge, and not *vice versa* as with Kant.

In the German development of the Greek concept-philosophy, from Kant to Hegel, the whole of "speculative philosophy" rests on two uncriticised postulates: namely, the possibility of separating, as well as distinguishing, experience and reason in the Empirical-Rational or Real I (*der mit Vernunft begabte Sinnenmensch*), and the possibility of criticising or investigating reason *minus* experience in the purely Rational or Pure I (*Bewusstsein überhaupt, reine Vernunft, reines Denken, reines Ich*). Both of these postulates have now been criticised and demonstrated to be untrue; see Tables I and II in § 60, and Table III in § 71. The developed Graeco-German concept-philosophy has no foundation but the Irrational Antithesis of I and Not-We; with that it stands or falls. The character and fate of every philosophy hinge at last on the mode of its transition from the I to the We; yet no philosophy as yet has seriously considered this to be important. The individual I is posited as bottom fact, as not needing to be grounded in a necessary universal; and the We is just taken for granted, as not needing to be grounded in a necessary unit. But a rational transition from the I to the We is rendered impossible by stopping, as Kant and his followers stop, with the synthetic unity of apperception as "the highest principle in all human knowledge." It can only be effected by going on to the generic unity of apperception, and discovering how absolutely these two principles condition each other as co-factors of real personal consciousness and personality as such.

Moreover, this strictly rational and necessary transition from the I to the We is at the same time an equally rational

and necessary transition from knowledge of the internal world to knowledge of the external world. It is as strictly a truth of reason as it is a truth of experience that the human I is absolutely conditioned on the human We; and so, also, that the human We is identity in difference of the internal and the external worlds. Knowledge of the I is necessarily knowledge of the We; knowledge of the We is necessarily knowledge of the external world; if I know enough to know myself as a unit-universal, I know my knowledge of the external world, since knowledge of either is knowledge of both. But this necessary transition from the I to the We, and thereby to the external world, carries philosophy from subjectivism to objectivism — carries it of sheer necessity back from German conceptualism or idealism to Greek realism, and forward from this to the new realism of modern science. Thus the "Retreat upon Kant!" becomes now — "Retreat upon Aristotle, and advance to Darwin!" This shifting of the centre of gravity from idealism to realism revolutionizes philosophy, yet at the same time restores it to that true line of evolution from which idealism, whether German, Anglican, or what not, had for a while perverted it. The entire revolution is formulated in the development of the Law of Unit-Universals out of the Aristotelian Paradox, or, what is the same thing, discovery of the Apriori of Being beneath the Apriori of Thought as the unconditioned condition of all knowledge as such.

CHAPTER IX

THE TRANSITION IN KANT

§ 101. KANT never investigates the *origin or genesis* of the Pure I, since this to him is not a reality or real substance at all, but a "mere logical subject." He considers the question of the substantiality of the I to be an insoluble problem. He accepts the dualism of sensibility and understanding, or sense and intellect, as a mere empirical datum of consciousness, unexplained and inexplicable except so far as they may "perhaps" arise from "a common but to us unknown root." He separates the two elements as practically ultimate, eliminates the empirical, isolates the rational, and makes the latter, as mere "act of synthesis" or "synthetical unity of apperception," the "highest principle in human knowledge." The whole fabric of the *Kritikismus*, therefore, rests on a separation (*Trennung*) of experience and reason which renders it quite as incapable of yielding an adequate concept of the Real I, that is, of real personality, as an equivalent dualism of sense and intellect, by Zeller's showing (§ 77), rendered the system of Aristotle.

From such a "mere logical subject" or Unreal I, manifestly, no transition to a Real We was logically possible. The inexorable consequence of Kant's premises or data, stated above, is that *my* "consciousness-in-general" cannot possibly transcend the indeterminate series of conscious states in *me*: an indeterminate series whose sole universality consists in their being all strung on the "I think" that must "accompany" each of those states to make it "mine," — an indeterminate series whose sole unity con-

sists in such indeterminate simplicity as can be discovered in the bare "I" of the "I think." But such indeterminate unity or simplicity as this is wholly insufficient to determine the I as real, that is, as a real unit-universal of energy, or substantial personality, or One of the We. For Kant finds in the "I" of the "I think" nothing but a "merely logical or transcendental subject," not at all a substantial, or real, or Knowing I; it is "an unknown *x*," which is known indeed to join state to state in me (*not in you*) like beads on a string, but of which nothing more can be known than that it is an "act of synthesis," "the understanding itself," "the faculty of conjoining *a priori*" empirical states to which it is itself utterly foreign. Such an I as this is a mere "faculty" of *me*, a mere element of *my* personality, an abstract *ens rationis*; it is certainly not a Knowing I, and from it there is no possible rational transition to a Real We. Thus Kant arrives at a fragment of the Real I; but he arrives at nothing else whatsoever, and avoids rigorous solipsism by nothing but an arbitrary volition against reason.

§ 102. It is exceedingly curious to note how Kant's conscious impotency to effect a rational transition from the Unreal or Pure I to the Real We by any principles known to him betrays itself in his treatment of the subject—nay, in the very phrases he is compelled to employ. For example:—

"I cannot have the least idea of a thinking being by any external experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Therefore such objects are nothing else than the transference [*Uebertragung*] of this my own consciousness to other things, which only by that means are represented as thinking beings."¹

¹ "Nun kann ich von einem denkenden Wesen durch *keine* äussere Erfahrung, sondern bloß durch das Selbstbewusstsein die mindeste Vorstellung haben. Also sind dergleichen Gegenstände nichts weiter, als die Uebertragung dieses meines Bewusstseins auf andere Dinge, welche nur dadurch als denkende Wesen vorgestellt werden." (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Werke, III. 277.)

Such shallowness as this confidence in an unwarranted analogy is by no means characteristic of this profound and acute analyst. According to Kant himself, what is my self-consciousness? Nothing but that indeterminate unity of my empirical conscious states which results from the transcendental "act of synthesis," by which my "understanding" or "synthetical unity of apperception" adds an *a priori* or transcendental "I-think" to each of those states, and thereby conjoins them all *a priori* in an indeterminate series of "I-thinks." That is all. Hence *my* self-consciousness can never transcend this indeterminate series, or give to it a determinate unity; it transcends *each of my conscious states*, but can never transcend *itself*. It follows clearly and necessarily that my mere self-consciousness can never arrive at knowledge of itself as "*a* thinking being;" for this would be to transcend itself, pass from the thing to the kind as a real species beyond itself, and give itself a determinate unity as One of the We. Most certainly, if I am to know myself at all as One of the We, it must be by knowing Others of the We. But this knowledge of Others beyond myself is a matter of "external experience" alone — a matter of perception as well as of conception; and, if perception is not admissible as an essential element of all knowledge, all knowledge of my determinate unity as "*a* thinking being" becomes impossible. Self-consciousness, in other words, can never determine itself as "*a* thinking being," that is, as a unit-universal or real person or One of the We, without the aid of "external experience" of Others of the We — without the aid of race-consciousness or generic unity of apperception. Kant's first sentence above, therefore, needs to be reversed, so as to read: "I cannot have the least idea of a thinking being through self-consciousness alone, but solely by the aid of external experience."

The second sentence simply makes a bad matter worse: "Such objects [as thinking beings] are nothing else than the transference of this my own consciousness to other

things, which only by that means are represented as thinking beings."

What are these "other things"? Certainly not "things in themselves," for of these Kant denies all knowledge; and certainly not "objects of experience," for these, as nothing but combined products of my own sensibility and my own understanding according to the *a priori* laws of my own general faculty of knowledge (*Erkenntnisvermögen*), he makes a part of my own "thinking being." Consequently, according to Kant, there are no "other things" whatsoever to which I *can* "transfer this my own consciousness."

But let us waive this fatal objection altogether, and ask: what is "this my own consciousness" which is to be "transferred" so mysteriously to these mysterious "other things"? Certainly not my empirical consciousness, for Kant would never maintain the absurdity that I can "transfer" my single and absolutely inalienable conscious states to any possible "other thing;" and certainly not my pure consciousness, for this Kant makes the mere "*a priori* synthesis" of *my* conscious states, and the synthesis must be inseparable from the states synthesized in *me*. There is, then, no consciousness of mine whatsoever, empirical or pure, which I can possibly "transfer;" and, even if I had such a separable or transferable consciousness, there is, as has just been shown, no "other thing" to which I could possibly "transfer" it. Kant's whimsical hypothesis of "transference," therefore, which contradicts every principle of his *Kritikismus*, is plainly no legitimate result of it, but rather a desperate device to avoid solipsism. The device, however, is as ineffectual as it is desperate, and must be dismissed as a surrender at discretion to mere "common sense," a virtual confession that from the Pure I to the Real We no rational transition is possible.

If, nevertheless, it be argued in Kant's defence that he never meant an actual or literal *transference* of my individual consciousness to "other things," but only the in-

dubitable discovery of such an *analogy* between myself and certain "other things" as justifies me in classing them and myself together as "thinking beings," the reply must be that, if allowed to be valid, the defence itself demolishes the *Kritikismus* from base to cope. On Kantian principles such a discovery is absolutely unthinkable, since it presupposes, contrary to Kant himself, that both myself and these "other things" are known things in themselves. If I know of myself that I am "a thinking being," *per se*, and if I know of certain "other things" that they, too, are "thinking beings" *per se*, — that is, if I can indeed make the alleged discovery, no matter how, — it follows of necessity that these "other things," which *ex hypothesi* are utterly independent of me, my consciousness, and my very existence, become known in themselves in virtue of the discovery itself. That is, they must not only be *known things in themselves*, but must also be *known consciousnesses in themselves*; otherwise, the alleged discovery is not made at all.¹ Such a defence as this may be very good "common sense," but it is upheaval and destruction of the thing defended; for no one will dispute the statement that the whole *Kritikismus* has for its substructural principle the doctrine that phaenomena, or things as they appear, are the sole objects of knowledge, and that noumena, or things as they are in themselves, are utterly unknowable. The defence, therefore, ceases to be a defence altogether, and becomes a mere corroboration of the criticism. If conformed strictly to the principles of his own philosophy, Kant's second sentence would have to read: "Such objects as thinking beings may exist phaenomenally or *for me* in my empirical consciousness, but they can never be known to exist noumenally or *for themselves* beyond it; in my pure self-consciousness, which is mere unity of apperception

¹ "Ich berufe mich hier lediglich auf deine eigene innere Anschauung; von aussen dir anzudemonstrieren, was nur in dir selbst seyn kann, vermag ich nicht." (Fichte, Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 531.)

and admits no plurality of self-consciousnesses, they cannot possibly exist at all." That, however would be solipsism, the necessary terminus of all logical or self-consistent idealism. Kant's quoted sentences do not untie the Gordian knot—they only cut it by a *tour de force*, which is the abandonment and end of all philosophy.

§ 103. This flighty hypothesis of a possible "transference of this my consciousness" (the obvious origin of W. K. Clifford's still more flighty hypothesis of other "thinking objects" as merely my "ejects") proves clearly enough that, with all his ingenuity and fertility of resources, Kant felt his own powerlessness to derive from the principles of his *Kritik* any mode of transition from the I to the We which should be other than merely volitional or arbitrary. The *Prolegomena*,¹ published several years after the *Kritik* as a restatement of it, shows that in the interval he had become increasingly conscious of this powerlessness; for the language now used carries an almost cynical confession that he himself perceives his inability to transform the merely wilful transition into a logical and rational one. But he endeavors to make the best of a bad case.

In the statement of his famous distinction between "judgments of perception" as possessing merely "subjective validity," and "judgments of experience" as possessing "objective validity," he arbitrarily and illogically interprets the latter as objective validity *for others* as well as *for himself*. This is acknowledging these others to be already *known* as co-equal with himself, *i. e.* both noumenally and phaenomenally *known* as *thinking beings*, or *conscious things in themselves*, in contradiction of his own fundamental standpoint. For the "I think," with which my pure self-consciousness "accompanies" every state of my empirical consciousness, and by which it combines all my states in one series, and in virtue of which alone it

¹ "Sie [d. h. die Prolegomena] sind, was die didaktische Kunst betrifft, Kants Meisterstück." (K. Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, III. 551.)

makes these "mine," cannot, of course, be attached to the states of any empirical consciousness which is not mine: its sole function is to make my own conscious states *mine*, and cannot without absurdity be "transferred" to any possible empirical consciousness which is *not mine*. No one has admitted this more clearly or more emphatically than Kant himself: "Every manifold of intuition refers of necessity to the 'I think,' *in the same subject in which this manifold is found.*"¹ (The italics are ours.) Whatever "universality" or "objective validity," therefore, I may attribute to my own "judgments of experience," must be logically limited to such universality and objective validity as may obtain *in me*; it cannot logically be attributed to any judgment *in you*. From all attribution to his own judgments of any "objective validity" for any other consciousness, Kant is absolutely precluded by his own most essential principles; if he attributes to them any validity beyond his own personal "I think," he does it in glaring contradiction of himself. His own "judgments of experience" may perhaps hold good universally throughout his own empirical consciousness, and be, therefore, objectively valid *for himself*. But, if he tries for that reason to make them necessary, universal, and objectively valid *for you*, he turns into nonsense his great doctrine of the "synthetic unity of apperception," by making his own "I think" overleap the chasm between *him* and *you*, by confounding *his* "I think" with *your* "I think," and *his* "I" with *your* "I," and by setting up this "merely logical subject" of *his own consciousness* as a second and usurping subject in *yours*. This is wilfulness incarnate. The supposition of any Other-I whatsoever, except as a mere phaenomenon in his own empirical consciousness, and as dependent for its very existence, therefore, on his own "I think," is throwing all logical consistency to the dogs. And this is precisely what he does, in shrinking from the solipsism which lies implicit in all his premises.

¹ Kr. d. r. Vernunft, Werke, III. 116.

§ 104. Turning to Kant's own language on this topic, nevertheless, it is interesting to note how freely and naively he uses the expressions "we," "us," "our," "ourselves," "every one else," "everybody," and so forth, as if there were no necessity of justifying them rationally by a logical transition from the I to the We; and how he thus begs the whole question of the *Kritikismus* by taking for granted, as a mere empirical datum of "common sense," that very plurality of subjects which he is bound to account for rationally, but does not and cannot account for at all. For the main thesis of the *Kritikismus* is to prove the reality of "pure knowledge" *a priori*, as the condition of all necessity and universality, that is, of all objective validity, in human experience as such; in other words, to explain the possibility of "synthetic judgments *a priori*" by proving the existence of a universal "pure reason" which shall legislate *a priori* for all possible experience, not only in himself, but also in all mankind. Yet he seeks to prove this *universal* "pure reason" from premises or principles which forbid the recognition of any save a strictly *individual* "pure reason" of his own. All such expressions as the above, therefore, being unjustified by any rational transition from the I to the We, do but betray a purely arbitrary and naïve admission of a fact too stubborn to be denied or doubted, yet impossible to be established by the "synthetic unity of apperception," if unsupplemented by the generic unity of apperception: namely, the fact of a human race. These are the passages to be considered:—

"All our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception; they are valid merely for ourselves, that is, for our subject; and only afterwards do we give them a new reference, namely, to an object, and insist [*wollen*,—so translated forcibly and correctly by Bax] they shall be valid for ourselves at all times, and, likewise, for everybody." ¹

"'Objective validity' means precisely the same thing as 'validity

¹ Prolegomena, § 18, Werke, IV. 47.

which is necessary and universal for everybody.' . . . We will explain this. That the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the worm-wood bitter, are merely subjectively valid judgments. I do not in the least expect [*verlange*] that I at all times shall, or that every one else will, make these judgments as I make them now. They express only a reference of two sensations to the same subject, namely, myself, and that, too, only in my present state of perception; and for that reason they cannot be supposed to declare the nature of the object. Such judgments I call judgments of perception. The case is quite different with the judgment of experience. What experience teaches me under stated circumstances, it must teach me at all times, and likewise everybody, and its validity is not limited to the subject or to its present state. Therefore I characterize all such judgments as objectively valid. For example, if I say, 'the air is elastic,' this judgment is at first only a judgment of perception; I only relate two sensations in my senses to one another. If I insist [*will ich*] that it shall be called a judgment of experience, I require [*verlange*] this [subjective] correlation to stand under an [objective] condition which makes it universally valid. Therefore, I insist [*ich will*] that I at all times, and, likewise, everybody, must necessarily combine the same perceptions [that is, make the same correlation of subject and predicate, the same judgment] under the same circumstances."¹

§ 105. In these significant passages of his two greatest works, what reason does Kant assign for believing in the existence of any I but his own? None whatever. Despite the earlier hypothesis of a "transference of this my consciousness" to "other things," he afterwards simply postulates the existence of other I's, without offering any genuine reason for it in either case. He cannot help believing it, but he does not know why he believes it. Instead of a reason, he assigns only an act of will in his thrice-repeated "I insist"—in his "I expect," "I require," "I transfer my own consciousness to other things, which only by that means are represented as thinking beings." But why need they be represented or at all conceived as thinking beings, when such conception vitiates

¹ Prolegomena, § 19, Werke, IV. 47, 48.

and nullifies all his reasoning? No reason, no necessity, no justification is shown or can be shown for arbitrarily injecting consciousness into "other things," and thereby converting them, in violation of every principle of *Kritikismus*, into *known things in themselves*.

The real reason for this necessary and universal belief in the existence of Other I's is hidden from him by his own theory of the Pure I. This left him satisfied with an unsubstantial or Unreal I, a "merely logical subject." If he had only discerned that it is impossible to arrive at the consciousness of "my self" (which must be a determinate unit or Real I) except through consciousness of "other selves" (which must be a determinate universal or Real We), and *vice versa*, — that is, if he had only supplemented the synthetic with the generic unity of apperception as two reciprocal conditions, just as necessary to each other in the real unity of personal consciousness as subject and predicate are necessary to each other in the real unity of the judgment, — he could readily have found a rational transition from the I to the We. But he found none such, and relied at last, as the above passages show, on a mere volition, "I insist," as the ground of his belief in "other thinking beings." One can almost see the ironical smile with which the great reasoner must have written down the words; for no one could understand better than he the utter arbitrariness of his own procedure, in a case where nothing but arbitrariness, it is true, was possible for him. The fact remains that the whole *Kritikismus* collapses in this failure to effect a rational transition from the I to the We; for it leaves "synthetic judgments *a priori*" necessary and universal, or objectively valid, *for me and for nobody else*, and therefore makes his "judgments of experience" impossible in the sense propounded and demanded: namely, that of "objective validity for me at all times, and, likewise, for everybody."

CHAPTER X

THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE

§ 106. IT was the baffling, almost mocking evasiveness of Kant's Pure I, a "merely logical subject" which is conscious of itself as nothing but a *faculty*¹ of conjoining single elements into one intuition and many intuitions or states into one consciousness, and of which not even substance can be predicated, that drove the powerful and earnest mind of Fichte into rebellion against his master. His intensely ethical nature and consciousness revolted at the Kantian evaporation of personality into an Unreal I—a spontaneous, empty, unsubstantial "act of synthesis." Unfortunately he, too, inherited the Aristotelian Paradox, and did not dream of questioning the Kantian separation of reason and experience.² Hence he struggled in vain in his own philosophy to overcome the logical necessity of an Unreal I which lay implicit in those premises. He ex-

¹ "Ich existire als Intelligenz, die sich lediglich ihres Verbindungsvermögens bewusst ist," u. s. w. (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 131.)

² "Nun hat die Philosophie den Grund aller Erfahrung anzugeben; ihr Object liegt sonach nothwendig *ausser aller Erfahrung*." (Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 425.)—"Wir können dieses Bewusstseyn [des Besonderen] *Wahrnehmung* nennen, oder Erfahrung. Es hat sich gefunden, dass im Wissen von der blossen Wahrnehmung abgesehen werden muss." (Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, II. 7.)—"Zu diesem Denken des Wissens nun, als des Einen und sich selbst gleichen in allem besonderen Wissen, und wodurch dieses letztere nicht *dieses*, sondern eben überhaupt *Wissen* ist, ist der Leser hier eingeladen, wo vom absoluten Wissen gesprochen wird." (*Ibid.* II. 14.) The italics are all Fichte's. He, like Aristotle, cancelled the individual difference as unknowable: nothing was knowable but τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνὸν.

hausted a fine philosophical genius in the effort to evolve Kant's disembodied ghost of an I into the truth of life. He did indeed clothe it with some of the attributes of vitality, yet he left it at last a phantom still.

Although beginning his career with a firm persuasion that he was only interpreting Kant's system to the world in a more intelligible and explicit fashion than that of its framer, Fichte soon discovered, especially after Kant had disowned the interpretations of his self-appointed expounder, that the work of exposition involved, not merely far-reaching developments, but also fundamental corrections of Kant's own conception of the Pure I as "nothing more than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x , which is known solely by the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these thoughts, we can never have the the least conception" — "a simple, contentless, utterly empty representation, *I*, of which we cannot say that it is a concept at all, but a mere consciousness which accompanies all concepts" — "the concept of a subject taken here in a merely logical sense."¹ Such an I as this, Fichte clearly perceived, would be phantasmal, unreal, incapable even of the one essential function assigned to it in the synthetic unity of apperception, as the condition of all experience. Even Kant himself confesses that "the absolute unity of apperception, the simple I, in the representation [*ich denke*] to which all the conjunction or disjunction that constitutes thought is related, becomes important for itself, although I have found out nothing about the subject's constitution or subsistence: apperception is something real, and its unity lies already in its possibility."² Surely, reasoned Fichte, that which in all thinking whatsoever really joins or disjoins, that is, *actively relates*, must be itself a real activity — something vastly more than a mere subject (*blosses Subject*), a mere logical abstraction, a mere negation of all real activity. Without an I both real and active, all synthetical

¹ Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 276, 285.

² *Ibid.* III. 285.

unity of apperception necessarily vanishes, and with it all real thinking. But a real and active I must be a real unit — *object* as well as *subject* — object to itself and thereby conscious of itself as *subject-object*. His argument, which marked a new epoch in speculation, is perhaps best presented in his Attempt at a New Exposition of the Doctrine of Science, translated here with his own italics :

§ 107. “ Let us advance to a higher speculative standpoint.

“ 1. Think yourself, and observe how you do it: that was my first demand. Observe you must, in order to understand me (for I spoke of something which could be only in yourself), and in order to find what I said to you true in your own experience. This *attention* to ourselves in that act was the *subjective element* common to us both. Your procedure in the thinking of yourself, which in me, too, was the same procedure, was *that to which* you attended; it was the object of our investigation, the *objective element* common to us both.

“ But now I say to you: observe *your observation* of your own act of self-position; observe what you did in the just made investigation itself, and how you did it, in order to observe yourself. What was before the subjective element, make that itself the object of a new investigation which we are now instituting.

“ 2. The point which I have here in mind is not so easily hit; but, if it is missed, everything is missed, for on it rests my whole doctrine. Let the reader permit me, then, to conduct him through a passage-way and place him as closely as possible before that which he has to consider.

“ When you are conscious of any object, — yonder wall, perhaps, — you are properly conscious, as you have conceded, of your thinking of the wall, and only so far as you are conscious of that is a consciousness of the wall possible. But, in order to be conscious of your thinking, you must be conscious of yourself.

“ *You* are conscious of *yourself*, you say; you must distinguish, therefore, your *thinking* I from the I *thought* in the thinking of it. But, in order that you may be able to do this, again must that which thinks in that thinking be *object* of a higher thinking, to become a possible object of consciousness; and you at once obtain a new *subject*, which is conscious now of that which was previously the self-consciousness. Here, again, I argue as before; and, after

we have once begun to reason according to this law, you can nowhere show me a place where we can stop; we shall need forever, consequently, for every consciousness a new consciousness whose object is the first, and shall never arrive, therefore, at the possibility of assuming a real consciousness. You are conscious of yourself as object [*des Bewussten*] merely in so far as you are conscious of yourself as subject [*des Bewusstseyenden*]; but then the subject is again the object, and you must again become conscious of the subject of this object, and so on *ad infinitum*; and so you may see how you reach a first consciousness.

“Shortly: in this way consciousness cannot possibly be explained.

“Once more: what was the essence of the argument just gone through, and the true reason why consciousness was inconceivable in that way? This: every object comes into consciousness merely on condition that I be conscious also of myself, the conscious subject. This proposition is undeniable. But in this self-consciousness of myself, it was further contended, I am to myself an object, and what held true of the previous subject holds true again of the subject to this object; it becomes object, and needs a new subject, and so on *ad infinitum*. In every consciousness, therefore, subject and object were divided from each other, and each was treated as a separate thing: that was the reason why consciousness fell out for us to be inconceivable.

“But, notwithstanding, consciousness exists; that contention, therefore, must be false. ‘It is false’ means ‘its opposite is true.’ Consequently, the following proposition is true: there is a consciousness in which the subjective and objective elements cannot be divided, but are absolutely one and the same. Accordingly, such a consciousness would be what we needed in order to explain consciousness in general. Without dwelling further on the point, we now return unembarrassed to our investigation.

“3. Since, as we requested you, you thought now objects external to you, now yourself, you undoubtedly knew that, and what, and how you thought; for we were able to converse on the subject with each other, as we have done in the foregoing.

“Now how did you come to this consciousness of your thinking? You will answer me: ‘I knew it immediately; the consciousness of my thinking is not something contingent, subsequent, additional, annexed to my thinking itself, but it is inseparable

from it.' So you will answer and must answer; for you cannot at all think your thinking without a consciousness of it.

"At the very outset, then, we might have found such a consciousness as we were in search of — a consciousness in which the subjective and objective elements were immediately united. The consciousness of our own thinking is this consciousness. Well, then, you are immediately conscious of your thinking: how do you conceive this? Manifestly, no otherwise than thus: your inner activity, which goes to something out of it, to the object of thought, goes at the same time to itself and into itself. But, according to what precedes, through activity returning into itself there originates for us the I. Accordingly, in the thinking of yourself, you were conscious of yourself, and just this self-consciousness was that immediate consciousness of your thinking, whether you thought an object or merely yourself. Therefore, self-consciousness is immediate; in it the subjective and objective elements are inseparably united and absolutely one.

"Such an immediate consciousness is scientifically expressed as an *Intuition*, and we, too, will call it so. The intuition here considered is a *positing of self as* positing something objective, which may be myself as mere object. But it cannot in any way be a mere *positing*; for by that we should be involved in the already indicated impossibility of explaining consciousness. Everything depends for me on being understood and found convincing on this point, which constitutes the foundation of my whole system.

"All possible consciousness as objective to a subject presupposes an immediate consciousness in which the subjective and objective elements are absolutely one; without this, consciousness is positively inconceivable. We shall always seek in vain for a bond between subject and object, unless we have originally apprehended them both in their union. All philosophy, therefore, which fails to start from the point in which they are united, is necessarily shallow and incomplete, and is, therefore, no philosophy.

"This immediate consciousness is the intuition of the I, just described; in it, the I necessarily posits itself, and is for that reason the subjective and objective elements in one. Every other consciousness is attached to this and mediated by it, — becomes a consciousness merely through combination with it; this alone is mediated or conditioned by nothing; it is absolutely possible and simply necessary, if any other consciousness is to take place. The I is not to be considered as bare subject, which it has been

considered almost universally down to the present time,¹ but as subject-object in the sense explained.

“Now here there is question of no other ‘being’ of the I than that in the self-intuition described, — or, more strictly expressed, than the ‘being’ of this intuition itself. I am this intuition, and absolutely nothing more; and this intuition itself is I. By this self-positing there is not produced an existence of the I as a thing-in-itself which subsists independently of consciousness, — a contention which would be, without doubt, the greatest of absurdities. Just as little does this intuition presuppose an existence, independent of consciousness, of the I as (intuiting) thing: which in my judgment is no less an absurdity, although, of course, one must not say this, since the most celebrated world-sages of our philosophical century have adhered to this opinion. Such an existence is not to be presupposed, I say; for, if you can speak of nothing *of which you are not conscious*, but everything of which you are conscious *is conditioned by the self-consciousness pointed out, you cannot, on the contrary, make a determined something of which you are conscious*, that existence of the I which is said to be independent of all intuiting and thinking, *condition that self-consciousness*. Either you would have to confess that you speak of something without knowing about it, which you will hardly do, or you would have to deny that the self-consciousness pointed out conditions every other consciousness, which will be absolutely impossible for you, if you have only understood me. From what has been said, it is evident, moreover, that, in virtue of our first proposition, not only for the case instanced but for all possible cases, we are inevitably committed to the standpoint of transcendental idealism; and that it is one and the same thing to understand that proposition and to be convinced of this standpoint.

“Consequently, the intelligence intuits itself simply as intelligence, or as pure intelligence, and precisely in this self-intuition its essence consists. Hence this intuition, in case there should possibly be still another mode of intuition, is called *intellectual* intuition in distinction from the latter. Instead of the word ‘intelligence,’ I prefer the designation ‘I-hood’ [*Ichheit*], because this most directly expresses, for every one who is capable of the least attention, the return of activity into itself.”²

¹ Fichte has in mind here Kant’s description of the I as “nichts weiter, als ein transscendentales Subject der Gedanken = x.” (Werke, III. 276.)

² Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 525-530.

§ 108. Considered simply as a criticism of Kant, Fichte's reasoning admits of no reply. Kant's "division" or "separation" of the I-object from the I-subject in self-consciousness, to which Fichte is evidently alluding, involves, as the latter clearly proves, the impossibility of thinking any self-conscious subject whatever. That is, if in a given self-consciousness or "real unity of apperception" the object can be indeed "divided" or "separated" from the subject, the "division" instantly abolishes the self-consciousness; the object (O) immediately absorbs the subject (S), and becomes a new object (O + S) which of course demands a new subject (S'); this new subject is immediately absorbed by the new object (O + S) to constitute still another object (O + S + S'), which in turn demands still another subject (S''); and this process must repeat itself endlessly, without the possibility of ever arriving at any real self-conscious subject at all. Shortly:—

Immediate consciousness = O + S.

First self-consciousness = (O + S) + S' = O' + S'.

Second self-consciousness = (O' + S') + S'' = O'' + S''.

Third self-consciousness = (O'' + S'') + S''' = O''' + S''', etc.

This Kantian method of separating the object and the subject in self-consciousness, therefore, as Fichte above makes clear, annihilates the possibility of self-consciousness itself by annihilating its necessary condition, namely, a self-conscious subject. The "separated" or pure subject (*reines Ich*) vanishes in the unattainable limit of an infinite series; and Kant's pure consciousness-in-general (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*), which absolutely requires a pure subject, vanishes with it. But this, both to Kant and to Fichte, would be the end of all philosophy. The "division" or "separation," then, as Fichte unanswerably urged, must be itself impossible; in all self-consciousness subject and object must be, not separated, but distinguished; self-consciousness as such must be a consciousness in which subject and object are one and indivisible, that is, *identical in difference*

as *Subject-Object*. It is Fichte's supreme merit to have seen and demonstrated this commanding truth; for Kant himself failed to see that it was the necessary logical implication of his own confession that "the absolute unity of apperception, the simple I, in the representation [*i. e.* 'I think'] to which all the combination or separation that constitutes thinking is related, is important for itself, too, although I have discovered nothing as to the subject's constitution or substantiality,"—that "apperception is something real, and its unity lies already in its possibility."¹ Fichte has proved that Kant's "division" or "separation" of I-subject and I-object in self-consciousness would annihilate all possibility of this "real unity of apperception," and thus render impossible "the highest principle in all human knowledge;" and it is Fichte's greatest achievement in philosophy to have established, in opposition to Kant's notion of the I as "mere logical subject," his own notion of it as indissoluble "subject-object."²

§ 109. But how did he proceed to develop this notion? Only two lines of development lay logically open before him. One is determined by the Aristotelian Paradox (§ 78, VI), which excludes the individual difference of each I, isolates the common essence of all I's as bare "subject-object," and leads to the abstract universal as the *Ichheit*, the "I-hood" or Pure I (§ 71, Table III, Rationalist Form of the Irrational Antithesis). The other is determined by the Law of Unit-Universals (§ 99), which includes the individual difference with the common essence in each Real I, and leads to the concrete universal as the Real We (§ 71, Table III, Rational Antithesis). Fichte followed the former line, as his whole doctrine shows. For instance:—

¹ Kr. d. r. Vern., Werke, III. 285.

² "Das Ich ist nicht zu betrachten, als blosses Subject, wie man es bis jetzt beinahe durchgängig betrachtet hat, sondern als Subject-Object in dem angegebenen Sinne." (Werke, I. 529.)—"Die in sich zurückgehende Thätigkeit als feststehend und beharrlich aufgefasst, wodurch sonach beides, Ich, als Thätiges, und Ich, als Object meiner Thätigkeit, zusammenfallen, ist der Begriff des Ich." (*Ibid.* I. 533.)

Kant had said: "This representation [namely, the universal 'I think'] is an act of spontaneity; that is, it cannot be considered as belonging to the sensibility. I call it the *pure* apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical; or, also, the *original* apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, in producing the representation 'I think' that must be capable of accompanying all other representations and is in every consciousness one and the same, can be accompanied by no representation beyond itself."¹

Now Fichte quoted this passage approvingly, because he interpreted it as expressing his own concept of the Pure I. He particularly emphasized by italics the words — "*is in every consciousness one and the same,*" and added: "Here the nature of the pure self-consciousness is clearly described. It is in every consciousness the same — undetermined, therefore, by any accident of the consciousness: the I in it is determined solely by itself, and is absolutely determined."² What does this mean? Those words italicized by Fichte are the hall-mark of the Aristotelian Paradox. They do but translate, as applied to this instance, Aristotle's τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν — the pure "form" in the "compound of form and matter," the universal which inheres in the individual and thereby gives to the latter all its reality and all its intelligibility. Fichte's "I in it," *das Ich in ihm*, is simply the εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν of consciousness, the Pure I immanent as universal self-consciousness in every conscious state of every empirical individual, absolutely identical and unchangeable in all individuals as pure "subject-object." In no possible way could Fichte have disclosed his adhesion to the Aristotelian Paradox with greater clearness than in this emphatic approval of Kant's adhesion to it, or indicated more unmistakably what theory of the general relation of the universal to the individual determined and went to the making of his whole theory of the I.

¹ Kant, Werke, III. 116.

² Fichte, Werke, I. 476.

Rationally to conceive, in its entirety, necessity, and universality, "the absolutely unconditioned and characteristic element of self-consciousness," to the complete exclusion of every empirical element, and thereby to know the absolute essence of the I as "subject-object," was Fichte's aim. This knowledge was the *Wissenschaftslehre*, the all-exhaustive science of the *Ichheit*, beyond which nothing exists.¹ Yet, in order by the method thus adopted to win knowledge of the I as "subject-object," Fichte fell into the very error which he exposed in Kant. Precisely as Kant, according to Fichte, destroyed self-consciousness by "separating" the I-object and the I-subject, Fichte himself destroyed knowledge by "separating" reason and experience.² In both cases, "separation" or "division" renders insoluble a prob-

¹ "Alles was ist, ist nur insofern, als es im Ich gesetzt ist, und ausser dem Ich ist nichts." (Werke, I. 99.) — "Ich bediene mich statt des Wortes Intelligenz lieber der Benennung: Ichheit; weil diese das Zurückgehen der Thätigkeit in sich selbst für jeden, der nur der geringsten Aufmerksamkeit fähig ist, am unmittelbarsten bezeichnet." (*Ibid.* I. 530.) — "Die *Ichheit* ist es [d. h. das absolut Unbedingte und Characteristische des Selbstbewusstseins], die Subject-Objectivität, und sonst durchaus nichts; das Setzen des Subjectiven und seines Objectiven, des Bewusstseins und seines Bewussten, als Eins; und schlechthin nichts weiter, ausser dieser Identität." (*Ibid.* II. 362.) — "Die Wissenschaftslehre soll aber nicht nur *sich selbst*, sondern auch *allen möglichen übrigen Wissenschaften* ihre Form geben, und die Gültigkeit dieser Form für alle sicher stellen." (*Ibid.* I. 51.)

² "Nun hat die Philosophie den Grund aller Erfahrung anzugeben; ihr Object liegt sonach nothwendig *ausser aller Erfahrung*. Dieser Satz gilt für alle Philosophie, und hat auch, bis auf die Epoche der Kantianer und ihrer Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns, und also der inneren Erfahrung, wirklich allgemein gegolten." (*Ibid.* I. 425.) — "Der Grund liegt allemal ausserhalb des begründeten, d. i. er ist demselben entgegengesetzt." (*Ibid.* I. 456.) Compare Kant's own words: "Der Verstand vermag nichts anzuschauen und die Sinne nichts zu denken. Nur daraus, dass sie sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntniss entspringen. Deswegen darf man aber doch nicht ihren Antheil vermischen, sondern man hat grosse Ursache, jedes von dem andern sorgfältig abzusondern und zu unterscheiden." (Kr. d. r. Vern. Werke, III. 82.) To separate and distinguish — not to distinguish without separating: that is the concept-philosophy's principle.

lem which can be solved only by *distinction within the inseparable or indivisible*,—by the equal recognition of *difference and identity in one and the same reality*. But it is necessary to take note of Fichte's resultant concept of the *Ichheit*, and to inquire whether by means of it a rational transition can be effected from the I to the We.

§ 110. The Pure I, as "subject-object," is variously, but in the main self-consistently, characterized by Fichte. It is a free self-activity (*Selbstthätigkeit*) which returns into itself.¹ It is a self-realizing energy, a union of power and product, a "deed-act" which appears in no empirical consciousness, but underlies and conditions every empirical consciousness, and which absolutely posits, originates, and constructs its own being.² It is an unconditioned free-

¹ "Er [d. h. jeder] wird hoffentlich einsehen . . . dass, sage ich, der Gedanke seiner selbst nichts anderes sey, als der Gedanke dieser Handlung, und das Wort Ich nichts anderes, als die Bezeichnung desselben; dass Ich und *in sich zurückkehrendes Handeln* völlig identische Begriffe sind." (Werke, I. 462.)—"Nun aber ist das Ich laut obigem nichts anderes, als ein in sich selbst zurückgehendes Handeln; und ein in sich selbst zurückgehendes Handeln ist das Ich." (*Ibid.* I. 532.)

² "Er [d. h. der absolut-erste, schlechthin unbedingte Grundsatz alles menschlichen Wissens] soll diejenige *Thathandlung* ausdrücken, welche unter den empirischen Bestimmungen unseres Bewusstseyns nicht vorkommt, noch vorkommen kann, sondern vielmehr allem Bewusstsein zum Grunde liegt, und allein es möglich macht." (*Ibid.* I. 91.)—"Also das Setzen des Ich durch sich selbst ist die reine Thätigkeit desselben.—Das Ich *setzt sich selbst*, und es *ist*, vermöge dieses blossen Setzens durch sich selbst; und umgekehrt: das Ich *ist*, und es *setzt* sein Seyn, vermöge seines blossen Seyns. Es ist zugleich das Handelnde, und das Product der Handlung; das Thätige, und das, was durch die Thätigkeit hervorgebracht wird; Handlung und That sind Eins und dasselbe; und daher ist das: *Ich bin*, Ausdruck einer Thathandlung; aber auch der einzig-möglichen." (*Ibid.* I. 96.)—"Das Ich ist ursprünglich nur ein Thun; denkt man es auch nur als Thätiges, so hat man schon einen empirischen, und also erst abzuleitenden Begriff desselben." (*Ibid.* I. 495.)—"Sich selbst setzen und Seyn sind, vom Ich gebraucht, völlig gleich. . . . Denkt man sich die Erzählung von dieser Thathandlung an die Spitze einer Wissenschaftslehre, so müsste sie etwa folgendermassen ausgedrückt werden: *Das Ich setzt ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn*." (*Ibid.* I. 98.)—"Erst durch

agency, which is the I's substance and innermost essence.¹ It is a shut but self-seeing eye, which produces itself out of nothing.² It is an intellectual intuition, without which the concept and the sensuous intuition together would not be enough to constitute a mental representation or definite state of consciousness (*Vorstellung*).³ It is an absolute,

diesen Act, und lediglich durch ihn, durch ein Handeln auf ein Handeln selbst, welchem bestimmten Handeln kein Handeln überhaupt vorhergeht, wird das Ich *ursprünglich* für sich selbst." (*Ibid.* I. 459.) This denies heredity — denies that act of the We which, as generation, conditions every act of the I, even the *Thathandlung*.

¹ "Die letztere [d. h. die absolute Kraft des Ich] ist Substanz des Ich, sein eigenstes innerstes Wesen, in welchem das Wissen ewig ruht: die Aeusserung [d. h. das Gefühl] ist Accidens, aber nur *formaliter*; seyn könnend überhaupt, oder auch nicht; wenn sie aber ist, durchaus nothwendig diejenige seyend, welche sie ist, denn sie ist bestimmt durch das unveränderliche Verhältniss zum Universum." (*Ibid.* II. 124.)

² "Das Wissen ist nun gefunden und steht vor uns, als ein auf sich selbst ruhendes und geschlossenes Auge. Es sieht nichts ausser sich, aber es sieht sich selbst. Diese Selbstanschauung desselben haben wir zu erschöpfen, und mit ihr ist das System alles möglichen Wissens erschöpft, und die Wissenschaftslehre realisirt und geschlossen. . . . Die intellectuelle Anschauung ist für sich ein absolutes Selbsterzeugen, durchaus aus Nichts. . . . Alle Anschauung aber ist Freiheit, *ist* daher schlechthin, *weil* sie ist: absolutes Selbsterzeugen aus Nichts." (*Ibid.* II. 38, 39.)

³ "Die Wissenschaftslehre geht, wie wir soeben gesehen haben, aus von einer intellectuellen Anschauung, der absoluten Selbstthätigkeit des Ich." (*Ibid.* I. 471.) — "Ich bin diese Anschauung und schlechthin nichts weiter, und diese Anschauung selbst ist Ich." (*Ibid.* I. 529.) — "Diese intellectuelle Anschauung ist der einzige feste Standpunct für alle Philosophie." (*Ibid.* I. 466.) — "Nach Kant, nach Schulz, nach mir, gehört zu einer vollständigen Vorstellung dreierlei: das, wodurch die Vorstellung sich auf ein Object bezieht, und die Vorstellung von *Etwas* wird, und welches wir einstimmig die sinnliche Anschauung nennen (auch wenn ich selbst das Object der Vorstellung bin, ist es so; ich werde mir selbst ein Beharrliches in der Zeit); das, wodurch sie sich auf das Subject bezieht, und *meine* Vorstellung wird, und welches bei Kant und Schulz nicht Anschauung heissen soll, von mir aber, weil es zur vollständigen Vorstellung in demselben Verhältnisse steht, als die sinnliche Anschauung, so genannt wird; und endlich das, wodurch beides vereinigt, und nur in dieser Vereinigung Vorstellung wird, welches wir abermals einstimmig den Begriff nennen." (*Ibid.* I. 474.) — "Nun aber kommt diese Anschauung nie

illimitable subject, which originates or produces unconsciously within itself both terms of the conscious antithesis of (empirical) I and (empirical) Not-I — both terms being mere “accidents” in the unconscious I as “divisible substance.”¹ It is an absolute I-in-itself, which nevertheless is not a thing-in-itself, because it is not an object of experience, but is above all experience in virtue of its own free self-determination.² This I-in-itself is for

allein, als ein vollständiger Act des Bewusstseyns, vor; wie denn auch die sinnliche Anschauung nicht allein vorkommt, noch das Bewusstseyn vollendet, sondern beide müssen *begriffen* werden. Nicht aber allein dies, sondern die intellectuelle Anschauung ist auch stets mit einer *sinnlichen* verknüpft.” (*Ibid.* I. 463–464. So, also, II. 41.)

¹ “Das Ich sowohl, als das Nicht-Ich sind beides Producte ursprünglicher Handlungen des Ich, und das Bewusstseyn selbst ist ein solches Product der ersten ursprünglichen Handlung des Ich, des Setzens des Ich durch sich selbst.” (*Ibid.* I. 107). — “Die Masse dessen, was unbedingt und schlechthin gewiss ist, ist nunmehr erschöpft; und ich würde sie etwa in folgender Formel ausdrücken: *Ich setze im Ich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen*. Ueber diese Erkenntniß hinaus geht keine Philosophie; aber bis zu ihr zurückgehen soll jede gründliche Philosophie; und so wie sie es thut, wird sie Wissenschaftslehre. Alles was von nun an im Systeme des menschlichen Geistes vorkommen soll, muss sich aus dem Aufgestellten ableiten lassen.” (*Ibid.* I. 110.) — “Ich und Nicht-Ich, sowie sie durch den Begriff der gegenseitigen Einschränkung gleich- und entgegengesetzt werden, sind selbst beide etwas (Accidenzen) im Ich, als theilbarer Substanz; gesetzt durch das Ich, als absolutes unbeschränkbares Subject, dem nichts gleich ist, und nichts entgegengesetzt ist.” (*Ibid.* I. 119.) — “Ferner ist klar, dass das Ich seiner Thätigkeit in dieser Production des angeschauten, als eines solchen, sich nicht bewusst seyn könne, darum, weil sie nicht reflectirt, dem Ich nicht zugeschrieben wird. (Nur in der philosophischen Reflexion, die wir jetzt anstellen, und die wir immer sorgfältig von der gemeinen nothwendigen zu unterscheiden haben, wird sie dem Ich beigemessen.)” (*Ibid.* I. 230.) But — “Das Ich ist nur insofern, inwiefern es sich seiner bewusst ist.” (*Ibid.* I. 97.) How reconcile these two positions?

² “Nun ist gerade dieses Ich an sich das Object des Idealismus. Das Object dieses Systems kommt noch als etwas reales wirklich im Bewusstseyn vor, nicht als ein *Ding an sich*, wodurch der Idealismus aufhören würde zu seyn, was er ist, und in Dogmatismus sich verwandeln würde, aber als *Ich an sich*, nicht als Gegenstand der Erfahrung (denn es ist nicht bestimmt,

itself alone,¹ an *Anundfürsichseyn*, a universal self-consciousness which, excluding every element of human experience and every ground of human individuality, includes nothing but the colorless and characterless self-identity of a merely potential Subject-Object, a *Pure Universal I* which holds in itself, as such, no possibility of *Empirical Individual I's*. If these are known to exist, the ground of the knowledge of their existence must lie, not in reason, but in experience; and knowledge of it must have the form, not of a pure concept, but of the percept-concept.

§ 111. For, precisely as Aristotle's "first philosophy" was found, in §§ 76-78, to contain no principle of individuation in general and his psychology no principle of personal identity, so Fichte's philosophy of the I, his *Wissenschaftslehre*, which from beginning to end is completely dominated by the Aristotelian Paradox, is found to contain no principle of individuality. Constructed in accordance with that theory of universals, which suppresses the individual difference as unknowable, how could his philosophy find room anywhere for the real individual as such? The only I which it recognizes must be, of course, divested of individuality; and so we find it. Just as Aristotle opposed the pure, impersonal, and imperishable intelligence, or νοῦς, to the perishing empirical individual, or ὁ τὸς ἀνθρώπος, — just as Kant opposed them as *das Bewusstsein überhaupt* and *der mit Vernunft begabte Sinnenmensch*, — so Fichte opposed them as *Ichheit* and *Individualität*, *das Ich* and *das*

sondern es wird lediglich durch mich bestimmt, und ist ohne diese Bestimmung nichts, und ist überhaupt ohne sie nicht), sondern als etwas über alle Erfahrung erhabenes. Das Object des Dogmatismus im Gegentheil gehört zu den Objecten der ersten Klasse, die lediglich durch freies Denken hervorgebracht werden; das Ding an sich ist eine blosser Erfindung, und hat gar keine Realität." (*Ibid.* I. 427-428.) Of course, this distinction is futile. The "thing" is simply a "something," a unit of existence, an *Etwas* as opposed to *Nichts*; and, if the *Ich* is *Etwas*, and not *Nichts*, the *Ich an sich* is of necessity a *Ding an sich*. See above, §§ 67, 68, 98.

¹ "*Ich bin nur für Mich: aber für Mich bin ich nothwendig.*" (*Ibid.* I. 98.)

Individuum. In each case the reason was one and the same, namely, the Aristotelian Paradox. How could it be otherwise with a theory which shuts its eyes to the endlessly rich and scientifically knowable variety exhibited by the individual specimens of a given species, treats them all as mere *ᾠμοια* or *ἀδιάφορα*, and in the species itself can discern no other intelligible reality than the immutable common essence, which, if divorced from all the individual differences of all the specimens, has no possible existence save as an empty abstraction, a definition that defines nothing real, a mere *ens rationis*? But Fichte's adoption or unconscious inheritance of this theory, with its consequent complete exclusion of individuality from his notion of the I, does not admit of doubt.

At the close of his philosophical lectures, in 1794, Fichte thus concluded a farewell address to his students (the italics are his own): —

“Earth, and heaven, and time, and space, vanish for me in this thought; and should not the individual vanish for me? I lead you not back to that! *All individuals are included in the one great unity of the pure spirit.* Let that be the last word which I commend to your remembrance, and with which I take my leave.”¹

Again, speaking confidentially to his reader, he says:

“Perhaps thou mightest have introduced into the concept of the I sundry things which I had not introduced into it; for example, the concept of thy own individuality, because this, too, is denoted by that verbal symbol. All this now is dropped; only that which comes to pass by the mere return of thy thinking upon thyself is the I of which I here speak.”²

§ 112. Still more significant are the passages in which he puts his exclusion of individuality from the notion of the Pure I into scientific form. For instance:

“The sum of that which is unconditionally and absolutely certain is now exhausted, and I would express it in the following

¹ Werke, I. 416.

² Werke, I. 523.

formula : *Within the I, I oppose to the divisible I a divisible not-I.* No philosophy travels beyond this truth ; but every well-grounded philosophy must recur to it, and, in proportion as it does this, becomes *Wissenschaftslehre*. Whatever truth is hereafter to appear in the system of the human spirit must be deducible from that formula." ¹

But thus —

" the I itself is degraded to a lower concept, that of divisibility, in order that it may be equated with the Not-I, to which, in the same concept, it is likewise opposed. Here, therefore, there is no *ascent*, as in every other synthesis, but a *descent*. Both the I and the Not-I, as they are thus equated and opposed through the concept of reciprocal limitability, are themselves something (accidents) in the I as divisible substance — posited by the I as absolute and illimitable subject, to which nothing is equal and nothing opposed. All judgments, therefore, whose logical subject is the limitable or determinable I, or anything which determines the I, must be limited or determined by something higher. All judgments, however, whose logical subject is the absolutely undeterminable I can be determined by nothing higher, because the absolute I is determined by nothing higher ; but they are unconditionally grounded and determined by themselves." ²

The meaning and intent of this somewhat bunglingly expressed distinction are on the whole sufficiently plain. Fichte is laboring to define to himself in scientific clearness the relation of the *reines Ich* to *das Individuum*, in such a way as shall meet the requirements of the Aristotelian logic, whose well-known rule of definition by genus and specific difference he has just been expounding with approval. *This individual I* : how close the truth lay to Fichte's hand, could he but have grasped it ! But he missed it. His unconscious fidelity to the Aristotelian Paradox made him as unable to grasp it as Aristotle was before him. Out of "This Individual I" he was bound to reject "This Individual," and to keep the pure "I" as its sole reality. To Fichte, the *reines Ich* is rational, uni-

¹ Werke, I. 110.

² Werke, I. 119.

versal, necessary, absolute, undeterminable, impersonal, imperishable, — in effect, *νοῦς*; while *das Individuum* is empirical, individual, accidental, relative, determinable, personal, perishable, — in effect, *ὁ τὸς ἄνθρωπος*. Within itself as “divisible substance,” the Pure I, being the *sum-mum genus* as the *Ich an sich* or original “self-returning activity,” posits the antithesis of I and Not-I, — that is, the “divisible I,” as empirical individuals, and the “divisible Not-I,” as the world of phaenomenal existence. But, for Fichte, these two cannot be subordinate *species* of a *generic* Pure I, since that relationship would give them equal validity as “things in themselves,” and thereby involve surrender to that “dogmatic philosophy,” which to Fichte, as follower of the “critical philosophy,” was altogether intolerable. Hence, this empirical I and this equally empirical Not-I, he concludes, must both stand to the Pure I in the relation of mere “accidents” (Fichte’s *Accidenzen* is the translation of Aristotle’s *τὰ συμβεβηκότα*) — mere evanescent phaenomena, non-essential to the Pure I, unreal, perishable. The individual as such, truly, must “vanish for him;” yet not without great violence to logic.

§ 113. For, if we inquire by what logical right he admits the “concept of divisibility,” not to mention that of “divisible substance,” into his concept of the Pure I as nothing whatever but “self-returning activity,” we inquire in vain. “The concept of a thinking that returns into itself, and the concept of the I, mutually exhaust each other. The I is that which posits itself, and nothing more; that which posits itself is the I, and nothing more.”¹ Surely, this pure notion of outgoing and self-returning activity admits of no conceivable division except into the outgo and the self-return; but, if these are divided into two independent acts, the unity of the *Thathandlung*, and with it the unity of the *Ichheit*, are totally abolished. Such a division should be for Fichte unthinkable; it would

¹ Werke, I. 523.

be even more ruinous than that conversion of the outgo into the self-return for which Fichte's mysterious *Anstoss* is no explanation. The "self-returning activity," as a pure universal concept, must surely be *one and indivisible*, or the unity of the *Ichheit* is destroyed and the *Wissenschaftslehre* self-exploded. By what logical warrant, then, does he divide the Pure I into a "divisible I" and a "divisible Not-I"? That these cannot be *species* within the Pure I, he clearly sees; for, since the genus enters with the specific difference into the definition of every species, the empirical individual or "divisible I" would then be a Pure I, and the empirical world of phaenomena or "divisible Not-I" would be a Pure I, too,—precisely as the tiger and the lion are each a cat. Such a result would be pure nonsense, of course. But Fichte does not help matters, when he calls his "divisible I" and "divisible Not-I," not *species*, but *accidents*: "*etwas (Accidenzen) im Ich.*" For the accident (*τὸ συμβεβηκός*) never belongs to the genus, to the species, to any universal, but solely to the individual; and to call the Empirical I an "accident" of the Pure I is not to account for it in the least, or find a logical place for it in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, but simply to degrade the Pure I itself to the rank of a mere individual, that is, to the rank of the only concept that can possibly support "accidents." Extremes meet! This is "descent" with a vengeance (*gar kein Heraufsteigen, sondern ein Herabsteigen*). The truth is that the whole philosophy of "pure thought," which begins with a rigorous exclusion of "experience" from "knowledge" and seeks the latter in "pure reason" alone, fails utterly in the endeavor to think any Real I whatsoever. How could it be otherwise with the Aristotelian Paradox for foundation? Fichte's failure is only the failure of his school, while his successes are his own.

But let us persevere in the examination of his theory as it stands. We have already seen that it excludes all individuality from the I-hood, and reduces the individual to

a mere vanishing "accident" of the Pure I. We have yet to see how he relates the I, both as empirical and as pure, to the We, and how far he effects a rational transition from one to the other, over and above that mere common-sense assumption of human plurality which he and all other idealists, with innocent and amusing gayety, everywhere make.

§ 114. Our attention is now challenged by the following long but important passage :—

" 'We can form no other notion of our person, under the concept of the I, than that of our own person in contrast with other persons,' confess other opponents of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. '*I* signifies my own determinate person, just as I am now named, Caius or Sempronius, in contrast with all others who are not so named. If I now eliminate by abstraction this individual personality, as the *Wissenschaftslehre* requires, there remains behind to me nothing which could be characterized as *I*; I might just as well name the remainder *It*.'

"What is it that this objection, advanced with so much boldness, really means to say? Does it speak of the original real synthesis of the concept of the individual (their own person and other persons), and do they intend therefore, to say: nothing is synthesized in this concept except the concept of an object in general, that is, of the *It*, and the distinction from others of its own sort, which, consequently, are likewise an *It* and nothing more? Or does it rely upon verbal usage, and do they mean to say: in language nothing is denoted by the expression *I* except individuality?

"As to the first objection: every one who is still master of his faculties must surely comprehend that, by the distinction of an object from its like, and therefore from other objects, nothing results except a *determined object*, but not at all a *determined person*. With regard to the synthesis of the concept of the person, the relation is quite otherwise. The *I-hood* (self-returning activity, subject-objectivity, or what you please) is originally opposed to the *It*, to mere objectivity; and the positing of these concepts is absolute, conditioned by no other positing,—thetic, not synthetic. To something which has been posited in this first positing as an *It*, as mere object, as something external to us, the concept of *I-hood*

which has been developed in ourselves is transferred,¹ and synthetically united with it; and first through this conditioned synthesis there arises for us a *Thou*. The concept of the *Thou* originates out of the union of the *It* and the *I*. The concept of the *I* in this opposition, therefore, as the concept of the individual, is the synthesis of the *I* with itself. In the act described, I am that which posits itself — not posits in general, but posits as *I*; and, in the same act, thou art that which is posited *by me*, and not that which is posited *by itself*, as *I*. This product of a synthesis which has to be explained can doubtless be eliminated by abstraction; for what one has himself synthesized, one should certainly be able to analyze again. That which remains behind after the abstraction is the *I* in general, that is, the Not-Object. Taken in this sense, this objection would be very absurd.

“Or do these opponents rely on verbal usage? If they were right in the assertion that the word *I* has hitherto signified in language the individual alone, would it follow, from the fact that a distinction which needs to be pointed out in the original synthesis has hitherto not been noticed and expressed in speech, that it must never be noticed and never expressed? But are they right in that assertion? Of what verbal usage may they speak?

“Of the philosophical? That Kant takes the concept of the Pure *I* in the same sense in which the *Wissenschaftslehre* takes it, I have already shown above. When it is said, ‘I am that which thinks in this thought,’ do I then oppose myself merely to other persons outside of me, or do I not rather oppose myself to every

¹ Fichte’s word for “transferred” is *übertragen*, which betrays a conscious reference to and acceptance of Kant’s theory of “transference” (*Uebertragung*), already stated and sufficiently criticised above in § 102. To the criticisms there urged, Fichte here makes no anticipatory semblance of a reply. He does not show how a mere *It*, posited absolutely by the *I*, can become a *Thou* outside of the *I* that posits it, without becoming at the same time a *Ding an sich* as well as an *Ich an sich* — for him an insufferable result: the *Thou*, compound of *It* and *I*, an *It* which becomes an *I*, is an *It in itself* and an *I* by “transference” alone. Nor does he in the least explain the miraculous process by which the “concept of the *I*” can be “transferred” into a mere *It*, so as to metamorphose it into a *Thou*; nor throw any light on the question whether it is the *pure* or the *empirical* consciousness which is “transferred.” Yet (Werke, I. 490) he tenders to us this same blind explanation of “transference” as accounting for the “Kantian empirical realism.”

particular thought? 'The principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself identical, consequently an analytical proposition,' says Kant. That means the same thing which I likewise said: the I originates through no synthesis, whose manifold one might further analyze, but through an absolute thesis. This I, however, is the I-hood in general; for the concept of individuality originates evidently through synthesis, as I have just proved, and the principle of it is a synthetical proposition. Reinhold, in his law of consciousness, speaks of the subject, in German, *vom Ich*; to be sure, merely as of the presenter or representer [*vom Vorstellenden*], but here that is nothing to the point. In distinguishing myself as representer from the represented [*vom Vorgestellten*], do I distinguish myself merely from other persons, or do I distinguish myself from everything represented, as such? Even in the case of the above lauded philosophers, who do not, like Kant and the *Wissenschaftslehre*, make the I the presupposition of the manifold of representation, but constitute it out of that, is their one thinking principle in the manifold thought the individual only, or is it not rather the intelligence in general [*νοῦς* rather than *ὁ τῆς ἀνθρώπου*]? In one word: is there indeed any philosopher of repute who, before them, has made the discovery that *I* signifies the individual only, and that, if individuality is abstracted, there remains nothing behind but an object in general?

"Or do they speak of the common verbal usage? To point out this, I am obliged to introduce examples from common life. If you call to someone in the darkness, 'Who is there?' and he gives you for answer, 'It is I,' on the supposition that his voice is known to you, it is clear that he speaks of himself as this determined person, and is to be understood as saying, 'It is I who am called so and so, and no one of all the rest who are not so called;' and this because you, in consequence of your question, 'Who is there?' already presuppose that it is some reasonable being, and now only wish to know what particular one among the possible reasonable beings it is. But if you, perhaps, — pardon me this example, which I find especially convenient, — are sewing or cutting some garment on the body of a person, and you unawares wound him, he would possibly cry out, 'Hark! that is *I*, you are hitting *me*.' What would he mean by that? Not that he is this determinate person and no other, for that you know very well; but that what you are hitting is not his dead and feelingless garment, but his living and feeling self — which you did not know. By this 'I'

he does not distinguish himself from other persons, but from things. This distinction is ever-present in life, and without it we cannot take a step on the ground or move a hand in the air.

"In short, I-hood and individuality are very different concepts, and the composite character of the latter can be very distinctly observed. By the former we oppose ourselves to everything which is outside of us, not simply to persons outside of us, and we comprehend under it not only our determined personality, but our intellectual nature in general; and so the word is used in philosophical and in ordinary language. The objection under consideration reveals, accordingly, not only an unusual want of thought, but also a great ignorance and unfamiliarity with the commonest philosophical literature. But they persist in their incapacity of thinking the concept explained to them, and we must believe their word. Not that they must needs lack the general concept of the Pure I, in the sense of mere rationality and intellectuality; for then they would cease, as much as a block of wood, to make objections to us. But it is *the concept of this concept* (*der Begriff dieses Begriffs*) which fails them, and to which they are unable to elevate themselves. Of course they have it in themselves; they simply do not know that they have it. The ground of this incapacity of theirs does not lie in any particular weakness of their thinking powers, but in a weakness of their whole character. Their I, in the sense in which they take the word, that is, their individual person, is the ultimate aim of their conduct, and consequently the limit of their distinct thought. It is for them the only true substance, and reason is only an accident of it. Their person does not exist as a particular expression of reason, but reason exists in order to help their person through the world; if their person could only be just as well off without reason, we could dispense with reason, and then there would be no reason at all. This mode of thinking betrays itself throughout the whole system of their ideas, in all their assertions, and many among them are honest enough to make no concealment of it. These are quite right in their confession of incapacity, so far as they themselves are concerned; only they must not give out for objective truth what has merely subjective validity. In the *Wissenschaftslehre* the relation is precisely the reverse: there reason is the only thing in itself [*i. e.* the *Ich an sich*], and individuality is only accidental [*accidentell*]; reason is the end, and personality the means; personality is only a particular mode of expressing reason which must

evermore lose itself in the universal form of reason itself. For the *Wissenschaftslehre*, only reason is eternal; individuality must everlastingly perish. He who shall not first of all conform his will to this order of things will also never attain to a true understanding of the *Wissenschaftslehre*.”¹

§ 115. We have let Fichte state his own case fully and at length in his own way. It remains to examine his statement.

The objection of certain unnamed opponents whom Fichte undertook to refute, although not put by him in such terms as are adapted to bring out its full force, simply because he could not escape from the Aristotelian Paradox, goes deeper than he perceived; undoubtedly deeper than his opponents themselves perceived. It raises the question of the real unity of the I in the real universality of the We, and demands such a notion of the real person as shall recognize the *independent equality* of many real persons in real human society. It means that we must have, not the “original real synthesis of the concept of the individual (their own person and other persons),” but the original synthesis of the generic unity of apperception as *I and Other-I's*, or *I in the We*, by which the I is given not as a mere “object in general” or empty “It,” but as a real specimen in a real species. It means that, “in language,” the expression I denotes, not mere “individuality,” but the identity in difference of individuality and universality, each element conditioning and conditioned by the other in the real unit-universal. It maintains that the word I, whatever else it may signify besides, must and does signify this real unity of the individual and the real independent equality of many individuals as coexistences in the We, each as *an I in its own right*; and that, if individual personality and independent equality are to be eliminated from the notion of the I, the I is evaporated into an unreality which is neither specimen nor species, a mere impersonal thing without either empirical or rational self-consciousness, a mere abstraction

¹ Zweite Einleitung, u. s. w. Werke, I. 501-505.

without other reality than that of an unconscious entity as a mere object of thought, — not *an I*, or *the I*, or *I at all*, but merely *It*.

This was the deeper meaning of the objection raised by Fichte's opponents, easily discernible even in his statement of it. But he failed to penetrate to the heart of their difficulty, much more to solve it. "The I must be a real person, at once individual and universal, in order to explain the We as many persons; if you strike out its real personality, you strike out its real I-hood and degrade it to an It." This was the pith of the objection, however stammeringly articulated. What was the pith of his reply? "The I cannot be a real person, because it must be a pure universal, and not an individual at all; the universal I [$\tau\acute{o}$ εἶδος $\tau\acute{o}$ ἐνόν] which is immanent or inherent in the individual I is alone real; the individual I [$\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma + \upsilon\lambda\eta = \acute{o}$ τὸς ἄνθρωπος] is a mere vanishing accident [$\sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\epsilon\beta\eta\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$] of the universal I; the person as such perishes, but leaves behind the universal, impersonal, and imperishable Pure I [$\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$], of which it is only a transitory and brief expression. The concept of the individual is that of the empirical I, as opposed to the empirical Thou. But the Thou is a mere compound of the I and the It; for, to some It in the phaenomenal world of Its, the empirical I transfers its own concept of I-hood, and thus clothes it as an empirical Thou, an It which appears as another I. But the I which posits this compound of It and I as Thou, and the I which is thus posited, are one and the same I; it is merely a synthesis of the I with itself."

Is this an answer to the real difficulty propounded? "If you strike individuality out of the individual I," say the objectors, in the true meaning of their objection, "you strike out its real I-hood, and have nothing left but an It." "On the contrary," replies Fichte, "I do strike individuality out of the individual I, and I have left the Pure I; and the Pure I is not an It." Clearly, the difficulty is not met, unless the real I-hood and the Pure I are one and the same

— which is not the case, unless the Pure I is self-conscious. What distinguishes the I from the It is the presence or absence of *self-consciousness*: whatever has self-consciousness is an I, whatever lacks self-consciousness is an It. No other distinction between the two has ever been suggested, so far as we know; and Fichte himself unqualifiedly approves it, when he says that “the I exists so far only as it is conscious to itself of itself.”¹ But, if the distinction holds, Fichte’s objectors are in the right, and his answer to their objection has said nothing whatever to put them in the wrong. He does not at all answer them until he proves that *the Pure I is conscious as such*; but this he does not even try to prove. So far from this, they can prove to him out of his own mouth that, when he strikes individuality out of the individual I, the residuum which he so jealously guards as a *Pure I* is, by his own principles, *unconscious*, and therefore nothing but a *Pure It*. To show this, we must quote another passage.

§ 116. “The first question would be, ‘How is the I for itself?’ and the first postulate, ‘Think thyself, construct the concept of thyself, and notice how thou doest it.’

“Every one who only does this, maintains the philosopher, will find that, in the thinking of that concept, his activity as intelligence goes back into itself, makes itself its own object. . . .

“In the first place, what in the act described belongs to the philosopher as such, and what to the I which is to be observed by him? To the I, nothing more than the turning-back into itself; all else belongs to the relation between it and the philosopher, for whom already exists, as mere fact, that system of completed experience which is to be brought under his gaze by the I, in order that he may learn to know the manner of its origination.

“The I goes back *into itself*, — that is maintained. Does it not then, already exist for itself before this going back, and independently of it? Must it not already exist for itself, in order to be able to make itself the goal of an action? If this is so, does not your philosophy take for granted what it ought to explain?

¹ “Das Ich ist nur insofern, inwiefern es sich seiner bewusst ist.” (Werke, I. 97.)

"I answer: not at all. First by this act, and by it alone, by an action on an action, which particular action no action in general precedes, does the I *originate* for itself. Only *for the philosopher* does it pre-exist as a fact, because he has already passed through the whole experience. He must express himself as he does, simply in order to be understood; and he can express himself so, because he has already long ago formed all the requisite concepts.

"What, then, considering first of all the observed I, is this its going back into itself? Under what class of the modifications of consciousness should it be put? It is not *conception* [*kein Begreifen*]; this originates through the opposition of a Not-I, and through the determination of the I in that opposition. Consequently, it is a mere *intuition* [*eine blosse Anschauung*]. For these reasons, also, it is not consciousness, certainly not self-consciousness [*kein Bewusstsein, nicht einmal Selbstbewusstsein*]. Solely because no consciousness comes to pass through this simple act [of going back or self-return], another act is inferred by which a Not-I arises for us; solely by that other act does a progress of philosophical reasoning and the required deduction of the system of experience become possible. By the act described, the I is advanced merely to the possibility of self-consciousness, and with it of all other consciousness, but there arises yet no real consciousness [*kein wirkliches Bewusstsein*]. The act in question is simply a part of that whole procedure of the intelligence by which it brings about its consciousness—a part to be isolated by the philosopher alone, but originally not isolated.

"On the other hand, how is it with the philosopher? That self-constructing I is no other than his own [*jenes sich selbst konstruierende Ich ist kein anderes, als sein eigenes*]. Only in himself can he intuit the act of the I in question, and, in order to be able to intuit it, he must perform it. He produces it in himself voluntarily and with freedom."¹

§ 117. Here, pointed out and elaborated by Fichte himself with singular precision, we learn the essential distinction he draws between *das Ich* and *das Individuum*, the Pure I and the Real I. Nothing whatever belongs to the Pure I, he says, beyond "the return into itself" of an activity which is absolutely spontaneous and underived, and

¹ Werke, I. 458-460.

whose alleged origin is a mere recoil on itself as "an action on an action" — a "determinate action" which is absolutely unconditioned by any "action in general" prior to itself — an action, therefore, which is confessedly unparalleled elsewhere, a unit of no universal, a thing of no kind, and for that reason a pure impossibility in being as well as in thought. It could not even appear in Fichte's system as a metaphysical entity, unless, unrecognized by him, his own mind had necessarily supplied *motion* as the universal conditioning activity of which both the outgo and the self-return of *das Ich* must be thought as two particular and differently determined units; for only as such can the "self-returning activity" itself be thought at all. But (waiving this point) the "self-returning activity" is determined further in itself as a "mere intuition:" not a "concept," and therefore not a cognition,¹ not a "self-consciousness," not a "real consciousness" at all. That is to say, the Pure I, if once divorced from the individuality or personality which is only its non-essential and perishing "accident," is not in itself even a "subject-object," does not know itself, is not conscious of itself, *is in itself unconscious*, and therefore, by Fichte's own declaration that "the I exists in so far only as it is conscious to itself of itself,"² not an existent *I* at all, but only an existent *It*. When, therefore, he strikes out of *das Ich* the individuality or personality which, by his own showing, is the ground of its only possible self-consciousness, he himself reduces *das Ich* to *das Es*, and establishes the truth of the very objection which he has vainly tried to refute.

But this is not all. Not only does Fichte prove, however much against his will and intent, that the Pure I divested of individuality is nothing whatever but a Pure It, but he also proves that the individual as such is the only Real I — that

¹ "Eine blossе Anschauung giebt kein Bewusstseyn; man weiss nur von demjenigen, was man begreift und denkt." (Werke, I. 491.)

² "Das Ich ist nur insofern, inwiefern es sich seiner bewusst ist." (*Ibid.* I. 97.)

the Pure I becomes a Real I only by becoming individualized. His "philosopher as such" is only *das Individuum*, only an individual who has fitted himself to philosophize; and Fichte, as we have seen, teaches that, in the philosopher, "the I which constructs itself is no other than his own." In other words, the I becomes real solely by becoming an individual; the "mere intuition" of "self-returning activity" which constitutes the whole being of the Pure I as such, and without which the Pure I itself would vanish, is conditioned on the *philosopher's own individual or personal intuition*, an intuitive act which the philosopher as an individual or person must perform, and does perform "voluntarily and with freedom," that is, with free self-conscious volition. It is strange that Fichte should not have perceived the real bearing and import of these determinations. They do not show, nor tend to show, that *das Individuum* is a mere "accident" of *das Ich*, and that the *Ichheit* is absolutely independent of and separable from the *Individualität*: on the contrary, they show that *das Ich* is nothing but an inalienable intuition, a "voluntary and free" act, of *das Individuum*, and that the *Ichheit* and the *Individualität* inseparably depend on each other. If the individual must vanish, the I-hood which is nothing but *his own intuition* of "self-returning activity" in himself must vanish with him, and nothing of the I would remain in being, not even an It. If, in order to attain reality, the I must construct itself in the philosopher, not as such, but as an individual merely, then the individual is just as necessary to the I as the I is to the individual; the universal and the individual must reciprocally condition each other in the unit-universal, as Real I; and *das Ich* can never survive *das Individuum*. These conclusions lie in Fichte's own premises, which he has failed to handle logically. The logical result of his own determinations would simply confirm the results above arrived at in § 59: namely, that the only Real I, real in any other sense than that of a barren abstraction in speculative metaphysics, is the real

individual, the real person as such, and that the scientific-philosophic concept of the real person as such can be nothing whatever but the percept-concept: "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We." When Fichte, therefore, strikes *Individualität* out of his *Ichheit*, and *das Individuum* out of his *das Ich*, instead of retaining *das Ich* as a reality, he annihilates the reality of both, and retains *das Ich* solely as a barren abstraction, a mere object of thought, a mere "entity of reason," *das Es*, — which is precisely what his opponents charged him with doing, in the objection which he failed to refute. "I think myself," Fichte says, "and that pure self-returning activity is the real whole of my Pure I." "Not so," might his opponents reply; "you do not and cannot think yourself at all, unless you think yourself (1) as in each and all of your conscious states, and (2) as One of the We. The first gives you your internal empirical multiplicity or universality; the second gives you your external individuality and rational unity; both together give you your whole reality as a unit-universal, or possible object of knowledge. And you cannot be an object of knowledge, even to yourself, until you think and know yourself as you are in yourself — a unit-universal. Your Pure I or *das Ich* is a blank potentiality of self-consciousness, at the most a blank condition of it, a mere abstract and unreal It, unless it is complemented with your Empirical I or *das Individuum*. It is the inseparable and conditioning *union* of the two concepts that must constitute your concept of yourself as a Real I, empirical and rational at once, and solely as such, by your own confession, self-conscious or capable of self-consciousness." What effective rejoinder could Fichte make to this reply?

§ 118. By Fichte's own principles of reasoning, it thus becomes clear that the Pure I retains and can retain no reality whatever, that is, no real self-consciousness, when individuality has "vanished." The I can be real only as the identity in difference of individuality and universality.

When Fichte made his epochal protest against Kant's "separation" of subject and object in self-consciousness, he in effect proclaimed the doctrine of their identity in difference as Subject-Object; by parity of reasoning, he ought to have protested against his "own separation" of the Pure I and the Empirical I, and proclaimed the doctrine of their identity in difference as the Real I. But he did not. The consequence of this inconsequence shows itself in his amazing theory of the origin of *das Ich*. For he makes this origin an absolute miracle, the absolute self-creation of something out of nothing.

This theory lies in a nutshell. It is all condensed into the sentence already quoted: "First by this act, and by it alone, by an action on an action, which particular action no action in general precedes, does the I *originate* for itself."¹ No Being (*Seyn*) other than that of the self-returning activity itself, as "mere intuition," conditions this self-originate act; no universal activity conditions it as a particular act; no prior act whatever conditions it; it is absolutely unconditioned, absolutely spontaneous, absolutely first and sole of its kind; it is something self-born out of nothing. Such a definition defines no concept. It is simply unthinkable. "*De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.*"

Yet there is in it an element of necessary truth. In any thinking of that which evolves, room must be found for the concept of spontaneity, self-adaptation, or self-determination. In the succession of stages or phases which together constitute the universal evolution-series, each is an individual unit and as such necessarily unique (see §§ 81-83); and spontaneity is simply the origination of this uniqueness, the becoming of the individual difference, the emergence of the unique unit out of the self-particularizing universal. The universal is itself conditioned by this necessity of self-

¹ "Erst durch diesen Act, und lediglich durch ihn, durch ein Handeln auf ein Handeln selbst, welchem bestimmten Handeln kein Handeln überhaupt vorhergeht, wird das Ich *ursprünglich* für sich selbst." (Werke, I. 459.)

particularization, that is, it can be a universal only as a universal of units; and the unit is conditioned by the necessity of origination out of, yet still within, its own universal. The evolution-process is thus necessarily the identity in difference of continuity and discontinuity, of heredity and spontaneity; and these two essential elements or moments must enter into the origin of every unit out of, yet still within, its universal.

Fichte's theory of the origin of the I, therefore, is fundamentally untrue, not because it recognizes the element of spontaneity, but because it does not recognize the element of heredity. He absolutely severs the I from the We — makes the unit originate in itself alone, and not at all in its universal (*absolutes Selbsterzeugen aus Nichts*). He absolutely fails to see that every Real I *inherits its capacity* of intuiting its own self-returning activity because it pre-existed in the Real We as a Potential I, and that its actual origination, its becoming in Space and Time, is its evolutionary passage from potentiality to reality. He fails to see that the spontaneous and real *act of the I*, in its "quicken- ing" or embryonic self-consciousness as Subject-Object, is conditioned by that generative *act of the We*, as the universal, by which the capacity of self-consciousness is hereditarily transmitted to the new I, as the unit. Contrary to Fichte's statement, the "particular action" of *self-intuition* must be preceded by the "action in general" of *generation*, by which the I itself, as a unit, originates out of, yet still within, the We, as its universal. His merely speculative explanation of the origin of the I, founded on suppression of individuality or the individual difference, as required by the Aristotelian Paradox, lands us in miracle; while the scientific explanation of it by the law of unit-universals is completely in accord with experience and reason alike. Thus the Pure I, as a something self-originated out of nothing, reduces itself to the Miraculous I.

§ 119. From the Pure I, therefore, as the "absolutely undeterminable" or "absolute and illimitable subject to

which nothing is equal and nothing opposed," it is evident that there can be in Fichte's system no rational transition whatever to the We. In severing the I from the We, he severs the We from the I. The Pure I, as he has said above, posits within itself, as divisible substance, a divisible I and a divisible Not-I, but only as mere "accidents." But the Pure I cannot be held to have any rational relation to either one or the other of these, when it is remembered that "accident" belongs to no genus, no species, no universal as such, but only to the individual, and that Fichte excludes all individuality from the Pure I. The species produces the specimen, and the specimen produces the accident; the species can no more produce the accident than a grandfather can beget his grandson. Even if we should grant that the "divisible" I is equivalent to the Real We as the species, the Pure I contains, and can bestow, no principle of plurality or "divisibility" whatever, least of all an "empirical" and "accidental" plurality; the Pure I and the Real We must remain for Fichte wholly alien, foreign, and heterogeneous to each other. For him, there can be no rational transition whatever from the Pure I to the Real We.

§ 120. From the Empirical I, however, may there not be for him a rational transition to the Empirical We? He has certainly made a bold attempt to effect one, as we have just seen in § 114. In the passage there translated, he attempts to deduce the Thou, and therewith the We, from the act of "transference" by which the I conceives another I through a synthesis of itself with the It, and thereby creates the Thou as I + It (*Vereinigung des Es und des Ich*). This curious and ingenious hypothesis, which is no deduction, however, but only the Gordian-knot-cutting of a problem beyond his solution, deserves to be critically examined; for it is the original foundation of the "inferential realism" which is the sole refuge of idealists who shrink from "solipsism" — that is, from the logical result of the principle that "I know only my own states of con-

sciousness," or, what means at bottom the same thing, "the immediate object of consciousness is nothing but consciousness itself."¹

It is Fichte's central and sovereign formula, as we have seen, that "the I, as divisible substance, posits within itself a divisible I and a divisible Not-I." That antithesis of I and Not-I is his explanation of the origin of real self-consciousness (§ 67). The Pure I, as mere intuition of self-returning activity, is not knowledge, because it is not at the same time conception; all real knowledge is union of intuition and conception, as Fichte himself maintains. But it follows that the Pure I is no real Subject-Object, no real self-knowledge or self-consciousness, but is in itself unconscious.

The unconscious I, then, posits within itself the conscious I and the unconscious It — a world of unconscious Its. To some one of these unconscious Its (to some *etwas* — Fichte does not explain how or why the particular selection is made) the conscious I "transfers" its own inwardly constructed concept of I-hood; and through this union of an originally unconscious It and the "transferred" concept of I-hood there first originates a Thou. This union of a "transferred" I-hood with an It, however, is only a union of the "transferring" I with itself; the "transferring I" and the "transferred I" remain still one and the same (*die Synthesis des Ich mit sich selbst*); and there results, not another I in its own right, not another I in virtue of its own inwardly constructed concept of I-hood, but merely an I by

¹ "Da diese Frage von der Einkehr in sich selbst, von der Bemerkung, dass das unmittelbare Object des Bewusstseyns doch lediglich das Bewusstseyn selbst sey, ausgeht, so kann sie von keinem anderen Seyn, als von einem Seyn für uns reden; und es wäre völlig widersinnig, sie mit der Frage nach einem Seyn ohne Beziehung auf ein Bewusstseyn für einerlei zu halten." (Werke, I. 456.) Since *my* consciousness is the only "a consciousness" of which *I* can speak with knowledge, Fichte ought in logical frankness to have confessed that *I* can speak of no other "being" than being for *me*, not "being for *us*." But this avoidance of a foe whom one cannot front is characteristic of much loose modern philosophizing.

"transference," a Thou by courtesy. The I which posits the Thou is not the Pure I which originally posited the "transferring I," but only the "transferring I" itself, the empirical individual. The Thou which is thus posited by the "transferring I," and not at all by its own "self-returning activity" or "self-intuition" as an *Ich an sich*, is a Thou which is "posited as an I *by me*, and not *by itself*" (*das in demselben Acte durch mich, und nicht durch sich selbst, als Ich gesetzte*). The only real Thou in the case, therefore, is a mere It, dressed up in the garb of I-hood by another It which happens to be an I-in-itself, and which possesses a supernumerary I-hood to spare and "transfer." Such a Thou is no I-in-itself at all; it is a puppet, a Marionette Thou, a Thou which is only a scare-crow made out of a stick and an empty coat, a mirror reflecting a form which is not in it, a shadow that is only darkness in human shape—in truth, a sham, and no true Thou whatever. Out of a million such Marionette Thou's, Fichte can make no true We whatever. His attempt at a rational transition from the Empirical I to the Empirical We remains a colossal failure.

§ 121. What, then, is the net result of Fichte's speculative philosophy of the I? The Pure I, the *Ich an sich*, is confessedly *solus ipse*; the Empirical I, or the individual as real person, leaves behind, when its individuality or personality has "vanished," nothing but the Pure I, which is still *solus ipse*; and, even while it lasts, the Empirical I has no true Thou—is itself *solus ipse*. Hence the *Wissenschaftslehre*, reduced to its ultimate terms of a Miraculous Pure I, a Solitary Empirical I, a Marionette Thou and a Marionette We, becomes thus, if held to its principle with logical rigor, *solipsism pure and simple*, however inconsistently coupled in actual presentation with that common-sense recognition of the plurality of human consciousnesses which redeems it from practical absurdity at the price of logical inconsequence. As an ostensible excuse for this recognition, and for this logical inconsequence, later forms

of idealism have abandoned Kant's and Fichte's theory of "transference," and substituted that of "inference." But the realistic "inference" remains still a purely subjective act of the inferring consciousness, confers no objective reality or independence, and lies open to precisely the same fatal criticism of yielding only a Marionette Thou. If, as Fichte formulates the principle of subjectivism, and as countless continuators have echoed it after him, "the immediate object of consciousness is nothing but consciousness itself,"¹ no "inference" whatever can confer upon the Thou an equal reality *per se*, in the same sense in which the subject I vindicates it for itself; the Thou remains still merely "*my* object," mere "being for *me*," a mere Marionette Thou. For inference is a purely rational act of conception: if it is not complemented by intuition, by experience, by real consciousness, it is not knowledge; and, unless I know you in the same sense in which I know myself, namely as an *Ich an sich*, you remain for me a mere hypothesis, a mere state of my own consciousness, a mere It which I arbitrarily clothe with I-hood, a mere Marionette Thou. The only logical escape from solipsism is by recognizing the generic unity of apperception — that act of immediate consciousness which gives the I and the Other-I in one indivisible cognition as the We, and which makes self-consciousness and race-consciousness absolutely inseparable (see §§ 59, 68, 69). Any other principle must leave you, respected reader, so far as I can acknowledge your "being for me," a mere *It in yourself* and an *I by my courtesy alone*, a mere Marionette Thou. What defeat of philosophy could be more complete? With all its acuteness, genius, and brave highmindedness, a *Wissenschaftslehre*

¹ "— das unmittelbare Object des Bewusstseyns doch lediglich das Bewusstseyn selbst sey." (Werke, I. 456.) Compare Hegel's statement of the same principle: "Das Innere der Dinge ist der *Gedanke* oder Begriff derselben. Indem das Bewusstsein das Innere zum Gegenstande hat, hat es den Gedanken oder eben so sehr seine eigene Reflexion oder Form, somit überhaupt sich zum Gegenstande." (Werke, XVIII. 84.)

which loses its Pure I in a mere unconscious It, resolves its Empirical I into a mere "accident" of this It, and finds no *rôle* for the Thou and the We save that of dancing marionettes, can hardly be considered a final philosophy of the I. Its failure, however, is at last only the failure of the Aristotelian Paradox, and so only one more illustration of the necessity of a reformed theory of universals.

CHAPTER XI

THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL: THE HEGELIAN PARADOX

§ 122. Hegel's notion of the I is substantially the same as Fichte's. This it could not fail to be, since both of these great thinkers derive it from a common source in that general theory of the relation between the universal and the individual which we have designated as the Aristotelian Paradox (§ 78, VI). But Hegel's application of this theory to the supreme problem of philosophy, determination of the I, the We, and their mutual relation, led him to a culminating formula which, if not for truth, certainly for boldness, subtilty, and logical precision, has never been surpassed in the history of speculation: "*Ich das Wir, und Wir das Ich ist.*"¹ That is, the I is the We; the We is the I; the two are absolutely one; as essences, and as concepts of essence, there is absolutely no difference between them. That is Hegel's doctrine of doctrines, as we are now to explain.

To Aristotle, the conceptual relation of the universal and the individual, despite his helpless and bewildered reservation as to mere number ($\tau\acute{o} \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{\omega}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu$), is that of absolute identity without difference. Whether with regard to reality or to conceptual intelligibility, to Being or to Thought, the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon \tau\iota$ and the $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma \tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ are identical; the addition of matter as mere potentiality to the universal, by which the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon \tau\iota$ is conceived as $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma + \acute{\upsilon}\lambda\eta$, $\tau\acute{o} \sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\lambda\omicron\nu$, $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\kappa \tau\acute{o}\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega\nu$, or $\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}$ in the sense of *substance*, adds nothing that is either real or intelligible to the $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma \tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$, or $\omicron\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}$ in the sense of *essence*. For $\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\eta$ as pure potentiality is unreal and unintelligible, and so are the individual difference, individual

¹ *Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. 139.*

form, individual concept, and individual definition, which even if Aristotle had room for these, could have, as Zeller shows, no ground whatever except ἄλη alone (§ 78). From these rational determinations, which Aristotle strove in vain to reconcile either with themselves or with the facts of experience, resulted the principles (1) of the absolute conceptual indifference of species and specimen at one time, and (2) of the absolute conceptual identity, or invariability, of species at all times: principles which ruled the philosophic world, and even the scientific world, until the advent of Darwin. For numerical difference alone, by which Aristotle strove to differentiate the single thing as a whole (τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἐν) from other single things, the τόδε τι from τάδε τινά, is empirical merely, not rational, an affair of αἴσθησις, not ἐπιστήμη, and so contributes nothing to the conceptual content of the universal essence (τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι). In other words, the Aristotelian Paradox culminates in the principle of the absolute conceptual indifference of the individual and the universal, the specimen and the species, because particulars are unknowable (τὰ δὲ καθ' ἑκάστων ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν). This principle never found a more perfect expression, in its highest and most important particular application, than in Hegel's doctrine of the absolute conceptual indifference of the I and the We. This doctrine, however, is in the highest degree paradoxical, because (1) it completely suppresses those particulars or individual differences which distinguish one I from another I, and both from the We, and (2) it completely suppresses that universal constitution as an organism of persons which distinguishes the We from every I, and from every other organism. Hence, as a direct outgrowth of the Aristotelian Paradox, it may be fittingly designated as the Hegelian Paradox: "*Ich, das Wir, und Wir das Ich ist.*" It was certainly never outdone in epigrammatic audacity except by the kindred political paradox of Louis XIV: "*L'État c'est moi.*"

§ 123. It is true that, in the more than two millenniums

between Aristotle and Hegel, the concept-philosophy which finds all truth in the pure concept (*λόγος*, *notio*, *Begriff*) passed through numerous changes; but the Aristotelian Paradox which is its life survived unchanged. From beginning to end, the Greek philosophy was realism, uncritical realism. Plato's "idealism" had nothing in common with what passes under that name in modern times; his "ideas" (*ιδέα*, *εἶδος*), were not mere thoughts about things, but pure universals as things in themselves, the only real things, the only realities, and Zeller explicitly and correctly declares that Plato "deduced from the Socratic requirement of conceptual knowledge a system of the most pronounced realism (*ein System des entschiedensten Realismus*)."¹ Aristotle's "forms," though no longer "separated" from "semblances," were still Plato's pure universals, still things in themselves, real objects of knowledge, real essences, and not mere thoughts about essences; Zeller correctly interprets him as teaching that "the object of the concept is the substance, and indeed, more precisely, the determined substance or peculiar essence of the things; and the concept itself is nothing except the thought of this essence (*der Gedanke dieses Wesens*)."² And so on throughout the whole of Greek speculation, even including the "Skepsis," Neo-Pythagoreanism, and Neo-Platonism. It was not until the extravagance of mediæval realism provoked the reaction of extravagant nominalism, and not until this had sobered down into the doctrine of modern conceptualism, that the concept-philosophy took the shape of "pure *a priori* knowledge" in Kant, whose fundamental tenet is that "things in themselves are unknowable" and that we "know phaenomena alone." Yet, as has been shown, Kant and Fichte adhere to the Aristotelian Paradox as firmly as Aristotle himself. The truth is that the concept-philosophy, whether it takes the form of uncritical realism or critical idealism, is not so much a theory of the

¹ Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. i. 295.

² *Ibid.* II. ii. 209.

relation of the concept to its object—as it is a theory of the relation of units and universals in the concept as such. In other words, the pith and core of the concept-philosophy is the Aristotelian Paradox itself; and Hegel, as the originator of the dialectic of the pure concept and the undoubted perfecter of the concept-philosophy, which since his day has received no higher scientific development, must be expected to be no less staunch an adherent of the Aristotelian Paradox than his great predecessors. Is this expectation warranted?

§ 124. There can be no doubt on the subject. The Aristotelian Paradox rests fundamentally on the technical distinction between “inherence” and “subsumption:” the universal *inheres in*, but is not *subsumed under*, the individual—the individual is subsumed under, but does not inhere in, the universal. Precisely so does Hegel explain the matter, and precisely so does he apply the distinction throughout his entire system. The abiding problem of Greek philosophy, indeed of all philosophy, was the mutual relation of the One and the Many, and its profoundest answer was Aristotelianism, of which the Aristotelian Paradox was the heart; and Hegel, with all the rich gains of more than two thousand years of added thought, could not essentially better that answer, because the only possible betterment lay in discovery of the knowableness of the individual difference, and thereby of the “thing in itself.” This discovery was not possible to the concept-philosophy, and so not to Hegel, because, despising perception and relying on conception alone, *reines Denken* necessarily found the individual difference and the “thing in itself” unknowable; the utmost that Hegel could do was to substitute for the unknown “thing in itself” the known “phenomenon in itself,” as having the “ground of its being” in the “universal Divine Idea”—a position which he distinguished from the Kantian “subjective idealism” as his own “absolute idealism.”¹ It was a discovery reserved for the

¹ Hegel, *Encyklopädie*, Werke, VI. 97. See below, § 192.

patient genius of Darwin, who, after Hegel's death, first conclusively proved the derivation and variability of species through the "advantageous variation" or individual difference of the specimen or isolated group of specimens as *known thing in itself*. But let Hegel speak for himself, as follows (the italics are all his own):

§ 125. "The *concept* contains the moments of individuality, particularity, and universality. *Individuality* is the negative reflection of the concept into itself, by which something is in and for itself, and in which the determinations as moments *inhere*. *Universality* is the positive, not exclusive, unity of the concept with itself, which unity contains the opposite in itself, in such a way that the unity remains at the same time indifferent towards it and undetermined by it. *Particularity* is the reference of the individuality and the universality to one another. It is the universal reduced to a determination; or, conversely, the individual raised to universality.

"The universal *subsumes* or comprehends the particular and individual under itself. The individual has the same and at the same time still more determinations than the particular and universal. The same relation obtains with the particular in respect to the universal. What holds good of the universal, therefore, holds good of the particular and individual, also; and what holds good of the particular holds good of the individual; but not conversely.

"The universal comprehends the particular and individual, just as the particular, also, comprehends the individual, *under itself*; on the other hand, the individual comprehends particularity and universality, and the particular comprehends universality, *in itself*. The universal is *wider* than particularity and individuality; on the other hand, particularity and individuality comprehends *more* in itself than the universal, which becomes again a determination through the fact that it is comprehended in individuality. The universal *inheres* in the particular and individual; on the other hand, it *subsumes* the particular and individual under itself."¹

¹ Hegel, Propädeutik, Werke, XVIII. 116, 117, 124. Cf. Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 315 ff. The former rather than the latter is quoted above, because, as a compend for instruction, it states the essential ideas in the simplest and clearest form and with the fewest words, yet such as

§ 126. This distinction between inherence and subsumption, therefore, which Hegel here carefully elaborates and everywhere applies throughout his system, is absolutely essential to the Aristotelian Paradox. The universal, as τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν is immanent or inherent in the individual, or τόδε τι, because it is the only real and only intelligible element within the individual itself, which, as individual, is the union, τὸ σύνολον, of the form and the matter, the εἶδος and the ὕλη. Hence the principle that *the universal inheres in the individual*. On the other hand, the individual, which is the only real being, or οὐσία in the sense of substance, contains not only the universal form, εἶδος or οὐσία in the sense of essence, but also the matter, or ὕλη, which is the sole ground of its individuality or individual difference; and this compound of form and matter, τὸ ἐκ τούτων or σύνολον, which of course cannot possibly inhere as a whole in merely one of its own elements, the form alone, can only be classed or “subsumed” under the form as one of its cases, instances, or exemplars. Hence the principle that *the individual is subsumed under the universal*. The combination of these two principles gives the Aristotelian Paradox as Hegel has just expounded it: *the universal inheres in, but is not subsumed under, the individual; the individual is subsumed under, but does not inhere in, the uni-* express Hegel’s adhesion to the Aristotelian Paradox with a plainness that forbids cavilling dispute. It was written for his courses in the Nürnberg Gymnasium from 1808 to 1811; and Rosenkranz says (Vorrede, XV) that “the Logic was already complete in 1808, which is very remarkable in view of Hegel’s relation to Schelling.” Further, Rosenkranz expressly declares that “Hegel remained always self-consistent in all ground-determinations of his system.” Prof. William Wallace, likewise, referring to the *Propädeutik*, says that “Hegel drew it up with great care and many revisions.” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, XI. 615, 9th ed.) Its authority as to Hegel’s opinions is unquestioned by any competent judge, and the passages cited above agree entirely with both the larger and the smaller *Logik*. Kuno Fischer says expressly: “In seiner nürnbergischen Propädeutik vertragen sich Logik und Religionslehre sehr wohl miteinander und hängen genau zusammen.” (Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Jubiläumsausgabe, VIII. 83.)

versal. A rough example would be: the apple-core inheres in the apple, but is not subsumed under it, while the apple does not inhere in the apple-core, but is subsumed under it. Or, more succinctly still, if understood as meaning the same thing: *the universal has greater extensive magnitude, and the individual greater intensive magnitude*—expressions which Hegel likewise sanctions and employs.¹

§ 127. Now this distinction between inherence and subsumption is totally transformed by the Law of Unit-Universals. By this law, the whole reality of the individual includes generic + specific + reific essence,—that is, not only all its real being as a member of its genus and species, all that it has in common with its fellow-members, but also all the real being which it does not share with them, but which is its own peculiarity, individuality, individual difference, as a thing in itself. This individual difference is its reific essence—what makes it to be itself and not another individual; and it includes, not only what makes it to be itself at this particular moment, but also what has made it to be itself from the beginning,—its origin and total evolution as a unit of existence in a universe of existences. Into its true reality enters the whole series of those miscalled “accidents” which are unintelligible in their isolation alone, but which are perfectly intelligible in their connectedness and concatenation as the elements of a real evolution; for its true reality is its total real being in Time as well as in Space.

¹ “Die Grenze des Quantums in der Form des Insichseins giebt die *intensive* Grösse, in der Form der Aeusserlichkeit die *extensive* Grösse. Es giebt aber nicht ein Intensives, das nicht auch die Form von extensivem Dasein hätte und umgekehrt.” (Werke, XVIII. 98.) That is, there can be neither a universal without its individuals nor an individual without its universal. This last statement holds good equally by the Aristotelian Paradox and by the Law of Unit-Universals, so far as the individual difference is *real*, but it is nullified by the former so far as the individual difference is held to be *unintelligible*. This is the fatal error of *reines Denken*, which is founded on the assumption that Reason can survive when separated from Experience.

If this total real being of the "thing in itself," not as an enigmatical $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ or pseudo-individual, which is unknowable in its individuality and knowable solely through its immanent universality, but rather as a real unit-universal which is knowable in both its aspects, though never exhaustively so by our actual powers of perception and conception (§ 93), had been understood by Aristotle to be the only real *object* of scientific knowledge,—and if, instead of the pure concept, the percept-concept had been understood to be the only real *form* of scientific knowledge,—the whole history of philosophy would have to be rewritten. For then it would have been seen that the individual difference is essential to the whole reality of the individual specimen, and that the whole reality of all its individual specimens, including both their universality and their individuality, is essential to the whole reality of the universal species; that the whole reality of all the species, as higher individuals, is essential to the whole reality of the universal genus; and so on to the *genus generum*, the universe as a unit. In other words, it would have been seen that *the individual inheres wholly in the universal, but the universal inheres only partly in the individual*—just as the leaf inheres wholly in the tree, but the tree inheres only partly in the leaf.

Under this principle alone, which belongs to the Apriori of Being or ultimate condition of existence, and for that reason to the Apriori of Thought and the Apriori of Knowledge (§§ 98, 99), is it possible to explain the derivation and the variation of species. The Darwinian revolution in the conception of the species, by which the species ceases to consist solely of the *sum of the characters common to all the specimens* ($\tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu\acute{o}\nu$), real nowhere except as *inherent within the larger individuality of each specimen*, ($\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$), and consists, instead, of *all the specimens themselves*, as grouped and linked in their evolutionary reality, and therefore as *inherent in the species itself*,—this revolution is an accomplished fact, final and irreversible. But it necessi-

tates a deeper and wider revolution in the conception of the concept itself (*Begriff des Begriffs*), by which the concept ceases to be rational universality *minus* empirical individuality (*reiner Begriff, Begriff ohne Anschauung*), and becomes rational universality *plus* empirical individuality, percept-concept of the unit-universal, inseparable and mutually conditioning union of *Begriff* and *Anschauung* in every real or possible cognition.

But this is complete dissipation of the dream of *reines Denken*, complete overthrow of the *Begriffsphilosophie*, complete abandonment of the effort to separate reason and experience, complete establishment of their inseparability or necessary identity in difference, complete abolition of the superstition of "pure knowledge *a priori*." And this deeper and wider revolution necessarily follows from correction of the Aristotelian Paradox in its doctrine of *inherence*, as just explained. The truth of the matter will be then stated: *the whole universal neither inheres in, nor is subsumed under, an individual, but does inhere in all the individuals; the whole individual both inheres in, and is subsumed under, the universal; the whole universal has both greater extensive and greater intensive magnitude than the whole individual.* But it still remains true, and as important as true, that *the universal inheres in each individual to the full extent that the individual can contain it*; for the total extension of the universal is the total extension of all its units taken together, while the total intension of the universal is not only the sum of the intensions of all its units, but also its own intension, transcending all these, as their universal origin, medium, and sphere of being. It is this higher intension of its own which unifies it as an individual of a higher universal, and at the same time makes it the productive source of new individuals within itself. That is, just as every cell in an organism is completely individualized as a cell, yet lives its cell-life from and within the organism alone, while the organism is more than the mere aggregate of its cells, and lives a universal yet unitary

life of its own, over and above that of any or all of the cells as cells, out of which universal life the life of all these cells proceeds; so, in general, the universal and its units are that organic union of the One and the Many in which, once understood, contradiction ceases, the Aristotelian Paradox itself is evolved into the Law of Unit-Universals, and the Greek philosophy solves its problem in scientific or critical realism.

§ 128. To the superficial student who is misled by mere words, it may seem that Hegel carefully shuns Fichte's example of excluding *Individualität* from *Ichheit*, or individuality from the pure universal, because he includes it as one of the three essential moments of the pure notion as such. But no semblance could be more illusive. Hegel is too great a thinker not to respect the logical necessities of his own thought in a matter so vital to his system. When he tells us that "the concept contains the moments of individuality, particularity, and universality," it would require the easy credulity of the sciolist to imagine that the "individuality" which Fichte found it necessary to exclude from his Pure I would be admitted by Hegel into his Pure Concept. A modicum of cautious reflection will save us from so gross a mistake. Hegel's "individuality" is by no means the empirical individuality which all Pure Thought as such is bound to exclude, aims to exclude, and does exclude as far as it can succeed in an impossible task. On the contrary, it is that mere *numerical individuality*, that empty arithmetical unity of the τὸδε τι as τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἐν, which Aristotle himself had to recognize, even while striving to exclude all *empirical individuality* as the "unknowable accidents" or individual difference. So much individuality as this Hegel was likewise compelled to recognize, since without it universality and particularity would lose all conceptual content whatever, even as "moments," and the Pure Concept would become a blank vacuity as No Concept. That even numerical individuality must be in truth empirical (since the mere unit as such can only be perceived, not

understood), is what neither Aristotle nor Hegel would admit, and we waive that point for the present, in order to do justice to their doctrine as it stands.

The individuality, therefore, which Hegel makes one of the three essential moments of the Pure Concept, is not empirical individuality at all, but pure or numerical individuality — such individuality as Aristotle concedes to the *τόδε τι* as merely *τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἔν*, and such as none the less requires suppression of the empirical individuality as unknowable *συμβεβηκότα* in the *τὸ καθ' ἑκάστων*. This is no mere inference or surmise, but the unmistakable and undeniable meaning of Hegel himself, transparently clear to all who have followed the discussion thus far, as, for example, in this most instructive and lucid passage: —

“The universal of the concept is not merely a something-in-common, in opposition to which the particular subsists independently for itself, but rather that which particularizes (specifies) itself, and, in its other, abides by itself in undisturbed clearness. It is of the highest importance, as well for the interests of science as also for our practical conduct, that the mere something-in-common should not be confounded with the really all-common, the universal.”¹

Two things are worthy of special attention here.

1. Hegel's *Begriff* is essentially equivalent to Fichte's *reines Ich* — pure self-returning and self-determining activity, which posits within itself both the divisible I and the divisible Not-I. But Hegel goes into the matter far more deeply. The *Begriff* is not a mere abstraction of thought, an abstract class essence set over against the particulars

¹ “Nun aber ist das Allgemeine des Begriffs nicht bloss ein Gemeinschaftliches, welchem gegenüber das Besondere seinen Bestand für sich hat, sondern vielmehr das sich selbst Besondernde (Specificirende) und in seinem Anderen, in ungetrübter Klarheit bei sich selbst Bleibende. Es ist von der grössten Wichtigkeit, sowohl für das Erkennen als auch für unser praktisches Verhalten, dass das bloss Gemeinschaftliche nicht mit dem wahrhaft Allgemeinen, dem Universellen, verwechselt wird.” (Encyclopädie, Werke, VI. 321.)

from which it is abstracted and which in no degree depend upon it, but rather the original, universal, and self-determining activity which produces them out of itself, particularizes or "specifies" itself in them, and still remains itself, entire, unchanged, and unchangeable, in these its others as merely numerical individuals.¹ This is Aristotle's essential form (εἶδος) which realizes itself out of pure potentiality (ὑλη) in the real units of existence (τόδε τι, τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἔν), in which it still remains, entire, unchanged, and unchangeable, as the universal which is immanent or inherent in the individual (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν). Who can fail to recognize in this passage, although in new technical terms, every essential feature of the Aristotelian Paradox, without the addition of a single really new feature?

2. Hegel's *das Allgemeine des Begriffs*, or pure universality as a moment of the pure concept, is "that which particularizes or specifies itself (*das sich selbst Besondernde, Specificirende*), and, in its other, abides by itself in undisturbed clearness." In other words, it is the *self-determining species as a universal*, which multiplies itself, particularizes or evolves the many out of itself as the one, projects itself out of itself in pure numerical otherness, yet without taking on a single new conceptual determination, and so remains conceptually identical with itself in all its numerical others, namely, its multitudinous *specimens as individuals*. Here, then, we have, in all its length and breadth and explicitness, Aristotle's general doctrine of pure numerical individuality, or the conceptual indifference of the species and the specimen. Hegel is so conscious of this that he himself calls attention to the fact by inserting the explanatory Aristotelian word *Specificirende*, with its manifest allusion to the specific or species-making

¹ "Das Einzelne ist dasselbe, was das Wirkliche ist, nur dass jenes aus dem Begriffe hervorgegangen, somit als Allgemeines als die negative Identität mit sich *gesetzt* ist. . . . Jedes Moment des Begriffs ist selbst der ganze Begriff, aber die Einzelheit, das Subjekt, ist der als Totalität *gesetzte* Begriff." (Werke, VI. 320.)

difference, διαφορά ἐδοποιός. The species, out of itself as its own ὅλη, multiplies or particularizes itself in its own specimens, but remains, nevertheless, in absolute conceptual identity or self-equality with each and every one of them, since mere numerical difference or empty individuality adds no conceptual determination of any sort to either species or specimen. To be sure, no such relation obtains between the species and the genus, for the universal as genus multiplies or particularizes itself into many species, but does *not*, in these others, “abide by itself in undisturbed clearness.” Quite the contrary: it makes each of these species a real other, and not a merely numerical other, by adding to it a unique specific difference which is, in truth, the individual difference of the species as a higher individual, and this *individualizing* difference of the species destroys utterly the conceptual indifference of the species and the genus. Here the doctrine gives to itself a self-destructive scorpion-sting. But Hegel could not rise above the mistakes of his master, or see that the only way really to specialize the species or to individualize the individual is through a real and intelligible difference — empirical, therefore, and not merely numerical; in other words, that his supposedly pure numerical difference is either empirical difference or else no difference at all. It required the unconscious but potent aid of a Darwin to reform the Aristotelian Paradox by vindicating the reality and the scientific intelligibility of the empirical individual difference. Meanwhile it remains clear as noonday that the Aristotelian Paradox, with its principle of the conceptual indifference of the species and the specimen,¹ is the only possible ground of the conceptual indifference of the We

¹ “Die Vielen sind aber das Eine was das Andere ist, jedes ist Eins oder auch Eins der Vielen; sie sind daher eins und dasselbe.” (Encyclopädie, Werke, VI. 192. Cf. Prop. Werke, XVIII. 97.) It would be difficult to express more tersely the Aristotelian principle of merely numerical individuality, with its suppression of the individual difference and empirical individuality, and the resultant identity of every specimen with

and the I — that is, of the Hegelian Paradox, "*Ich, das Wir, und Wir das Ich ist.*"¹

In this bold doctrine, however, the *Begriffsphilosophie* at the same time completes itself and destroys itself. By suppressing the empirical individual difference and all empirical individuality, by construing the individuality which it retains as no more than numerical or mathematical, and by thus alone identifying the species and the specimen conceptually, it falsifies the *Begriff* as a whole because it falsifies one of its three essential moments, and through this the other two as well. It thus ends in a false concept, and a false concept of the concept (*Begriff des Begriffs, die an und für sich seyende und hiermit absolute Idee, die Idee sich selbst gegenständlich*). No wonder that Hegel, having begun with the Aristotelian Paradox, should frankly avow his final result as identical with Aristotle's (subject, therefore, to Zeller's criticisms of Aristotle in §§ 74-77): "This is the *νόησις νοήσεως* which Aristotle has already designated as the highest form of the Idea."² But the *νόησις νοήσεως* or *Begriff des Begriffs* which thus mutilates the individual by recognizing in it, as knowable or conceptual, no other individuality than that of an empty arithmetical unit (*τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἐν*), and which thus incapacitates itself for understanding either the particular or the universal, cannot possibly stand the test of examination as

every other specimen and with the species itself, so far as conceptual content is concerned. But nothing could be more untrue to the philosophy and the science which recognize the individual difference as both real and knowable. To Darwin it would be simply absurd. Hegel is dealing with the One and the Many in the pure category of number, and what he says holds good in the abstractness of pure mathematics or "pure thought;" but it is worse than futile, because fatally misleading, in dealing with the organic relations of genus, species, and specimen, of universality, particularity, and individuality, in the world of real existence.

¹ "Das 'Ich' des Philosophen ist erst eine Folge von dem 'Wir' des Biologen." (Rudolph Virchow, *Vier Reden über Leben und Kranksein*, 1862, p. 71.)

² *Encyclopädie, Werke, VI. 408.*

a scientific theory of universals. For it absolutely requires the separation of reason and experience, as the necessary condition of scientific cognition (*ἐπιστήμη*, *reines Denken*) ; whereas all scientific cognition involves their necessary identity in difference. This is the capital and incurable defect of the concept-philosophy as a mode of thinking, and it reveals itself in every movement and every provisional result of the dialectic method, no less than in its final outcome as the absolute conceptual indifference of the I and the We. For the success of any philosophy must lie in the successful *integration and differentiation* of these two in a self-harmonious concept of the *Real I in the Real We in the Real World as Absolute I* (§§ 67-73, 98).

§ 129. In what has preceded, we have shown that the conceptual indifference of the I and the We is merely one application of the broad principle of the conceptual indifference of the specimen and the species: in other words, that the Hegelian Paradox is merely a necessary consequence of the Aristotelian Paradox, as its source and ground. Here we might leave it to stand or fall with the latter, confiding in the strength of the reasons already given for reforming the Aristotelian Paradox as a general theory of universals through recognition of the knowableness of the individual difference, and for developing that time-honored theory into a truer form as the Law of Unit-Universals. But such a course would not only be unjust to Hegel, whose fuller position deserves to be stated, but would also leave in our rear difficulties which it would be foolish to underrate. Hegel's attitude towards personality and personal identity demands profound attention, and we go on to examine his chief statements respecting the nature of the I and the rational transition from the I to the We. We translate first from the *Propädeutik* because it gives with great fidelity, but in small compass, the substance of the long argument of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

§ 130. "The I intuits itself as self-consciousness, and the expression of it in its purity is $I = I$, or, I am I.¹

"This proposition of self-consciousness is empty of content. The impulse of the self-consciousness consists in realizing its own concept and giving to itself the consciousness of itself in everything. It is active, therefore, (1) in cancelling the otherness of objects of experience [*das Anderssein der Gegenstände*] and positing them as equal to itself, and (2) in alienating itself from itself and in that way giving itself objectivity and existence.² Both are one and the same activity. The becoming-determined [*Bestimmtwerden*] of the self-consciousness is at the same time its self-determining [*Selbstbestimmen*], and conversely. It produces itself as object of experience.

"In its formation or movement the self-consciousness has the three stages: (1) of desire, in so far as it is directed to other things; (2) of the relation of mastership and servanthship, in so far as it is directed to another self-consciousness which is unequal to it; (3) of the universal self-consciousness which knows itself in other self-consciousnesses, equal to them as they are equal to it.

"Both sides of the self-consciousness, the positing and the cancelling, are therefore immediately united with each other. The self-consciousness posits itself through *negation of the otherness*, and is *practical* consciousness. When, therefore, in the consciousness proper, which is also called the *theoretical*, the determinations of it and of the object change *in themselves*, this happens now through the activity of the consciousness itself, and for it. It is conscious to itself that this cancelling activity belongs to it. In the concept of self-consciousness lies the determination of the not yet realized [purely arithmetical] difference. In so far as this difference becomes distinct in it, it has the feeling of an other-being or otherness in itself, of a negation of itself, or the feeling of a want, *a need*.

"This feeling of its otherness contradicts its equality with itself. The *felt necessity* of cancelling this opposition is the *impulse*. The negation or the otherness presents itself to it as a thing which

¹ Compare Fichte's — "Ich bin diese Anschauung und schlechthin nichts weiter, und diese Anschauung selbst ist Ich" (Werke, I. 529), and — "das schlechthin gesetzte X lässt sich auch so ausdrücken: *Ich = Ich*; Ich bin Ich" (I. 94).

² Compare Fichte's — "Ich setze im Ich dem theilbaren Ich ein theilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen." (Werke, I. 110.)

is external and different from it, but which is determined by the self-consciousness (1) as a something *consonant* to the impulse, and (2) as a something *negative in itself* whose existence is to be cancelled by the self and posited in equality with it.

"The activity of desire, therefore, cancels the otherness of the object, its existence in general, and unites it with the subject, whereby the *desire* is gratified. This is accordingly conditioned (1) through an external object which subsists as its equivalent, or through the consciousness; (2) its activity produces the gratification only through cancellation of the object. The self-consciousness derives thence its *self feeling* alone.

"In desire the self-consciousness is related to itself as *individual*. It refers to a selfless [*selbstlosen*] object, which in and for itself is another than the self-consciousness. The latter attains, therefore, to its self-equality with regard to the object solely through cancellation of it. Desire is in general (1) *destructive*; (2) in the satisfaction of it, therefore, the result is only the self-feeling of the subject's existence for itself as individual, the undetermined concept of the subject combined with objectivity.

"The concept of the self-consciousness, as a subject which is at the same time objective, gives the relation that for the self-consciousness another self-consciousness exists.

"A self-consciousness which is for another is not as mere object for it, but as *its other self*. 'I' is no abstract universality in which, as such, there is no difference or determination. When 'I,' therefore, is object to the I, it is to it, on this side, as the same which it is. It intuits itself in the other.

"This self-intuition of the one in the other is (1) the abstract moment of *sameness*. (2) But each has also the determination that it appears for the other as an external object, and in so far immediate, sensuous, and *concrete existence*. (3) Each is absolutely for itself and individual towards the other, and demands also to be as such for the other, and to be taken at its worth accordingly — to intuite its own freedom as a subject which is for itself in the other, or to be *acknowledged* by it.

"In order to establish its own worth and be acknowledged as *free*, the self-consciousness must exhibit itself for another as *free from the natural existence*. This moment is as necessary as the freedom of the self-consciousness in itself. The absolute equality of the I with itself is not essentially an immediate equality, but such as accomplishes itself through annulment of the sensuous

immediacy, and thereby establishes itself for another, also, as free and independent from the sensuous. Thus it shows itself to be in agreement with its concept, and must be acknowledged because it gives to the I reality."

[Here we omit some sections which relate to the doctrine of mastership and servanthship, but not to the matter in hand.]

"The universal self-consciousness is the intuition of itself, not as a self which is particular and different from others, but as the self which exists in itself and is universal. Thus it recognizes in itself both itself and the other self-consciousnesses, and is recognized by them.

"According to this its essential universality, the self-consciousness is real only in so far as it knows its reflection in others (I know that others know me as themselves), and as pure spiritual universality belonging to the family, the fatherland, and so forth, — knows itself as *essential self*. (This self-consciousness is the foundation of all virtues, of love, honor, friendship, valor, all sacrifice, all fame, and so forth.)"

§ 131. However different may be the form of expression, Hegel's theory of the I and the We is in all essential determinations identical with Fichte's, as plainly appears in the foregoing statements. His "universal self-consciousness," or Pure I, is the self-returning and self-determining activity of pure "self-intuition," empty of all content, of all particularity or manifoldness, of all difference from others, the "universal self" which exists in and for itself as "essential self" (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνὸν in ὁ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, the νοῦς); it contains no principle of plurality or individuation other than that of mere number or pure arithmetical unity (τὸ ἀριθμῶδες), and even for this there is no more rational ground than is to be found in Aristotle. Nay, the "universal self-consciousness" does not become "real" at all, even as a bare arithmetical unit, until it "knows its reflection in another;" that is, until it has become an empirical consciousness in "the family, the fatherland, and so forth." In other words,

just as Aristotle denied reality to Plato's ideas when separated from their appearances in single things, yet conceded reality to single things themselves solely in virtue of the idea or essential universal inherent in them as individuals, — just as Fichte denied reality or self-consciousness to the Pure I, until it had “constructed itself” in the “philosopher as such” or the empirical individual in general, yet conceded reality to the individual himself solely in virtue of the abiding *Ich-heit* immanent in his vanishing *Individualität*, — precisely so does Hegel deny reality to the “self-consciousness according to this its essential universality” until it “appears for the other as an external object, and in so far immediate, sensuous, and concrete existence,” yet concede reality to this “self-consciousness for the other” only in so far as, while still immanent in this external object, it “exhibits itself for an other as free from the natural existence” — as “free and independent of the sensuous.” Thus for Hegel, no less than for Fichte, the Pure I in its purity is not a real self-consciousness at all, — is in itself and for itself alone unreal and unconscious, — is in truth not a Pure I, but a Pure It (§ 117); a Pure It, moreover, which can become a Real I solely as an Empirical I (§ 118), and which loses all its reality and relapses once more into a Pure It, when *reines Denken* separates reason and experience, suppresses the empirical individual difference, cancels the individual as such, and again resolves the “universal self-consciousness” into a *real unconsciousness*.

§ 132. In the first three paragraphs translated above in § 130, a keen eye will easily detect the essential features of Fichte's theory of the “transference” of self-consciousness, as developed out of Kant's original hint and as criticised in the last chapter. Hegel holds that the self-consciousness is impelled to realize its own conceptual essence in the form of externality, and to renew or duplicate itself in every such external form, whether in that of “the other” as “object” (Fichte's *das Es* as *das Object überhaupt*) or in

that of "the other" as "self-consciousness" (Fichte's *das Ich überhaupt, d. h. das Nicht-Object*). In either case, the subject "produces" its "other" out of itself, and necessarily encounters the impossibility of "transferring" its own self-consciousness, as already explained (§§ 102, 120).¹ To the It, or mere object, the subject attributes its own "thought, reflection, or form," as the object's only true essence or "inwardness;" it thus alienates itself from itself, cancels the object's otherness or "other-being," equates it with itself, and makes itself thereby an objective reality, either as a thought-thing or as another self, the Thou. To this Thou, Other-I, or conscious object, the subject attributes a real relationship to itself, whether as unequal (master or servant) or as equal (pure unit of universal self-consciousness). But the whole of this activity, whether positing or cancelling, is only an elaborate and complicated "transferring;" it happens within the pure subject itself,

¹ "Das Innere der Dinge ist der *Gedanke* oder Begriff derselben. Indem das Bewusstsein das Innere zum Gegenstande hat, hat es den Gedanken oder eben so sehr seine eigene Reflexion oder Form, somit überhaupt sich zum Gegenstande. . . . Der Trieb des Selbstbewusstseins besteht darin, seinen Begriff zu realisiren und in Allem sich das Bewusstsein seiner zu geben. . . . Es bringt sich selbst als Gegenstand hervor." (Werke, XVIII. 84.) These last words of Hegel are a manifest equivalent in idea to Fichte's: "Auf etwas, das in diesem ersten Setzen als ein Es, als blosses Object, als etwas ausser uns gesetzt worden, wird der in uns selbst gewordene Begriff der Ichheit übertragen, und damit synthetisch vereinigt; und durch diese bedingte Synthesis erst entsteht uns ein *Du*. Der Begriff des *Du* entsteht aus der Vereinigung des Es und des Ich." (Werke, I. 502.) For the subject can "give itself consciousness of itself in everything" solely by some mode of "transference" of that consciousness. In the *Phänomenologie*, Werke, II. 131-140, Hegel explains dialectically the mode of this "transference" in a way peculiarly his own, but not in a way to remove the impossibility of it. If the subject "produces itself as object," it matters not whether that object is an It or an I; for self-consciousness is absolutely and forever non-transferable, and can only be evolved in a new unit of existence through the generic unity of apperception. The I producing and the I produced can only be one and the same I, as Fichte saw and admitted. A new I can originate in the *We* alone.

and for itself; it cannot transcend the subject; it is nothing but the motion of the *Begriff* as pure self-determination in the sphere of pure thought, and is no warrant whatever for considering this strictly subjective dialectical process as capable of establishing valid distinctions of any sort in the carefully excluded sphere of empirical reality. The triadic dialectic movement is all within the universal self-consciousness as such, and has nothing to do with a plurality of empirical units, whether unconsciousnesses or other self-consciousnesses. When it comes to that, Hegel is as impotent as Fichte. If he is bent on recognizing the empirical plurality of I's as the We, he can only murmur something about the pure subject's "realizing its own concept and giving itself consciousness of itself in everything." But that is a mere euphuism for the fantastic doctrine of "transference," which needs no further discussion. Hegel's Thou, like Fichte's, is neither more nor less than a marionette, and his We remains still undifferentiated from his I: "*Ich, das Wir, und Wir das Ich ist.*"

§ 133. It is all in vain that, out of an evident discontent with this Kantian-Fichtian theory of "transference," Hegel seeks to find some ground of real plurality of self-consciousnesses in the pure concept of self-consciousness as such. He has expressed this concept in the first sentence of the passage quoted: "The I intuits itself as self-consciousness, and the expression of it in its purity is, $I = I$, or, I am I." Later, he says: "In the concept of self-consciousness lies the determination of the not yet realized difference. In so far as this difference becomes distinct in it, it has the feeling of an other-being or otherness in itself, of a negation of itself, or the feeling of a want, a *need*." Is this true? Does Hegel derive these elements of "feeling" (*Gefühl*), "want" (*Mangel*), "need" (*Bedürfniss*), and, as he goes on to say, "desire" (*Begierde*) and its "gratification" (*Befriedigung*), from the pure concept in its purity as *I am I*? Or rather must he derive them from that mere empirical individuality, that impure element of mere indi-

vidual experience as such, which the pure concept rigorously excludes? Hegel finds himself helpless in carrying out his dialectical development of the pure self-consciousness without introducing into it these elements of the empirical consciousness — “feeling,” “want,” “need,” “desire,” “gratification,” and so on; and it is futile to claim that these empirical elements lie already in the pure concept as the “not yet realized difference.” If the difference involves these empirical elements, it cannot be itself involved in the pure concept. One cannot have his cake, and eat it too, — not even in *reines Denken*. “Desire” and its “gratification” are no grounds of pure thought, no grounds on which to rest the deduction of a plurality of self-consciousnesses in a system which professes to unfold the purely dialectical self-evolution of the pure concept. The bare “I am I” cannot contain or involve the Other-I, the Thou, the We, even as a “not yet realized difference.”

Nor is Hegel’s other attempt more successful. “The concept of the self-consciousness,” he says, “as a subject which is at the same time objective, gives the relation that for the self-consciousness another self-consciousness exists.” This assertion is quite too bold. As Fichte proved (§ 108), Kant’s separation of the subject and object in self-consciousness is unthinkable; they are inseparable as subject-object. The very essence of self-consciousness is the identity in difference of subject and object; it is subject-object, or nothing at all. But the reality of one subject-object does not give the independent reality of another subject-object, *except in and through the We as their common universal* (generic unity of apperception). Hegel’s statement is surprisingly sophistical. The “concept of self-consciousness” is that of “a subject which is at the same time objective” — *objective to itself alone*; it is not, as Hegel here employs it, that of “a subject which is at the same time objective” — *objective to another*. Neither does it nor can it “give the relation that for the self-consciousness another self-consciousness exists,” unless it is logical to argue that, because

"A exists," therefore "B exists" — which is the impossible inference from particular to particular. How Hegel could have fallen into such an error as to find a plurality of subjects involved in "a subject which is objective" *to itself alone*, is not to be explained, in view of Kant's explicit warning against it on merely logical grounds: "That the I of apperception (for that reason in every act of thought) is a *singular*, which cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and therefore denotes a logically simple subject, lies already in the concept of thinking [*i. e.* '*ich denke*'], and is, therefore, an analytical proposition."¹ It is an error which is not in the least explained, but only deepened, by Hegel's fuller exposition of his doctrine in the *Phänomenologie*, as follows (we preserve his own italics):—

§ 134. "In life, which is the object of the desire, the *negation* is either *in an other*, namely, in the desire, or as *determinateness* in comparison with another equivalent form, or as its *inorganic universal nature*. This universal independent nature, in which the negation is as absolute, is the species (*Gattung*) as such, or as *self-consciousness*. *The self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.*

"The concept of self-consciousness is first perfected in these three moments: (a) pure indifferentiated I is its first immediate object. (b) This immediacy, however, is itself absolute mediation; it is only as annulment of the independent object, or it is desire. The satisfaction of the desire is, indeed, the reflection of the self-consciousness into itself, or the self-certainty developed (*gewordene*) into truth. (c) But the truth of the same is rather the doubled reflection, the reduplication of the self-consciousness. It is for the consciousness an object which posits in itself its other-being or the difference as an invalid one, and in this [procedure] is independent. In the process of life itself, indeed, the differentiated merely *living* form annuls its own independence, too, but ceases with its difference to be what it is; the object of the self-consciousness, however, is equally independent in this negativity of itself, and by that it is for itself species, universal fluidity in the particularity of its separation — it is living self-consciousness.

¹ Kr. d. r. Vern., Werke, III. 278.

"A *self-consciousness is for a self-consciousness*. First by this [relation] does it in fact exist; for first in this there becomes for it the unity of itself in its other-being; *I*, which is the object of its concept, is in fact not *object*; the object of desire, however, is only *independent*, for it is the universal indestructible substance, the fluid self-equal essence. Since a self-consciousness is the object, it is just as much *I* as object. With this, the concept of *the spirit* is already present for us. What further becomes for the consciousness is the experience what the spirit is, this absolute substance which, in the perfect freedom and independence of its antithesis, namely, of diverse self-consciousnesses existing for themselves, is their unity: the *I* is the *We*, and the *We* is the *I*. First in the self-consciousness, as the concept of the spirit, has the consciousness its turning-point, at which, out of the colored show of the sensuous Here and out of the empty night of the supersensuous Beyond, it advances into the spiritual day of the present."¹

§ 135. In this passage lies Hegel's attempt at a rational transition from the *I* to the *We*, through the dialectical self-evolution of the "concept of self-consciousness," the *Begriff* of the *reines Ich*. He here states its three essential "moments," that is, the essential movements, stages, or steps, in the "motion" (*Bewegung*) of its self-evolution as pure self-determination.

(a) In its pure self-position and self-intuition as $I = I$, the subject has, for its immediate object, itself as "pure undifferentiated *I*." That is, the object is empty of all difference, determination, or content; it is "the fluid self-equal essence," "the universal indestructible substance," of the *I* as such, — not an absolute vacuum, but the pure universal which implicitly contains everything in itself, or in which everything lies concealed.²

¹ *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke, II. 138-140.

² "So ist denn Ich das Allgemeine, in welchem von allem Besonderen abstrahirt ist, in welchem aber zugleich Alles verhüllet liegt. Es ist deshalb nicht die bloß abstrakte Allgemeinheit, sondern die Allgemeinheit, welche Alles in sich enthält." (*Encyklopädie*, Werke, VI. 48) — "Das erste dieser Momente ist das der mit sich identischen Allgemeinheit, gleichsam das neutrale erste Wasser, worin Alles enthalten, aber noch nichts geschieden ist. Der zweite ist dann die Besonderung dieses Allgemeinen,

(b) "Desire" of "life," discontent with the emptiness of its immediate object, impels the subject (*Trieb des Selbstbewusstseins*) to negate the object as "pure undifferentiated I."¹ But the negation of pure undifferentiation is the position of difference, and the "desire" can be "satisfied" only by positing such a difference in the I-object as shall make it reflect the I-subject. But the I-object by reflecting the I-subject becomes itself I-subject as well as I-object; it becomes another subject-object, another self-consciousness. The I has duplicated itself.

(c) The self-consciousness now negates its own negation; it negates the difference it has just posited, and again posits its own original self-certainty or unity with itself in a higher unity; it posits the truth of its own self-certainty as the doubled reflection of each in the other, the reduplication of self-consciousness. The other self-consciousness which it has posited in the object is just as independent as itself, and now posits itself, not as other-being for the first, but as being for itself; it is no longer only object, but also subject (*ebenso wohl Ich, wie Gegenstand*). The two self-consciousnesses, then, are numerically, but not conceptually, two; they are empirically or phaenomenally *two units*, but conceptually *one universal*; there is no conceptual difference between them; each unit [$\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{\omega}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$] is *pure subject-object*, no more and no less, that and that only. In this higher unity with itself (*die Einheit seiner selbst in seinem Anderssein*), the Pure I

wodurch dasselbe einen bestimmten Inhalt bekömmet. Indem dann dieser bestimmte Inhalt durch die Bethätigung des Allgemeinen gesetzt ist, so kehrt dieses durch denselben zu sich selbst zurück, und schliesst sich mit sich selbst zusammen." (*Ibid.* VI. 380.)

¹ Hegel's doctrine of Negation has been explained and criticised above, in the footnote to § 67. The "negation" of the dialectic movement does not give the vacuum (*die Leerheit*) or the pure nothing (*ein leeres Nichts, das reine Nichts*), but the nothing which is a determinate and has a content (*ist ein Bestimmtes und hat einen Inhalt*). Here not the I itself is negated, but only its undifferentiation, and the nothing of that is, of course, the difference.

becomes the unity of all the plural independent self-consciousnesses (*die Einheit verschiedener für sich seyender Selbstbewusstsein*); it is universal fluidity, with no solution of continuity in the particularity of its separateness; it is living self-consciousness, a self-consciousness for another self-consciousness. The I is the We, and the We is the I; the two are conceptually one and the same; the I = the We = the Species (*Gattung*) = the Reason (*Vernunft*) = the Spirit (*Geist*).¹

¹ Kuno Fischer, restating Hegel, enumerates the stages of the whole phaenomenological development substantially as follows: I. *Consciousness* as (1) the sensuous certainty, (2) the perceiving consciousness, (3) the understanding, and (4) the single Self; II. *Self-Consciousness* as (1) the desiring self-consciousness, (2) the recognizing self-consciousness, (3) the universal self-consciousness or the Reason, and (4) the consciousness of reason, the truth knowing itself, or the Spirit. (*Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Jubiläumsausgabe, VIII. 666-671. This volume appeared after the present chapter was written.) As to the transition from the I to the We, he says: "Among the living objects which, in fulfilment of its desire, the single self-consciousness destroys, devours, and makes away with, are also self-conscious beings; for the living thing which has the impulse to raise itself above its own existence is self-conscious. The single self-consciousness is now encountered by *another* single self-consciousness, the I by another I; their demeanor to each other in mutual *strife* and the relation of *mastership* and *servantship* leads to mutual *recognition*. This whole process in all its moments and stages is named by Hegel the *recognizing self-consciousness*. . . . Out of the relation of mastership and servantship develops itself the *recognizing self-consciousness*, the consciousness of the equality of essence between I and I. This essence, however, in which the differing I's are equal and identical, hence one and only one, is the *Reason*. Consequently, the recognizing self-consciousness has for its object and theme, no longer the single, atomic, mutually exclusive individuals, but their identity, — no longer the single I, but the We; it is no longer the individual self-consciousness, but the *universal self-consciousness*, or the Reason." (The italics are Fischer's.) In other words, Hegel, like Fichte, excludes all *Individualität* from the *Ichheit*; the We is not the correlated total reality of many I's, but merely their common identical essence, which is neither individual nor personal, the Aristotelian *εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν*; and the "universal self-consciousness" is nothing but Aristotle's impersonal *νοῦς*. Hegel's actual transition from one I to another I is wholly empirical, arbitrary, assertive, naïve, — mere echo of

This abortive attempt to effect a rational transition from the I to the We and from the We to the Absolute Spirit, is the dialectical evolution of the Hegelian Paradox. Hegel began with Fichte and now ends with Fichte: "All individuals are included in the one great Unity of the Pure Spirit."¹ Both, with Aristotle, acknowledge reality and intelligibility in the immanent universal alone (τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν), as the conceptual essence of the individual; and both, discarding the individual difference as accidental and unintelligible, concede to the individual no individuality or personality which is other than merely numerical, empirical, phaenomenal, and therefore evanescent. The pure unity of the *Ichheit* "includes," indeed, the arithmetical plurality of *Individualität*, but only to dissolve it again in itself; and the Pure I, like the νοῦς, is a "universal self-consciousness" which, containing no principle of conceptual difference or individuation, leaves the empirical individual utterly unexplained and phantasmal, and, as with Aristotle, reduces itself to a real unconsciousness, an impersonal reason, a Pure It. The dialectical evolution of the Pure I becomes thus its dialectical dissolution.

§ 136. But let us more narrowly examine the process as Hegel presents it, and inquire into its validity as a process of "pure thought."

1. In the formula of the pure self-consciousness as

common sense; while his transition from the I to the We is simply transition from the I's empirical individuality to its own rational and immanent universality — from the I as τὸδε τι to the I itself as εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν. For him, the We does not exist at all except phaenomenally; from the Real I to the Real We he makes actually no rational transition whatever; and the Hegelian Paradox shows itself as merely the Aristotelian Paradox applied. Fischer throws absolutely no light on the difficulties of either, and remains unconscious of them; hence he anticipates none of the criticisms of our present chapter.

¹ "Alle Individuen sind in der Einen grossen Einheit des reinen Geistes eingeschlossen: dies sey das letzte Wort, wodurch ich mich Ihrem Andenken empfehle; und das Andenken, zu dem ich mich Ihnen empfehle." (Fichte, Werke, I. 416.)

subject-object, $I = I$, the immediate I-object is "pure undifferentiated I." The truth of the equation itself requires, then, that the I-subject shall be likewise "pure undifferentiated I." Each is absolutely and equally empty of all difference or distinguishable content; neither contains anything but pure conceptual emptiness; neither possesses even numerical unity in itself to reflect into the other, for, if either were a numerical unit in itself, the equation would then necessarily present *two self-consciousnesses at the start*, the one subject-object would be already doubled, and the first moment of the triad would be a bald begging of the question. It would be absurd to represent the explicit "reduplication of the self-consciousness" in the third moment as an evolution from the first, if the first already contains and exhibits that explicit reduplication. Neither I-object nor I-subject, therefore, in the formula, $I = I$, is a numerical unit in itself; and neither can reflect into the other a numerical unity or numerical "otherness" which it does not possess. Hence the equation, $I = I$, as the "expression of self-consciousness in its purity," is of necessity the expression of "subject-object" as *one unit*, and not as *two units*. This was the capital truth which Fichte vindicated against Kant. But that which is so empty of all difference or content as to be in itself not even a numerical unit, not even "a something," cannot be distinguished from "nothing" (*die Leerheit, das reine Nichts*). Hence the formula of pure self-consciousness, $I = I$, is precisely equivalent to $O = O$, and what cannot be evolved out of the latter cannot be evolved out of the former. From that equation, $O = O$, not even Hegel would pretend to evolve a "reduplication of self-consciousness." The $O = O$, however, really expresses the truth that there is no such thing as "pure self-consciousness;" for all self-consciousness that is real is both rational and empirical at once, never "pure," and its true formula is "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states" (§ 59). The first moment of Hegel's triad lies, therefore, between

Scylla and Charybdis: the equation $I = I$, either postulates two self-consciousnesses at the start as coequal units, as $1 = 1$, and thereby begs the question of the "reduplication of self-consciousness," or else it is equivalent to $O = O$, and goes no farther.

2. Hegel makes his election in the former alternative; he is, of course, unconscious of begging the question, but he begs it, nevertheless. He illicitly introduces numerous empirical elements into his pure concept. That is, in the formula, $I = I$, he takes the I-subject virtually as a full-fledged empirical self-consciousness, endowed with "desire" and the power of "gratifying" it, determined in itself as a numerical unit and "certain" of itself as such, and enabled to "reflect" this its own individual unity into the I-object; further, he takes the I-object, ostensibly defined as "pure undifferentiated I," as in fact an empirical "other," another empirical self-consciousness, stout enough to resist and defeat the sublating or annulling attack of the I-subject, to maintain its own "independence," and to establish its own independent "being-for-self" by "reflecting" back into the I-subject as defiant a self-assertion as its own. Frankenstein has created his "monster." But "desire," "gratification," "reflection," "certainty," numerical unity, *Trieb*,—all these, without which the triad of moments would lack all mediation, are empirical determinations which cannot possibly exist, either in the I-object or in the I-subject, as "pure undifferentiated I." Yet Hegel is obliged to assume their presence in both, if the motion of the *Begriff* is to move at all. The result, however, is to beg the question by assuming these differences, these empirical determinations, in the "pure undifferentiated I" with which he starts.

3. On these easy terms, he arrives in the third moment at the *Verdopplung des Selbstbewusstseins*, the plurality of independent self-consciousnesses, as if the result were a pure self-determining motion of the *Begriff* in the "element of pure thought." In truth, the process is nothing

but a thinly disguised, palpably evident *petitio principii*; for it starts ostensibly with the pure self-consciousness, in fact with two empirical self-consciousnesses, and arrives ostensibly at a dialectical evolution of the two self-consciousnesses, in fact at a mere assertion of common-sense. For the plurality of independent self-conscious subjects never has been and never can be arrived at logically by arguing from I to I, — that is, from individual to individual or particular to particular; such an argument is mere volitional assumption of a desired conclusion, not a logical or even speculative process of any sort. The subject-object is one, and one only; and the attempt to elicit from it *another subject-object*, whether by dialectic triadism, transferential idealism, inferential realism, or what not, is a sorry waste of speculative ingenuity. *The I originates in the We, never in the I except through the We*: no juggler-trick of *Scheinen in Anderes, Widerschein, Verdopplung des Selbstbewusstseins*, will ever shake the inexorable necessity of that law of unit-universals. Hegel's whole dialectic process is self-bound to proceed within the charmed circle of a Pure I which is nothing but a Pure It, the Pure Notion which everlastingly falls short of the Real I; and it is no derogation from his unsurpassed speculative genius to point out that the Hegelian Paradox can have no more truth than the Aristotelian Paradox from which it is derived. So impossible is the endeavor of "thought" to be "pure," to separate experience from reason, that Hegel himself, as Trendelenburg long ago pointed out, has to reintroduce piecemeal the very experience he excludes in the lump. It is the eternal irony of error.

4. In the continued equation, the I = the We = the Species = the Reason = the Spirit, the Hegelian Paradox exhibits itself as the necessary fruition of the Aristotelian Paradox. "The object of self-consciousness," says Hegel, "is species for itself, universal fluidity in the particularity of its self-multiplication (*für sich selbst Gattung, allgemeine Flüssigkeit in der Eigenheit seiner Absonderung*). The

object in general, the object as such, the unit of existence as the unconscious thing, he has already defined in exact conformity with Aristotle: "The object [*i. e.* τὸδε τι] is determined as having (α) an absolutely accidental side [*i. e.* τὰ συμβεβηκότα grounded in $\epsilon\lambda\eta$], but also (β) an essentiality and a permanent element [*i. e.* τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν]." ¹ This "absolutely accidental side," as he goes on to explain, is the "manifoldness" of the "phaenomenon," which on its sensuous side is the object of *perception*, but on the side of its "inwardness," or essence, the object of *conception* or *understanding*; and this manifoldness of the accidents, which constitutes the empirical individuality or individual difference of the thing as a specimen in its species, is thrown out of consideration as no intelligible part of it — in perfect accordance with Aristotle's principle that "particulars are innumerable and cannot be known." What remains as intelligible is the "inwardness," the essence,

¹ "Der Gegenstand hat nunmehr die Bestimmung, (α) eine schlechthin accidentelle Seite, aber (β) auch eine Wesentlichkeit und ein Bleibendes zu haben. Das Bewusstsein, indem der Gegenstand für dasselbe diese Bestimmung hat, ist der Verstand, dem die Dinge der Wahrnehmung nur als *Erscheinungen* gelten, und der das *Innere* der Dinge betrachtet. Das Innere der Dinge ist das an ihnen, was einestheils von der Erscheinung frei ist, nämlich von ihrer *Mannigfaltigkeit*, die ein gegen sich selbst Aeusserliches ausmacht; andernteils aber das, was durch seinen Begriff darauf bezogen ist." (Werke, XVIII. 83.) — "Die Dinge überhaupt haben eine bleibende, innere Natur und ein äusserliches Daseyn. Sie leben und sterben, entstehen und vergehen; ihre Wesentlichkeit, ihre Allgemeinheit ist die Gattung, und diese ist nicht blos als ein Gemeinschaftliches aufzufassen." (Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 46.) — "*Alle Dinge* sind eine *Gattung* (ihre Bestimmung und Zweck) in einer *einzelnen* Wirklichkeit von einer *besondern* Beschaffenheit; und ihre Endlichkeit ist, dass das Besondere derselben dem Allgemeinen gemäss seyn kann oder auch nicht." (*Ibid.* VI. 344.) That is, the specimens may or may not conform to the rigidly unchangeable species, which *inheres* in each one of them as the immanent universal, but which may be defeated of its formative aim by the "absolutely accidental side" of them — that chaotic mass of *συμβεβηκότα* grounded in mere $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ which is amenable to no law or reason. This is Aristotelianism of the strictest orthodoxy, on its Antis-thenian as well as on its Platonic side (§ 79).

the essential form, the *species as such*; and this essence as the species, as the pure universal, is identical with the essence of each and every specimen, as the empty numerical individual purified from its empirical individuality. Hence results the doctrine of the absolute conceptual indifference of the species and the specimen, as a general principle in which Aristotle and Hegel are completely at one.

It is a mere matter of course, therefore, when Hegel applies this general principle to the object of self-consciousness, and absolutely identifies the I, as the essence of the specimen when purified from its phaenomenal manifoldness, with the We, as the essence of the species identically inherent in all the specimens. The principle of the Aristotelian Paradox, as inherence of the whole universal in the whole individual and subsumption of the whole individual under the whole universal (§ 126), requires inherence of the whole We in the whole I and subsumption of the whole I under the whole We, through the complete suppression of empirical individuality or real personality as necessarily inconceivable. The entire empirical self-consciousness is unintelligible, because it is the "phaenomenal manifoldness," the "absolutely accidental side," of the Real I; nothing is intelligible in it except the pure self-consciousness, the Pure I, the universal " $I = I$ " — absolutely nothing more. All of personality that is either real, knowable, or permanent, in what sphere of Being soever, lies, according to Hegel, in this pure universality divested of all real individuality, in this pure subject-object as " $I = I$;" and that is not Pure I, but Pure It.¹ On the

¹ "Ich ist das reine Fürsichseyn, worin alles Besondere negirt und aufgehoben ist, dieses Letzte, Einfache und Reine des Bewusstseins. Wir können sagen: Ich und Denken sind dasselbe, oder bestimmter: Ich ist das Denken als Denkendes." (Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 47.) — "Das Princip der Persönlickkeit aber ist die Allgemeinheit." (*Ibid.* VI. 322.) — "Ich ist nur allgemeines." (Phänomenologie, Werke, II. 78.) — "Ich ist das an und für sich Allgemeine." (Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 37.) Such an *Ich* is nothing but an *Es*, and that *Es* a mere O. The

other hand, to adopt as the formula of real personality, "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We" (§ 59), which expresses the identity in difference of universality and individuality, and conceives the I, not as pure subject-object or as "pure undifferentiated I," but as real unit-universal and real person, is to set aside, not the Hegelian Paradox alone, but the whole German ideal of "pure thought." And to do this is the imperative demand of the scientific philosophy that is soon to be.

5. Hegel's principle of the conceptual indifference of species and specimen, and the consequent indistinguishableness of the I and the We, while in complete conformity with Aristotle, is in complete non-conformity with Darwin. The great controversy over the *origin* of species which has made memorable the latter half of the nineteenth century, and which has worked a revolution in science not to be reversed, had its root in conceptions of the *nature* of species which were dimly but obstinately unlike; and out of this unlikeness must grow a controversy in philosophy which has as yet scarcely begun. When it is fairly under way, it must work a revolution in Philosophy, too, not to be reversed; for, as we see, it vitally affects the notion of personality and all that depends upon personality, and its decision must turn on the truth or untruth of the Aristotelian and Hegelian Paradoxes. Is there indeed no intelligible difference among the many specimens of one and the same species, and are they, as Aristotle and Hegel teach, conceptually indistinguishable? Is there no intelligible difference between the specimen and its species; above all, between the I and the We, as human specimen and human species? If philosophy as it now exists can discover none, so much the worse for a philosophy incompetent to its task. It is quite time for the human intellect to challenge those false identifications of species and I-object becomes a real object solely through the varied content of its individuality, of which the I-subject is the unity in that universality.

specimen, of I and We, and to prove itself capable of philosophy by equating its concepts with the realities. From the imbecilities of a *Begriffsphilosophie* which ends in such a self-defeat as the Hegelian Paradox, the acuter, profounder, and more successful philosophy of the future will turn with gratitude to Darwin, who, though not technically a philosopher, has rendered to philosophy an incalculable service by shaking the very foundations of the Aristotelian Paradox and overthrowing the despotism of an error two thousand years old,—by discovering and verifying the scientific (and therefore philosophic) value of the individual difference as the “spontaneous variation.” Through this discovery, Darwin has established for all time the new concept of species, as not merely that real common element of the many specimens which is abstractible as the scientific definition of the *class*, and which has served admirably the purposes of mere *classification*, but still more as that organic unity of all the specimens in one species which explains *genesis*, lives a real life of its own, descends from ancestral species, leaves a posterity of species yet unborn, and converts the world-wide variety of living forms into a veritable Ygdrasill, a Tree of Life. Applied in the sphere of self-consciousness, the relations are the same, and to think them out thoroughly is the problem of philosophy for the future.

§ 137. Hegel gives us an immense and futile tautology: the I is “pure self-consciousness,” the Thou is “pure self-consciousness,” the We is “pure self-consciousness,” the Species is “pure self-consciousness,” the Reason is “pure self-consciousness,” the Spirit is “pure self-consciousness” —with no elements but pure universality, pure particularity, and pure individuality, the three rarefied and sublimated moments of the *Begriff des Begriffs* which eternally repeat each other like waves of the sea in bewildering motion, and in which the only individuals are Aristotle’s ὁμοια, ἀδιάφορα, τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἔν, conceptually identical with each other and with their immanent universal, bare units as

units. This infinite monotony is the very essence of the "Absolute Spirit" itself, which Hegel thus expounds:—

"The word of reconciliation [between Evil and Good, or, as he here calls it, Duty] is the *existing* Spirit, which intuites in its opposite, in the pure self-consciousness (*das reine Wissen seiner selbst*) as absolutely independent *individuality*, the pure self-consciousness as *universal* essence,—a mutual recognition which is the *Absolute Spirit*. It enters into existence only at the apex, at which its pure self-consciousness is opposition and interchange with itself. Knowing that its *pure knowing* is the abstract *essence*, it is this knowing Good (*Pflicht*) in absolute opposition to the knowing which knows itself to be the essence as absolute *individuality* of the self. The former [*i. e.* Good] is the pure continuity of the universal, which knows that the individuality that knows itself as essence is intrinsic nothingness, the Evil. The latter [*i. e.* Evil], however, is the absolute discontinuity which knows itself absolutely in its pure One [*Eins* = τὸ ἀπὸ μὲν ἑν], and knows that universal as the unreal which is only *for others*. Both sides are refined to that purity in which no selfless existence, no negation of consciousness remains in them, but that *Good* is the consistent character of its self-consciousness, and this Evil has likewise its aim in its own independent being, and its reality in its utterance; the content of this utterance is the substance of its existence; it is the assertion of the certainty of the Spirit in itself. Both of its self-certain spirits [*i. e.* the Good and the Evil, the pure continuity of the universal and the pure discontinuity of the particular or individual, as *die wissenden reinen Begriffe*, and so as *beide ihrer selbst gewissen Geister*] have no other aim than its Pure Self, and no other reality and existence than just this Pure Self. But they are still different, and the difference is absolute, because it is posited in this element of the pure *Begriff*. It is so, moreover, not only for us, but for the *Begriffe* themselves which stand in this opposition. For these *Begriffe* are, it is true, determinate ones in reference to each other, but at the same time universals in themselves, so that they fill out the whole extent of the Self, and this Self has no other content than this determination of it, which neither goes beyond it nor falls short of it; for the one, the absolutely universal, is just as much the pure self-consciousness as is the other, the absolute discretion of individuality, and both are only this pure self-consciousness. The two determinations, there-

fore, are the knowing pure notions whose determination itself is to know immediately, or whose *relation* and opposition is the I. Through this fact, they are *for each other* these absolute opposites; it is the completely *Internal* which has thus entered into contrast with itself and into existence; they constitute the *Pure Knowing* which, by this opposition, is posited as *consciousness*. But it is not yet *self-consciousness*. This realization it has in the motion of this opposition. For this opposition itself is rather the *unbroken continuity* and *equality* of the ' $I = I$ '; and each *for itself* annuls itself in it, just through the contradiction of its pure universality, which at the same time still struggles against its equality with the other, and separates itself from it. Through this alienation, this Knowing which has cut itself in two in its existence returns into the unity of the *Self*; it is the *real I*, the universal knowing of *self* in its *absolute counterpart*, namely, in the knowing which is *in itself*, and which, on account of the purity of its separate *Insichseyn*, is itself the completely universal. The reconciling *Yes*, in which both I's cease from their opposed *existence*, is the *existence* of the reduplicated *I*, which remains therein equal to itself and in its complete alienation and opposite has the certainty of itself: it is the appearing God between them, who know themselves as the *Pure Knowing*." ¹

§ 138. It is quite possible to admire the subtilty, continuity, and power which Hegel exhibits in the handling of his conceptions, yet to see without admiration the strained artificiality of his dialectic method and the baffling sterility of its result as an interpretation of reality. Its falsity lies in the fundamental thesis of all idealism which understands itself: that "knowledge" must be "pure thought" — that consciousness can have no object but itself — that the content of the pure subject-object as " $I = I$ " is the sum of its knowledge as self-knowledge. The previous question, "Is pure thought either actual or possible?" idealism has never yet answered; for the only answer is *No*.

Hegel does the best he can with his " $I = I$," as the "expression of self-consciousness in its purity," the source of the motion of the "absolute *Begriff*," and the goal of

¹ *Phänomenologie, Werke, II.* 506-508.

this motion as "the absolute Knowing, or the Spirit knowing itself as Spirit."¹

But we saw (§ 136) that, in this formula for the pure self-consciousness as subject-object, the immediate I-object is "pure undifferentiated I," and that the truth of the equation itself requires the I-subject to be likewise "pure undifferentiated I." Now, since the numerical unit, in its most abstract or purest form, is yet *different* (1) from the *multitude* and (2) from the *fraction*, it follows that the absolute absence of difference in the "pure undifferentiated I" involves the denial or negation both of the I-object and the I-subject as a numerical unit. The I, then, is not even a pure unit of existence, a "something," but becomes absolutely indistinguishable from non-existence, or "nothing." Consequently, the equation, " $I = I$," that is, "pure undifferentiated $I =$ pure undifferentiated I," becomes simply, $O = O$. But, if the first moment of the triad thus absolutely disappears even in pure thought into the night of absolute zero, — if the attempt to think pure identity without difference is the self-annihilation of thought itself, — the triad as a whole disappears with its first moment, and nothing is left, even in pure thought, of the *Begriff des Begriffs*.

In order to escape this self-stultification, we saw that Hegel was obliged to relax the rigor of his logic, to admit at least a little difference into his "pure undifferentiated I," and to adulterate his *reines Denken* with a large percentage of *Erfahrung*. The "element of pure thought" proving to be too highly rarefied to permit respiration even to the "pure *Begriff*," he found himself unable to mediate between the "pure undifferentiated I" in the first moment and the "reduplication of self-consciousness" in the third moment without introducing various strictly empirical elements, not only numerical unity, but even "desire," "gratification," "certainty," "reflection," "impulse" or *Trieb*. With the aid of these empirical elements, he could interpret the original " $I = I$," not as $O = O$, but as $1 = 1$,

¹ *Phänomenologie*, II. 612.

and so arrive at the "reduplication of self-consciousness" as $1 + 1 = 2$. This desired conclusion, however, instead of being a dialectical development, is now seen to be nothing but a simple begging of the question; for 2, as a sum or "reduplication," is manifestly conditioned upon the presupposition of the $1 + 1$ as *already separate and numerically differentiated units*. If each of the I's is not 1 at the start, their sum will not be 2 at the end. Yet this is to relapse into that separation of subject and object in self-consciousness against which in Kant, Fichte made his memorable protest (§ 108). In the light of these criticisms, let us now examine the just translated passage on the dialectical evolution of the *Begriff* of the " $I = I$ " as *der absolute Geist*. The startling distinctness of the original dualism is apparent all through.

§ 139. The Absolute Spirit (*der absolute Geist, dieses reine Selbst, der erscheinende Gott*) is the reciprocal recognition, and in that the single self-certainty, of two Spirits as pure knowing (*beide ihrer selbst gewissen Geister, die wissenden reinen Begriffe, beide Ich*); "the I" is their "relation and opposition." The first of these two Spirits is pure self-consciousness as *Universality*, pure continuity of the universal essence as Duty or the Good. The second is pure self-consciousness as *Individuality*, absolute discontinuity of the universal essence as Nothingness or the Evil.¹ The two are absolutely different from each other, yet both are universals in themselves and interpenetrate each other;

¹ "Evil is nothing else than nonconformity of the Is to the Ought (*Unangemessenheit des Seyns zu dem Sollen*). . . . There is no evil or pain in the dead, because in inorganic nature the Notion does not contradict its own Existence, and does not abide in the Difference as at the same time its Subject. In life, and still more in the spirit, this immanent distinction is already present, and with it enters an Ought; and this negativity, subjectivity, I, freedom, are the principles of evil and of pain. Jacob Böhm conceived the I-hood as pain and grief, and as the source of nature and the spirit." (*Encyklopädie, Philosophie des Geistes, Werke, VII. ii. 364.*) That is, the I is the root of all Evil. This explains Hegel's antithesis of Universality and Individuality as that of Good and Evil.

each by itself fills out the entire circumference of the Pure Self, which has no other content than just these two interpenetrating determinations of Universality and Individuality as its own inner self-determination. Each knows the other as pure self-consciousness; but the single self-certainty of the two as one, that is, the pure self-consciousness of the Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, arises through the motion of their opposition, as first positing and then cancelling their own separateness. As both are universals, each is the whole opposition, and so annuls itself as a member of it; by which annulment the perfect unity of the $I = I$ is restored through free self-renunciation. The reconciling *Yes* in which each of the two *I*'s renounces, resigns, and sacrifices its opposed existence is the existence of the Real *I*, the One Self which is the reduplication of self-consciousness (*Daseyn des zur Zweiheit ausgedehnten Ichs, diess in seinem Daseyn entzweite Wissen, Verdopplung des Selbstbewusstseins*), or the Appearing God as pure self-consciousness of One in Two (*Ich = Ich : Ich, das Wir, und Wir das Ich ist*).

In this culmination of the Hegelian Paradox as the Absolute Spirit, which "enters into existence," but "only at the apex," and then only as a "relation," only as the *Verhältniss* of *beide Ich* as *das Ich*, we have the final answer of the Greek-German concept-philosophy to the original Greek problem of the One and the Many, the apparently irreconcilable conflict of unity and multiplicity in the universe. Pythagoras found the secret of Being in Number; Hegel finds it only in Pure Number. For, apart from certain empirical elements which have no rightful place in "pure thought," nothing but purely arithmetical or void number (which itself is empirical in the last analysis) is found in the Absolute Spirit. This will easily appear.

§ 140. Universality, particularity, and individuality are the three essential moments, the only moments, of the Pure Notion.¹ But these are pure universals abstracted from

¹ *Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 315, 320.*

experience, in which they are given only as real unit-universals, in the form of genus, species, and specimen. The real individual in the first instance is the specimen, the *filled unit of existence*, at once the real unit to its own universal species and the real universal to its own particulars or individual difference; while, in the second instance, the species itself is an individual or filled unit of a higher order, a real unit or specimen to its genus as a higher species, and a real universal to its own particulars, namely, its own included specimens with all their included individual differences. Genus, species, and specimen are the *filled units* of existence, as opposed to the desiccated or *empty units* out of which alone "pure thought" constructs the abstractions of universality, particularity, and individuality. For at the bottom of all three of these assumed "pure moments" of the "pure notion" lies, and must lie, simple *perception* of the *individual*. If the individual is absolutely extinguished in imperceptibility, conceptual individuality goes into extinction with it; hence, in order to think individuality as a moment of the *Begriff*, the individual, too, must be thought, at least as the empty unit, the unit emptied of all individual difference but number, the arithmetical or merely numerical unit as such. "Pure thought" may suppress the individual difference and reduce the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ to $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{\omega}\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu$; but this arithmetical individual it must retain, or lose the very concept of individuality. Yet the pure arithmetical unit (*das Einzelne*), just because it has been emptied of all conceptual content, cannot be conceived at all; it can only be perceived; and only as a perception, recognized or unrecognized as such, can it enter into the concept of individuality as a moment of the pure *Begriff*. Here once more is the impossibility of "pure thought" forced upon our attention; the pure unit itself, on which all three moments of the *Begriff* equally depend, turns out not to be pure, but empirical. But Hegel treats it as pure, precisely as Kant before him treated geometrical figures with their points, lines, and surfaces (which are

self-evidently mere sense-intuitions or visualizations of the sensuous-empirical imagination) as "pure intuitions" in mathematics and as elements of "pure knowledge *a priori*." Unless, therefore, the empirical but empty arithmetical unit is admitted into the *Begriff*, as the indispensable presupposition of all individuality, particularity, and universality as its moments, the *Begriff* itself vanishes. Its admission conceded and winked at, then, what are these moments in themselves?

Each of these three moments is a "pure universal," and each in turn is the whole "pure notion" itself. Pure individuality or totality is that which is common to all individuals *minus* their individual differences;¹ it is the εἶδος τὸ ἐνὸν in every τὸδε τι as such, that is, the immanent universal as empty arithmetical unity in every τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἐν. Pure particularity is that which is common to all species *minus* their specific differences. Pure universality is that which is common to all genera *minus* their generic differences. When all individual (except numerical), all specific, and all generic differences are thus discarded or abstracted from the specimen, species, and genus, nothing remains but mere relations of number, mere formal determinations as *one*, *some*, and *all*; and these determinations of pure number constitute the whole conceptual content of the three moments of Hegel's *reiner Begriff*, even in its highest form as *der absolute Geist*, which thus appears as a mere apotheosis of the multiplication table. In this way the *Begriffsphilosophie* exhibits itself as indeed the "self-returning circle" whose curve sweeps back to its starting-point, and Hegel himself appears as Pythagoras *redivivus*.

¹ "Das Einzelne ist dasselbe, was das Wirkliche ist. . . . Die Einzelheit ist aber nicht in dem Sinne nur *unmittelbarer* [*i.e.* empirical] Einzelheit zu nehmen, nach der wir von einzelnen Dingen, Menschen sprechen; diese Bestimmtheit der Einzelheit kommt erst beim Urtheile vor. Jedes Moment des Begriffs ist selbst der ganze Begriff, aber die Einzelheit, das Subjekt, ist der als Totalität *gesetzte* Begriff." (Encyclopädie, Werke, VI. 320.)

§ 141. In the ultimate interpretation of the " $I = I$ " as the notion of the notion or Absolute Spirit, the "Spirit knowing itself as Spirit," the three moments are reduced to two, particularity being evidently included under individuality. The two moments of Universality and Individuality are now treated as each in itself a Knowing I, each in itself a pure self-consciousness. The one I, or Universality, is identified with Duty or the Good, because it is *continuity* of the universal essence as pure knowing; its goodness is nothing but this continuity, this absolute undifferentiation, this pure self-identity without difference. The other I, or Individuality, is identified with Nothingness or the Evil, because it is *discontinuity* of the same universal essence; its badness is nothing but this discontinuity, this interruption or breaking up of the universal essence of pure knowing by the empty arithmetical difference of pure number; the very "reduplication of self-consciousness" is evil in itself; only the pure One is good.

In these determinations, the Aristotelian Paradox, ripened into the Hegelian Paradox, betrays its radical insufficiency in this ultimate confounding of the great ideas of Good and Evil. The true Good is the identity in difference of real universality and real individuality, as the *organic self-harmony*, not the *pure undifferentiated continuity*, of the Absolute I; and the only Evil would be the loss of either element through disharmony, disproportion, disruption, or complete extinction. But in Hegel's " $I = I$ " as Pure Universality = Pure Individuality, that is, as he himself explains the words, Good = Evil, we see the error brought to self-refutation. It brings out the essential falsity of the " $I = I$ " as "expression of self-consciousness in its purity;" for self-consciousness is not and cannot be "pure," that is, a universal without units (§§ 60, 71). The sign of equality *falsifies* self-consciousness by *separating* the universal and its units, its universality and its individuality, its rational element and its empirical element. The true expression of self-consciousness is the "I know myself

in each and all of my conscious states" (§ 59); for here the two elements are in no degree separated or even equated, but united in organic self-harmony. The unity of the organism cannot be set over against the multiplicity of the organs, whether as equal or as unequal; for each is possible only through the other, each conditions the other, and neither can be or be thought in isolation, even as member of an equation. The organic constitution is the condition of all life; the Living I must live in organic self-harmony, one in many and many in one. Hegelianism depends absolutely, however, on the truth of the equation, " $I = I$," as the essence of the *Begriff des Begriffs*; which equation here refutes itself in its equivalent equation, Good = Evil — both Good and Evil being buried in the depths of the One Divine as the Appearing God.

If further refutation were needed, it would be found in the violence of the hypostasis by which the two abstract determinations, empty arithmetical universality abstracted from the real genus or species, and empty arithmetical individuality abstracted from the real specimen, are personified as two conscious I's (*beide Ich*), and equated in the " $I = I$." It is enough to point this out, without enlarging upon it unnecessarily.

§ 142. But the absolute collapse of the Hegelian Paradox that "the I is the We, and the We is the I," lies in its loss of both I and We through its unintended reduction of both to the It. In the equation, " $I = I$," each member is made to vanish into the mere sign of equality, in the mere " $=$ " as a "*relation*." But a relation as such is not an I at all; it is neither more nor less than an It.

This reduction of the I to a "relation," and therefore to an It, is the explicit and literal teaching of Hegel's explanation of the Absolute Spirit, as already translated in § 137: "The two determinations [of universality and individuality as *beide Ich*] are the knowing pure notions, whose determination itself is to know immediately, or whose *relation* [the

italics are Hegel's] and opposition is the I." ¹ That is, "the I" is itself the mere relation of opposition between universality and individuality, as the two I's of the equation, " $I = I$." They are these absolute opposites *for each other*, but not *for themselves*; and for that very reason they are *conscious* of each other, but not *self-conscious*. It is through the inward motion of the opposition, as the self-determining activity of the *Begriff*, that self-consciousness originates in it. For the opposition itself is the indiscrete continuity and equality of the I with itself; each opposite *for itself* is the whole opposition, which contradicts, however, the universality of each; and this contradiction can be removed only by each annulling itself in the opposition, and by both thus returning to the unity of the one Pure Self, the Real I, the universal consciousness of itself in its absolute opposite, and thereby the perfectly universal Self-Knowing. The *Yes* by which the two I's thus annul themselves as opposites, abandon their *opposed existence*, and transform the opposition into reconciliation, is the *existence* of the Two I's as One I, the single self-certainty of the Appearing God.

Now, in all the bewildering complexity and subtilty of this motion of the *Begriff*, "the I" remains throughout a mere "relation" of "two I's" in the " $I = I$." If the "two I's" *abide as two*, "the I" *abides only as the " $=$."* But, if the "two I's" *disappear as two*, "the I" *disappears with the " $=$."* For the relation abides or disappears with the terms. In either case, "the I" is identical with the mere "relation" of equality, out of which no logical or speculative adroitness can educe, conjure, or coax anything more than an It. All in vain does Hegel strive to elicit a single "Pure Self" or a single "Real I" out of a "reconciling *Yes*." The relation of "mutual recognition," the relation of "opposition," the relation of "recon-

¹ "Beide Bestimmtheiten sind also die wissenden reinen Begriffe, deren Bestimmtheit selbst unmittelbar Wissen oder deren *Verhältniss* und Gegensatz das Ich ist." (Phänomenologie, Werke, II. 507.)

ciliation," — these relations, like every other relation, remain obstinately conditioned on two terms; change as they may, they cannot escape the necessity of two terms, or reduce the two to one, or evoke out of the two a third. The "reconciling *Yes*" is a brilliant coruscation of rhetoric or poetry, perhaps, but it serves no logical or speculative purpose except to mislead. For the reconciliation between the two I's is nothing but a relation of agreement between "Yes" on this side and "Yes" on that side, a mere treaty of alliance. It is not *one Yes*, but *two Yeses*, the voices of two self-consciousnesses (if mere universality and individuality may be hypostasized as *beide Ich* or *Geister*), but not the voice of one. A duet cannot become a solo. Manifestly, therefore, since there is here, by Hegel's own showing, nothing but a relation of agreement between *two Yeses* out of which to constitute "the I" as a single self-consciousness, — since "the reconciling *Yes* in which both I's abandon their opposed existence" may be the death of their own existence, but by no means the birth of another, — and since no mere relation of reconciliation, no mere relation as such, can either be or become a self-consciousness as such, — it follows that Hegel's Absolute Spirit, when so generated, is not at all an absolute I, but, on the contrary, as confessedly a mere "relation," nothing but an Absolute It. The "universality" and the "individuality" hypostasized in vain as *Geister* or *beide Ich* (disembodied ghosts of the species and the specimen), remain separate and unidentified *abstractions*; the One remains the One, and the Many remains the Many; and the modernized Greek problem remains unsolved by the "I = I" of the *Begriffsphilosophie*.

§ 143. Thus the continued equation of the Hegelian Paradox, the I = the We = the Species = the Reason = the Spirit, requires to be still further continued and completed by one additional member: the I = the We = the Species = the Reason = the Spirit = *the It*. The whole stream of personality loses itself and disappears in the limit-

less marsh of impersonality. All the endless iteration and reiteration of the magic words, "pure self-consciousness," "pure self," "pure I," ultimate in the concept of pure unconsciousness or pure selflessness as the It. In other words, "pure thought" proves itself unable to think either the I or the We; for it deliberately excludes, as merely empirical, all those unitary states of consciousness without which a really universal self-consciousness is impossible, and therefore inconceivable, and erases all conceptual distinction between the I and the We by its traditional but discredited Aristotelian principle of the conceptual indifference of the species and the specimen. It is in the Hegelian Paradox that the concept-philosophy culminates, and not in the dialectical method, as speculative deduction of pure categories and eternal self-motion of the *Begriff*; for this method is a mere mannerism, and an unscientific, unnatural, intensely artificial manner at that, while the *Begriff* itself is lost by self-extinction when its Absolute Spirit ends in an Absolute It. The supreme test of any and every philosophy lies in their ability or inability to think the I and the We *as they are in themselves and in their interrelations*; and the falsest of all possible answers is the Hegelian Paradox, confounding them as absolutely indistinguishable. Any method of which this is the necessary outcome, as final unity or identity of process and content, is self-exploded; and the famous *mot* of Louis XIV, "*L'État c'est moi*," although long antedating Hegel, was the historical self-explosion of the Hegelian Paradox. For history reduced it to absurdity in the English, American, and French Revolutions, and Hegel (notwithstanding Fischer) was justly considered the philosopher of the Restoration as Reaction.

§ 144. The supreme interest of the world, and for that reason the supreme interest of philosophy, centre alike in PERSONALITY: not on the principle that "the I is the We, and the We is the I," but on the principle that *the I is in the We, and the We is in the I*, whereby the finite I and

the infinite I are mediated by the finite We. Elsewhere we have shown that there are but three known types of real being, the machine, the organism, and the person; that the machine is known through the organism, and the organism through the person, and in no other way; that man is the identity in difference of all three in virtue of his personality; that the principle of the machine is the law of cause and effect (causality), of the organism the law of end and means (finality or teleology), and of the person the law of real and ideal (ethicality); that all three types of being are realized self-harmoniously in the person, and all three principles of being in personality as ethicality; and that personality as ethicality is thus the supreme and all-inclusive principle of real being, so far as real being is known to human thought.¹ An examination of what Hegel teaches about personality, therefore, will conclude what we have to say in this chapter. A few more short but highly representative extracts will suffice (again preserving his own italics).

(1) "*I* is only a universal, like *now*, *here*, or *this* in general. I mean, to be sure, an *individual I*; but just as little as I can say what I mean in the case of *now* or *here*, just so little can I say it in the case of *I*. When I say *this*, *here*, *now*, or an *individual*, I say *all thises*, *all heres*, *nows*, *individuals*; just so, when I say *I*, *this individual I*, I say in general *all I's*. Everybody is that which I say: *I*, *this individual I*. If this demand is imposed upon science as its test, by which it absolutely could not abide, to deduce, construct, find *a priori* (or however it may be phrased) a so-called *this thing* or a *this man*, it is reasonable that the demand should say what *this thing* or what *this I* it means; but to say this is impossible."²

(2) "Nature does not bring the *vous* to self-consciousness; man is the first to duplicate himself so as to be the universal *for* the universal. This is the case first of all when man knows himself as *I*. When I say *I*, I mean myself as this individual and completely determined person. Yet in fact I express thereby nothing

¹ The Way out of Agnosticism, Boston, 1890.

² Phänomenologie, Werke, II. 78.

particular about myself. Everybody else is *I*, too; and when I describe myself as *I*, it is true that I mean myself, this individual; yet at the same time I express something which is perfectly universal. *I* is the pure being-for-self (*Fürsichseyn*) in which every particular is negated and cancelled, — that ultimate, simple, and pure element of consciousness. We can say, *I* and Thought are the same; or, more precisely, *I* is Thought as a Thinking [*ein Denkendes* = *chose qui pense, res cogitans*]. What I have in my consciousness, that is for me. *I* is this vacuum, the receptacle for all and everything, for which all is, and which preserves all in itself. Every man is a whole world of representations which are buried in the night of the *I*. Thus *I*, then, is the universal in which there is abstraction from every particular, but in which at the same time all lies concealed.”¹

(3) “When *individuality* is understood as *I*, as *personality*, in so far not as an *empirical I* or as a *particular personality*, especially when the personality of God is present to consciousness, then we speak of a personality which is *pure*, that is, *universal in itself*. Such a personality is an idea, and belongs to thought alone.”²

(4) “The principle of personality is universality.”³

§ 145. The interpretation of language as such which Hegel, by implication sufficiently clear, gives in the first of the foregoing passages is essentially that which is attributed to Talleyrand: namely, that language is a device for concealing thought. What I mean, I cannot say; what I say is not what I mean. To be sure, Hegel applies this interpretation to language so far only as it strives to say the individual; every word, like “*I*,” is “only a universal” — says the universal alone. This notion of language, as incapable of expressing anything but the pure universal, follows necessarily from the Aristotelian Paradox, and is but one more illustration of the fact that Hegelianism is

¹ Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 47, 48; cf. 37.

² *Ibid.* VI. 129.

³ “Was dem Sklaven fehlt, das ist die Anerkennung seiner Persönlichkeit; das Princip der Persönlichkeit aber ist die Allgemeinheit.” (*Ibid.* VI. 322.)

modernized Aristotelianism. For, if the $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$, or the single thing as such, is neither real nor intelligible except through its $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \epsilon\nu\acute{o}\nu$, or the pure universal which is inherent in it, — if the individual as such, $\tau\acute{o}\ \kappa\alpha\theta'\ \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$, is inconceivable, and only the universal, $\tau\acute{o}\ \kappa\alpha\theta\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\nu$, can be conceived, — it follows of course that the word, as expression of the concept, can express nothing but the universal. Hegel, therefore, is entirely consistent with himself and his master in his view that language cannot be so used as to say the individual — to say “I” in any other than a strictly universal sense.

But, on the other hand, this view is untenable because it belies the nature and contradicts the facts of language itself. *The pure universal, the universal without any units, cannot be thought, and for that reason cannot be said.* If any one thinks he thinks it, it is only in virtue of unsuspected empirical elements. In proof of this statement, we cite Hegel himself as an unwilling witness. The *reiner Begriff*, in its highest form as the Absolute Spirit, has just been shown to be the equation of “I” as *Universality* with “I” as *Individuality*; that is, the equation of the pure universal as “pure continuity,” or the Pure One, with its pure individuals as “absolute discontinuity,” or the Pure Many. But the Pure One, equated with the Pure Many as their infinite “Totality,”¹ is of necessity the Pure Many as the Totality of Many Finite Ones, or pure individuals ($\delta\mu\omicron\iota\alpha$, $\alpha\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\phi\omicron\rho\alpha$). “Pure individuality,” however, has been proved to be neither more nor less than the empty arithmetical unity of $\tau\acute{o}\ \alpha\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{\omega}\ \epsilon\nu$; and this arithmetical unity, be it never so empty, has been proved to be neither more nor less than *empirical individuality*. (§ 140.) Of two things, therefore, one is necessarily true: (1) if the “ $I = I$ ” is really pure from all individuality, as it must be if it is “pure,” it becomes “ $0 = 0$ ”; the I itself disappears in identity without difference, the universal without

¹ Encyklopädie, Werke, VI. 315: “Der Begriff ist das Freie . . . und ist Totalität . . .”

any units, which is unreal, unthinkable, and for that reason unspeakable; and, when I say "I," I *say nothing at all*; or, (2) if the " $I=I$ " contains any individuality whatever, even in the form of the empty arithmetical unity, then, when I say "I," I *say the individual as well as the universal*. In either case, Hegel's view is utterly untenable. If it is true that "*I* is only a universal," the word means nothing and says nothing; but, if *I* is a unit-universal, then the word says what it means and means what it says.

It avails nothing to urge the shallow truism that *I* is a word of universal application,—that "everybody is that which I say : *I, this individual I.*" Words are universal representatives, but what they represent in any given instance is the *meaning intended* or the *meaning understood* (speaker and hearer are the factors in all speech). They can represent nothing else. Every word is a unit-universal, a universal symbol applied to a particular case, a saying of "something," which is itself of necessity a unit-universal; every word, therefore, both means and utters the particularity as well as the universality. It must say "something" or "nothing." Otherwise speech would cease to be speech, and all communication of meanings would become impossible. Hegel's reasoning here is sophistical to the last degree. What *I* says is determined, not alone by the universality of its application as a mere word, but equally by the individuality of the speaker who applies it to himself and himself alone; it must and does mean and say *him*, and *no other*. This necessity of determining it by *individuality of application* as well as by *universality of applicability* constitutes the very possibility of language as such; without it, nothing whatever is said or could be said.

It is absolutely untrue, then, that "*I* is only a universal," and the untruth is apparent in a test case. If the statement were true, it would follow that, since "the *I* is the We and the We is the *I*," all *I*'s are one and the same, in-

distinguishable as one and the same pure universal; all difference between one I and another I, even empty numerical difference, vanishes absolutely in this universality, if it is indeed pure. Consequently, the relation between speaker and hearer, if thought, must be that of absolute identity, and, if said, will become the judgment, "I am You." But nothing could be clearer to either of them than that this is a false judgment, and that the only true judgment is, "I am *not* You." That *not* is the absolute disproof that "*I* is only a universal" — absolute proof that "I" and "You" are not only *each* a unit-universal in itself, but also, taken together, *two* unit-universals which cannot be identified as indistinguishably *one*. That is what the true judgment *means*, and that is what it *says*. Hegel's assertion, therefore, that I may mean the individual, but must say the universal only, falls to the ground — goes to wreck in that *not*. I can say neither the pure universal nor the pure individual: I can only mean, and I can only say, the unit-universal.

§ 146. When, in the second passage translated above, Hegel says that, "when I say *I*, I mean myself as this individual and completely determined person," the statement is unexceptionably true. But, when he adds, "yet in fact I express nothing particular about myself," the addition is wholly untrue; for what I express is my own particularity, as an absolutely unique person, and nothing could be more particular than that. If Hegel's notion of personality as the pure " $I = I$," the pure self-consciousness stripped of all empirical conscious states, were true to the fact, his addition would be true, too. But, if the notion of personality as "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We," is true to the fact (§ 59), his addition is completely untrue; for each of my conscious states is particular and unique in my whole consciousness, and I myself am particular and unique as one, and no other one, in the We. To "pure thought" as the Hegelian concept-philosophy, "*I* is the pure being-

for-self in which every particular is negated and cancelled — that ultimate, simple, and pure element of consciousness;” which is nothing but a Pure It. But to scientific thought as knowledge of the real world in history, and so in the history of philosophy, *I* is the unduplicated self-conscious being of *my real person*, not for myself alone (immanent end), but just as much for the common being of all in the organism of persons as the human race (existent end); which is a Real I in a Real We. It is enough to contrast the two notions in outline, and leave them so for the present.

§ 147. In the third and fourth extracts above, Hegel indicates with precision his conception of personality, freely and more fully restated as follows:—

1. Individuality as such is simple singleness, the empty arithmetical unity with no empirical determinations, the numerically one continent of the universal essence as *species* with no content of individual difference as *specimen* (τὸδε τι as only τὸ ἀριθμῶ ἐν), pure specific essence with no reific essence, the pure one which is also pure universal.

2. Individuality as *I* is the single personality, not as the empirical I with its merely perceptive content, the “succession of perceptions” which is its “particular” or “absolutely accidental side,” but rather as the pure I with its conceptual content of “ $I = I$,” the specific essence as indifferently I or We, the pure arithmetical unit of self-consciousness as such. Personality is single but pure, the pure one which is in itself pure universal.

3. Such a pure personality is that of God, the Absolute One which is the Absolute Universal, the “ $I = I$ ” as “Universality = Individuality,” the “absolute Spirit” which is the “relation” of mutual recognition, mutual opposition, and mutual reconciliation of these two I’s in the “reconciling Yes.” But it is real only as an idea (*Gedanke*), and has no existence except in thought.

4. The principle of personality is universality — that is, universality which admits no other individuality than

empty arithmetical unity, the *pure one* which is in itself the *pure universal* (1) as pure individuals in "absolute discontinuity" of the universal essence, and (2) as unity of all the pure individuals in "unbroken continuity" of the universal essence. (How the many pure individuals of the "absolute discontinuity" can become the one pure universal of the "unbroken continuity" without sacrificing their empty arithmetical unity remains unexplained.)

This is Hegel's best endeavor to conceive "pure personality" — personality which shall be "perfectly universal," "the universal in which there is abstraction from every particular, but in which at the same time all lies concealed," "the pure being-for-self in which every particular is negated and annulled — that ultimate, simple, and pure element of consciousness." But this best endeavor was from the first a foreordained failure, not from any lack of subtilty or speculative genius in Hegel, but from the intrinsic impossibility of thinking the absolutely self-contradictory and conceiving the inconceivable. He wants to conceive a universal in which there shall be *no particulars*, yet in which there shall be pure numerical units as *pure particularity*; whereas all units *qua* units are impure (empirical) and themselves particulars, and particularity as such is synonymous with impurity. He wants to conceive a universal in which "unbroken continuity," as pure universality, shall be equated with "absolute discontinuity," as pure individuality; that is, in which no-particulars shall be equated with all-particulars, no-individuals with all-individuals. He wants, in short, to conceive a pure universal which yet shall not be a pure universal, and the result is, not a pure concept, but no concept at all. For his " $I = I$ " is construed as "pure universality = pure individuality," *i. e.* "pure identity = pure difference," or "identity without difference = difference without identity," which is an irremediable self-contradiction and a speculative absurdity. If it had been construed as "universality in individuality = individuality in universality,"

i. e. "identity in difference = difference in identity," it would have expressed at least the possibility of considering the *real unit-universal* in its twofold aspect, (1) in the aspect of its universality as a rational whole of seriated and empirically known self-conscious states, and (2) in the aspect of its individuality or unity as one of the We; but this would have been the expression, not at all of the impossible *Pure I*, but of the *Real* or *Rational-Empirical I* (§§ 60-71) — recognition, therefore, of the necessary truth that the empirical consciousness and the rational self-consciousness reciprocally condition each other, and that neither one nor the other can either be or be thought alone. But this recognition would have been recognition of the absolute impossibility of "absolute idealism" as *reines Denken*.

It is no escape from this self-contradiction in Hegel's outcome, as the equation of universality with individuality in the pure universal as Absolute Spirit, to plead that, in the "pure individuality," all the individuals or particulars as such are annulled (*aufgehoben*), and that the "pure individuality" is retained solely as an absorbed result. For individuality or particularity, however pure, is nothing but the *specific common essence of individuals or particulars as such*, inseparable from them as they are inseparable from it; whence it follows that, if the individuals or particulars are annulled, the individuality or the particularity must be annulled with them — cannot be retained without them, just as the idea of motion cannot be retained without the idea of that which moves. But to annul the individuality would destroy one member of the " $I=I$," and so break up the whole *Begriff* in "pure thought" itself. In order to avoid this, Hegel has no option but to retain the "pure individuality" as a member of his equation, and therewith the individuals or particulars, as at least pure arithmetical units. But he takes his revenge upon them for this obstinate intrusion by identifying them as a mass with "the Evil," while the "pure universality"

he identifies with "Duty" or the Good. There is immense significance in this. For he thus buries ethical dualism in the very heart of his "pure personality," irreconcilable discord in the "personality of God," even if this has no existence, as he says, except in thought; and his *Geister*, his *beide Ich*, whose two concurrent *Yeses*, as a mere treaty, constitute the "reconciling *Yes*" which, even in thought, is the only existence of the Two I's as One I (*Daseyn des zur Zweiheit ausgedehnten Ichs*), would be most fittingly named as Ormuzd and Ahriman, if not as Jehovah and Satan.¹

§ 148. This ethical dualism in the "personality of God," however, would possess more significance than it does, if it were not so evidently formal rather than ethical, mathematical rather than spiritual. For it reduces Good and Evil themselves to mere relations of pure number,—to empty arithmetical unity ("unbroken continuity") as related to empty arithmetical multiplicity ("absolute discontinuity") in an impersonal It, as their mere "relation" of equality, recognition, opposition, and reconciliation. Hegel's "pure personality" thus reduces itself to absolute impersonality. It consists in excluding from real personality as it is experienced ("I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We") every element which is derived from experience,—every element, therefore, which involves conduct or the laws of conduct, the essence of all real ethics. It is nothing but abstraction carried to the last limit of attenuation, to the very verge of absolute nothingness, since its only content is the absolutely barren tautology, "I = I." If Good and Evil, moreover, when

¹ It is, of course, not difficult to discern in Hegel's notion of "pure personality" as One I in Two I's an obscure allusion to the doctrine of the Trinity—"universality" as the Father, "individuality" as the Son, and the "reconciling Yes" as the Holy Spirit. But the identification of "individuality" with "the Evil" reduces the whole notion to utter confusion and chaos. "Nur die Dreieinigkeit ist also die Bestimmung Gottes als Geist, Geist ist ohne diese Bestimmung ein leeres Wort." (*Philosophie der Religion*, Werke, XI. 22.)

identified respectively with "pure universality" and "pure individuality," had any positive ethical significance whatever, such an identification would give them nothing but a false significance; for ethical good and evil concern the Real I alone, into which, as unit-universal, both universality and individuality enter as constitutive factors, and by which, as real person in the organism of persons, good and evil must be found in practical truth or untruth to the organic-personal constitution of the We.

So far as Hegel's "pure personality" is concerned, then, its "pure universality" and "pure individuality," by his own account, possess only mathematical significance, and his "Good" and "Evil" are (in this connection) words without ethical or spiritual meaning of any sort. But in another aspect they possess a profound philosophical significance quite unintended by Hegel himself. His effort to eliminate all empirical elements from the I as "pure personality," and his supposition that he has done this by reducing empirical individuality to the empty arithmetical unity of "pure individuality" as one of the three essential moments of the Pure Notion of the Absolute Spirit, when in truth this "pure individuality" is itself unsuspected empirical individuality to the very last, reveal the utter impossibility of "pure thought" *as such*. The Hegelian Paradox is founded on the Aristotelian Paradox, and this is founded on the assumed impossibility of knowing the individual difference — on the principle, therefore, of the absolute conceptual indifference of species and specimen. Hegel's application of this principle to the Absolute Spirit as the absolute conceptual indifference of the I and the We, or their absolute indistinguishableness, renders impossible any rational transition from the one to the other, any rational comprehension of either, any true idea of Man, of Nature, of God. This total defeat of philosophy as *Begriffsphilosophie* or *reines Denken* lay in the essential nature of its aim, not in any defect of genius in its great advocates and formulators; it lay in the very attempt to separate

reason and experience, instead of recognizing their necessary identity in difference; and its remedy lies in the law of unit-universals as rational reform of the Aristotelian and Hegelian Paradoxes. The advent of Darwinism was the passing of the Greek-German concept-philosophy and the Hegelianism which was its splendid culmination.

END OF VOL. I.

